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DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN NATIONS

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES
CONCERNING
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
LATIN-AMERICAN NATIONS

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
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814	Richard Rush, U. S. Minister to Great Britain	George Canning, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain	March 5, 1824	1523 —
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868	James Smith Wilcocks, subsequently U. S. Consul at Mexico City	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Oct. 25, 1821	1599
869	José Manuel Herrera, Sec. of State of Mexico	Same	Nov. 30, 1821	1614
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871	Iturbide	Letter of credence to José Manuel Zozaya, Mexican Minister to the U. S.	Sept. 25, 1822	1616
872	José Manuel Zozaya, Mexican Minister to the U. S.	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	April 4, 1823 [?]	1617
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877	Same	Same	March 29, 1824	1620
878	Same	Same	Oct. 20, 1824	1621
879	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	April 8, 1825	1621
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885	Same	Same	June 15, 1825	1626
886	Lucas Alamán, Sec. of State of Mexico	Joel Roberts Poinsett, U. S. Minister to Mexico	Aug. 16, 1825	1628
887	Joel Roberts Poinsett, U. S. Minister to Mexico	Lucas Alamán, Sec. of State of Mexico	Aug. 17, 1825	1629
888	Same	Henry Clay, Sec of State	Same	1630
889	Same	Same	Aug. 21, 1825	1631
890	Same	Same	Sept. 22, 1825	1632
891	Same	Same	Sept. 24, 1825	1633
892	Same	Rufus King, U. S. Minister to Great Britain	Oct. 10, 1825	1634
893	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Oct. 12, 1825	1636
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895	Guadalupe Victoria, President of Mexico	John Quincy Adams, President of the U. S.	Transmitted Nov. 1, 1825	1641
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900	Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the U. S.	Same	Jan. 4, 1826	1645
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902	Joel Roberts Poinsett, U. S. Minister to Mexico	Sebastián Camacho, Sec. of State of Mexico	Jan. 14, 1826	1647
903	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Jan. 14, 1826	1649
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910	Same	Same	May 6, 1826	1657
911	Same	Same	Nov. 15, 1826	1658
912	Same	Same	March 28, 1827	1659
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914	Same	Same	June 16, 1827	1661
915	Same	Same	June 20, 1827	1662
916	Same	Same	July 8, 1827	1662
917	Same	Same	April 24, 1828	1668
918	Same	Same	Oct. 28, 1828	1669
919	Same	Same	Nov. 5, 1828	1670
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928	José María de Bocanegra, Sec. of State of Mexico	Joel Roberts Poinsett, U. S. Minister to Mexico	Same	1702
929	Joel Roberts Poinsett, U. S. Minister to Mexico	Martin Van Buren, Sec. of State	Oct. 2, 1829	1704
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944	Act of Independence of Peru		July 15, 1821	1729
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971	John B. Prevost, U. S. Special Agent to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile	Same	Nov. 9, 1824	1771
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987	Same	Same	April 25, 1826	1788
988	Same	Same	May 6, 1826	1791
989	Same	Same	May 17, 1826	1792
990	Same	Same	June 11, 1826	1798
991	Same	Same	July 5, 1826	1799
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1019	Baron de Tuyll, Rus- sian Minister to the U. S.	Same	Oct. 4/16, 1823	1868
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1021	Same	Same	Feb. 7/19, 1825	1869
1022	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	April 7/13, 1825	1870
1023	Same	Count Nesselrode, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia	July 2/14, 1825	1873
1024	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	July 15/27, 1825	1874
1025	Count Nesselrode, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia	Henry Middleton, U. S. Minister to Russia	Aug. 20, 1825	1875
1026	Henry Middleton, U. S. Minister to Russia	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Aug. 27/Sept. 8, 1825	1877
1027	Same	Same	Same	1877
1028	Same	Same	Sept. 18/30, 1825	1878
1029	Same	Count Nesselrode, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia	Feb. 27/March 11, 1826	1879
1030	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Feb. 28/March 12, 1826	1881
1031	Same	Same	July 18/30, 1826	1881
1032	Same	Count Nesselrode, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia	Aug. 30, 1826	1883

PART XII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM RUSSIA (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1033	Henry Middleton, U. S. Minister to Russia	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Sept. 5/17, 1826	1884
1034	Same	Same	Sept. 8/20, 1826	1885
1035	Baron de Maltitz, Chargé d'Affaires of Russia at Wash- ington	Same	Nov. 18/30, 1826	1886

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1036	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	James Monroe, Sec. of State	Sept. 5, 1815	1891
1037	Same	Same	Dec. 30, 1815	1891
1038	Same	Same	Jan. 2, 1816	1895
1039	Same	Same	Feb. 22, 1816	1897
1040	Same	Same	March 2, 1816	1904
1041	Same	Same	March 25, 1816	1905
1042	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Pedro Cevallos, First Minister of State of Spain	Sept. 26, 1816	1907
1043	Pedro Cevallos, First Minister of State of Spain	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Oct. 17, 1816	1908
1044	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Pedro Cevallos, First Minister of State of Spain	Oct. 25, 1816	1909
1045	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	James Monroe, Sec. of State	Oct. 26, 1816	1909
1046	Same	Same	Jan. 2, 1817	1910
1047	Same	Same	Jan. 15, 1817	1913
1048	Same	Same	Jan. 16, 1817	1914
1049	Same	Same	Same	1914
1050	Same	Same	Feb. 10, 1817	1915
1051	Same	Same	Feb. 11, 1817	1917
1052	Same	Same	Feb. 12, 1817	1918
1053	Same	Same	Feb. 22, 1817	1919
1054	Same	Same	Feb. 28, 1817	1919

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1055	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	March 10, 1817	1920
1056	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Richard Rush, Acting Sec. of State	March 11, 1817	1920
1057	Same	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	March 15, 1817	1922
1058	Same	Same	March 26, 1817	1923
1059	Same	Same	Same	1924
1060	Same	Richard Rush, Acting Sec. of State	March 29, 1817	1925
1061	Same	Same	April 4, 1817	1927
1062	Same	Same	April 5, 1817	1929
1063	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	April 6, 1817	1930
1064	Same	Same	Same	1932
1065	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to U. S.	Acting Sec. of State	April 18, 1817	1934
1066	Same	Richard Rush, Acting Sec. of State	April 19, 1817	1935
1067	Same	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	July 9, 1817	1942
1068	José Pizarro, First Sec. of State of Spain	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Aug. 17, 1817	1944
1069	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	José Pizarro, First Sec. of State of Spain	Aug. 19, 1817	1945
1070	Same	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Aug. 27, 1817	1946
1071	Same	Same	Same	1948
1072	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	Sept. 2, 1817	1949
1073	Same	Same	Sept. 19, 1817	1950
1074	Same	Same	Nov. 2, 1817	1951
1075	Same	Same	Same	1953
1076	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	Jan. 10, 1818	1957
1077	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	Jan. 24, 1818	1959
1078	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Feb. 10, 1818	1961
1079	Same	Same	Feb. 26, 1818	1962
1080	Same	Same	March 1, 1818	1963

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1081	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	May 7, 1818	1966
1082	Same	Same	June 9, 1818	1967
1083	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	June 11, 1818	1969
1084	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	July 27, 1818	1971
1085	Same	Same	July 28, 1818	1975
1086	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	Aug. 9, 1818	1977
1087	Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	Oct. 24, 1818	1979
1088	Same	Same	Nov. 16, 1818	1980
1089	Same	Same	Dec. 12, 1818	1984
1090	George W. Erving, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	Jan. 4, 1819	1984
1091	Same	Same	Feb. 11, 1819	1985
1092	John Forsyth, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	Aug. 22, 1819	1986
1093	Same	Same	Same	1987
1094	Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	April 14, 1820	1988
1095	Same	Same	April 19, 1820	1990
1096	Same	Same	April 24, 1820	1990
1097	Same	Same	May 5, 1820	1992
1098	Same	Same	May 9, 1820	1994
1099	John Forsyth, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	June 29, 1820	1995
1100	Same	Same	July 13, 1820	1996
1101	Thomas L. L. Brent, Chargé d'Affaires <i>ad interim</i> of the U. S. at Madrid	Same	July 10, 1821	2000
1102	John Forsyth, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	Sept. 19, 1821	2005
1103	Same	Same	Dec. 17, 1821	2006
1104	Same	Same	Feb. 14, 1822	2006
1105	Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	March 9, 1822	2009

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1106	John Forsyth, U. S. Minister to Spain	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	March 21, 1822	2011
1107	Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	April 11, 1822	2012
1108	Same	Same	April 24, 1822	2012
1109	John Forsyth, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	May 2, 1822	2013
1110	Same	Same	May 20, 1822	2014
1111	Same	Same	June 23, 1822	2016
1112	Same	Same	June 28, 1822	2022
1113	Same	Same	July 18, 1822	2022
1114	Same	Same	Aug. 26, 1822	2023
1115	Same	Same	Oct. 31, 1822	2024
1116	Same	Same	Nov. 20, 1822	2025
1117	Same	Same	Dec. 13, 1822	2028
1118	Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	Dec. 14, 1822	2028
1119	John Forsyth, U. S. Minister to Spain	Same	Jan. 10, 1823	2030
1120	Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the U. S.	Same	March 6, 1823	2031
1121	Same	Same	March 7, 1823	2032
1122	John J. Appleton, Chargé d'Affaires <i>ad interim</i> of the U. S. at Madrid	Same	March 20, 1823	2035
1123	Same	Same	July 9, 1823	2038
1124	John J. Appleton, Chargé d'Affaires <i>ad interim</i> at Madrid	Same	Aug. 6, 1823	2040
1125	William à Court, British Minister to Spain	Conversation with John J. Appleton, U. S. Chargé d'Affaires <i>ad interim</i> at Madrid	Dec. 7, 1823	2044
1126	Hugh Nelson, U. S. Minister to Spain	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Dec. 18, 1823	2046
1127	Same	Same	June 18, 1824	2047
1128	Same	Same	July 15, 1824	2048
1129	Francisco Hilario de Rivas y Salmon, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of Spain at Washington	Daniel Brent, Acting Sec. of State	Sept. 29, 1824	2049

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1130	Hugh Nelson, U. S. Minister to Spain	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Oct. 17, 1824	2054
1131	Same	Same	Nov. 22, 1824	2055
1132	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Aug. 12, 1825	2056
1133	Same	Same	Sept. 8, 1825	2058
1134	Same	Same	Sept. 25, 1825	2059
1135	Same	Francisco de Zea Bermudez, First Sec. of State of Spain	Oct. 10, 1825	2063
1136	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Oct. 16, 1825	2065
1137	Same	Same	Oct. 20, 1825	2066
1138	Same	Same	Nov. 21, 1825	2071
1139	Same	Same	Dec. 12, 1825	2072
1140	Same	Same	Jan. 1, 1826	2073
1141	Same	Duke del Infantado, First Sec. of State of Spain	Jan. 20, 1826	2075
1142	Same	Same	Jan. 26, 1826	2096
1143	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Jan. 27, 1826	2097
1144	Same	Same	Feb. 3, 1826	2100
1145	Same	Same	Feb. 8, 1826	2100
1146	Same	Same	Feb. 13, 1826	2103
1147	Duke del Infantado, First Sec. of State of Spain	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Feb. 14, 1826	2107
1148	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Feb. 24, 1826	2107
1149	Same	Same	March 13, 1826	2111
1150	Same	Same	April 5, 1826	2114
1151	Same	Same	May 20, 1826	2118
1152	Same	Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain	Same	2119
1153	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	June 2, 1826	2120
1154	Same	Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain	June 7, 1826	2127
1155	Same	Same	June 8, 1826	2127

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1156	Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	June 8, 1826	2128
1157	Same	Same	June 9, 1826	2128
1158	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Same	2129
1159	Same	Duke del Infantado, First Sec. of State of Spain	June 10, 1826	2130
1160	Same	Marquis de Moustiers, French Ambassador to Spain	June 12, 1826	2131
1161	Same	Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain	Same	2132
1162	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	June 25, 1826	2132
1163	Duke del Infantado, First Sec. of State of Spain	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	July 8, 1826	2134
1164	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	July 13, 1826	2134
1165	Same	Same	Sept. 1, 1826	2135
1166	Same	Same	Nov. 7, 1826	2137
1167	Same	Same	Jan. 7, 1827	2139
1168	Same	Same	March 31, 1827	2140
1169	Same	Same	April 7, 1827	2141
1170	Same	Same	April 19, 1827	2142
1171	Same	Same	June 9, 1827	2143
1172	Same	Same	Aug. 17, 1827	2146
1173	Same	Same	Nov. 8, 1827	2148
1174	Same	Same	Dec. 12, 1827	2149
1175	Same	Same	April 4, 1828	2152
1176	Same	Same	April 29, 1828	2157
1177	Manuel Gonzalez Sal- mon, First Sec. of State of Spain	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	April, 1828	2158
1178	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Manuel Gonzalez Salmon, First Sec. of State of Spain	April 30, 1828	2159
1179	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	May 1, 1828	2160
1180	Same	Same	June 23, 1828	2161

PART XIII.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN (*Continued*)

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1181	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	Manuel Gonzalez Salmon, First Sec. of State of Spain	Dec. 15, 1828	2162
1182	Same	F. M. de Madrid, Colom- bian Minister to Great Britain	Dec. 30, 1828	2163
1183	Same	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Jan. 10, 1829	2169

PART XIV.—COMMUNICATIONS FROM URUGUAY

Doc. No.	From	To	Date	Page
1184	General José Artigas, revolutionary leader of Uruguay	President James Monroe	Sept. 1, 1817	2175
1185	W. G. Miller, U. S. Consul at Montevideo	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	April 17, 1821	2175
1186	Same	Same	April 18, 1821	2176
1187	Same	Same	July 13, 1821	2177
1188	W. G. Miller, U. S. Consul at Montevideo	Same	July 20, 1821	2183
1189	Same	Same	Sept. 14, 1821	2184
1190	Joshua Bond, U. S. Consul at Montevideo	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Feb. 20, 1829	2186
1191	Same	Martin Van Buren, Sec. of State	Nov. 20, 1830	2188

NOTE

The idiosyncrasies of spelling, punctuation, capitalization and grammar of the original manuscript stand uncorrected in this print, except in case of manifest and inadvertent error, where the correction could in nowise affect the sense.

PART VIII

COMMUNICATIONS FROM GREAT BRITAIN

COMMUNICATIONS FROM GREAT BRITAIN

755

*John Spear Smith, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at London, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *October 22, 1811.*

Mr. Stuart, Mr. Morrier [Morier?] & Captain Cockburn are the persons appointed by the Prince Regent, for the purpose of reconciling the Spanish Colonies in South America, to the Mother Country.

I have the honour [etc.].

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*Jonathan Russell, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at London, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *January 14, 1812.*

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 27th of Nov^r. last.³ . . .

I shall endeavour to perform the trust committed to me relative to the independence of the Provinces of Venezuela in a manner calculated to accomplish the wishes of those provinces & the United States without compromising the pacific relations of the latter with other powers. I feel it however to be in the existing state of things a delicate undertaking & should I defer it until I have a more accurate knowledge of the spirit which prevails here in relation to those Provinces I hope the delay will be approved by the President.

I have the honour [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XVII. John Spear Smith left in charge of legation in Great Britain from May 7, 1811, to November 15, 1811.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XVIII.

³ See above, pt. 1, doc. 12, Monroe to Barlow, November 27, 1811, a copy of which also went to the legation in London.

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*Jonathan Russell, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at London, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, February 3, 1812.

The persons appointed here as mediators between Spain & her colonies will, I am well informed, immediately proceed to the execution of their trust. Cap^t. Coburn probably leaves England this day for Lisbon with Mr. Benham on board who goes thither to replace Mr. Stuart. Cap^t. Coburn² will thence proceed with Mr. Stuart to join Mr. Morier. The object of this mission as far as I can learn is to persuade the Spanish colonies to aid the mother country in her present struggle and to promise them new privileges *immediately*—and even to flatter them with independence when this conflict is over. Much good is not indeed sanguinely expected from this interference but it appears generally to be admitted that the efforts of old Spain will cease the moment she is cut off from the resources of the new world. England will no doubt endeavour to draw from those provinces all the supplies which she possibly can for the aid of her ally during the war & to secure for herself the monopoly of their commerce afterwards. If we go to war with England these projects may not be unworthy of attention as we shall have ample means to render them abortive.

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*John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, January 22, 1816.

On the 14th I wrote a Note to Lord Castlereagh, requesting an interview with him. On the 18th I received his answer, appointing the 25th to meet me, and apologizing for the delay, on account of his being detained in the country. The Ratification by the President, of the Commercial Convention, was received here on the 17th and was published in the Newspapers of the next day, together with the speech of the Chevalier Onis, upon his reception by the President. It is to be hoped that the restoration of the ordinary Diplomatic Relations, between the United States and Spain, will be followed

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XVIII.

² Cockburn? See above pt. VIII, doc. 755.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XX.

by a more conciliatory policy on the part of the latter Power, than she has hitherto pursued. The internal administration of Spain has given so much disgust to the public feeling of Europe, and particularly of this Country, that the British Cabinet itself has in some sort partaken of it. The National Sentiment in England is likewise strong in favour of the South Americans; and the prevailing opinion is that their Independence would be highly advantageous to the interests of this Country. A different and directly opposite sentiment is entertained by the Government. Their Disposition is decided against the South Americans; but by a political obliquity, not without example, it is not so unequivocally, in favour of the mother country.

In the year 1776, that wise and honest Minister, Mr. Turgot, reported to the King of France, that it was for the interest of his kingdom, that the insurrection in North America should be suppressed; because the Insurgents when subdued, would still be such turbulent and mutinous subjects, that it would employ all the force of Great Britain to keep them down; and her weakness would make her a peaceable, or at least a harmless neighbour. In the month of February 1778, France concluded a Treaty of Commerce, and an eventual Treaty of Alliance, with the United States, because they were *de facto* Independent. In the interval between those two periods, France was wavering, and temporizing—With one hand seizing American privateers in her Ports, and with the other sending supplies of arms and ammunition to America. This is precisely the present situation of Great Britain towards Spain. The Cabinet have many other reasons, besides that of Mr. Turgot, to secure the good neighbourhood of impotence, for wishing that the Insurrection should be suppressed. 1. They have a deep-rooted and inveterate prejudice, fortified by all the painful recollections of their own unfortunate contest, against any revolution by which Colonies are emancipated and become Independent States. 2. They have a forcible *moral* impression, like that of their antipathy to the Slave Trade, that it is *wrong*, to assist or encourage Colonies in the attempt to throw off the yoke of their mother Country. 3. They dread the influence of example, and always remember how many Colonies they themselves still possess. 4. They fear the consequences of South American Independence upon the whole system of European Colonial Policy. Their attachment to this has been amply displayed, in their anxious and persevering efforts to draw the Braganza family back to Lisbon; efforts, well known to you; and which will probably yet be successful. 5. The mystic Virtues of Legitimacy. It is impossible to write with proper gravity upon this subject. But it has no small operation against the South American Independents. 6. And last but not least, they look with no propitious eye to the relations which will naturally arise between Independent Governments on the two American Continents. They foresee less direct advantage to themselves, from a free commercial intercourse with South America, than indirect injury, by its

tendency to promote the interests of the United States—Perhaps they think a period may arise when one of the parties to their struggle, will offer exclusive advantages and privileges to them as the price of their assistance. Hitherto they have professed to be neutral, and at one time offered their mediation between the parties—But they have assisted Ferdinand at least with money; without which, Morillo's armament never could have sailed from Cadiz, and they have suffered all sorts of supplies to be sent to the insurgents, from Jamaica. For, as, notwithstanding their inclinations, they are aware the South Americans may ultimately prove *de facto* Independent, they hold themselves ready to take advantage of the proper moment to acknowledge them, if it should occur. This is one of the points upon which the Opposition are continually urging the Ministry, but hitherto without effect.

Should the United States be involved in a War with Spain, whether by acknowledging the South Americans, or from any other cause, we may take it for granted that all the propensities of the British Government will be against us. Those of the Nation will be so, perhaps in equal degree; for we must not disguise to ourselves that the national feeling against the United States is more strong and more universal than it ever has been. The State of Peace instead of being attended by general prosperity is found only to have aggravated the burdens of taxation which press upon the Country. There is considerable distress weighing chiefly upon the landed interest, although the accounts which you will see of it, are excessively exaggerated. Enough however is felt to prompt a strong wish for a new War, in a great portion of the community; and there is no Nation with which a War would be so popular as with America. But I have no hesitation in stating my conviction that the present policy of the Ministry towards America is more pacific than that of the Nation. They are aware of the responsibility which such a War would bring upon them, and are not at this time prepared to encounter it. Of the cession of Florida, I have not lately heard, but I think there is no considerable armed force prepared or preparing to be sent there either from England or Ireland. The Navy, as I have informed you, is reduced to a Peace Establishment unusually small, and even the ships that are recommissioned cannot be manned, without bounties and impressment. There is a Col^l. Stapleton, Secretary to the Commissioners of the Barrack Office, going out in the frigate with Mr. Bagot. He goes to Charleston, South Carolina, as he says, on private business of his own. This is the only symptom I have yet perceived, of a large military expedition to Florida.

*John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain, to James Monroe,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LONDON, *February 8, 1816.*

The tone of struggling irritation and complacency with which this was said, induced me to observe that I did not precisely understand what he [Lord Castlereagh] intended by this advice of moderation. That the United States had no design of encroachment upon their neighbours, or of exercising any injustice towards Spain. . . . Instead of an explanation, he replied only by recurring to the British policy with regard to Spain. "You may be sure (said he) that Great Britain has no design of acquiring any addition to her possessions there. Great Britain has done every thing for Spain. We have saved, we have delivered her. We have restored her Government to her, and we had hoped the result would have proved more advantageous to herself as well as more useful to the world than it has been. We are sorry that the Event has not altogether answered our expectations. We lament the unfortunate situation of her internal circumstances; owing to which we are afraid that she can neither exercise her own faculties for the comfort and happiness of the Nation, nor avail herself of her resources for the effectual exertion of her Power. We regret this, but we have no disposition to take advantage of this state of things to obtain from it any exclusive privilege for ourselves. In the unfortunate troubles of her colonies in South America, we have not only avoided to seek, but we have declined every exclusive indulgence or privilege to ourselves. We went even so far as to offer to take upon us that most unpleasant and thankless of all offices, that of mediating between the parties to those differences. We appointed a formal mission for that purpose, who proceeded to Madrid; but there, the Court of Spain declined accepting our offer, and we have had the usual fortune of impartiality; we have displeased both parties. The Spanish Government for not taking part with them against their Colonies, and the South Americans for not countenancing their resistance." . . . I told him that the policy of the American Government towards Spain, had in this particular been the same. They had not indeed made any offer of their mediation. The state of their Relations with the Spanish Government, could neither have warranted, nor admitted of such an offer. But they have observed the same system of impartial neutrality between the parties. They have sought no peculiar, or exclusive advantage for the United States, and I was happy to hear from him that such was the policy of Great Britain; for it might have an influence upon the Views of my own Government, to co-operate with it"— "I have always, (resumed he) "avowed it to be our

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XX.

policy, in Parliament. We have never acknowledged the Governments set up by the South Americans, because that would not have comported with *our* views of neutrality. But we have not consented to prohibit the commerce of our People, with them, because that was what Spain had no right to require of us. Our plan, in offering the mediation which Spain rejected was that the South Americans should submit themselves to the Government of Spain, as Colonies, because we thought she had the right to authority over them, as the Mother Country. But that she should allow them commerce with other nations. Nothing exclusive to us. We neither asked, nor would have accepted any exclusive privileges for ourselves. We have no little, or contracted policy. But we proposed that Spain should allow a *liberal* commercial intercourse between her Colonies and other Nations, similar to that which we allow, in our Possessions in India." I then asked him what he thought would be the ultimate issue of this struggle in South America? whether Spain would subdue them, or that they would maintain their Independence? He answered, that every thing was so fluctuating in the Councils of Spain, and generally, every thing was so dependent upon Events, not to be calculated, that it was not possible to say what the result might be. The actual state of things was the only safe foundation for present Policy, which must be shaped to Events, as they may happen. . . . In closing this part of our Conversation, Lord Castlereagh desired me to consider all that he had just said with regard to Spain, the situation of her internal affairs, and the conduct of her Government, as *confidential*; it having been spoken with the most perfect freedom, and openness; and that if I should report it to my Government, I would so state it. I have therefore to request that it may be so received.

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John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States ¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, March 30, 1816.

SIR: A few days since, Mr. Del Real, residing here as a Deputy from New Grenada called upon me and enquired if I had any knowledge of the arrival at Washington of Mr. Peter Gual, in a similar capacity from that Country. I told him I had heard generally that there were at Washington, deputies from the South American Provinces, but not particularly the name of that Gentleman. Mr. Del Real said he knew of his arrival at New York; but had not heard from him at Washington. He then enquired what foundation

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XX.

there was for a rumour generally circulating here, of a rupture between the United States and Spain. I knew nothing further than had appeared in the English Newspapers. I had heard of a correspondence in December and January between the Secretary of State, and the Spanish Minister Onis, which had been communicated by the President to Congress, and the supposed substance of which had been published here. It had further been said that about the 12th of last month, Mr. Onis had left Washington, and that all communication between him and the American Government had been broken off. Later accounts equally unauthenticated, contradicted this last circumstance, but repeated that Mr. Onis had left Washington much dissatisfied. It was impossible for me to say what the real state of the Relations, between the United States and Spain were, but as to the question of Peace or War, I was persuaded it would depend upon Spain herself. If the demands of Mr. Onis, had been such as they were represented, the American Government neither would nor could comply with them—The present course of Spanish Policy was incomprehensible. If such demands were made, it could not be but with a knowledge that they must, and would be refused. In ordinary cases the very making of such demands would imply a settled determination of the Power, advancing them to follow up the refusal of them by immediate War. If such was the intention of Spain, the United States would have no alternative left, but to defend themselves. But they had no desire for a War with Spain. As to the South American Provinces struggling for their Independence, the general sentiment in the United States was certainly in their favour. But the Policy of the Government, a Policy dictated equally by their duty to their own Country, by their state of amity with Spain, and by their good-will to the South Americans themselves, was a strict and impartial neutrality between them and Spain. I said by their good-will for the South Americans themselves, because the neutrality of the United States was more advantageous to them, by securing to them the neutrality also of Great Britain, than any support which the United States could give them, by declaring in their favour, and making common cause with them, the effect of which probably would be to make Great Britain declare against both. He was aware that the popular feeling in this country was now favourable to the South Americans. More so than the dispositions of the present Ministry. They complied so far with the prevailing opinion as to observe a neutrality. But the same popular sentiment here, he knew was very strong against the North Americans; and if the United States, were openly to join the cause of South America, and consequently be engaged in a War with Spain, the British People would immediately consider them as the Principals in the contest: all their jealousies, and national antipathies would be enlisted against the common American cause, and as they are even now tormented with an uneasy hankering for War, which they think would relieve them from their embarrassments,

their Ministers would take advantage of these Passions, and engage this Nation upon the side of Spain, merely because the United States would be on the other side. He said he was perfectly convinced of the justice of these observations. I asked him if he had any knowledge of an order in Council, lately issued here, prohibiting all British subjects from supplying arms, ammunition and warlike stores to the South Americans. He said he had not. That the professed system of this Government had always been and continued to be neutrality. That they allowed a free intercourse between Jamaica and the South American Continent; and had given orders to their Admirals on the Station, not to molest the Independent flag, and had refused to deliver up vessels bearing it, which had entered their Ports. But whenever applied to for an acknowledgment of the Independent Governments, they had declined upon the ground of their engagements with Spain.

I had shortly before had some conversation upon these subjects with Count Fernan Nuñez, the Spanish Ambassador at this Court, who spoke to me, with some courteous expressions of concern, of this abrupt departure of Mr. Onis from Washington; which he said was altogether unexpected to him—though he supposed Onis could not have acted without Orders. He then referred to the points which had been mentioned in the summary published here of your correspondence with Onis. He thought the expeditions from Kentuckey and Tennessee, might justly be considered by the Spanish Government as offensive; and that after the surrender of Carthage, there was no insurgent Government and that all Vessels under its pretended flag were to be considered, and treated as Pirates— I said that I had no knowledge what the alleged expeditions from Kentuckey and Tennessee were, but was very sure they had no countenance from the Government of the United States. The President's Proclamation had on the contrary warned all the Citizens of the United States against engaging in any enterprize hostile to Spain. He said that the proceedings complained of were subsequent to the Proclamation. I replied that if any illegal combination for such a purpose had been formed at a distance from the seat of Government, it was to be considered that the Government of the United States had not the same means of immediate or of complete controul over them, as in similar cases were possessed by European Governments. They had an open Country. No barrier of fortified cities, to stop persons intending to pass the frontiers. No army, or corps of *Gensdarmes* to support and give efficacy to measures of Police; and no authority to arrest individuals, or disperse assemblages, until possessed of proof that they have committed acts, or are in the process of committing acts in violation of the Law. With these considerations, I was very sure that if any such expeditions had been undertaken, they had neither been sanctioned nor connived at by the American Government. That they would on the contrary, in the manner, and according to the forms allowed by our Constitutions be ultimately and effectually prevented, unless

this impatience and heat of Mr. Onís should precipitate the two Countries into a state of hostility which we sincerely deprecated. That as to commercial intercourse with the Independents, and the admission of their flag into our Ports, this he knew was conformable to the received usages of Nations. It was practised in this case by Great Britain, the closest ally of Spain, and no one knew better than he, that she had refused either to interdict the commerce with the insurgents to her Subjects, or to exclude their flag from her Ports. He at first nodded assent to these remarks; and I observed that if his Colleague Onís was ordered to demand his Passports for causes such as these, I should expect to hear that he Fernan Nuñez had also left this Court without taking leave, as the causes of offence to Spain were the same here, as had been alleged by him at Washington. The Count said he did not know what Onís' orders were, and in truth it was not his concern . . . but for himself, he was pretty well satisfied with what he had *lately* obtained here against the insurgents. By which I understood him to allude to the recent order in Council, which I mentioned to Mr. Del Real, but of which he had not heard. Fernan-Nuñez is a man of great softness of manners and politeness of demeanour, and throughout the whole of this conversation, preserved the most perfect good humour.

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*John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, April 30, 1816.

My letters of 22. and 31. January, and 8. February,² have given you a very full account of the execution of your Instructions of 10. December,³ and of the views of this Government, in relation to Spain and Spanish Affairs. The debates in Parliament have occasionally furnished since then further elucidations of the British Policy. At the very commencement of the Session of Parliament, Mr. Brougham made a motion in the House of Commons for an Address to the Prince Regent, requesting him to interpose in behalf of the Spanish Patriots, who are suffering under Prosecutions by the Government of Ferdinand 7. On that occasion, after a very long speech of Mr. Brougham, and an animated debate, Lord Castlereagh closed the whole by a speech equally long, the main object of which was to inculcate the Spanish

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XX.

² See above, pt. VIII, docs. 758 and 759. The letter of January 31 is not printed in this collection.

³ See above, pt. I, doc. 17.

Patriots, and to defend the proceedings of Ferdinand's Government against them, but in which he at the same time said that this Government had interposed, and were yet interposing in behalf of the Patriots. If he had mentioned this at the time when Mr. Brougham gave notice of his motion the whole debate would have been superseded, and it appears that the motive for letting the debate take its course, must have been to have the opportunity of displaying in the face of Europe, a formal defence of Ferdinand's Government. The interference in behalf of the Patriots, was thus an ostensible compliance with the strong public sentiment of this Country, while the Spanish Government easily understood, that against these representations, it might assert all its spirit of Independence without much offending the remonstrants. It does not appear that there has been any relaxation of rigour, in the treatment of the Patriots, but the *Madrid Gazette* has given the utmost publicity in Spain to Lord Castlereagh's defence of Ferdinand. Since then in other debates, notice has been taken of the commerce between this Country and South America, and of the British Subjects taken at Carthagena by Morillo. Lord Castlereagh said this Government were taking all the measures in their power, to increase the commerce with South America, and that the Spanish Government were disposed to treat the British Subjects taken at Carthagena with *indulgence*. From all this, and especially from a comparison between Lord Castlereagh's speech on Mr. Brougham's motion, and what he was nearly at the same time saying to me, concerning Spain, under an injunction of confidence, the present British policy towards that Country may be accurately ascertained.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LONDON, *March 21, 1818.*

Since my arrival here, I have not been unmindful of the interest which the government and people of the United States take in the efforts which South America is making for its emancipation; nor how desirable it hence becomes to ascertain the intentions of this cabinet, and those of the principal continental powers in relation to that contest. . . .

In the absence of other sympathies, the actual and swiftly rising power of the United States, guided as it is known to be by a policy liberal and just in international intercourse, may then open more distinctly to view; gaining

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXII.

for her government, through the medium of its appointed agents abroad, a more quick and intimate participation in the councils of kings and princes than any other considerations but such as spring from a sense of her resources, and above all her complete independence, can promise to inspire.

I hope the digression of these remarks will be pardoned. They are merely designed, if of any force, as hinting at some excuse for imparting so much less of authentic information on the affairs of South America, than I should desire to do, or than it has been my invariable aim to obtain. Should the projected congress take place, it may be affirmed, with reasonable certainty, that those affairs will engage in part its deliberations. In the meanwhile, were I to venture upon opinions, resting upon the best observation which the imperfect opportunities of a short residence have yet afforded, they would be chiefly, though not confidently, to the effect following.

And first as to England. Notwithstanding the scarcely disguised antipathies of her ministers to the principle of that struggle; notwithstanding their late majority of one hundred and seventy five on the indemnity bill, and their increased security derived from a really meliorated condition of the country in most of its internal concerns, I do not believe that the cabinet of England contemplates a departure from its hitherto substantially neutral course. The cause of the patriots has numerous and powerful friends. Any active or declared interference against it, would be denounced as a wanton crusade against human liberty. It would want all the excuses that have marked out France as the victim of foreign dictation, and besides being thought to strike at some of the solid interests of the British nation, would shock the spirit of freedom yet left in whole classes, and be likely to create and bind together the elements of an opposition, that ministers with all their power may not choose to face. As respects Russia, recent acts will best speak for themselves. Judging from the little that has been open to me on this theatre, I should infer a decided predominance of friendly feeling on her part towards old Spain. France, from the force of several motives, seems to be more inclined than the others to see the quarrel made up by free offers of the olive branch proceeding from Ferdinand. But what France thinks, under her actual circumstances, is of so little account, that I will not further hazard inaccuracy by dwelling upon her views. It is an anxiety to make even the slightest contributions on a subject which I know is regarded with deep interest by the President under all its aspects, that alone has led me as far as I have gone. Paris and St. Petersburg, the former too being now the scene of European discussions, will be the fountain of opinions far more ample and satisfactory.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, April 20, 1818.

Leaving both papers in the hands of his Lordship, [Lord Castlereagh] I next reminded him of his apparent intention to say something further on Spanish affairs at the moment of the breaking up of our last meeting. He resumed the thread. First he gave me an account more in detail than before of the manner in which their late mediation had been offered, and the grounds of rejection. This being all known at Washington need not here be repeated. He then said, speaking of the contest with the colonies and lamenting its long continuance, that Great Britain had done all in her power to cause it to be made up; but hitherto without success. That she would not wholly give over her efforts, always desiring that Spain should pursue a liberal course. He explained by saying, a course that would look largely to the commercial emancipation of the colonies. The communication which he made of chief importance was this: that Great Britain would not be instrumental to the settlement of the dispute upon terms, which, drawing to herself peculiar advantages, would exclude the U. States, or any other nation, from a just participation in the trade of South America. He hoped that the United States would continue to be actuated by the same policy. I naturally reminded him of the declaration on this point contained in the President's Message at the opening of Congress in December last.

He asked if our government had given notice beforehand to Spain, of its intention to take possession of Amelia Island; also, whether I was acquainted with its determination as to the reception of deputies from the provinces, and the character with which it designed to clothe them.

Respecting the first question, I replied, that I had no precise information. It afforded me an opportunity for the first time, which I was careful to improve, of alluding to the imperious considerations which led to that measure. Even if Spain had had no previous formal notice, I said, that not only was the government of the United States always ready to explain satisfactorily the grounds of its conduct, but had also, I was sure, made the movement under a proper sense of all the just rights and claims of that power to the territory occupied. His Lordship offered no reply. While on that part of the subject which led me to speak of the vexatious interruptions of our neighbouring commerce as one of the motives for the occupation, his manner indicated an acquiescence in its force.

The second question I thought still more pointed. It induced me to speak with some particularity on our general relations with Spain. In doing so I

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXII.

had only to recall to his recollection facts contained in the many state papers that have gone to the world. I referred especially to the leading one of January the nineteenth 1816¹ from the department of state to Mr. Onis, and to the occasion which drew it forth. In that paper was stated at large the principles upon which the United States had acted. Regarding the contest in the light of a civil war, they had, as well before as since the distinctive exposition there given of the line of their policy, observed all the corresponding duties of a fair neutrality. I went on to say, that, urged by a sincere desire to accommodate their differences in a friendly manner with Spain, and a constant reluctance to disturb the peace of the world; they had maintained this neutrality in the face of long-standing and as they conceived well-founded causes of complaint against the justice of the parent state. He neither assented to nor impugned any of my remarks. I said in conclusion, answering more directly the inquiry, that up to the time of my leaving Washington, those deputies had not been formally received, and that I was without information from my government since.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, July 25, 1818.

I now proceed to state all that passed in these interviews relative to the affairs of South America. This subject has taken a turn little anticipated; but to me it only belongs to possess the department of the declarations of Lord Castlereagh.

I endeavoured in the most ample and exact manner in my power, consistently with the spirit of a friendly communication, to fulfil the instructions of your number 4³ on the interesting points which it discusses. Explaining the views and expectations of the government of the United States I said that it was not from a mere desire to draw aside the veil of European politics that it sought information on the plans respecting Spanish America; but from the real and deep interest which it had such good reason to take in that struggle. That moreover it asked nothing which it was not willing to impart, being ready to disclose with candour and fulness its own course and intentions, as in fact it had been doing; and that especially it was the wish of the Presi-

¹ See above, pt. 1, doc. 18.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIII.

³ See above, pt. 1, doc. 56, Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818.

dent, if so allowed, to act in perfect good understanding with this government in relation to all that bore upon that great question.

To a full opening on my part, his Lordship offered the following replies.

He began by declaring not merely the willingness but the desire which the British government felt to communicate to that of the United States the whole plan of mediation which had been projected, at the instance of Spain, by the European alliance. That it most fully acknowledged our strong and natural interest in the questions; but that, in truth, there was, to this hour, no plan matured. That such difficulties had grown up with Spain touching the very fundamental points upon which a general mediation should be interposed, that no adjustment of them had taken place. That these difficulties were increased by the obstacles to a quick intercourse of counsels where some of the parties were so remote from each other as St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Madrid. That he was aware of the promise made by Mr. Bagot the latter end of January, of which I had reminded him, and which had not been kept only for the reasons mentioned, viz., an inability, prolonged much beyond any period that had been expected, to do so upon any precise or satisfactory grounds. That even the place of meeting for the mediation was not fixed. That when the sovereigns got together in the Autumn, the subject would be taken up, though not the primary one of the meeting, and efforts made to arrange it. That whenever the terms and conditions of a pacification could be settled, which still continued to rest in total uncertainty, the promise made to our government would be redeemed. His Lordship expressed himself in a way full of conciliation towards the United States, saying that the British government naturally abstained from all steps that might have brought them in as party to the mediation, from a belief that it would contradict their general wish and policy to be leagued with Europe for such an object, added to the consideration of the peculiar nature of their subsisting relations with Spain.

Here I took care distinctly to disavow for my government all desire to have the least participation in the mediation. From the turn and exigencies of the conversation I did not go on further and make known the terms upon which alone it would ever yield its concurring assent to any plan of pacification. Nothing having been said of terms on the other side, except to inform me that none whatever had been agreed upon, I thought that such a communication was not, for the present, called for. Other and more appropriate opportunities may occur to me of disclosing that the United States look to the absolute and unqualified independence of the colonies, and would embark their consent on no other basis, if indeed it has not long since been abundantly inferred that such is their fixed policy and determination.

Premising that I do not include the legations of either Russia or France among the sources of my knowledge, I have incidentally heard, in diplomatic circles, thus much touching the mediation. 1st. That as regards the

Alliance, it is the undoubted wish of one and all the potentates that a mediation must, by all means, assume as its basis a continuance of the royal government and supremacy of Spain—a delusion which seems even to survive the annihilations of Osorio's forces in Chili. Next that as regards the determinations of Ferdinand, he insists upon the following points, agreeing to the concessions which they import. 1. That he will grant an amnesty to the colonies on condition that they submit and lay down their arms. 2. That henceforth, in his royal service in America, he will, at his option, occasionally employ the natives, taking also, whenever he chooses, the European Spaniard. 3. That he will grant the colonies certain privileges of trade, which he does not define. And 4th, That in the progress of the mediation he will concur in all measures proposed by the sovereigns, provided he approves of them. Neither the indistinct, nor the ludicrous, character of these terms must be viewed as impugning their reality. I am very credibly informed that they are such as he substantially and peremptorily holds to, somewhat to the discomfiture of the deliberations of those who would stand by him.

In my interview with Lord Castlereagh on the sixteenth, he mentioned the order of this government of the eighth of June respecting those unauthorised cruisers, which, under colour of the South American flag, commit depredations upon British vessels or commerce on the high seas. It will be seen by this document, of which no other than a verbal mention was made to me but which will be found in the newspapers that go to the department, that the colonies are recognized as competent to grant lawful commissions of war. His Lordship made no comment upon the order, nor did I.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, August 3, 1818.

SIR: On the thirty first of last month I met Lord Castlereagh at the French ambassador's. It was on the occasion of a dinner given to the Prince Regent, to which the whole diplomatic corps was invited.

In the evening his Lordship took me aside to say, that he had a communication to make on the affairs of South America. That since our last conversations, the Spanish government had made new propositions, through the medium of the Spanish ambassador at this court, to the British government upon the subject of a mediation, inviting also the European alliance

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIII.

generally as parties to it. That the note from the Spanish ambassador, had been written early last month, but that the first interview with me had taken place so immediately after his own return from Ireland that he had not then seen it, and that at our second a convenient opportunity did not present itself for dwelling upon the matter which it contained. He mentioned these circumstances as explanatory of the nature of his recent communications to me, and which will of course be likewise applicable to the contents of my despatch number thirty,¹ which embodies all that had been said to me up to the period of its date. He added, that it had been his desire to seek another and early interview specially upon this topic to which end he invited me to come to his house on the following day at eleven in the morning.

I went accordingly. Premising that what he was about to impart was to be considered as confidential, he proceeded without further remark to put into my hands a copy of the note itself from the Spanish ambassador, which I read. It bears date on the third of July. Next he furnished me with a copy of the answer of this government dated in July, which I also read. Thirdly, as coupling itself with the subject, he likewise offered to my perusal the paper drawn up by this government on the twenty eighth of August 1817 addressed not to Spain, but to the other powers of Europe, and containing the sentiments of the British court at that epoch, of the nature of which Spain was made acquainted through the channel of the British embassy at Madrid.

If the knowledge of all that these several papers embrace was to be communicated to the department through me alone, I should anxiously strive to go through the task; but I am happy to subjoin, that his Lordship stated it to be his intention, in compliance with former declarations, to transmit them at once to Mr. Bagot with instructions to lay their contents fully and unreservedly before our government. It is therefore unnecessary that I should run the risk of inaccuracy by attempting to detail them, minutely, after but a single perusal in quick succession; yet, knowing the anxiety of the President upon this interesting subject, and in the possible hope of anticipating the arrival of his Lordship's despatches to Mr. Bagot, I will make known, for the President's early information, the most material and prominent points.

As respects the paper of the twenty eighth of last August, I need say nothing. Such of its matter as is not superseded by lapse of time, is recapitulated in the late note from this government of which I shall have occasion to speak. It may be sufficient to remark, that the attempt at mediation went off at that time on the point of the slave trade, Great Britain insisting on its cessation, for an agreement to which Spain was not then ripe.

The note from the Spanish ambassador of July the third, solicits in the

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 764, Rush to Adams, July 25, 1818.

most formal manner the mediation of this court. Its introductory remarks dwell upon the rebellious character of the war, upon the past clemency of the parent country, and its present willingness to see the unhappy quarrel terminated upon principles that are moderate and just. The basis upon which the mediation is asked is than stated. It consists of four conditions. It so falls out that, as well in real meaning from all that I could discover, as in the order in which they are set out, they are the same as those unofficially mentioned at the close of my number thirty:¹ that is to say, 1st. An amnesty is to be granted to the colonies on their being *reduced*. Lord Castlereagh explained this word, which was a translation from the Spanish, by saying that Spain did not mean by it *conquered*, but merely that the colonies must desist from hostility. 2ndly. The King agrees to employ in the public service in America, *qualified* Americans, as well as European Spaniards. 3rdly. He agrees to grant the colonists priviledges of trade, adapted to the existing posture of things. 4thly. He engages to acquiesce in all measures which the mediating powers may suggest calculated to effect, in their true intent, the above objects, which he further hopes will be speedily brought about by their cooperating counsels and efforts.

I do not pretend to give the words, but believe that the above will be found to be the purport of each condition.

I come to what is most important in proceeding to state the answer of the British court.

1. It approves of these propositions, considered as general propositions, but calls for explanations in detail that the meaning of some of them may be rendered more definite.

2. It expresses an unequivocal opinion, that the dispute ought to be healed without overthrowing the political supremacy of the parent state.

3. Touching commerce, it declares, that the trade of the colonies ought to be free to the rest of the world, the mother country being placed upon a footing of reasonable preference.

4. It is very explicit in making known, that Great Britain will do no more than interpose her friendly offices, repudiating every idea of compulsion or force, should they fail.

Under these explanations, the mediation is accepted. The note of the twenty-eighth of August 1817 is alike explicit in disavowing all intention of forcing by arms the colonies into any measures whatever. It is very full also on the point of their commercial freedom, and goes the length of saying, that Great Britain will accept no priviledges in this respect but on equal ground with other nations.

Thus much will, I hope, be found to possess the President of the essential features of both the notes, and consequently of the present views and determinations of the British government upon this great question.

¹ See above, pt. viii, doc. 764.

Having gone through the reading of all three, and expressed, as I took leave to do, an approbation of some of the principles disclosed by this court as being in unison with those held by the United States, his Lordship put the question to me directly, whether I knew the views of my own government in relation to the final termination of the struggle.

Here an occasion was made to my hand of distinctly communicating them, which I accordingly improved. I said, that its desire was, to see the colonies completely emancipated, and that such too was its belief, would be the only permanent issue of the contest.

He received the communication with apparent regret. He was, he said, sincerely desirous that the two governments should act in harmony, and this was perhaps the only point where their policy would be found divergent. I replied, that it was, unfortunately, a fundamental one. He reiterated his expressions of the interest which the United States naturally had in the whole question, on which account its being known that they coincided in opinion with Europe on all the points of pacification, though they took no part in it, would have, as it ought to have, an influence in rendering it effectual. I gave his Lordship no reason to expect that their policy would change. The conversation soon afterwards ended in the same conciliatory spirit in which it began,—a spirit which has invariably marked all the official conversations I have held with his Lordship during my residence, thus far at this court.

Before parting, he asked in a way altogether casual, if I had any accounts respecting the capture of Pensacola, by General Jackson. I replied that I had not. I added, being careful that my manner should take from every thing offensive in the sentiment, that although the United States felt themselves free to act, in their relations with Spain, without any appeal to Europe, they nevertheless respected the moral force of opinion, and would, I doubted not, be able in due time strictly to justify the measure. At the dinner at the French ambassador's I was pointedly asked the same question by the Russian and Prussian ambassadors, to which I gave, in effect, the same answer. Another of the corps said to me, that the duke of San Carlos, the Spanish ambassador, was greatly excited under the news. If I may be pardoned the familiarity of repeating the very words of my informant, they were, that the duke "had got the fidgets." It will be seen from the newspapers what sensation it has produced upon at least a portion of the British publick. Insurance upon vessels of the United States has, I have just been told, risen one half per cent within the last few days. Whether this has been occasioned by the possible apprehension of a Spanish war, or arises from the increasing accounts of depredations upon all ships going to America by piratical cruisers under colour of some Spanish American flag, I have not, at this moment, the means of determining.

I take this occasion to mention, that no reply has been given to my note to this government of the eighteenth of June, relative to the four articles on

colonial trade; and that, from the harmony of all the intermediate conversations I have had with Lord Castlereagh in the course of which the subject has not again been referred to, I no longer anticipate one.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *November 20, 1818.*

I have anxiously watched, with the best lights I could command in this quarter, the progress of events at Aix la Chapelle, so far as they chiefly concern us. I mean in regard to the affairs of South America and Spain. The government of the latter might perhaps receive commiseration for its imbecility, did not its conduct in all other respects strip it, day by day, of all remaining titles to confidence and respect. Accordingly, deserving no friends at Aix la Chapelle, it appears to have found none. From what I can collect in diplomatic circles, there exists no serious intention on the part of any of the great sovereigns to take the cause of Ferdinand effectively in hand. I have been told, that when the king of Prussia first heard of his capricious removal of Pirano, and tyrannical treatment of him afterwards, he really uttered the exclamation which the journals of Europe ascribed to him: "This is the policy of Asia." Pirano had once been ambassador at Berlin. This unpopularity of a king among kings; this political solecism happily produces another. It softens if it does not subdue their natural hostility against his former subjects struggling for their freedom. The assembling of this congress at a period up to which the United States had maintained a passive course, appears to have created a favorable and peculiar juncture respecting that interesting contest, which will perhaps leave them henceforth more at liberty to act upon their own views of it; views springing from feelings known to be alike dear to the American government and people. I will add, that I have reason to think, that the communication which, by order of the President, I made some time ago to this government, of the unequivocal determination of the United States to acquiesce in no plan of settling the contest that did not look to the absolute independence of the colonies as a fundamental point, has not been without its influence in working a change in British councils; and that it may even prove the means, in connexion with other causes, of exciting

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIII. The portion of this document printed in small capital letters was received in cipher.

kinder feelings in them towards the patriots, not indeed from sympathy in their cause, but an apprehension of other consequences. But on this head I speak doubtfully.

IT WILL BE ENOUGH THAT I REPEAT WITH INCREASING CONFIDENCE THE BELIEF WHICH I HAVE HERETOFORE EXPRESSED THAT G. B. WOULD NOT CONSIDER OUR RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF ANY OF THE COLONIES AS IN ITSELF CAUSE OF WAR.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, February 15, 1819.

SIR: Your despatch, number fifteen, of the first of January,² got to hand on the eighth of this month. On the ninth I addressed a note to Lord Castlereagh, asking an interview for the purpose of making known to him the matters of which it treats. He named Friday the twelfth at nine in the evening, for me to call upon him.

I informed him that the despatch which I had received related altogether to the struggle going on in South America, and was very distinct and full in its disclosure of the intentions of the President upon that subject. That it set out with stating, that the government of the United States, continued to consider the controversy in the light of a civil war, under which head a course of general reasoning followed, going to ascertain the true duty of a neutral state, which had been the condition of the United States, towards both the parties to this war. It showed next in order, that the conduct of the United States had, in point of fact, always strictly conformed, as far as had been possible, to this duty. It then spoke of the mediation invoked by Spain for the settlement of the dispute, bringing into view what had also been the uniform conduct of the United States in relation to it up to the present period. Dwelling upon the visible progress which some of the newly formed states in South America had made towards an independent existence, it next gave into a hope, that the time was rapidly approaching if it had not arrived when the British government and the powers of Europe generally, might perhaps see their own interest, that of Spain herself, as well as of these new states, in such a recognition of the latter as would bring them within the pale of nations. Finally it declared, that, as regarded Buenos Ayres, the President had come to a determination to grant an exequatur to a consul general who had been appointed by the government of that country so long ago as before the month of May last to reside in the United States; or to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIII.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 71.

recognize its independence in some other way, should no event occur in the meantime to justify a postponement of his intention.

After this summary of the points, I thought that I could in no way so well put his Lordship in possession of the facts and reasoning by which they were elucidated and enforced, as by reading to him the despatch itself. Besides the advantage which this course would be sure to bring with it of enabling me to fulfil with perfect precision my instructions, I was the more induced to it by the recollection that he had himself, in more than one instance, adopted it as a means of informing me of the intentions of this government. It seemed to be the first occasion which I have yet deemed a suitable one for reciprocating on my part this kind of confidence. The despatch embracing no other topick, and dealing of this, throughout, in terms which it appeared to me proper for this government to hear, and better than any I could have employed, I accordingly proceeded to read the whole of it to him.

It was evident, when I had done that some passages were unexpected to him. They were those the spirit of which seemed to import, that the government of Great Britain was, in reality, inclining to our view of the subject as regarded the emancipation of the colonies. He said he was not aware upon what occasion his government had uttered sentiments leading to this impression. At any rate, none such had been intended to be conveyed. On the contrary, he observed, that while Great Britain had, from the first, anxiously desired to see the controversy at an end, and had done her best to effect this desire, it had always been upon the basis of a restoration of the supremacy of Spain; on an improved plan of government indeed, especially as regarded the commercial interests of the colonies, but still a complete and total supremacy. That he candidly thought, that this mode of ending the conflict, besides being the one pointed out to Great Britain by all the subsisting relations between herself and Spain, would prove the best for both parties, and the world at large, as the materials of regular and orderly government among the colonies did not, at present, appear to exist. That it was therefore impossible to predict in what manner they would be able to sustain themselves as independent communities, whether as it concerned their own happiness and prosperity or the principles which might affect their intercourse with established nations. These had been the leading motives with Great Britain to wish that the colonies might be brought back again under the authority of the parent state, motives that still had their operation, and must continue to have as long as any room or hope was left of the result at which they aimed being accomplished. The employment of force as a means of bringing it about, Great Britain had ever repudiated, and still did, the moral power of opinion and advice being the sole ground upon which he had acted, hitherto he admitted to no effective purpose. It was, upon this basis, however, that she had agreed to become party to the mediation in the manner made known to me during the last summer, and the relations which

bound her to the allied powers as well as to Spain, held her to this course, in whatever degree the councils and conduct of Spain might seem to retard the hope of its success.

Such was the nature of his remarks. They corresponded, as he observed, with what had been stated to me in the summer, for a detail of which I must beg to refer to my number thirty two, of the third of last August.¹ Things stood, he said, in regard to the mediation upon the same footing, substantially, now as then; that is, although it had been acceded to by the European alliance, nothing in effect had been done. The subject had several times been brought into discussion at Aix la Chapelle, but no act had yet followed. Spain seemed bent upon a prosecution of the contest upon her own means, and was rallying them at the present moment in the hope of bringing it to a close upon her own terms. In the discussions above alluded to, he had found both France and Russia labouring under a belief that the United States desired to be associated in the mediation, and that they would be willing to come in upon the same basis with the other powers, until he had removed it. The duke of Richelieu had been very decided in this belief. His Lordship concluded with expressing anew his regrets, that my government viewed the question of emancipation in a light opposite to that in which it was still looked at by the government of Great Britain.

What fell from him on this occasion may seem to clash with some of the opinions expressed, on less authentick grounds, in my despatch number forty six.² I am bound on the other hand to add, that his whole manner was conciliatory. While he expressed regret at the divergent views of our two governments upon the point of emancipation, he indulged in no other sentiment than regret, nor was this expressed but in the mildest way. The known opinions of the United States, he thought, from obvious political and local causes, could not fail to have had an influence upon the South Americans. Hence, he said, the wish that had been cherished here, that their policy had harmonized with that of Europe upon this fundamental point, thinking that it might have been the means, although they were not formal parties to the mediation, of sooner healing the dispute upon terms which the governments of Britain and of Europe really thought best for the colonies, best for Spain, and best for all other nations. How far it was yet practicable to settle it, giving back to Spain her supremacy, and granting to the colonies a just government under her sway, he could not affirm; but it was the hope to which the European alliance clung. He admitted that Buenos Ayres stood upon a better footing in the proofs it had afforded of capacity to exist as an independent community, than any of the other colonies; and freely admitted also the present and prospective value of our commerce in that quarter when I had occasion to mention that it already consisted on our side of articles so important

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 765.

² *Ibid.*, 766, Rush to Adams, November 20, 1818.

to particular portions of the United States as fish, naval stores, ready built vessels, furniture, and lumber of every description.

The conversation closed with a declaration on his part, that the unreserved and candid disclosure which had been made to this government of the President's intentions respecting this struggle, and especially of the intended recognition of Buenos Ayres, would be taken as a mark of confidence, and received in the spirit in which they had been communicated. He said nothing further.

Being the first interview I had had with his Lordship since the arrival in this country of your despatch to Mr. Erving of the twenty eighth of November,¹ and the other documents relating to the transactions in Florida which were laid before Congress on the twenty eighth of December, I was not sure that he would not have made some allusion to them. He, however, did not. This leaves me to infer, for the present, that no exception is taken by this court to any of them. The names of Arbuthnot and Ambrister were only once glanced at, and that incidentally. His Lordship was saying, that notwithstanding the neutrality of the government of Great Britain as between Spain and the colonies, the latter had undoubtedly received aid from England, as from the United States, in arms, ammunition, and men, in ways that the laws could not prevent. This led him to speak of the order of the court of Madrid of the fourteenth of January last, denouncing such heavy penalties against all subjects of foreign states, who join the standard of the colonists. "This order" said he, "is very much felt by France; but we give ourselves no concern at it, to whatever remarks the principles on which it assumes to rest might be open. Those of our subjects who choose to join the colonists must take all consequences; we can hold out no hand to protect them, any more than we thought ourselves bound to do in the case of the two men who intermeddled with the savages along your borders." I have learned that the Spanish ambassador at this court, makes frequent and earnest remonstrances against the military supplies and assistance which it is notorious are going almost daily from English ports to South America. It seems difficult to reconcile the professions with the conduct of the British cabinet upon this subject; for certainly, lax as the existing laws of England may be in all power to restrain these armaments, it would be easy to strengthen them. Lord Castlereagh did hint at a half-formed intention that had existed of bringing a bill into parliament with this object, which however had been abandoned from the difficulties attending any attempt to conciliate with all other parts of their present system, any new prohibitory or restraining statutes.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ Not printed in this collection.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *March 22, 1819.*

His Lordship [Lord Castlereagh] informed me that, since our conversation of the twelfth of last month,² the long standing topick of the mediation, had taken a decisive turn. This turn consisted, in Spain having absolutely and finally declined it. There was therefore he said at present an entire end of the subject, as to any further steps to be taken either by Great Britain, or, as I also understood him, by any of the powers of Europe in relation to it.

Recapitulating the history of this mediation, now, after so much expectation, come to an abortive close, he went over many of the grounds connected with its origin and progress to which he had alluded in past conversations, and which have had place from time to time in my former despatches. Referring to what had passed at Aix la Chapelle, he said, that it had entered into the plan of the allies, that if the mediation had been acted upon, it should have been upon the basis, superadded to every other, of Spain conceding to such of her South American colonies as had not been in general revolt, the same terms, so far as would be applicable to their future government, as were proposed to be granted to those that had openly resisted her authority. He also said, that it had been suggested, that some one individual in whom as well Spain herself as the allies had confidence, should be selected to repair to Madrid as the representative with full powers of the latter, in the whole business of the mediation, and that the duke of Wellington should be that individual; but that this proposition had not been acceded to by Spain. Further he observed, that Spain had made a request to be permitted to send a representative to the congress at Aix la Chapelle; but that this request was deemed of a nature not to be acquiesced in by the allies. These were the only points adverted to by his Lordship which had not been stated to me upon former occasions. I collected from all he said, that the part Spain has now acted, has grown out of the change of ministry in that country. It will be recollected that this event took place contemporaneously with the assemblage of the sovereigns at Aix la Chapelle. It appears, that those who have since directed the publick councils at Madrid, are resolved to place exclusive reliance upon their own efforts of vigor by sea and land, and upon the supplies of their own treasury, for putting down all insurrection throughout the dominions of Ferdinand.

His Lordship concluded by remarking, that this total rejection of the mediation would not influence the course which this government would

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 767, Rush to Adams, February 15, 1819.

otherwise have adopted under the communication which I made to him on the twelfth of February; meaning, as he explained, that it had created no unfriendly sensibility in the British cabinet towards Spain. I am left to infer from this remark, that the precise and final views which are to be taken by this government of our recognition of the independence of Buenos Ayres, are not yet determined upon. The intentions of the President upon this point, have doubtless been under consideration; but beyond the expressions of a general nature uttered by his Lordship on first being made acquainted with them, he has said nothing except what dropped from him as above. I was desirous that he should have pursued the subject; but he was evidently disinclined to go into it with any more particularity.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, May 14, 1819.

. . . I have been in company with the Portuguese chargé d'affaires. He informed me, that he has little hope of count Palmella's succeeding in the object of his visit to Paris, and that the great armament at Cadiz was carrying on its preparations *with all expedition* to go against Monte Video, which he thought would certainly be its first destination should this last attempt at negociation fail. He spoke as if his court was under but slight alarm from the meditated hostility of Spain, and alluded with complacency to the subsisting guarantee of the European possessions of Portugal by Great Britain. He inquired with some interest as to the intentions of the United States respecting the acknowledgement of Buenos Ayres, saying that whenever that event took place, he believed that Portugal would not be slow to follow the example. It was at the table of the duke of San Carlos that I met this gentleman. With the former I exchanged congratulations on the happy prospect of seeing Spain and the United States placed by the late treaty upon the best of terms, both of us agreeing, that the happiness of each nation was thereby best to be promoted.

Last week, I had a request from Mr. Hamilton, that I would refer him to all our Acts of Congress passed to preserve our neutral relations, but chiefly those that were known to have been aimed at Spain and the colonies. It is not the first time since I have been here, that I have sent these laws to the foreign office. The motive and result of this second application for them,

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIII.

may be seen in the proceedings of the house of commons yesterday. It appears that the attorney general has asked leave to bring in a bill the object of which is to prevent for the future the departure from the ports of this kingdom of men, ships, or military supplies, for the use of the Spanish patriots. Thus is the British government at last about to tread in the steps of our legislation upon this subject, with a declaration from Lord Castlereagh, that his majesty's ministers owe an apology to Europe, for not having adopted the measure sooner. Other parts of this debate may attract the eye of the President.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, July 21, 1819.

A minister or deputy, Mr. Yrisari [Yrisarri], has lately arrived here from Chili. It will be taken for granted, that the government has not received him. It is said that he has been invested by the Independents with five hundred thousand pounds to aid their cause in this capital, and that he cherishes the expectation of being able to send out assistance to them in men as well as in other ways, notwithstanding the provisions of the foreign enlistment law. I presume by evading them. Rumours add, that the great banker, Rothschild, has declared that he will advance the whole sum if Sir Robert Wilson will take the command of the expedition to be sent out, and that the latter has actually gone to Paris to see if he can select and organize a corps of officers. The Cadiz armament is now said to be bound to Venezuela, to cut up the English auxiliaries.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, August 24, 1819.

Knowing that the course of events in South America must influence more or less the wayward councils of Ferdinand, I feel a desire more frequently than it is in my power to execute it to report for the information of the Presi-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIV.

dent all such occurrences in this quarter as held out any prospect of affecting the progress of those events. I had the honor upon former occasions, to speak of the intended departure of Lord Cochrane to act in a naval capacity with the South Americans at Chili, and of the embarkation from the Thames of the recruits under Colonel English that have since been associated with the arms of the patriots at Venezuela. With the same views I have watched the armament of Ireland under General Devereux, notoriously set on foot with the same intentions of aiding the cause of Spanish emancipation. But I have it not in my power to impart all the information I could wish respecting it.

I believe it to be a fact, that about twelve hundred men have actually sailed within the last month from Dublin, and that two or three hundred more may be expected to sail very shortly. These numbers fall far below the accounts stated in the newspapers. Their immediate destination I understand to be Margaritta, whence they will act as events in Venezuela may render expedient. General Devereux is to command them, but has not yet embarked. 'Tis said that he is expected here before his final departure. This is all the information pretending to authenticity that I find myself able at this time to transmit in regard to this enterprise.

As far as I may judge from all indications of opinion within the compass of my observations, the cause of South American freedom continues to ripen in the judgment and affections of the British publick. I consequently continue to hold to the belief, and even more strongly than heretofore, that whenever it may be thought to comport with a wise policy in all other respects for the government of the United States to recognize Buenos Ayres, that the British government will not consider such a measure, *per se*, as any cause of breach with us. It will not have escaped attention in what manner our presumed intention to recognize this new state was treated in the debate on the foreign enlistment bill, both by the ministerialists and the whigs, in connexion with the treaty by which the Floridas are ceded to us.

There is good reason for believing, as might so naturally have been expected, that as soon as the mutiny broke out among the troops at Cadiz, Spain began to give ground in the negociations with Portugal respecting Monte Video. These negociations are still unclosed, and will probably remain in a state of vibration while the fate of this long-talked of expedition hangs in any degree in suspense.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *September 17, 1819.*

Another short anecdote, with which I will conclude, may help us to infer how general an interest is taken throughout the courts of Europe, even those that are inland and subordinate, in our supposed intention to recognize the independence of Buenos Ayres. It is of date some little time back; but present circumstances serve to recall it. During the last spring, Baron Just, the minister at this court from the king of Saxony, opened a conversation with me upon this express subject. He did not conceal his wish to be informed upon it, stating as a reason, that he had on the day preceding received a despatch from his government, in which it was mentioned that I had, by order of mine, made a communication to Lord Castlereagh in relation to it, in February. The precise nature of this communication it was the Baron's anxious desire to learn through what he imagined to be the best source. That the communication should thus have been wafted through the circle of cabinets, and reach for the first time the ears of a Saxon minister at London in the shape of a despatch from his own court, made, at the moment, an impression upon me.

With the greatest respect [etc.].

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, *October 5, 1819.*

SIR: In a late communication,² I had the honor to allude to the preparations that were going on under the auspices of General Devereux, in aid of the cause of South American freedom.

In addition to the troops heretofore dispatched on this service, I learn, that from two to three thousand will be embarked from Ireland, by the first of December. Their first destination, as with the former, will be Margaritta. It is from General Devereux himself, that I have this information. He intends to embark with this principal section of his force, placing himself at its head. The foreign enlistment law is evaded by the men going out under colour of settling as farmers and labourers in the province of Vene-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIV.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 711; Rush to Adams, August 24, 1819.

zuela. The better to mask this project, General Devereux has received either an actual or an ostensible grant from General Bolivar, of fifty square leagues of land in that province. Against this mode of violating the law, the Spanish ambassador has, as I hear, remonstrated with the British ministry; but to no effect. The inference would seem to be unavoidable, that their zeal for its execution, must be very slack. They fold their arms whilst it is infringed almost in open day. In Ireland, it is well understood, that an attachment to the cause of the South Americans, is nearly universal. It takes in men of the highest standing, and what is remarkable but true, embraces conspicuous individuals who on all other points of their political conduct, are entirely identified with the ministers. Whence the pecuniary supplies are derived of fitting out so large an expedition, is not known to me. General Devereux professes to do it upon his own resources. But this seems impossible. Troops have been raised and equipped, transports hired, munitions of war provided, and a great military enterprize in all things completed upon the scale I have stated. The whole number of men by the time the next division is sent off, will scarcely fall short of four thousand. All this would appear to be an undertaking too much for the purse of an individual. That General Devereux's movements will be ahead of those of the armada at Cadiz, is, to the last degree, probable.

There arrived in this capital a fortnight ago, from Venezuela, two individuals, Don Fernando Penálvez and Colonel Bergara, in capacity of new deputies from that province. I have been informed, that a Mr. Vondam, now here from Sweden, and who alleges himself to be possessed of an informal authority for what he does, has proposed to these deputies to be the bearer of propositions to his Swedish Majesty for entering into some commercial arrangements, with Venezuela and New Granada. This information, while I do not confidently rely upon it, reaches me through a channel entitled to some respect.

With very great respect [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, October 15, 1819.

I have lately heard, through a channel upon which I can rely, that Mr. Irisari [Yrisarri], the deputy from Chili, of whom I made mention in a former despatch,² had an interview with Lord Castlereagh soon after his arrival.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIV.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 770, Rush to Adams, July 21, 1819.

He inquired in the course of it, if the vessels of Chili would be admitted and hospitably received, when they came to the ports of Great Britain? His Lordship replied certainly, at all times. Would their prizes be admitted, it was next asked. Here an objection was interposed by Lord Castlereagh, who said that such a permission might give cause of complaint to Spain. Whether England allows Chilian prizes taken by Spain, to be brought into her ports, is a point that cannot so well be known, as it is understood to be a fact, that Spain has never yet captured a vessel belonging to Chili! His Lordship went on to say, that Sir Thomas Hardy, who was appointed to the command of the squadron destined to act in the South Seas, was charged to attend to British interests in that quarter, and specially authorised to be the medium of any communications between his government and the authorities at Chili, which events upon his arrival there might make necessary or convenient. He would thus exercise, substantially, the functions of a consul. Mr. Irisari [Yrisarri] inquired if England would not in return receive a consul from Chili. His Lordship replied, that such reciprocity did not appear to follow as a duty, Chili not being recognized by other nations as an established power. Finally, his Lordship read to Mr. Irisari [Yrisarri] the instructions given to Sir Thomas Hardy. Far from being hostile, they bore a friendly aspect towards Chili, and directed Sir Thomas to respect all the just regulations touching trade and commerce, which those who exercised the powers of government in that community, might establish.

Mr. Irisari [Yrisarri] preferred no request for the acknowledgment of the independence of Chili, by England. His government deemed it better to let that matter rest where it is, than run the hazard of receiving a direct refusal.

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*Colonel Yrisarri, Envoy of Chile to Europe and the United States, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

LONDON, November 3, 1819.

Col^l. Yrisarri presents his compliments to His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, Mr. Rush, and begs leave to inform him through Mr. Ribas on some points, which Col Y. hopes His Excellency's goodness will consider with interest.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIV, enclosed in Rush to Adams, November 10, 1819, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 777.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Colonel Yrisarri, Envoy of Chile to Europe and the United States*¹

LONDON, November 6, 1819.

Mr. Rush presents his compliments to Colonel Yrisarri, and has had the honor to receive this day, through the hands of Mr. Ribas, his note of the third of this month.² Mr. Rush had not the good fortune to see Mr. Ribas; but the papers which he left with the secretary of his Legation, Mr. R has read with the interest that belongs to them. The official document,³ signed by the Supreme Director of the state of Chili, is herewith returned. A copy of it, together with Colonel Yrisarri's letter to the Secretary of State,³ Mr. R. will have great pleasure in transmitting to Washington, by the earliest opportunity.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*⁴

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, November 10, 1819.

The interview⁵ might here have closed. But I was unwilling to let pass the opportunity which it presented of touching upon our affairs with Spain. In a letter from Mr. Forsyth, of the seventeenth of October, informing me of the continued refusal of Ferdinand to ratify the treaty, he also says that it was rumoured whilst he was writing, that some agreement in relation to Spain and her colonies, or to Spain and the United States, was then actually about to be transmitted by the court of Madrid to that of London, and by the very same courier (despatched by Sir Henry Wellesley) that had charge of my letter. What the agreement was, Mr. F. did not profess accurately to know. His impressions pointed to its being one by which Great Britain had pledged herself, on sufficient inducements, to convey for Spain the troops now in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, to some of her possessions in America. Nothing that I had heard, or no scrutiny that it has fallen within my power to make in this quarter, had reflected any light upon this rumour. Perhaps his Lordship might not have felt himself bound to answer to it, at such a moment; yet I thought it right to take the chances of what he might say

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIV, enclosed in Rush to Adams, November 10, 1819, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 777.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 775.

³ See above, pt. V, doc. 472, Yrisarri to the Secretary of State, October 31, 1819.

⁴ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIV.

⁵ With Lord Castlereagh.

under an allusion to it. I described the rumour in terms that appeared to me best adapted to the end proposed. In spite of my best caution, his Lordship I thought manifested a slight, momentary, excitement. "Falsehoods", he said, "will get into circulation upon this, as upon other occasions." Resuming his complacency he observed, "I can assure you, that our policy upon this subject remains unchanged." I replied, that my government would, I well knew, hear his declaration with new satisfaction, anticipating no other.

Here the matter ended. The above report of the little that fell from his Lordship is given, for the information of the President, with as close an adherence as possible to his words as well as manner.

On the sixth instant I received from Mr. Yrisarri a note dated on the third, of which a copy is enclosed.¹ This is the gentleman of whom I have spoken heretofore (with a deviation in the spelling of his name) who came to London a few months ago in capacity of deputy or envoy from the new state of Chili. A copy of my reply to his note is also enclosed,¹ together with the papers referred to; one being a letter to your address as secretary of state; the other a copy of Mr. Yrisarri's credentials, or diploma from the government of Chili. The original of this instrument, I have seen. It is stamped with every mark of authenticity. It bears date at Santiago, on the eighteenth of November, 1818. It sets forth in the name of the Supreme Director and Senate of Chili, that, having determined to send a publick minister from Chili, to solicit from the governments of Europe and of the United States, an acknowledgment of the independence of that state, the said Director, has appointed for that purpose, Mr. Yrisarri, constituting him also minister envoy from Chile to the United States, with all necessary powers to enter upon negotiations respecting such acknowledgment; and engaging to confirm whatever he may do in fulfilment of his trust. Mr. Yrisarri continues to be confined by ill-health, which hinders him from embarking for the United States. In this state of things I could not hesitate to become the medium, at his request, of transmitting to your hands the documents in question.

With the highest respect [etc.].

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 775 and 776, Yrisarri to Rush, November 3, 1819, and Rush to Yrisarri, November 6, 1819.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *July 20, 1820.*

I send herewith a pamphlet containing, in a convenient form, all the documents which have been published in this country respecting the attempt of France to set up a throne in Buenos Ayres, and place upon it a prince of the house of Bourbon. The subject has excited universal interest in the political circles of this capital. I have good information for saying, that this project was not known to the British cabinet until it burst upon it by the recent arrival from South America of these documents. The duke de Cazes, I understand, does not admit them to be genuine. He positively disavows, I have heard, ever having seen the South American envoy, Gomez. Whether he disavows for the Marquis Desolles also, I have not heard. That France has been engaged in the project, nobody doubts; and this government, as might be expected, evidently regards the whole transaction with no complacency.

In an interesting debate in the house of commons on the eleventh of this month, on a call for information respecting the above documents, Dr. Lushington argued the broad principle, that England ought to recognize immediately and fully the independence of Buenos Ayres. Already he said the government had an accredited consul residing in that country, an assertion that was not afterwards controverted. Lord Castlereagh, in reply, expressed his entire dissent as to the policy of taking an *early* opportunity of recognizing any of those communities. Sir James Macintosh plainly intimated it as his opinion, that, since the altered state of things in Spain, the question of desiring a separation of the colonies from the parent state, had also essentially changed. This I take to be now a prevailing sentiment with the whigs. The very preliminary dissertation to the pamphlet which I send, was, I have reason to think, drawn up by one of the conductors of the Morning Chronicle, the leading whig journal of London. During the debate, a sentiment was uttered by Mr. Canning which may deserve to be repeated. He said, that as history had shown the condition of colonies always to have been more servile under the government of a popular assembly, than under the authority of even absolute monarchies, (a position which the learned speaker assumed without proving,) all those persons who had wished to see the colonies emancipated from monarchical Spain, ought to cherish this wish with much more zeal, now that Spain was democratical! This sentiment, not perhaps the less significant from its having escaped the lips of a distinguished member of the ministry, points to a prophecy which there need be little scruple in hazard-ing. It is this. That if Spain makes the advances in energy and power to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXV.

be naturally expected from her free constitution, to which no compliment was intended by the epithet of democratical, we shall find parties here shifting sides. All the branches of the opposition will desire to see Spain reinstated in full sovereignty over her dominions beyond sea; whilst the ministerialists, through an instinctive counterpart of feeling, will desire to see them struck off. The government will, I believe, observe great caution for a while, watching events. But, on the contingency presupposed, we can scarcely err in predicting this ultimate reverse in the publick opinion of the country.

Mr. Forsyth has stated to me in a letter, dated Madrid, June the twenty ninth, that he had understood, that the agents in London from Caraccas, Buenos Ayres and Chili held a meeting in May, when it was determined to address applications to Russia, Austria and Prussia, desiring that princes of their families might be given to Spanish America generally, and that one might be specially selected from the Brazils for Buenos Ayres. This is as I understand his statement. But it comes to me in cypher, and, either from some inadvertence on the part of his copyist, so liable to happen with figures, or possibly from there not being a perfect conformity between our cyphers, there are parts which I cannot make out, and may therefore have taken up the meaning inaccurately. I am aware of no such facts as Mr. Forsyth states. What I have heard is, that, in the month of April, (being subsequent to the establishment of the constitution of 1812,) the agents of Chili, Buenos Ayres and Venezuela, did meet together in this city, with however a different object. They jointly signed an address to the king of Spain asking that the independence of these countries might be acknowledged. This address was transmitted to Ferdinand through the medium of the duke of San Carlos, then the Spanish ambassador at this court. The reply to it through the same channel was, that no proposition would be listened to that had not for its basis the return of the colonies to their subjection to the mother country. This information I have derived since the publicity of the project of France upon Buenos Ayres.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LONDON, *April 22, 1822.*

Our acknowledgement of the South American states, has produced an effect upon those communities on this side of the water, of which the evidences are universal in the publick opinion of all circles. It seems to have

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVII.

spoken them into being; to have cleared away the doubts that lingered in men's minds as to their true condition; to have revealed and defined before the world the maturity of their attributes for sovereign and independent existence. It has formed a foundation point around which the judgment of the world can rally, undistracted by the uncertainties and contradictions under which the destinies of those new empires seemed hidden. It has come at the happy moment when their destiny complete in all things else by exertions of their own, seemed to wait only this moral welcome from the sister Republick of the north, as its last finish. So the citizen of the United States is happy to contemplate it, so mankind have hailed it. The day after the news arrived, the value of the Colombian bonds, a species of security for a loan contracted by that state, rose in the London market, nor have I caught from any source as yet a single objection to the measure. To this government, it is not my intention to speak of or allude to it in any way, in the first instance. To Mr. Onis, I broached the topick at the levee last week, as one of familiar conversation, saying, in the spirit of the President's message, that I hoped Spain would see no unfriendliness in the step, but rather one out of which good fruits would grow up to all parties. He replied, that he thought *Spain ought to follow the example*. If the commercial penalties which a French newspaper states as those which the Republick of Colombia designs to inflict upon the nations withholding a recognition, be correctly stated, and if the other new Republicks do the same, it may be presumed that the example of the United States will not be long without imitators. . . .

I received the day before yesterday from Mr. Sartoris, at Rio Janeiro, a letter dated February the 15th, in which he states that the Portuguese troops had been compelled, through the firmness of the Prince Regent, to embark for Europe, and that he had little doubt but that the whole of the Brazils in a few months more would declare independence, organizing a separate government with the Prince Regent at its head.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, May 6, 1822.

A meeting was held on the twenty third of last month of the merchants, ship owners, manufacturers, and traders, of London for the purpose of taking into consideration the means of opening a beneficial commercial intercourse

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVII.

with the countries of South America *formerly under the dominion of Spain*, a mode of expression which it is remarkable has sprung into use since the President's message on the recognition, and seems already to have become as universal, as it was before unknown. It was agreed at the meeting, to present a memorial to the Lords of the privy council submitting whether it would not be expedient to open the ports of Great Britain to the ships of these "newly established countries" in the same manner as to the ships of the United States and the Brazils. The Lords of the privy council have replied, in general terms, that the vessels of these countries will be admitted into the ports of the United Kingdom.

They have, in fact, been admitted heretofore, whenever they have chosen to come, *but not as vessels of the Independent governments of South America, eo nomine*. They have come as other vessels, that comply in all things with the British laws of navigation and trade. No interdict existed against them, founded upon the nature of their flag, which was not inquired into on their arrival at British ports, but admitted like other foreign flags. As to their being admitted upon the same terms with the vessels of the United States or the Brazils, this could only be the effect of compact. None whatever existing between Britain and these new states, the prayer of the memorialists in this respect goes unattended to. It is in this way that my inquiries lead me to understand the subject, though aware of the contradictory assertions in the English journals in relation to it.

It will be seen, that Lord Londonderry stated in the house of commons on the second instant, in answer to the questions of Sir James Mackintosh, that whilst this government had neither formally recognized, or entered into any correspondence that would imply a recognition of, these new governments, it had nevertheless considered them as governments *de facto*; had looked upon the parties at war in that quarter of the world as belligerents; had respected as such their rights of blockade, and that the commercial intercourse with them would be found to be provided for by Mr. Robinson's bill on the subject of foreign trade. This bill is not yet published, as far as I can learn, and probably not yet fully matured.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, June 10, 1822.

Touching the question of South American independence, I am happy to find that I have taken the same view of the part proper for me to act at this court that your despatch has now presented to me. From the moment of the arrival of the President's message of the 8th of March proposing the recognition, it appeared to me, that, as it was a measure adopted on our own views of its intrinsic justice and expediency, without concert with other nations, and as the great principles upon which it stood were sufficiently promulgated to the world in that message, no further mention of it by me was due to conciliation, or to any other duty in my intercourse with this government; but that, on the contrary, to avoid all notice of the subject in the first instance, would be the course most proper on my part. I have, accordingly, abstained from alluding to it when with Lord Londonderry, and he has not mentioned it to me. Whenever he may do so, I will not fail to express the sentiments with which you have charged me.

But although the measure has not been mentioned on either side, I have no reason to suppose that it is regarded by this cabinet otherwise than as its true nature demands. The public voice of the country is manifestly and loudly in its favor. The manufacturers and merchants take the lead, and urge the government to follow our example, rather than arraign it. When to this we add what Lord Londonderry has said upon the subject in parliament, and the step already taken by the lords of the privy council, and the further steps projected in parliament, for encouraging commercial relations with the new-born states in those regions, we should perhaps rather be warranted in inferring that it cannot be very long before our example, will, in effect, be followed. I have heard, indeed, from a respectable though not official source, that a person who has heretofore been in *diplomatic trusts* under this government (the name I did not hear) is going out at once to Buenos Ayres. Whether as agent or minister, or with what distinct objects, my informant could not say, but we may suppose with some view to the commencement of an official intercourse with that community of a character more marked than has yet existed. As to any formal or perfect recognition of the independence of that or any of the other new states of South America, I greatly doubt whether this government will give in to it, except on consultation with the European Alliance, which the reanimated hope of preserving peace in the East will probably tend to bind still more closely together.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVII.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, June 24, 1822.

SIR: Mr. Zea, the representative of the Republic of Colombia, arrived here lately from France. He waited upon me on the twenty first instant, but not being in at the moment of his call, I did not see him. I have on my part made efforts to see him since, but as yet we have not met.

I learn that he has had an interview with Lord Londonderry. The particulars of what passed at it, I am not instructed in, but understand that the following is the result.

That to the application which he distinctly preferred to this government to recognize the independence of Colombia, his lordship gave as distinct a refusal. He alleged that Great Britain would make no movement towards the recognition of any of those new states, except in concert with her European Allies, and that these latter were not at present disposed, any more than Great Britain, to take any steps in regard to the subject without consulting Spain.

What was said by his lordship in explanation of this policy; whether or not he took any notice of our act of recognition, or touched upon any of the prospects of commercial intercourse between this country and those new states, I am not informed. Upon such and other points that may be interesting in connexion with this subject, I will transmit whatever further information I may be able to obtain henceforth.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, July 24, 1822.

SIR: Mr. Echeverria, representing himself to be the minister plenipotentiary from the Republic of Colombia to this court, called upon me last week. I say representing himself as such, as there appears to be some question whether he or Mr. Zea actually holds this trust at the present moment, the latter having asked his recall from Europe some time ago on account of ill health, but now as it is understood intending to remain longer, his health having become better. Without deciding this point between them

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVII.

Mr. Echeverria is, at all events, a prominent citizen of his country having been selected as one of the deputies or commissioners sent by Colombia to Madrid last year, with proposals from his government to treat with Spain, on the basis of recognition, but to which, as is known, Spain utterly refused to accede. He expressed in a warm and feeling manner the satisfaction he had derived from the acknowledgement of the independence of his country by the United States, and requested my acceptance of a copy of the constitution of Colombia which has lately been republished in Paris, and which was rendered the more worthy to be accepted from having the President's message and the report of the committee of the house of representatives on the question of recognition, bound up with it. This volume, forwarded herewith, I ask leave to send to the department of state, having in my possession other copies of the instruments which it contains.

I must take occasion to mention, that after my despatch of the 24th of June,¹ I was deprived, by circumstances not in my power to controul, of all opportunity of seeing Mr. Zea, who has I believe since gone out of town.

The publick dinner given to this gentleman by the merchants of London on the tenth of this month, at which the duke of Somerset presided, and which was attended by several members of parliament without distinction of party—where amongst others of the group we saw Sir William Curtis ranged by the side of Sir James Macintosh,—carries with it stronger indications than are usually to be attached to festivals of this nature, and goes to show how impressive and loud publick opinion is becoming in this country in favor of South American independence. This voice will grow louder and louder, nor can it, I believe, be ultimately resisted by the government. In effect, the states of South America are already regarded by Great Britain as independent, for two acts of parliament have been passed by which commercial intercourse has been opened between them and every part of the British dominions. These acts [the] government will be in possession of through the parliamentary documents which are forwarded by this legation to the Treasury, as well as probably through the consul at this port, who mentioned to me that he has sent them.

I return to Mr. Echeverria. He informed me that he had had an interview with Lord Londonderry; but that he had in vain urged upon him the claims of Colombia to be recognized by this government. His Lordship said, that this was a measure into which Great Britain could not come consistently with what she owed to Spain. That Spain had been consulted respecting it, and had replied in a way which showed that she felt it to concern her interests and her rights that other nations should forbear to take such a step. Nor could Great Britain, he said, take it without the concurrence of France, and France was not prepared to lend her concurrence. Spain had also replied, that she had just despatched commissioners to her colonies,

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 782.

carrying out the most liberal offers of compromise, from which she still hoped for the best results, and which would serve to render but the more objectionable the interference of other Powers. Mr. Echeverria adverted to the fallacy of such hopes, and asked his Lordship whether this government would not use its influence to induce Spain herself to recognize the independence of the colonies as the best and only policy left to her. *His Lordship replied, that Great Britain would hold up this course to Spain.* He alluded to the recognition by the government of the United States, which, he remarked, stood upon a ground by itself, the United States having no European connexions to look to when determining upon such a policy, which was not the case with Great Britain. But whilst G^t. Britain could not justify to herself the political measure of formally recognizing the independence of those communities at present, his Lordship said, that it was her intention to maintain an unrestricted intercourse of commerce with them all, and of this intention Spain had been informed. I here mentioned to Mr. Echeverria the case of the *Lord Collingwood*, and asked if he ascertained from L^d Londonderry what Great Britain meant to do if Spain continued to capture British merchant vessels trading with those countries which Spain still assumed to treat as her colonies. He replied that his Lordship intimated, that as Great Britain would consider such a trade as regularly open to her merchants, she would sustain them in it.

The foregoing is the amount of what Mr. Echeverria told me. The *Lord Collingwood* it will be recollected was an English merchant vessel bound from Buenos Ayres to the Havannah with a cargo of hides. Pursuing this voyage, she was captured by a Spanish privateer, carried into Porto Rico and there condemned as good prize on the ground of trading with a Spanish colony, without a license from the king of Spain. A copy of the decree of condemnation in this case was sent to Lord Londonderry by Dr. Lushington, and its circumstances have been the subject of full remark in the house of commons.

Mr. Echeverria's interview with Lord Londonderry and his call upon me, were prior to the disclosures made as well by Lord Liverpool as Lord Londonderry in parliament on the same subject on the fifteenth and seventeenth instant. Taken together, they may be considered as affording a sufficiently satisfactory clue to the present feelings of this cabinet in relation to South American Independence. How much longer it will be able to withhold the formal recognition, and thus stand out against the importunities so universal of the commercial and manufacturing classes; against the just claims of those new states themselves, and against such cogent and irresistible appeals to the authority of public law and historical facts as were yesterday again made by Sir James Macintosh in the house of commons in support of those claims, time must show. These appeals are the more gratifying from following up as they do the grounds taken in the state papers of the United States.

As we have lately seen an important branch of the colonial policy of Britain, give way before the remonstrances of only her West India merchants and proprietors, it can scarcely be too much to imagine that we shall before very long behold her on this question of South America giving way to the universal demand of her merchants and manufacturers, backed too as their solicitations are by a commanding eloquence in her senate, and by the enlightened dictates of public opinion throughout the nation. To motives so powerful for fully acknowledging the independence of South America, her ministers have nothing to oppose but their connexions with the European Alliance, and their obligations to old Spain. From the trammels of the former it would be wise to extricate themselves, whilst it may be strongly suspected that their alleged delicacy towards Spain will not last longer than their hope of still seeing the ancient state of things brought back in that country. How far this hope will survive the events which have transpired at Madrid since the present month set in, we do not as yet know. In the meantime, British interests are suffering, and will probably continue more or less to suffer, as long as the full recognition is delayed. The journals of the day announce, that insurance upon ships from London to the ports of Colombia, cannot be effected at Lloyds but at great cost, and this not merely on account of the risk of capture from pirates in those seas, but also from Spanish ships of war and privateers. From these and other considerations we may infer, that British commerce with those new states will never have its full scope and fair advantage of competition, until their independence is completely acknowledged. If I have accurately understood Mr. Echeverria, and he in turn Lord Londonderry, it is plain that this government has taken in no ill part the act of recognition by the United States. It would seem that it is rather awake to the advantages of our situation which has enabled us to take our own measures freed from the incubus of the Holy Alliance. That Britain will take the step herself at a day not distant, is my confident belief, for whatever present excuses her statesmen may have laid hold of, I can scarcely believe it possible that they will not be roused to it by our rivalry, which they must be sensible will be rendered more formidable and dangerous by every hour of their procrastination.

Mr. Echeverria having had an object of his own in calling upon me, proceeded, after his other communications to state it. He said that he was about to set out for Paris in a few days, and requested that in the event of any despatches arriving for him in London during his absence, I would permit them to be forwarded to him in Paris, under cover of my seal to the minister of the United States in that capital. I replied that I feared they would have little additional security by this course, as I seldom wrote to Mr. Gallatin but by the mail, and it was well known that no seals, whether of foreign ministers or others, enjoyed much inviolability in the French post offices. He said that he believed the risk to his correspondence would be less if it could be put

under cover to our legation at Paris, to which I replied again that I would forward it in that manner, if Mr. Gallatin had no objections; but that as it was a measure which would concern him also, I could not make him a party to it without his consent. Something was said of special couriers, upon which I remarked that I had never yet had occasion to employ one in my correspondence with Paris. Mr. E. here upon asked whether I could employ one for his despatches, allowing him to be at the expense. I replied that such a course would be objectionable, but that if ever I found it necessary to employ one on the objects of my own government, I would send any letters addressed to him by the same conveyance, with Mr. Gallatin's concurrence, to whom I referred him, more especially as he would have an opportunity of consulting him at Paris. He then asked my permission to address a note to me embracing the request which he had made in person, adding that it was at the wish of his government that he had made it.

A copy of the note which he subsequently wrote to me, with a copy of my answer, is enclosed.¹ It appears that he had not conceived with entire accuracy what fell from me in conversation. I will either act in this matter on my own discretion henceforth, or receive any suggestions with which you may think it necessary to favor me.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

LONDON, July 26, 1822.

SIR: Mr. Zea called upon me this day. He confirms all that Mr. Echeverria told me respecting the views and intentions of this government on the question of South American independence. To repeat what he said, would therefore only be to go over again what is recounted in my last despatch,³ there having been a substantial and entire agreement in their communications to me. Those of Mr. Zea have, if any thing, been given with rather the most strength. He says that Lord Londonderry explicitly remarked, that Great Britain would not carry her consideration for Spain so far as to postpone too long her rights of acting as she might think fit; in other words, as the sentiment may be understood, that she will acknowledge the independence of the colonies after a little more formality, whatever may be the conduct or opinions of Spain in relation to the subject. Mr. Zea also represents Lord Londonderry as saying, that this court would strongly advise Spain herself to recognize the

¹ Not printed in this collection.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVII.

³ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 783.

colonies, and thus free the powers of Europe from all further embarrassment upon the occasion.

I collected from Mr. Zea that he, and not Mr. Echeverria, is the actual representative of Colombia at the present juncture. This may render unnecessary all notice of what I have written concerning the despatches of the latter. Should any similar requests ever be made to me by any of the representatives of these our new sister republics, whilst they remain unacknowledged in Europe, I shall feel a disposition to do what courtesy demands, without however going further than my proper duties to my own government will warrant. I shall, at the least, be ever disposed to extend to them as much accommodation in this line, as I have myself received from members of the resident diplomattick corps, from time to time since I have been in London.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *August 27, 1822.*

To all that is said in your number 58,² respecting Mr. Ravenga, I will take care to pay special attention, so as to execute as far as circumstances may allow, the President's desire in the spirit that it is conveyed to me. As yet I have not seen, or heard of this gentleman's arrival, in this capital. Mr. Echeverria, and Mr. Zea, both called upon me, as I have mentioned in former communications. The latter still claims, as I understand, to be considered the representative of Colombia. Heretofore there has been some difficulty in ascertaining with precision who has filled this trust, from the circumstance of that new Republick not being acknowledged here; but your despatch becomes full authority to me that it is in Mr. Ravenga's hands, and I will act accordingly.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVII.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 111, Adams to Rush, July 24, 1822.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, October 12, 1822.

On the eighth instant, Mr. Garcia and General Paroissien, the Peruvian envoys mentioned in my number 267,² waited upon me. They did not lay before me any complaints whatever respecting our naval officers in the Pacific, or any other of our officers or citizens residing in Peru or Chili, or trading there. They confined their visit, for this time, to one of personal and official civility, making it the occasion of expressing their gratitude and thankfulness to the United States for acknowledging the independence of their country. I gathered from them that their hopes of a speedy recognition by this government are not sanguine; yet they think the prospect better since Mr. Canning's appointment, than before. On what ground they rest this hope I know not, unless it be that Mr. Canning's long connexion with Liverpool, as the representative in parliament of that town, may be thought to have predisposed him to a participation in the sympathies of its commercial population upon this question. Mr. Garcia apologized for the medals he had sent me.³ I said to him, that the last gift of this kind which I had declined previously to his, was that of a coronation medal, set apart for my acceptance by one of the officers of this government on the occasion of the king's coronation last year; and that I was bound on such a point as this to look upon all foreign states in the same light, that of Great Britain and that of Peru, the latter being now in the eyes of my government, sovereign and independent like the former. The explanation being offered in a friendly and conciliating spirit, was so received,—a spirit which marked the whole conversation of both these gentlemen during the half hour they sat with me. I returned their visit on the following day, and shall omit no opportunity within my power of keeping up good will between us. I distinctly said to them, that it fell within the desire of the President, that I should use such endeavours as circumstances might justify in my intercourse with this court, to dispose it towards a recognition of the independence of their country, for I consider what is said in your number 58⁴ in regard to Colombia, as in its spirit extending to the other states of South America, comprehended in the President's message. They seemed to be sensible of the benefits which our act of recognition has already conferred upon the cause of South American freedom and independence throughout the world, and received with satisfaction this assurance from me, that the President did not cease to take an active interest in it.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVIII.

² Not printed in this collection.

³ See below, pt. VIII, doc. 787.

⁴ See above, pt. I, doc. 111, Adams to Rush, July 24, 1822.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *March 20, 1823.*

SIR: Mr. Garcia del Rio, one of the envoys from Peru, whose name I have mentioned to you in communications² at a former period, has given into my care, for the government of the United States, a medal struck to commemorate the Independence of Lima. In compliance with his request, having heretofore informed him that I could not accept such gifts myself, I now transmit this medal to your hands. It is enclosed in this despatch and I hope will reach you safely. I send also from Mr. Garcia, four pamphlets on Peruvian affairs, two of which he designs for the President, and two for your acceptance.

A conspicuous journal here, the Morning Chronicle, intimated a week ago that this government was upon the eve of recognizing the Independence of Colombia. I can only say that if this be the case I have heard nothing of it through any other channel, nor has Mr. Ravenga. This gentleman has not yet had an interview with Mr. Canning, or any other member of this government, nor does he know at present when one will be granted him.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *August 19, 1823.*

SIR: When my interview with Mr. Canning on Saturday was about to close, I transiently asked him whether, notwithstanding the late news from Spain, we might not still hope that the Spaniards would get the better of all their difficulties. I had allusion to the defection of Ballasteros, in Andalusia, an event seeming to threaten with new dangers the constitutional cause. His reply was general, importing nothing more than his opinion of the increased difficulties and dangers with which, undoubtedly, this event was calculated to surround the Spanish cause.

Pursuing the topick of Spanish affairs, I remarked that should France

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXVIII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 786, Rush to Adams, October 12, 1822.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

ultimately effect her purposes in Spain, there was at least the consolation left, that Great Britain would not allow her to go farther and lay her hands upon the Spanish colonies, bringing them too under her grasp. I here had in my mind the sentiments promulgated upon this subject in Mr. Canning's note to the British ambassador at Paris of the 31st of March, during the negotiations that preceded the invasion of Spain. It will be recollected that the British government say in this note, that time and the course of events appeared to have substantially decided the question of the separation of these colonies from the mother country, although their formal recognition as independent states by Gt. Britain might be hastened or retarded by external circumstances, as well as by the internal condition of those new states themselves; and that as his Britannic majesty disclaimed all intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, he was also satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of them under *her* dominion, either by conquest, or by cession from Spain.

By this we are to understand, in terms sufficiently distinct, that Great Britain would not be passive under such an attempt by France, and Mr. Canning, on my having referred to this note, asked me what I thought my government would say to going hand in hand with his, in the same sentiment; not as he added that any concert in action under it, could become necessary between the two countries, but that the simple fact of our being known to hold the same sentiment would, he had no doubt, by its moral effect, put down the intention on the part of France, admitting that she should ever entertain it. This belief was founded he said upon the large share of the maritime power of the world which Gt. Britain and the United States shared between them, and the consequent influence which the knowledge that they held a common opinion upon a question on which such large maritime interests, present and future, hung, could not fail to produce upon the rest of the world.

I replied, that in what manner my government would look upon such a suggestion, I was unable to say, but that I would communicate it in the same informal manner in which he threw it out. I said, however, that I did not think I should do so with full advantage, unless he would at the same time enlighten me as to the precise situation in which His Majesty's government stood at this moment in relation to those new states, and especially on the material point of their own independence.

He replied that Great Britain certainly never again intended to lend her instrumentality or aid, whether by mediation or otherwise, towards making up the dispute between Spain and her colonies; but that if this result could still be brought about, she would not interfere to *prevent* it. Upon my intimating that I had supposed that all idea of Spain ever recovering her authority over the colonies had long since gone by, he explained by saying

that he did not mean to controvert that opinion, for he too believed that the day had arrived when all America might be considered as lost to Europe, so far as the tie of political dependence was concerned. All that he meant was, that if Spain and the colonies should still be able to bring the dispute, not yet totally extinct between them, to a close upon terms satisfactory to both sides, and which should at the same time secure to Spain commercial or other advantages not extended to other nations, that Great Britain would not object to a compromise in this spirit of preference to Spain. All that she would ask would be, to stand upon as favoured a footing as any other nation after Spain. Upon my again alluding to the improbability of the dispute ever settling down now even upon this basis, he said that it was not his intention to maintain such a position, and that he had expressed himself as above rather for the purpose of indicating the feeling which this cabinet still had towards Spain in relation to the controversy, than of predicting results.

Wishing, however, to be still more specifically informed, I asked whether Great Britain was at this moment taking any step, or contemplating any, which had reference to the recognition to those states, this being the point in which we felt the chief interest.

He replied that she had taken none whatever, as yet, but was upon the eve of taking one, not final, but preparatory, and which would still leave her at large to recognize or not according to the position of events at a future period. The measure in question was, to send out one or more individuals under authority from this government to South America, not strictly diplomatic, but clothed with powers in the nature of a commission of inquiry, and which in short he described as analagous to those exercised by our commissioners in 1817; and that upon the result of this commission much might depend as to the ulterior conduct of Gt. Britain. I asked whether I was to understand that it would comprehend all the new states, or which of them; to which he replied that, for the present it would be limited to Mexico.

Reverting to his first idea he again said, that he hoped that France would not, should even events in the Peninsula be favorable to her, extend her views to South America for the purpose of reducing the colonies, nominally perhaps for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her own; but that in case she should meditate such a policy, he was satisfied that the knowledge of the United States being opposed to it as well as Gt. Britain, could not fail to have its influence in checking her steps. In this way he thought good might be done by prevention, and peaceful prospects all round increased. As to the form in which such knowledge might be made to reach France, and even the other powers of Europe, he said in conclusion that that might probably be arranged in a manner that would be free from objection.

I again told him that I would convey his suggestions to you for the information of the President, and impart to him whatever reply I might

receive. My own inference rather is, that his proposition was a fortuitous one; yet he entered into it I thought with some interest, and appeared to receive with a corresponding satisfaction the assurance I gave him that it should be made known to the President. I did not feel myself at liberty to express any opinion unfavorable to it, and was as careful to give none in its favor.

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*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Private & confidential.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 20, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: Before leaving Town, I am desirous of bringing before you in a more distinct, but still in an unofficial and confidential, shape, the question which we shortly discussed the last time that I had the pleasure of seeing you.

Is not the moment come when our Governments might understand each other as to the Spanish American Colonies? And if we can arrive at such an understanding, would it not be expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed?

For ourselves we have no disguise.

1. We conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the Recognition of them, as Independent States, to be one of time and circumstances.
3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them, and the mother country by amicable negotiation.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with indifference.

If these opinions and feelings are as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other; and to declare them in the face of the world?

If there be any European Power which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enterprize for reducing the Colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain; or which meditates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest; such a declaration on the part of your government and ours would be at once the most effectual and

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, August 23, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 791.

the least offensive mode of intimating our joint disapprobation of such projects.

It would at the same time put an end to all the jealousies of Spain with respect to her remaining Colonies—and to the agitation which prevails in those Colonies, an agitation which it would be but humane to allay; being determined (as we are) not to profit by encouraging it.—

Do you conceive that under the power which you have recently received, you are authorized to enter into negotiation, and to sign any Convention upon this subject? Do you conceive, if that be not within your competence, you could exchange with me ministerial notes upon it?

Nothing could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in such a work, and, I am persuaded, there has seldom, in the history of the world, occurred an opportunity, when so small an effort, of two friendly Governments, might produce so unequivocal a good and prevent such extensive calamities.

I shall be absent from London but three weeks at the utmost: but never so far distant, but that I can receive and reply to any communication, within three or four days.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

LONDON, August 23, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: Your unofficial and confidential note of the 20th instant² reached me yesterday, and has commanded from me all the reflection due to the interest of its subject, and to the friendly spirit of confidence upon which it is so emphatically founded.

The government of the United States having, in the most formal manner, acknowledged the independence of the late Spanish provinces in America, desires nothing more anxiously than to see this independence maintained with stability, and under auspices that may promise prosperity and happiness to these new states themselves, as well as advantage to the rest of the world. As conducing to these great ends, my government has always desired, and still desires, to see them received into the family of nations by the powers of Europe, and especially, I may add, by Great Britain.

My government is also under a sincere conviction, that the epoch has arrived when the interests of humanity and justice, as well as all other interests would be essentially subserved by the general recognition of these states.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, August 23, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 791.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 789.

Making these remarks, I believe I may confidently say, that the sentiments unfolded in your note are fully those which belong also to my government.

It conceives the recovery of the colonies by Spain, to be hopeless.

It would throw no impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country, by amicable negotiation—supposing an arrangement of this nature to be possible.

It does not aim at the possession of any portion of those communities, for or on behalf of the United States.

It would regard as highly unjust, and fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession of them by conquest, or by cession; or on any ground or pretext whatever.

But, in what manner my government might deem it expedient to avow these principles and feelings, or express its disapprobation of such projects as the last, are points which none of my instructions, or the power which I have recently received, embrace; and they involve I am forced to add considerations of too much delicacy for me to act upon them in advance.

It will yield me particular pleasure to be the organ of promptly causing to be brought under the notice of the President, the opinions and views of which you have made me the depository upon this subject, and I am of nothing more sure than that he will fully appreciate their intrinsic interest, and not less the frank and friendly feelings towards the United States in which they have been conceived and communicated to me on your part.

Nor, do I take too much upon myself, when I anticipate the peculiar satisfaction the President will also derive from the intimation which you have not scrupled to afford me, as to the just and liberal determinations of His Majesty's government, in regard to the colonies which still remain to Spain.

With a full reciprocation of the personal cordiality which your note also breathes, and begging you to accept [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, August 23, 1823.

SIR: I yesterday received from Mr. Canning a note headed "private and confidential" setting before me in a more distinct form the proposition respecting South America affairs, which he communicated to me in conversa-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

tion, on the 16th, as already reported in my number 323.¹ Of his note² I lose no time in transmitting a copy for your information, as well as a copy of my answer² to it written and sent this day.

In shaping the answer on my own judgment alone, I feel that I have had a task of some embarrassment to perform, and shall be happy if it receives the President's approbation.

I believe that this government has the subject of Mr. Canning's proposition much at heart, and certainly his note bears, upon the face of it, a character of cordiality towards the government of the United States which cannot escape notice.

I have therefore thought it proper to impart to my note a like character, and to meet the points laid down in his, as far as I could, consistently with other and paramount considerations.

These I conceived to be chiefly twofold; first the danger of pledging my government to any measure or course of policy which might in any degree, now or hereafter, implicate it in the federative system of Europe; and, secondly, I have felt myself alike without warrant to take a step which might prove exceptionable in the eyes of France, with whom our pacifick and friendly relations remain I presume undisturbed, whatever may be our speculative abhorrence of her attack upon the liberties of Spain.

In framing my answer, I had also to consider what was due to Spain herself, and I hope that I have not overlooked what was due to the colonies.

The whole subject is open to views on which my mind has deliberated anxiously. If the matter of my answer shall be thought to bear properly upon motives and considerations which belong most materially to the occasion, it will be a source of great satisfaction to me.

The tone of earnestness in Mr. Canning's note and the force of some of his expressions, naturally start the inference that the British cabinet cannot be without its serious apprehensions that ambitious enterprises are meditated against the independence of the South American states. Whether by France alone, I cannot now say, on any authentick grounds.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 788, Rush to Adams, August 19, 1823.

² See above, pt. VIII, docs. 789 and 790, Canning to Rush, August 20, and Rush to Canning, August 23, 1823.

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Private & confidential.

LIVERPOOL, August 23, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: Since I wrote to you on the 20th,² an additional motive has occurred for wishing that we might be able to come to some understanding on the part of our respective Governments on the subject of my letter; to come to it soon, and to be at liberty to announce it to the world.

It is this. I have received notice, but not such a notice as imposes upon me the necessity of any immediate answer or proceeding—that so soon as the military objects in Spain are achieved (of which the French expect, how justly I know not a very speedy achievement) a proposal will be made for a Congress, or some less formal concert and consultation, specially upon the affairs of Spanish America.

I need not point out to you all the complications to which this proposal, however dealt with by us, may lead.

Pray receive this communication in the same confidence with the former; and believe me with great truth [etc.].

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*³

LONDON, August 27, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 23d,⁴ dated at Liverpool, got to hand yesterday, and I perceive in its contents new motives for attaching importance to the subject to which it relates.

In the note which I had the honor to address to you on the 23rd, two principal ideas have place.

1. That the government of the United States earnestly desires to see maintained, permanently, the independence of the late Spanish provinces in America.

2. That it would view with uneasiness any attempt on the part of the powers of Europe to intrench upon that independence.

I will add, in the present note, that my government would view with like

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, August 28, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 794.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 789.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, August 28, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 794.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 792.

uneasiness any interference whatever, by the powers of Europe in the affairs of those new states, unsolicited by the latter and against their will. It would regard the convening of a congress, for example, at this period of time, to deliberate upon their affairs, as a measure uncalled for, and indicative of a policy highly unfriendly to the tranquillity of the world. It could never look with insensibility upon such an exercise of European jurisdiction over communities now of right exempt from it, and entitled to regulate their own concerns unmolested from abroad. In speaking thus, I am entirely confident that I do nothing more than strictly interpret the opinions of my government, and of the whole people of the United States. It is only as to the mode in which the former might choose to give expression to its strong disapprobation of such enterprizes, that my instructions at this moment, as I think, fail me.

If you suppose any of the sentiments of this, or my preceding, note,¹ susceptible of being moulded by me into a form promising to achieve the object proposed in your note of the 20th, or make² any useful approximation to it, I shall be most happy to take into consideration whatever suggestions you may favor me with, towards this end, either immediately in writing, or in the more unreserved intercourse of conversation when you return to town, being in this respect altogether at your disposal.

I will, for the present, only add, that could His Majesty's government see fit to consider the time *now* arrived for a full acknowledgment of the independence of the South American states by Great Britain, it is my unequivocal belief, entertained not on light grounds, that it would accelerate the steps of my government in a course of policy intimated as being common to this government, for the welfare of those states. It would also naturally place *me* in a new position in my further conferences with you, upon this interesting subject.

Begging to assure you that the notes with which you favor me are treated in the spirit of confidence with which they are written, I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*³

LONDON, *August 28, 1823.*

SIR: Since my last despatch, I have received a second confidential note⁴ from Mr. Canning, dated at Liverpool, the 23rd, a copy of which and of my

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 790, Rush to Canning, August 23, 1823.

² *Ibid.*, 789.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 792.

answer,¹ dated yesterday, are enclosed. The subject of our correspondence being, as appears to me, of deep interest, I think proper to apprise you of it from step to step, without waiting for the further developments to which it may possibly lead. I hence hope that this communication will be in time to accompany my last, in the packet ship that will leave Liverpool on the first of September.

Mr. Canning having now distinctly informed me, that he has received notice of measures being in projection by the powers of Europe relative to the affairs of Spanish America, as soon as the French succeed in their military movements in Spain,—which it would seem they expect soon to do,—I cannot avoid seeing this subject under the complications to which Mr. Canning alludes.

My first object will be to urge upon this government the obvious expediency of an immediate and unreserved recognition of the independence of the South American states.

It will be seen by my note to Mr. Canning of yesterday, that I have made a beginning in this work, and, should the opportunity be afforded me, it is my intention to follow it up zealously.

Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, *if the recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay*, I am, on my part, prepared to make a declaration in the name of my government that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is, that I will make this declaration, explicitly, and avow it before the world.

I am not unaware of the responsibility which I should, by such a measure, assume upon myself. My reasons for assuming it, I have not, at present, the leisure to recount with the requisite fulness. The leading ones would be, in brief, as follow:

1. I may thereby aid in achieving an immediate and positive good to those rising states in our hemisphere; for such I should conceive their recognition at this juncture by Great Britain, in itself, to be.

2. Such recognition, cooperating with the declaration which this government has already in effect made, that it will not look quietly on if Spanish America is attacked, and followed up by a similar (though not joint) declaration from me that neither will the United States, would prove at least a probable means of warding off the attack. The minister of foreign affairs of this government, it appears, is under a strong persuasion that it would forestall it, and this without the recognition by England being, as yet, a part of his case.

3. Should the issue of things be different, and events notwithstanding arise threatening the peace of the United States, or otherwise seriously to commit them, under such a declaration from me, it would still remain with the wisdom of my government to disavow my conduct, as I should manifestly have

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 793.

acted without its previous warrant, though hoping for its subsequent sanction. I would take to myself all the reproach, consoled if not justified under the desire that had animated me to render benefits of great magnitude to the cause of South American independence and freedom at a point of time, which, if lost, was not to be regained; and believing that, at all events, I should have rendered some benefits to it, in being instrumental towards accelerating the recognition by Great Britain.

My conduct might be disavowed in any issue of the transaction, and I should still not be left without a hope, that the President would see in it proofs of good intention, mixed with a zeal for the advancement of great political interests, not appearing at the moment, to be indifferent ultimately to the welfare of the United States themselves.

The result of my reasoning in a word then, is, that I find myself placed in a situation in which, by deciding and acting promptly, I may do much publick good, whilst publick mischiefs may be arrested by the controuling hand of my government, should my conduct be likely to draw any down.

I conclude with the usual assurances [etc.].

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*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Private & confidential.

STORRS, WESTMORLAND, August 31, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: I have now to acknowledge the receipt of your answer to both my letters; & whatever may be the practical result of our confidential communication, it is an unmixed satisfaction to me that the spirit in which it began on my part, has been met so cordially on yours.

To a practical result eminently beneficial I see no obstacle; except in your want of specific powers, & in the delay which may intervene before you can procure them; & during which events may get before us.

Had you felt yourself authorized to entertain any formal propositions, and to decide upon it, without reference home, I would immediately have taken measures for assembling my Colleagues in London, upon my return, in order to be enabled to submit to you as the *act* of my government, all that I have stated to you as my own *sentiments* & theirs. But with such a delay in prospect, I think I should hardly be justified in proposing to bind ourselves to any thing positively, & unconditionally; and think on the other hand that a proposition *qualified* either in respect to the contingency of your concurrence

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, September 8, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 796.

in it, or with reference to possible change of circumstances, would want the decision & frankness which I should wish to mark our proceeding.

Not that I anticipate any change of circumstances, which could vary the views opened to you in my first letter:—nor that, after what you have written to me in return, I apprehend any essential dissimilarity of views on the part of your Government.

But *we* must not place ourselves in a position, in which, if called upon from other quarters for an opinion, we cannot give a clear & definite account not only of what we think & feel, but of what we have done or are doing, upon the matter in question. To be able to say, in answer to such an appeal, that the U^d. States & Great Britain concur in thinking so & so—would be well. To anticipate any such appeal by a voluntary declaration to the same effect would be still better. But to have to say that we are in communication with the U. States, but have no conclusive understanding with them, would be inconvenient—Our free agency would thus be fettered with respect to other powers; while our agreement with you would be yet unascertained.

What appears to me, therefore, the most advisable is that you should see in my unofficial communication enough hope of good to warrant you in requiring Powers & Instructions from your Government on this point, in addition to the others upon which you have recently been instructed & empowered; treating that communication *not* as a proposition made to you, but as the evidence of the nature of a proposition which it would have been my desire to make to you, if I had found you provided with authority to entertain it.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, *September 8, 1823.*

SIR: I yesterday received another confidential note from Mr. Canning, dated the thirty first of August, a copy² of which I have the honor to enclose herewith for the President's information.

From this note it would appear, that Mr. Canning is not prepared to pledge this government to an immediate recognition of the independence of the South American states. I shall renew to him a proposition to this effect when we meet; but should he continue to draw back from it, I shall on my part not act upon the overture contained in his first note, not feeling myself at liberty to accede to them in the name of my government, but upon the basis of an equivalent. This equivalent as I now view the subject could be

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 795.

nothing less than the immediate and full acknowledgment of those states, or some of them, by Gt. Britain.

I shall send this despatch by this evening's mail to Liverpool, and have reason to hope that it will go in a ship that sails on the eighth, whereby there will have been not a moment's delay in putting you in possession of all the correspondence that has passed between Mr. Canning and me, or that now seems likely to pass, upon this delicate subject. I cannot help thinking, however, that its apparent urgency may, after all, be lessened by the turn which we may yet witness in affairs, military and political, in Spain.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, September 19, 1823.

SIR: Mr. Secretary Canning returned to town about a week ago, and I had an interview with him yesterday at the foreign office, at his request.

He entered at once upon the subject of Spanish America, remarking that he thought it claimed precedence, at present, over all others between us. Military events in the Peninsula seemed every day to be drawing nearer to a crisis in favor of the French arms, and the political arrangements projected afterwards, would, there was good reason to suppose, be immediately directed to the affairs of the late colonies. He would therefore not give up the hope, notwithstanding the footing upon which this subject appeared to be placed at the close of our recent correspondence, that I might yet see my way towards a substantial acquiescence in his proposals. They were hourly acquiring new importance and urgency under aspects that neither of our governments could be insensible to.

Having perceived, since we had last been together, the publication in the newspapers of the correspondence between a portion of the merchants of London and the foreign office, respecting the appointment of consuls, or commercial agents, for the South American states, I asked Mr. Canning whether I was to infer that this government was speedily about to adopt such a measure, to which he replied in the affirmative, saying that commercial agents would certainly be soon appointed, and sent out to the proper ports in those quarters.

As to the proposals he had submitted to me, I said that I was sure that he would himself appreciate the delicacy of the ground upon which I stood. The United States, it was true, would view any attempt on the part of France and

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

the continental alliance to re-subjugate those new states, as a transcendent act of national injustice, and indicative of a progressive and most alarming ambition. Yet, to join Great Britain in a declaration to this effect might lay them open in some respects to consequences upon the character and extent of which it became my duty to reflect with great caution, before I made up my mind to meet the responsibilities of them. The value of the declaration, it was agreed, would depend upon its being formally made known to Europe. Would not such a step wear the appearance of the United States implicating themselves in the political connexions of Europe? Would it not be acceding, in this instance at least, to the policy of one of its leading powers in opposition to the projects avowed by other powers? This heretofore had been no part of the system of the United States. Their foreign policy had been essentially bottomed on the maxim of keeping peace and harmony with all powers, without offending any. Upon the institutions as upon the dissensions of foreign nations, the government and the people of the United States might have, and might express, their speculative opinions; but it had been no part of their past conduct to interfere with the one, or, being unmolested themselves, to become parties to the other. In this broad principle laid one of my difficulties under his proposals.

He replied, that however just such a policy might have been formerly, or might continue to be as a general policy, he apprehended that powerful and controuling circumstances made it inapplicable on the present occasion. The question was a new and a complicated one in modern affairs. It was also, to the full, as much American as European, to say no more. It concerned the United States under interests as immediate and commanding, as it did or could any of the states of Europe. They (the United States) were the first power established on that continent, and now confessedly the leading power. They were connected with Spanish America by their position, as with Europe by their relations. They also stood connected with these new states by political relations. Was it possible that they could see with indifference their fate decided upon by Europe? Could Europe expect this indifference? Had not a new epoch arrived in the relative position of the United States towards Europe, which Europe must acknowledge? Were the great political and commercial interests which hung upon the destinies of the new continent, to be canvassed and adjusted in this hemisphere without the cooperation or even knowledge of the United States? Were they to be canvassed and adjusted, he would add, without some proper understanding between the United States and Great Britain, as the two chief commercial and maritime states of both worlds? He hoped not, he would wish to persuade himself not. Such was the tenor of his remarks. I said, that his suggestions were not unworthy of great consideration, and that such and others of the same nature would probably not escape the attention of my government. There might, I was aware, be room for thinking, that the late formation of these

new states would impose new political duties upon the United States, not merely as coupled with the great cause of national justice and freedom, but as more closely coupled with their own present and future interests, and with the very existence finally of their own institutions. That I might, perhaps, speaking for myself as an individual, be able to imagine that the expression of a voice by the United States, upon the destinies of these states, admitting that the powers of Europe usurped a right to bring them under deliberation, would imply no real departure from the principles that had heretofore regulated their foreign intercourse, or pledge them henceforth to the federative or political connexions of the old world. If, too, that voice happened to be in unison with the voice of Great Britain, I admitted that it might prove but the more auspicious to the common object which both nations had in view, without committing either to any systematick or ulterior concert. But I said, that as the question of the United States expressing this voice, and promulgating it under official authority to the powers of Europe, was one of novelty as well as magnitude in their history, it was for my government and not for me to decide upon it. Concomitant and after-duties of a grave and momentous character might be bound up in such a step. I was willing to take upon myself any fair responsibility growing out of the station which I hold under the confidence of my government. But here was a case wholly new, and not seeming to fall within the range of any of the contingent or discretionary duties that could have been in contemplation when I was clothed with my commission. For meeting a case thus extraordinary, if I could do so at all, I ought to have some justification beyond any that had yet been laid before me. Such was my opinion; such the conclusion to which I had been forced to come after full and anxious reflection.

He said that the case being new, might serve to account for my not being in possession of previous or specifick powers respecting it, but that its very nature seemed to preclude delay. He had the strongest reasons for believing, that the cooperation of the United States with England through my instrumentality, afforded with promptitude, would ward off altogether the meditated jurisdiction of the European powers over the affairs of the new world. Delay this cooperation until I could receive specifick powers, and the day might go by; the progress of events was rapid; the evil might come on. A portion of it might and probably would be consummated, and if Great Britain could by herself afterwards arrest it, there was at least more of uncertainty in this, besides that preventive measures were always, whether on the score of humanity or efficacy, preferable to those that were remedial. Why then should the United States whose institutions always, and whose policy in this instance, approximated them so much more closely to Great Britain than to any other power in Europe, hesitate to act with her to promote a common object approved alike by both; to achieve a common good estimated alike by both? To this effect did he express himself, amplifying his ideas of which I present

but the substance and outline. He finished by saying, that his station and duties as the organ of this government would oblige him to call upon me in another way, if I continued to feel unable to assent to his past proposals; for, said he, "if a congress be in fact assembled on the affairs of Spanish America, I shall ask that you, as the representative of the United States at this court, be invited to attend it. If you are not invited, I shall reserve to myself the option of determining whether or not Great Britain will send a representative to it. If you are invited and refuse to go, I shall still reserve to myself the same option. Hence you see the complication of the whole subject; hence you see how essential it is, in the opinion of Great Britain, that the United States should not be left out of view, if Europe determine to take cognizance of the subject." These last declarations could not fail to make an impression upon me, and I give them as nearly as may be in his own words.

The complication of the subject said I, continuing the discussion, may be cured at once, and by Great Britain. Let Great Britain immediately and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states. This will put an end to all difficulty. The moment is auspicious, every thing invites to the measure, justice, expediency, humanity; the repose of the world, the cause of national independence, the prosperity and happiness of both hemispheres. Let Britain but adopt this measure—so just in itself, so recommended by the point of time before us—the cause of all Spanish America triumphs. The European congress may meet afterwards, if it sees fit!

He said that such a measure was open to objection, but asked if he was to understand that it would make any difference in my powers or conduct.

I replied, the greatest difference. I had frankly told him that I had no powers that would cover my consent to his proposals in the shape that he had first made them to me. I would as frankly say, that I had no specifick powers to consent to them coupled with the fact of this government acknowledging at once the independence of Spanish America. But, this being done, I would stand upon my general powers. I had no hesitation in saying that, under their warrant, I would put forth with Great Britain the declaration to which he had invited me; that I would do so in the name of my government, and consent to its being promulgated, with all the present validity that I could give it, to the world. I had carefully examined all my instructions for years past bearing either directly or remotely on the great cause of these states. I saw in them all, so steady and so strong a desire for the firm establishment of their freedom and independence; I saw, too, sometimes in their letter and always in their spirit, so concurrent a desire to see their independence acknowledged by Great Britain, that I would not scruple, on seeing the latter event brought about, to lend my official name, as far as it could go, to the course which he had proposed, and count upon my government stamping with its subsequent sanction the part which I acted. If I could be in any degree instrumental towards accelerating this acknowledgment, I should feel that I

had achieved a great and positive good. Upon British recognition hung, not indeed the final, but perhaps in an eminent degree the present tranquility and happiness of those states. Their final safety was not, as I believed, at the mercy of European dictation; but we could not disguise that it might prolong their sufferings, and throw fresh clouds over all their prospects. It was in this manner that I expressed myself, displaying to him with entire candour my feelings and determinations, as well as the precise ground upon which the steps that I took, whatever they might be, would rest.

He said that among the objections to recognizing at present, was still that of the uncertain condition, internally, of these new states, or, at any rate, of some of them. He had, for example, sent an agent in January last to Mexico, supposing that Iturbide was at the head of affairs; but by the time he had arrived, a fresh revolution had set up other representatives of the executive power. The same internal vicissitudes were to be remarked in others of these communities, more to the south.

Another objection he said was started by the circumstances of this very Colombian loan, which had created so much agitation on the stock exchange of London for a twelvemonth past. It was true, that as this subject actually stood, the British Government owed no obligation to those British subjects who had embarked their money in an adventure of the safety of which they had themselves chosen to be the judges. But suppose the recognition to have been made by Great Britain sometime ago, as was wished, and the loan to have followed, would not the duty of countenance and protection have attached, and might not this serve to portray the hazards of coming too hastily into relations with distant states whose credit or whose means, in their dealings with the subjects of other nations, did not as yet appear to rest on any sure or adequate foundations?

Respecting the latter topick I replied, that it was beyond my competence to disentangle all its details. All I could say was, that the government of Colombia as far as I was informed had fallen into no departure from good faith in the transaction, and it yet remained to be known whether it would not in the end give satisfaction to all the parties concerned. But, far from an obstacle in the way of recognizing, it appeared to me that the incident fairly led to different conclusions; for had Colombia at the period of the loan been admitted to regular relations with this government, it is to be presumed that the powers of her diplomattick agents would have been open to other examinations than they appear to have received, and the whole transaction thus been freed from the subsequent embarrassments which surrounded it.

As to internal vicissitudes, I remarked that the dilemma thence arising was not greater than had been witnessed in France from time to time during a period of more than twenty years, than had been seen in Naples since, or than was experienced at this very moment by Britain herself in her diplomattick intercourse with Portugal and Spain. Had we not seen revolutions

and counter-revolutions, royal governments, constitutional governments, regencies, succeeding each other almost day by day in the oldest countries of Europe, whose affairs too were still as unsettled as when these commotions began? Why then be surprised at changes in the new world? Besides, these changes would be likely to be largely if not entirely checked by the fact of the new states being recognized by Europe. This would give stability to their institutions, and, by breaking down the hopes of the discontented and the factions amongst themselves, become the sure guarantees of their greater internal prosperity and repose. What proofs had they not given of military power? What proofs were they not giving of political wisdom? Look at Buenos Ayres, that as long ago as 1807 could repulse the well-appointed legions of Britain herself. Look at Colombia,—she was at this moment, at one and the same time, laying the ground work of a confederacy for all Spanish America, and by her auxiliary veterans marched into Peru, upholding the cause of emancipation upon that shore. Every thing attested the reality of that emancipation. It was irrevocable. Spain might go on with her languid efforts and protract, through her delusion, the miseries of war. But over Spanish American independence, she had no longer any controul—Europe had no controul. It was a question forever settled. It would soon be seen by Britain, that the United States, in their proposals for adjusting with Russia, and with Britain, the respective pretensions of the three powers on the coasts of the Pacific, were forced to take for granted the independence of all the late colonies of Spain on that continent, as the inevitable basis of all just and practical negotiation. Their independence was, in fine, the new political element of modern times and must henceforth pervade the political arrangements of both worlds. Why then should Britain longer forbear to acknowledge this independence? She had already done so in effect; why should she not in form? She had, by her solemn statutes, made her trade with those new states lawful; she had stood ready to support that trade with her squadrons; she was on the eve of sending out commercial agents to reside in some or all of them, as the guardians of British interests; all this she had done, and more. She had even declared in her state papers, that the question of their independence was *substantially decided* though the *formal recognition* of it might indeed be retarded, or be *hastened*, by external circumstances. What external circumstances *could be imagined* more imperious for hastening this formal recognition than the present, when Spain is seen to be doubly incapacitated from regaining dominion over these states, and continental Europe actually meditating such unwarrantable designs upon them?

It was thus that I endeavoured to develope what I suppose to be the views and convictions of the President upon this important subject. Our conversation was prolonged to a couple of hours, and, although informal, was, I need not say, of extraordinary interest. It was characterised by the freedom

with which I have reported it. In condensing it within the limits of these sheets, I can only hope that I have faithfully preserved its material points. I do not flatter myself with any sanguine belief, that this government will be prepared to yield to my appeals in favor of immediate recognition; but I am to have another interview with Mr. Canning some day next week, or the week after, which he is yet to name, and I can only say that I will zealously renew and extend these appeals as opportunities may be fitly afforded me.

Not knowing what other topics might have been handled at our interview yesterday, I had carried several of my papers with me, and amongst them a copy of your despatch number seventy one.¹ I was glad that I had done so, for thinking that the sentiments which it expresses on the value of the existing and prospective concord between the two countries, were in unison with the spirit of parts of our conversation, I did not scruple to read to him before we separated its introductory pages. He was alike struck with their applicability, and I flatter myself that so opportune an exhibition to him of these sentiments so recently conveyed to me from the high source of my government, may not be without its uses.

Should a congress be assembled under the guilty intention and hope of crushing South American freedom, and I receive an invitation to it, I shall not go, though the time for me to say so will not arrive until the invitation comes. For, first, I have no warrant from the President for such a step. Next, I infer from Mr. Canning's intimations, that Great Britain will send no representative to it, should the United States have none there. I should in this manner, by my absence, do more good than I possibly could by my presence. It is thus that I already make known my contingent determinations upon events that are contingent!

Mr. Canning was not, as it appeared, aware until yesterday, that I was prepared to come into his views, on condition of this government immediately and formally recognizing the new states. I had intended that the concluding sentence of my note² to him of the twenty seventh of August should start this idea to his mind, though I had designedly abstained from putting it forth more openly at that period of our correspondence.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ Not printed.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 793.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, October 2, 1823.

SIR: I had another interview with Mr. Canning on the twenty sixth of last month, at Gloucester Lodge, his residence a short distance from town.

The immediate motive of his inviting me to this interview was, to show me a despatch which he had just received from Sir Charles Stewart, the British ambassador at Paris, which had a bearing upon our late conferences respecting Spanish America. It recounted a short conversation which he had had with our chargé d'affaires at that court, Mr. Sheldon, the purport of which was, that Sir Charles having taken occasion to mention to Mr. Sheldon the projects of France and the Alliance upon Spanish America, Mr. Sheldon replied that the government of the United States was aware of them all, and disapproved of them. Mr. Canning, inferring that this reply of our chargé d'affaires probably rested upon some instructions or information from the government of the United States, also inferred that it might lend its aid towards my consent to his proposals² of the 20th of August. He added, that the despatch of Sir Charles Stewart had proceeded from no previous communication whatever from him (Mr. Canning) upon the subject, but had been altogether written on his own motion.

I replied, that what instructions or information the Legation of the U. States at Paris might have received upon this subject, I could not undertake to say with confidence; but that I scarcely believed any had reached it, which were not common to me. That certainly I had none, other than those general instructions which I had already mentioned to him, evidently never framed to meet the precise crisis which he supposed to be at hand respecting Spanish America, but under the comprehensive spirit of which I was nevertheless willing to go forward with him in his proposals upon the terms I had stated, in the hope of arresting this crisis.

He now declared that this government felt great embarrassments as regarded the immediate recognition of these new states, embarrassments which had not been common to the U. States, and asked whether I could not give my assent to his proposals on a promise by Great Britain of *future* acknowledgment. To this intimation I gave an immediate and unequivocal refusal. Further conversation passed between us though chiefly of a desultory nature, (it shall be reported at a future time,) and the conference ended by his saying that he would invite me to another interview in the course of a few days.

Having waited until now without yet hearing from him, I have concluded to write you thus much of what passed on the 26th without more delay. It

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 789.

does not fall within any of my intentions to accede to Mr. Canning's overtures but on the basis of a *previous* and explicit acknowledgment of the new states by this government in manner as formal and ample in all respects as was done by the United States, whose act of acknowledgment will be the example upon which I shall stand. Even then, the guarded manner in which alone my consent will be given when I come to use the name of my government, will, I trust, be found to free the step from all serious exception on my part, should I finally take it.

I cannot be unaware, that in this whole transaction the British cabinet are striving for their own ends; yet if these ends promise in this instance to be also auspicious to the safety and independence of all Spanish America, I persuade myself that we cannot look upon them but with approbation. England it is true has given her countenance, and still does, to all the evils with which the holy Alliance have afflicted Europe; but if she at length has determined to stay the career of their formidable and despotick ambition in the other hemisphere, the United States seem to owe it to all the policy and to all the principles of their system, to hail the effects whatever may be the motives of her conduct.

Mr. Canning at the close of the above interview, expressed his desire, that in informing my government of his communications to me, I would treat them as entirely confidential, as well the verbal as the written; the more so if no act resulted from them. That no act will result from them, is my present belief.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Memorandum of a Conference between the Prince de Polignac, French Ambassador to Great Britain, and Mr. Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, begun Thursday, October 9, and concluded Sunday, October 12, 1823*¹

The Prince de Polignac, having announced to Mr. Canning, that His Excellency was now prepared to enter with Mr. Canning into a frank explanation of the views of his Government respecting the question of Spanish America, in return for a similar communication which Mr. Canning had previously offered to make to the Prince de Polignac on the part of the British Cabinet, Mr. Canning stated:

That the British Cabinet has no disguise or reservation on that subject: That their opinions and intentions were substantially the same as were announced to the French Government by the dispatch of Mr. Canning to Sir Charles Stuart [Stewart?] of the 31st of March; which that Ambassador

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed with Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 808.

communicated to M. de Chateaubriand, and which had since been published to the world.

That the near approach of a crisis, in which the affairs of Spanish America must naturally occupy a great share of the attention of both Powers, made it desirable that there should be no misunderstanding between them on any part of a subject so important.

That the British Government were of opinion, that any attempt to bring Spanish America again under its ancient submission to Spain, must be utterly hopeless; that all negotiation for that purpose would be unsuccessful; and that the prolongation or renewal of war for the same object would be only a waste of human life, and an infliction of calamity on both parties, to no end.

That the British Government would, however, not only abstain from interposing any obstacle, on their part, to any attempt at negotiation, which Spain might think proper to make, but would aid and countenance such negotiation, provided it were founded upon a basis which appeared to them to be practicable; and that they would, in any case, remain strictly neutral in a War between Spain and the Colonies, if war should be unhappily prolonged.

But that the junction of any Foreign Power in an enterprize of Spain against the Colonies, would be viewed by them as constituting an entirely new question; and one upon which they must take such decision as the Interests of Great Britain might require.

That the British Government absolutely disclaimed not only, any desire of appropriating to itself any portion of the Spanish Colonies, but any intention of forming any connexion with them, beyond those of Amity and Commercial Intercourse.

That in those respects so far from seeking an exclusive preference for its subjects over those of Foreign States, It was prepared and would be contented, to see the Mother Country (by virtue of an amicable arrangement) in possession of that preference; and to be ranked, after her, equally with others, only on the footing of the most favoured nation.

That, completely convinced that the ancient system of the Colonies could not be restored, the British Government could not enter into any stipulation binding itself either to refuse or to delay its Recognition of their Independence.

That the British Government had no desire to precipitate that Recognition, so long as there was any reasonable chance of an accommodation with the Mother country, by which such a recognition might come first from Spain—

But that it could not wait indefinitely for that result; that it could not consent to make its Recognition of the New States *dependent* upon that of Spain; and that it would consider any Foreign Interference, by force or

menace, in the dispute between Spain and the Colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter without delay.

That the Mission of Consuls to the several Provinces of Spanish America, was no new measure on the part of this Country; that it was one which had, on the contrary, been delayed, perhaps too long, in consideration of the State of Spain, after having been announced to the Spanish Government in the month of December last, as settled; and even after a List had been furnished to that Government of the places to which such appointments were intended to be made.¹

That such appointments were absolutely necessary for the protection of British Trade in those Countries.

That the old pretension of Spain to interdict all trade with those countries, was, in the opinion of the British Government, altogether obsolete; but that, even if attempted to be enforced against others, it was, with regard to Great Britain, clearly inapplicable.

That permission to trade with the Spanish Colonies had been conceded to Great Britain in the year 1810, when the mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her Colonies was asked by Spain, and granted by Great Britain; that this mediation, indeed, was not afterwards employed, because Spain changed her Counsel; but that it was not therefore practicable for Great Britain to withdraw Commercial Capital once embarked in Spanish America, and to desist from Commercial Intercourse once established.

That it had been ever since distinctly understood that the trade was open to British subjects; and that the ancient Coast Laws of Spain were, so far as regarded them at least, tacitly repealed.

That in virtue of this understanding, redress had been demanded of Spain in 1822, for (among other grievances) seizures of vessels for alleged infringements of those Laws; which redress the Spanish Government bound itself by a Convention (now in course of execution) to afford.

That Great Britain, however, had no desire to set up any separate right to the free enjoyment of this Trade; that she considered the force of circumstances, and the irreversible progress of events, to have already determined the question of the existence of that freedom for all the world; but that, for herself, she claimed and would continue to use it; and should any attempt be made to dispute that claim, and to renew the obsolete interdiction, such attempt might be best cut short by a speedy and unqualified Recognition of the Independence of the Spanish American States.

That, with these general opinions, and with these peculiar claims, England could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America, upon an equal footing with other Powers; whose opinions were

¹ Mr. Canning here read to the Prince de Polignac Extracts of two dispatches addressed to Sir W. à Court on the 5th & 28th of December 1822, in which that Minister was directed to make those successive communications to the Spanish Government.

less formed upon that question, and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it.

That she thought it fair therefore to explain beforehand, to what degree her mind was made up, and her determination taken.

The Prince de Polignac declared:

That his Government believed it to be utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain;

That France disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail herself of the present state of the Colonies, or of the present situation of France towards Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America; or to obtain for herself any exclusive advantages; and that like England, she would willingly see the Mother country in possession of superior commercial advantages, by amicable arrangements; and would be contented, like her, to rank, after the Mother country, among the most favoured nations.¹ Lastly that she abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the Colonies by force of arms.

The Prince de Polignac proceeded to say that, as to what might be the best arrangement between Spain and Her Colonies, the French Government could not give, nor venture to form, an opinion, until the King of Spain should be at Liberty; that they would then be ready to enter upon it, in concert with their allies, and with Great Britain among the number.

In observing upon what Mr. Canning had said, with respect to the peculiar situation of Great Britain, in reference to such a Congress;

The Prince de Polignac declared he saw no difficulty to prevent England from taking part in the Congress, however she might now announce the difference in the view which she took of the question from that taken by the Allies. The refusal of England to cooperate in the work of reconciliation might afford reason to think, either that she did not really wish for that reconciliation, or that she had some ulterior object in contemplation; two suppositions equally injurious to the honour and good faith of the British Cabinet. The Prince de Polignac further declared, that he could not conceive what could be meant, under the present circumstances, by a pure and simple acknowledgment of the Independence of the Spanish Colonies; since, those Countries being actually distracted by civil wars, there existed no government in them which could offer any appearance of solidity; and that the acknowledgment of American Independence, so long as such a state of

¹ Mr. Canning having alluded to certain reports in the newspapers of some attack, or intended attack, by a French Naval Force, against the Independents in Colombia, The Prince de Polignac said that, so far from intending any such hostile act, the French Government had recalled the only Line of Battle ship in those seas, the *Jean Bart*, which is on its return to France.

things continued, appeared to him to be nothing less than a real sanction of Anarchy.

The Prince de Polignac observed that, in the interest of humanity, and especially in that of the Spanish Colonies, it would be worthy of the European Governments to concert together the means of calming in those distant and scarcely civilized regions, passions blinded by party spirit, and to endeavour to bring back to a principle of Union in Government, whether Monarchical or Aristocratical, people among whom absurd and dangerous theories were now keeping up agitation and disunion.

Mr. Canning, without entering into any discussion upon these abstract principles, contented himself with saying that however desirable the establishment of a Monarchical form of Government in any of those Provinces might be, he saw great difficulties in the way of it; nor could his Government take upon itself to put it forward as a condition of their Recognition.

Mr. Canning further remarked, that he could not understand how an *European* Congress could discuss Spanish American affairs, without calling to their Councils a Power so eminently interested in the result, as the United States of *America*; Austria, Russia, and Prussia being Powers comparatively so much less concerned in the subject.

The Prince de Polignac professed himself unprovided with any opinion of his Government upon what respected the United States of America; but did not *for himself* see any insuperable difficulty to such an association.

He added that he saw the less difficulty in a Congress upon this subject, as such a mode of treating it had been proposed at Verona by the Duke of Wellington.

Referring to the Convention said to have been concluded between the Government of Buenos Ayres and Commissioners from Spain—and especially to the declaration of the Buenos Ayres Legislature, accompanying that convention, which promised a subsidy to Spain in the war against France; the Prince de Polignac was not prepared to say how far such a declaration might be considered by his Government as an act of hostility against France: But upon Mr. Canning's observing that the declaration was only eventual and conditional; that it depended for its confirmation on two circumstances: 1st, the ratification of the Convention by the King of Spain; 2ndly, the acceptance of the like terms, and the conclusion of similar Conventions with Spain, by all the other states of Spanish America; neither of which had yet occurred; and further that, even if carried into effect, such a subsidy would have done no more against France than the Colonies might have been bound to do, if still under the control of the Mother country; the Prince de Polignac was willing to admit that this case was not one which could be expected to change practically the views of his Government with respect to the general question of Spanish America, or much to influence the general principles of Policy, by which that question must be

decided; But upon this point, the Prince de Polignac said that he was speaking only his own individual opinion, and that opinion not founded upon mature reflection.

P. S. Mr. Canning in transmitting to the Prince de Polignac a copy of the foregoing minute (according to agreement) on the day after it was written, accompanied it with an official note in which he observed. "That he had not yet had an opportunity of looking back to the Duke of Wellington's correspondence at Verona, but that the impression upon Mr. Canning's mind was, not that any proposal was made by the Duke of Wellington for treating the subject of Spanish America in Congress" but, "that the Duke certainly communicated (or offered to communicate) to the Plenipotentiaries there assembled, the views and opinions of his Government upon that subject; which were then in substance no other than they are now, except so far as time and events have since contributed to mature them."

Having afterwards referred to the Duke of Wellington's correspondence at Verona, Mr. Canning addressed on the 15th October the following note to the Prince de Polignac.

Mr. Canning, having referred to the Duke of Wellington's correspondence at Verona, has the honor to state to His Excellency the Prince de Polignac, that the impression which was upon his mind at the moment of his Conference with the Prince de Polignac on Sunday as to the nature of the Duke of Wellington's communication to the Congress at Verona on the subject of Spanish America, is by that reference entirely confirmed.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LONDON, *October 10, 1823.*

SIR: At the conference with Mr. Canning the day before yesterday, he said nothing of Spanish American affairs, except barely to remark at parting, that he should send off consuls to the new states very soon, perhaps in the course of this month. I asked whether *consuls* or commercial agents. He said he believed they might as well be called by the former name, as they would be invested with the powers and charged with the duties that belonged to the consular office. I asked if they would be received in that capacity by governments between which and Great Britain no political or

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

diplomatic relations had yet been formed. He said, that this he did not know with any certainty; he rather supposed that they would be received.

I saw him again at the foreign office yesterday, and he said not one single word relative to South America, although the occasion was altogether favorable for resuming the topick, had he been disposed to resume it. I therefore consider that all further discussion between us in relation to it is now at an end. I had myself regarded the questions involved in the discussion as essentially changed by the arrival of the news of the convention of the 4th of July between Buenos Ayres and the commissioners from Spain; and of the complete annihilation of the remnant of the royal forces in Colombia under Morales, on the third of August, both which pieces of intelligence have reached England since the twenty sixth of September, the date of my last conference with Mr. Canning on the South American subject.

The termination of the discussion between us may be thought somewhat sudden, not to say abrupt, considering how zealously as well as spontaneously it was started on his side. As I did not commence it, it is not my intention to revive it. If I had actually acceded to his proposals, I should have endeavoured to have placed my conduct in a satisfactory light before the President. The motives of it would not, I flatter myself, have been disapproved. But as the whole subject is now before my government, and as I shall do nothing further in it without instructions, I should deem it out of place to travel into any new reasons in support of a step not in fact taken.

Mr. Canning not having acceded to my proposal, nor I to his, we stand as we were before his first advance to me, with the exception only of the light which the intervening discussion may be supposed to have shed upon the dispositions and policy of England in this important matter. It appears that having ends of her own in view, she has been anxious to facilitate their accomplishment by invoking my auxiliary offices as the minister of the United States at this court; but as to the independence of the new states of America, for their own benefit, that this seems quite another question in her diplomacy. It is France that must not be aggrandized, not South America that must be made free. The former doctrine may fitly enough return upon Britain as part of her permanent political creed; but not having been taught to regard it as also incorporated with the foreign policy of the United States, I have forborne to give it gratuitous succour. I would have brought myself to minister to it incidentally on this occasion, only in return for a boon which it was in the power of Britain herself to have offered; a boon that might have closed the sufferings and brightened the prospects of those infant Republicks emerging from the new world, and seeming to be connected as by a great moral chain with our own destinies. . . .

In the conference with Mr. Canning at Gloucester Lodge on the 25th of last month, he informed me that this government had sent out *three* commissioners to Mexico with objects such as I have already stated in a for-

mer communication to you. Should the course and progress of events after their arrival in Mexico, render recognition by Great Britain advisable, one of these commissioners was furnished, he said, with contingent credentials to be minister, another would be constituted secretary of legation, and the third consul. He also said that these appointments, as well as those of commercial agents or consuls, whichever they might be, to go to the new states generally, would probably have the effect of inviting in the end further approaches from them all, to an intercourse with Great Britain, which approaches, should they be made, might be met by Great Britain, according to circumstances.

It may perhaps afford room for conjecture what has led to the preference of Mexico over the other ex-colonies for such a provisionary diplomatick representation. I have heard a rumour, that an eye to some immediate advantage from the mines of that country has been the motive. Whilst the independence of Mexico has been of more recent establishment, it seems not less true, that her advances to internal stability have been less sure than we have seen in some of the other new states. Mr. Canning himself in one of our conversations thought fit to select Mexico as affording a prominent illustration of interior disquiet. Whether then the above rumour is the key to this early preference, or the proximity of this new state to the territories of the United States—or what considerations may have led to it, a little more time will probably disclose. It may rest on the mere fact of her greater population and riches.

Mr. Canning also informed me, that orders would be given by this government to its squadron in the West Indies, to protect the trade of British subjects (to the extent of making reprisals if necessary) with the Spanish colonies, in case the licence for this trade which the Cortes granted in January last was not renewed. It will be recollected, that the same decree of the Cortes in that month which settled, under a threat of reprisals, the British claims upon Spain for captures, laid open the trade of the ultra marine provinces to Britain for ten years. This period of time being upon the eve of expiring, the intention of Britain is, to revive the orders for reprisals by her squadron, unless the time be extended.

So much for a measure against Spain in her present extremity. It will next be seen that her ex-colonies come in for their share of this prompt and summary species of remedy of which Britain is setting other nations the example, for Mr. Canning also informed me that if the Colombian government did not make speedy reparation for the alleged aggression committed upon a British ship by the fort at Bocachica at the entrance of the bay of Carthagena, orders would be given to blockade that port. He remarked that the blockade would be confined merely to Bocachica as a measure of local redress, other satisfaction having been refused, and that it was intended that an explanation to this effect should be given to the government of Colombia,

through a neutral minister residing at that government. He added that his wish was, that the minister of the United States should be the channel of communication. Into the detail of circumstances that belong to this alleged aggression Mr. Canning did not go. From the account I have had of it from the Colombian minister in this city, Mr. Ravenga, I infer and believe that the offence was on the side of the British ship. . . .

Throughout the progress of our discussion on Spanish American affairs, I thought it proper to apprise Mr. Ravenga, confidentially, of all that was going on. I take this opportunity of saying, that I have had equal pleasure in all my personal intercourse with this gentleman, and in my attempts to subserve the interests of his country.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, November 26, 1823.

SIR: I had an interview with Mr. Canning on the twenty fourth instant at the foreign office, when he afforded me some information on Spanish American affairs which I now proceed to lay before you.

He began by saying that our conversations on this subject at Gloucester Lodge (on the 26th of September)² having led him to conclude that nothing could be accomplished between us, owing to the ground which I had felt it necessary to take respecting the immediate recognition of the late colonies by Great Britain, he had deemed it indispensable, as no more time was to be lost, that Great Britain should herself, without any concert with the United States, come to an explanation with France. He had accordingly seen the prince de Polignac, the French ambassador at this court, and stated to him that as it was fit that the two courts should understand each other distinctly on the Spanish American question, it was his intention to unfold the views of Great Britain in an official note to him, the prince; or to Sir Charles Stewart the British ambassador at Paris, to be communicated to the French court; or in the form of an oral conference with the prince himself, whichever of these modes the latter might indicate as preferable. The prince taking some interval to decide, it was finally agreed to adopt the method of oral conference, with the precaution of making a minute³ of the conversation so that each government might have in its possession a record of what passed, to be previously assented to as correct on both sides.

In pursuance of this course Mr. Canning held several conferences with the

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 798. ³ *Ibid.*, 799.

prince de Polignac in the early part of October, in which each party unfolded the views of their respective governments on this branch of publick affairs, and agreed upon the written memorandum or paper which was to embody them.

This paper Mr. Canning said was of a nature which did not leave him at liberty to offer me a copy of it; but he had invited me to the foreign office for the purpose of reading it to me, having only since his return to town last week exhibited it to the ministers of other powers, and not yet to all of them.

He accordingly read the paper to me. When he had closed I said to him, notwithstanding what had previously fallen from him about not giving a copy of it, that its whole matter was so interwoven with our past discussions verbal and written upon the same subject, that I could not help thinking that my government would naturally expect a copy, as the regular termination of a subject the previous stages of which it had been my special duty to make known to my government. To this remark he replied, that he would willingly furnish me with a copy of that part of it which embodied the views of this government, but that where those of France were at stake, he did not feel that he had the same discretion, upon which footing my remark was left without more commentary.

I am therefore relieved from the task of recapitulating to you the contents of that portion of this paper of which I may expect to receive a copy. The points which chiefly arrested my attention as new to me (and these I now communicate without waiting longer for the paper itself) were, that Great Britain declares that she will recognize the independence of the colonies, first, *in case France should employ force in aid of their re-subjugation*; or, secondly, *in case Spain herself, reverting to her ancient system, should attempt to put a stop to the trade of Britain with those colonies*. But it is not said what Britain will do beyond recognize their independence, her ulterior conduct being left to be shaped, as we may infer, by ulterior events. She claims a right to trade with the colonies *on the footing of a permission given by Spain herself* so long back as in 1810, as an equivalent for British mediation offered at that day between the parent state and the colonies. As regards the form of government most desirable for the colonies, considered as independent states, a preference is expressed for *monarchy*, could it be practicable.

With the exception of the foregoing points, I recollect nothing material in the paper as regards the policy or intentions of Great Britain, not heretofore made known in my own communications upon this subject beginning with that of the 19th of August,¹ and continued in my numbers 325, 326, 330, 334 and 336. The letter of Mr. Canning to Sir Chs. Stewart of the 31st of March 1823² is still assumed as the basis of the policy of Great Britain.

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 788. For his numbers 325, 326, 330, 334 and 336, see under the following dates, respectively: August 23, August 28, September 8, October 2, and October 10, (docs. 791, 794, 796, 798 and 800). He has omitted mention of his long dispatch of September 19 on the subject, which bore the number 331, and appears in this print as doc. 797.

² Not printed in this collection.

To report with the requisite fidelity the views of France from this paper, read over but once to me, I might find an office more hazardous from the fact of my having had less acquaintance beforehand with them. I shall therefore not attempt to do so with any detail, from a fear that I might err. I have also the confident hope that an entire copy of it, although not given to me, will get to your hands through some other channel. I am not able, for my own share, to discern the adequate motives for wrapping it up in such secrecy, and have little doubt but that even the publick journals of Europe will, before very long, enlighten us with sufficient precision upon all its contents. The London journals of the present week have themselves made a beginning towards this end.

Having said thus much I will proceed in my endeavours to state the main points of this paper where it was illustrative of the policy of France.

1. It declares that France, like England, regards the recovery of the colonies by Spain as hopeless.

2. It expresses the *determination* (I think this was the very word) of France not to assist Spain in attempting their reconquest.

3. It expresses the desire of France to see the dispute made up by amicable arrangements between the mother country and the colonies.

4. It disclaims for France all idea of deriving exclusive commercial advantages from the colonies, saying that, like England, she only asks to be placed on the footing of the most favoured nation, after Spain.

5. It knows not what there is to be *recognized* as independent in the colonies, France regarding all government there as a mockery. The reasoning employed is to this effect.

6. It labours to show the necessity of assembling a congress to which England should be a party (which she declines) to bring about the benevolent end of reclaiming those remote regions from their past errors, and making up the dispute between them and the parent state upon terms satisfactory to both, as the policy worthy of both!

These were the material points of the paper, as I collected them. I am sensible that I state some of them in a way to start further questions as to their true meaning, questions which I could myself raise without, at this moment, being able to resolve them. Whether, amongst other things, France is to abstain from all kinds of aid to Spain, (*force* she says she will not employ) does not appear quite clear to my recollection. The apprehensions of Britain, however, seem to be fully allayed, at least for the present, on the score of French aggrandisement in Spanish America, and it is certain that she does not now anticipate any speedy interruption of the peace of Europe from this cause. Whether her apprehensions on this score were ever real, notwithstanding Mr. Canning's advances to me, or whether France, from uneasiness at a prospect of collision with Britain, has herself receded for a while from her ambitious projects, and only for a while,

are points around which there may be some obscurity. The language which she now holds to Britain, is obviously at variance with that which her manifestoes breathed when her troops entered Spain in the spring. Her duplicity therefore in this whole Peninsular war, from her memorable avowals respecting the *cordon sanitaire* to the present time, appears to have been as signal as her ambition.

In the course of the paper on the British side, there is allusion to the interest that the United States have in the question, which is met on the side of France by a declaration that she does not profess to be acquainted with our views on the subject. It is in the part which relates to the assembling of a congress. I might probably have made myself more accurately master of the whole paper by recurring in conversation to a few of the passages after Mr. Canning had finished reading it; but I was precluded the opportunity of doing this from his being pressed (whether by his previous wishes or otherwise I will not say) with another appointment a very few moments after he had closed.

Notwithstanding the tranquilizing professions of France, it would seem that the sentiments of Russia (if we may so infer from Pozzo di Borgo's address to Ferdinand, which has just come before the world) are, that the Holy Alliance consider themselves as still bound to keep a superintending eye upon the affairs of Spain, throughout all her dominions.

I have the honor [etc.].

802

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Private & confidential.

GLOUCESTER LODGE, December 13, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: In transmitting to you a copy of the memorandum of a conference between the French Ambassador and me, upon the affairs of Spanish America,² (which I had the honour to read to you yesterday) I am naturally led to revert to what passed between us in the summer upon that subject.

Had you had it in your power, at that time, to concur in any joint consideration of the measures to be adopted, you know how happy I should have been to be enabled to propose such a concert. But time and the pressure of events did not allow of an indefinite postponement of a matter, which was liable, from day to day, to be brought into immediate discussion by other Powers. Our step was therefore taken, within a few weeks, after

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 808.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799.

the last interchange of confidential letters between us. The result is before you. You will see that we were not unmindful of your claim to be heard: but I flatter myself that neither you nor we shall now have to lift our voice against any of the designs which were apprehended a few months ago.

I am sure you will feel, Sir, and I trust it will be felt by your government that the confidence which I individually reposed in you is sacred; and that our intercourse in August not having led to any practical result, nor become matter of discussion between our respective Governments will be considered as having passed between two individuals relying upon each other's honour & discretion.

I communicate the paper to you in such a way, as to relieve you from any difficulty in transmitting it to your Government.

I have the honour [etc.].

803

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Confidential.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 13, 1823.*

SIR: I have great pleasure in furnishing you (according to your desire) with a copy of the memorandum² of a Conference between the French Ambassador and me on the affairs of Spanish America; which I had the honor to read to you yesterday. You are at liberty to communicate to your Government; but of course (from its very nature) as a confidential communication not to be made public in the United States.

I have the honour [etc.].

804

*The Conde de Ofalia, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir William à Court, British Minister to Spain*³

PALACE, *December 26, 1823.*

HONOURED SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the King, my august Master, has determined to devote his particular attention to the regulation of the affairs concerning the disturbed countries of Spanish America, being

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 808.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, February 9, 1824, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 812.

solicitous to succeed in pacifying his dominions in which the seeds of anarchy have taken root to the prejudice of the safety of other governments. H. M. has therefore thought that he might justly calculate on the assistance of his dear allies towards obtaining results which cannot but prove beneficial to the tranquillity and happiness of all Europe.

The inclosed copy will put you, Sir, in possession of the orders issued to H. C. M. Representatives at the Courts of Austria, France and Russia, and as the Ministers of Spain have not yet proceeded to London and Berlin, the King has directed me to address to you, Sir, and to the Minister of Russia at this Court, a Transcript of the said communication, which H. M. hopes you will have the goodness to transmit to your Govt. whose friendship & upright policy, the King my master trusts, will know how to appreciate the frankness of this communication and the equity that had dictated the basis on which it is founded.

I avail myself [etc.].

[The above-mentioned enclosure is as follows:]

The King, our Sovereign, being restored to the Throne of his ancestors in the enjoyment of his hereditary rights, has seriously turned his thoughts to his American Dominions, distracted by civil war, and reduced to the brink of the most dangerous precipice. As during the last three years the Rebellion which prevailed in Spain defeated the constant efforts which were made for maintaining tranquillity in the Costa Firme, for rescuing the Banks of the River Plata, and for preserving Peru and New Spain, H. M. beheld with grief the progress of the flame of Insurrection, but it affords at the same time consolation to the King that repeated and irrefragable proofs exist of an immense number of Spaniards remaining true to their oaths of loyalty to the throne, and that the sound majority of Americans acknowledge that that hemisphere cannot be happy unless it live in brotherly connexion with those who civilized those countries.

These reflections powerfully animate his majesty to hope, that the justice of his cause will meet with a firm support in the influence of the Powers of Europe. Accordingly the King has resolved upon inviting the Cabinets of his dear and intimate allies to establish a conference at Paris, to the end that these Plenipotentiaries assembled there along with those of his Catholick Majesty, may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted countries of America. In examining this important question, H. M. will in conjunction with his powerful allies, consider of the alterations which events have produced in his American Provinces, and of the relations which during the disorders have been formed with Commercial Nations, in order thereby to adopt, with good faith, the measures most proper for conciliating the rights and just interests of the Crown of Spain and of its sovereignty with those which circumstances may have occasioned with respect to other nations. His Majesty confiding in the sentiments of his allies, hopes that they will assist him in accomplishing the worthy object of upholding the principles of order and Legitimacy. The subversion of which, once com-

menced in America, would presently communicate to Europe, and that they will aid him, at the same time, in reestablishing Peace between this Division of the Globe and his Colonies.

It is therefore H. M. pleasure that convinced of the above arguments and availing yourself of the resources of your well known talents, you should endeavour to dispose the Gov't with which you reside, to agree to the desired cooperation, for which the events of the Peninsula have paved the way authorizing you to communicate a copy of this note to the _____ Minister for Foreign Affairs.

God preserve you many years.

(Signed) THE CONDE DE OFALIA.

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*Mr. Planta, of the British Foreign Office, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 26, 1823.*

Mr. Planta presents his best compliments to Mr. Rush, and in sending him the enclosed letters,² begs to acquaint him, that they have been delayed by the process necessary for preparing (in its present form) the memorandum by which they are accompanied.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*³

LONDON, *December 27, 1823.*

SIR: Your note of the 13th of this month,⁴ owing to a cause which Mr. Planta has explained, did not get to my hands until last evening. With it came a copy of the memorandum⁵ of the conference between yourself and the French ambassador on the affairs of Spanish America, which you did me the honor to read to me, and which, according to your permission, I will transmit to my government as a confidential paper.

With sentiments of high respect [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 808.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 803.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 808.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 802.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 799.

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

LONDON, December 27, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR: In replying to your private and confidential note of the 13th instant,² which did not, from a cause which Mr. Planta has mentioned, reach me until yesterday, I can only say, that I am fully aware of the necessity which pressed you in the autumn in regard to the Spanish American question, as soon as you ascertained that I felt myself without power, under any other state of things than that of a formal acknowledgement by Great Britain of the independence of the late colonies, to concur in any joint consideration of the measures to be adopted touching that question. The correspondence which passed between us in August, as well as the informal conversations which followed it in September, relating to this whole subject, were all treated by me as strictly confidential, and in that spirit communicated to my government, and the notice which has been taken of it in the President's message, just now received and published in the London journals, will, I persuade myself, be remarked by you as having avoided the most indirect or remote allusion to any previous stirring of the subject between us in this quarter.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*³

LONDON, December 27, 1823.

SIR: In my letter number 346 of the 26th of November,⁴ I had the honor to mention that I requested of Mr. Canning a copy of the paper which he read to me embodying the views of England and France relative to Spanish America, and that he replied that he would do so of as much of it as related to England, but that over the portion of it that contained the exposition of the views of France he did not feel that he was at liberty to exercise the same option. The attempt to draw this line seemed to me at the time unnecessary, and perhaps would have been found not very easy in practice, and accordingly in the interview which I had with Mr. Canning on the twelfth of this month, referring again to the above paper, and to the request I had made of him to be furnished with a copy of the whole of it, he said that he now felt

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 808.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 803.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXIX.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 801.

himself able to comply, the French government having furnished other states with a copy of it; and he promised to send me the entire copy in a few days. I have abstained from mentioning this promise to you in my intermediate communications, preferring to wait until the paper itself reached me.

I have this day received it accompanied by a note from Mr. Canning dated the thirteenth instant,¹ and headed "confidential," in which he informs me that I am at liberty to communicate it to my government, but only as a confidential paper, not to be made public in the United States. A note of a few lines from Mr. Planta dated yesterday,² explains the delay which has taken place in sending it to me. Another note from Mr. Canning, dated also on the thirteenth instant,³ and headed "private and confidential" was received at the same time, in which he reverts to what passed between us in the summer on this Spanish American question, states his reason for having gone on to act without my concurrence, and intimates a hope that neither the United States [n]or Great Britain will now be called upon to lift their voice against the designs that were recently apprehended. In this latter note it will also be perceived what renewed anxiety is manifested that the whole subject may be treated by my government as entirely confidential. I have replied in two separate notes of this date to both of Mr. Canning's, and enclose copies of all the correspondence.⁴ It will be seen in Mr. Canning's notes that he describes the paper as having been read to me on the 12th instant. This is a mistake. He read it to me on the 24th of November, as my communication to you of the 26th of that month shows. The mistake is not material, and is only noticed lest it should otherwise be inferred that the paper was read to me a second time, which was not the case.

It is plain, in my belief, that this extraordinary solicitude for secrecy, springs from an unwillingness in this government to risk the cordiality of its standing with the holy Alliance to any greater extent than can be avoided. All serious danger to Spanish America, being now at an end, I do not at present see what there is to prevent a return to that effective amity between Great Britain and this Alliance which has heretofore existed. Events the most recent and authoritative justify us in saying, that no attempt upon the liberties of Europe, will essentially throw Britain off from the connexion, or impair her co-equal allegiance to the monarchical principle; and the authentick paper of her government which I this day transmit, indicates that the danger of disunion from the Spanish American question has had its source not in any concern of Britain at fresh strides of tyranny in the Alliance, but in an ambitious uneasiness in her councils at French or other

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 803.

² *Ibid.*, 805.

³ *Ibid.*, 802.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799, memorandum of conference between Polignac and Canning, October 9; Canning to [Rush] December 13, (doc. 802); same to same, same date, (doc. 803); Planta to Rush, December 26, (doc. 805); Rush to Canning, December 27, (doc. 806); and same to same, same date, (doc. 807).

continental interposition reaching a point which threatened at last to trench upon the commercial empire of England, an empire over which her statesmen never cease to keep their most jealous watch. As regards the essential rights of the Spanish American states—their internal polity and organization—it will be seen from the paper, that the foreign secretary of England permits the most revolting doctrines to be laid down by the ambassador of France without one word of dissent or disapprobation. Some of the questions that started to my mind when I undertook to report the contents of this paper to you from having heard it read, are not entirely solved, I must say, in a more deliberate examination of it.

In my interview with Mr. Canning on the 12th of this month, he said that the continental powers had intended to hold a congress, not, as they now alleged, to coerce the late colonies, but to assist Spain with their deliberations and advice towards recovering her supremacy over them; but that Spain's proposals had been of a nature to frustrate all their wishes. Their offer to assist her as above had lately been made through the French ambassador at Madrid; Spain, through the same channel, had simply said in reply, that France, Russia, and the other Allies had nothing to do but to furnish ships, troops and money for the reconquest, which being effected, Spain was ready to requite them all by a grant of equivalent advantages to be drawn from the colonies. France had sent these proposals back to Spain as not fit to be entertained, and thus, as Mr. Canning seemed to infer, has vanished the project of the congress. One other scheme only remained he said for reducing the colonies, more wild however, as he added, than all former ones. This was by an association in the form of a private company, to be composed of capitalists and bankers in sufficient numbers, and deriving a charter from Spain, which company with their funds were to hire ships and troops for the reconquest and seek their remuneration in certain exclusive rights of trade to be granted to them, and also in the transfer to them of an interest in the mines of Mexico and Peru. Some modification of this visionary scheme has since made a figure in the journals of Europe, serving, in this country at least, to excite the publick derision.

But the most decisive blow to all despotick interference with the new states is that which it has received in the President's message at the opening of Congress. It was looked for here with extraordinary interest at this juncture, and I have heard that the British packet which left New York the beginning of this month was instructed to wait for it and bring it over with all speed. It is certain that this vessel first brought it, having arrived at Falmouth on the 24th instant. On its publicity in London which followed as soon afterwards as possible, the credit of all the Spanish American securities immediately rose, and the question of the final and complete safety of the new states from all European coercion, is now considered as at rest.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *January 6, 1824.*

The timely and explicit assertion of the cause of Spanish American independence contained in the message, has met with approbation from all classes of this community, as far as has come to my knowledge. What feelings may pervade the government respecting it, I cannot yet say, Mr. Canning not having expressed any opinion to me on this part of the message in either of the interviews I have had with him since its arrival.

All the Spanish American deputies now in London have waited upon me since its arrival, testifying the high and grateful sense they entertain of the service which its decisive tone in regard to Spanish America, has rendered to their respective countries.

Under the instructions of your letter of the second of July, I have already put myself into correspondence with Mr. Middleton,² and shall write to him to impart to him the substance of this communication that I now make to you. It will not be inferred from any thing it contains that I shall intermit my exertions to obtain from this government in my own negociations with it, its consent to the boundaries as between the U. States and Gt. Britain on the northwest coast of America, in manner as you have laid them down, though certainly my hope of succeeding is feeble.

In regard to the principle of not considering any part of the American continents as henceforth open to colonization by any European nation, as I have reason to suppose that Great Britain will combat it with animation, if there would still be time whilst I remain here for me to receive any further views and developements of it from you, and the President deems it necessary that I should be furnished with them, I will take care to make the best use of them in my power towards strengthening our ground. The circumstance of there being at present no full British minister at Washington, increases the probability of my being more largely the medium of communication between the two governments on all points, than might otherwise be the case.

In all my late interviews with Mr. Canning, he has inquired if I had received any reply from my government to his confidential communications to me of August and September.³ He has heard respecting them from the British chargé d'affaires at Washington, and has read to me at different

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

² Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia.

³ See above, pt. VIII, docs. 789, 792 and 795.

times two communications from him. The matter of these, as they merely purport to report his confidential conversations with you in the autumn, I do not esteem it necessary to recapitulate.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, January 16, 1824.

The following consuls appointed by this government have sailed for Spanish America since this month set in, in the *Cambridge*, an 80 gun ship, Captain Maling, which ship is to be stationed in the Pacific and take command of the British naval forces there: viz., one consul general and two vice consuls for Buenos Ayres; one consul general and two vice consuls for Chili, to reside at Valparaiso; one consul general and two vice consuls for Peru, to reside at Lima, and one consul for Montevideo. Consular officers of similar degree sailed some time ago for Mexico and Colombia.

The British Naval force stationed at different points off the coast of South America or neighbouring seas, consists at present, or soon will consist, according to the best information I can obtain, of the following vessels: viz., the *Cambridge*, as above, of 80 guns; the *Gloucester*, of 80 guns; the *Ganges* of 86 guns; the *Spartiate* of 84, the *Superb* of 78, and ten frigates, several of them heavy ones.

Having heretofore mentioned that Mr. Ravenga was arrested and thrown into prison in this city on pretence of a debt due to a British subject for military supplies furnished by him to the government of Colombia, I take this opportunity of stating, that the action has been totally abandoned by the plaintiff. Its unwarrantable nature is now as apparent to everybody as it was at first to those who inquired into its circumstances; yet the laws of this country hold out no redress to Mr. Ravenga for the outrage put upon him. This gentleman has not, to this day, been recognized by this government in any shape. He informed the secretary of state for foreign affairs of his arrest and imprisonment as soon as they took place; but received no answer to his communication.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to
William à Court, British Minister to Spain*¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 30, 1824.*

SIR: The Messenger Latchford delivered to me on the 14th Inst. your despatch enclosing a copy of the Count de Ofalia's Official Note to you of the 26 of December last,² with the accompanying copy of an Instruction which has been addressed, by order of his Catholic Majesty, to his Ambassador at Paris, and to his Ministers Plenipotentiary at the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Having laid these papers before the King, I have received his Majesty's commands to direct you to return to them the following answer.

The purpose of the Spanish Instruction, is to invite the several powers, the allies of his Catholic Majesty, to "establish a conference at Paris, in order that their Plenipotentiaries together with those of his Catholic Majesty, may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolted colonies in America."

The maintenance of the "Sovereignty" of Spain over her late Colonies, is pointed out in this Instruction as one specifick object of the proposed conference and though no expectation of the employment of force for this object, by the powers invited to the Conference, is plainly indicated, it is not distinctly disclaimed.

The invitation contained in this Instruction not being addressed directly to the Government of Great Britain, it may not be necessary to observe upon that part of it, which refers to the late "events in the Peninsula," as having "paved the way" for the desired cooperation.

The British Government could not acknowledge an appeal founded upon transactions to which it was no party. But no such appeal was necessary. No variation in the internal affairs of Spain, has at any time varied the King's desire to see a termination to the evils arising from the protracted struggle between Spain and Spanish America; or his Majesty's disposition to concur in bringing about that termination.

From the year 1810 when His Majesty's single mediation was asked and granted to Spain, to effect a Reconciliation with her Colonies; the disturbances in which Colonies had then but newly broken out; to the year 1818, when the same task, increased in difficulty by the course and complication of events in America, was proposed to be undertaken by the Allied Powers assembled in conference at Aix la Chapelle; and from the year 1818 to the present time, the good offices of His Majesty for this purpose have always been at the

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, February 9, 1824, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 812.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 804.

service of Spain, within limitations and upon conditions, which have been in each instance explicitly described.

Those limitations have uniformly excluded the employment of Force or of menace against the Colonies on the part of any mediating Power; and those conditions have uniformly required the previous statement by Spain, of some definite and intelligible proposition, and the discontinuance on her part of a system utterly inapplicable to the new relations which had grown up between the American provinces and other Countries.

The fruitless issue of the Conferences at Aix la Chapelle, would have deterred the British Government from acceding to a proposal for again entertaining, in Conference, the question of a mediation between Spain and the American provinces; even if other circumstances had remained nearly the same. But the events which have followed each other with such rapidity during the last five years, have created so essential a difference, as well in the relative situation in which Spain and the American provinces stood, and now stand to each other, as in the external relations and the internal circumstances of the provinces themselves, that it would be vain to hope that any mediation, not founded on the Basis of Independence could be successful.

In this state of things, the best proof which the British Government can give of the interest which it continues to feel for Spain, is, to state frankly their opinion, as to the course most advisable to be pursued by his Catholic Majesty, and to answer with the like frankness, the question implied, in M. Ofalia's instructions as to the nature and extent of their own relations with Spanish America.

There is no hesitation in answering this question. The subjects of His Majesty have for many years carried on Trade, and formed Commercial Connections in all the American Provinces, which have declared their separation from Spain:

This Trade was originally opened with the consent of the Spanish Government. It has grown gradually to such an extent as to require some direct protection, by the establishment at several Ports and Places in those Provinces, of Consuls on the part of this country:—a measure long deferred out of delicacy to Spain, and not resorted to, at last without long previous notification to the Spanish Government.

As to any further step to be taken by His Majesty towards the acknowledgement of the *de facto* Governments of America, that question must (as has already been stated more than once to Spain and to other powers) depend upon various circumstances; and, among others, upon the Reports which the British Government may receive of the actual State of Affairs in the several American Provinces.

But it appears manifest to the British Government, that if so large a portion of the Globe should remain much longer without any recognized political existence, or any definite political connexion with the established Govern-

ments of Europe, the Consequences of such a state of things must be at once most embarrassing to those Governments, and most injurious to the interests of all European Nations.

For this reason, and not from mere views of selfish Policy, the British Government is decidedly of opinion, that the recognition of such of the new States as have established *de facto*, their separate political existence, cannot be much longer delayed.

The British Government have no desire to anticipate Spain in that Recognition. On the contrary, it is on every account their wish, that his Catholic Majesty should have the Grace and the advantage, of leading the way, in that recognition, among the powers of Europe. But the Court of Madrid must be aware, that the discretion of his Majesty in this respect, cannot be indefinitely bound up by that of his Catholic Majesty, and that even before many months elapse the desire, now sincerely felt by the British Government, to leave this precedency to Spain, may be overborne by considerations of a more comprehensive nature; Considerations which regard not only the essential interests of his Majesty's Subjects, but the relations of the old world, with the new.

Should Spain resolve to avail herself of the opportunity yet within her power, the British Government would, if the Court of Madrid desired it, willingly afford its countenance and aid to a negotiation, commenced on that only basis, which appears to them to be now practicable; and would see without reluctance, the conclusion through a negotiation on that basis, of an arrangement by which the Mother Country should be secured in the enjoyment of Commercial advantages, superior to those conceded to other Nations.

For Herself, Great Britain asks no exclusive privileges of Trade, no invidious preference, but equal freedom of Commerce for all.

If Spain shall determine to persevere in other Counsels, it cannot but be expected that Great Britain must take Her own course upon this matter, when the time for taking it shall arrive; of which Spain shall have full and early intimation.

Nothing that is here stated can occasion to the Spanish Government any surprise.

In my despatch to Sir Charles Stuart [Stewart] of the 31st of March 1823, which was communicated to the Spanish Government, the opinion was distinctly expressed, that "time and the course of events had substantially decided the separation of the Colonies from the Mother country, although the formal Recognition of those Provinces, as Independent States, by His Majesty, might be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each State, towards a Regular and settled Form of Government."

At a subsequent period, in a communication made, in the first instance to France and afterwards to other powers, as well as to Spain, the same opin-

ions were repeated, with this specifick addition, that in either of two cases (now happily not likely to occur); in that of any attempt on the part of Spain, to revive the obsolete interdiction of intercourse with Countries over which she has no longer any actual dominion;—or, in that of the employment of foreign assistance to reestablish her Dominion in those Countries, by force of Arms; the recognition of such new States by this country would be decided and immediate.

Having thus stated to you, for the information of the Court of Madrid, the deliberate opinion of the British Government on the points on which Spain required the Counsel of Her Allies, it does not appear to the British Cabinet, at all necessary to go into a conference to declare that opinion anew: even, if it were perfectly clear, from the tenour of Mr. Ofalia's Instruction, that Great Britain is in fact included in the invitation to the Conference at Paris.—

Every one of the Powers so invited has been constantly and unreservedly apprized, not only of each step which the British Government has taken, but of every opinion, which it has formed on this subject: and this despatch will be communicated to them all.

If those Powers should severally come to the same conclusion with Great Britain, the concurrent expression of their several opinions, cannot have less weight in the judgement of Spain, and must naturally be more acceptable to her feelings, than, if such concurrence, being the result of a conference of Five Powers, should carry the appearance of a concerted dictation.

If (unhappily as we think) the allies, or any of them, should come to a different conclusion, we shall at least have avoided the inconvenience of a discussion, by which our own opinions could not have been changed.

We shall have avoided an appearance of mystery, by which the jealousy of other parties might have been excited; we shall have avoided a delay which the state of the question may hardly allow.

Meanwhile, this explicit Recapitulation of the whole course of our sentiments and of our proceedings on this momentous subject, must at once acquit us of any indisposition to answer the call of Spain for friendly Counsel, and protect us against the suspicion of having any purpose to conceal from Spain or from the world.

I am [etc.].

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *February 9, 1824.*

Immediately after they got to hand I asked an interview of Mr. Secretary Canning, which he granted me on the second of this month. I should have transmitted you an account of what passed at it sooner, but that two laborious conferences which I had last week with the British plenipotentiaries on the business of the negociation, and other official calls upon my time, have prevented my writing until now.

I thought it best to be entirely candid with Mr. Canning in the first instance, and under this determination, after a few introductory words, I gave him to understand that having heard from my government on the subject of our confidential correspondence and conversations in August and September, it was my design to make him acquainted with what had been said to me without any reserve. I accordingly proceeded to read to him your despatch of November the twenty ninth,² number seventy six, and went through it without the omission of any part. This despatch so fully lays down the views and intentions of the President on this important subject, and conveys so distinctly the necessary answers and remarks on all Mr. Canning's points, that it left me nothing to add or explain on any of them.

When I had finished reading the despatch, he offered no commentary or opinion upon it whatever, either to the effect of the sentiments which it contained being satisfactory or the reverse. All that he said was, that intervening events had put an end to the state of things on the basis of which the propositions contained in his private notes would have been brought forward as the act of his government. He adverted to what had already passed on the subject in our interview in November, (the 24th) and afterwards in December, and to the notes which he had written to me in the course of the latter month. I refer to my numbers 346 and 354 for reports³ of these interviews, and to the latter for copies of his above notes, as well as for a copy of the paper agreed upon between Prince Polignac and himself, on the part of France and England, relative to Spanish America.

Mr. Canning after thus recurring, as he had done before, to the change of ground on which alone as he said a concert or understanding between our two governments had been contemplated as serviceable, proceeded in turn

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 122.

³ See above, pt. VIII, docs. 801 and 808, Rush to Adams, November 26, and December 27, 1823.

to make me acquainted with the contents of a despatch which he had written to Sir William à Court,¹ at Madrid, indicating the intentions of Great Britain at this immediate point of time in regard to the new American states. It bore date only on the 30th of January; of course, could scarcely have been more recent. In place of reading it to me, he put it into my hands requesting that I would read it myself, which I did throughout; and I am glad that it does not fall to my lot in this instance to describe to you from memory the contents of this paper, as I received on Saturday night an entire copy of it from Mr. Canning. It seems that the occasion of writing it has been, that the Count de Ofalia, on behalf of the Spanish government, has addressed, so recently as in December last, an official note to the ministers of Spain at Paris, Vienna, and St Petersburg, instructing them to endeavour anew to obtain the assistance of those three courts, through means of a congress to be assembled at Paris, towards recovering the sovereignty of Spain over the "revolted countries in America"; and a copy of this note is communicated to Sir William à Court, by Count Ofalia, although Great Britain is not directly invited to assist at the congress. Mr. Canning having also sent me both the notes of Count Ofalia, I am happy to have it in my power to enclose copies of them,² as well as of the despatch to Sir William à Court.

As the latter paper will be before you, I need not recapitulate the matter of it. It appears from it, that England thinks that all further mediation in this contest not founded on the basis of the Independence of the new states, would now be vain; that Spain herself ought to take the lead among the powers of Europe in formally acknowledging them, and that she ought to do it quickly; that the policy of England is rapidly hastening to this point, and may be expected to reach it before "many months," but that she is still so desirous that Spain should precede her, that she is ready now to lend her mediation on the basis of their independence; and that if Spain should acknowledge them, England will consent to an arrangement by which she, Spain, may be secured in the enjoyment of commercial advantages superior to those conceded to other nations.

How these superior advantages are to be obtained for Spain, the despatch does not intimate. As we can scarcely suppose that the new states themselves will grant them, we may expect that England will in the end see the necessity as well as justice of following the more direct and consistent course of the United States upon this as upon other points of this great public question. I drew Mr. Canning's attention to the expressions in a parenthesis which will be seen towards the close of the despatch, as wearing an appearance of belief in the mind of this government that a congress would be held.

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 811.

² See above, pt. VIII, docs. 804 and 811, Conde de Ofalia to Minister of England, December 26, 1823, and Canning to à Court, January 30, 1824.

He replied however that such was not his belief; that on the contrary his opinion unequivocally was, that none would be held; yet as the three powers applied to had not all of them distinctly refused, as far as he yet knew, he could not undertake to say so to me officially. He renewed at parting the expression of his hope, that publicity would not be given to his correspondence or conferences with me on any part of this subject. The further sentiments and facts in relation to it imparted to me in your number 77 of November the 30th,¹ and your number 177 of December the 8th, I did not make known at this interview, but shall hold them in reserve to be used or otherwise, according to time and circumstances. It may be hardly necessary to add, that Britain continues to refuse to attend a congress, and declines lending her assistance to Spain on any other basis than the Independence of the new states.

On the point of publicity, so constantly adverted to by Mr. Canning, I should have no difficulty whatever but for one consideration. If the sentiments expressed in the President's Message on Spanish America, were to be taken as flowing from Mr. Canning's overture of last August, I should say, that a solemn *act* of my government having been the fruit of that overture, it would rest wholly with the discretion of my government to disclose or not the grounds of that act. Indeed, it may be proper I should mention, as I believe that I have not heretofore, that at an early stage of our conferences I remarked to Mr. Canning, that if the affair took this course, he must prepare himself for any degree or form of publicity which the executive, on its responsibility to the nation, might judge proper to give of the whole grounds of it. But as I do not understand this to have been the case from any of the communications which I have yet had the honor to receive from you, I am alike unauthorised to infer it. The delicacy of the same consideration restrains me from calling on Great Britain to avow before the world, with the same distinctness and solemnity that we have done, her determinations in regard to the new states, since I do not well see upon what basis I could found such a call, other than that of our avowal having proceeded from her call. I trust that this forbearance on my part, for the present at least, will be approved as due to the dignity of the United States, as well as to the independent course so invariably pursued by them heretofore in relation to Spanish America. I have ventured to feel, that as the circumstances under which your instructions to me on the whole of this interesting subject were written, have varied before they could reach me, so there must necessarily be something left to my own discretion in executing them. I apprehended also, that the steady desire which, in my belief, Britain has to avoid any further advance to a political cooperation with our system now that she can say that the urgent notice for the one of last summer has gone by, would lead her to allege, if called upon by us at this juncture to be more explicit, that in her note² to Sir

¹ See above, pt. 1, doc. 124.

² Not printed.

Charles Stewart of the 31st of last March, in her paper¹ drawn up in conjunction with Prince Polignac in October, and in this despatch² to her ambassador at Madrid of the 30th of January, (all of which papers have been communicated to the powers of Europe,) she has already promulgated her determinations.

Parliament met on the third instant, and I enclose a copy of the king's speech as sent to me from the foreign office. The debates upon it, will have attracted your attention. In the *Times*, the newspaper generally supposed to give the debates with the most accuracy and fulness, Mr. Canning is made to say whilst discussing the topick of Spanish America, that "a proposition had been made by the government of Spain to that of this country, to which an answer had been returned and was on its way to Madrid; and that after it had been disposed of, the time would arrive when this government would be enabled to speak with more explicitness." In the *Courier and Morning Chronicle* it is given, that a proposition of *recognition* had been made by Spain. I have not had the leisure to collate the above passage with the report of it in any other newspapers, than the *Courier and Chronicle*. The idea of such a proposition as the latter was new to me, and is excluded by the whole context of the despatch to Sir William à Court. This despatch is doubtless to be regarded as the most recent and most authentick exposition of the present state of the Spanish American question, so far as the relations of Great Britain to it are concerned.

I have the honor [etc.].

813

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain*³

LONDON, March 4, 1824.

The Undersigned His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in transmitting to Mr. Rush, a copy of the papers respecting Spanish America, which are this day communicated, by His Majesty's Command, to both Houses of Parliament, has the honor to call Mr. Rush's attention to the Extract of the "*Memorandum of the Conference between the Prince de Polignac and Mr. Canning*"; already communicated⁴ *in extenso* to Mr. Rush; in which Mr. Rush will observe, that care has been taken to omit that part which had reference to the United States of America; The Prince de Polignac and Mr.

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799.

² *Ibid.*, 811.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, March 6, 1824, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 815.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799, under date of October 9, 1823.

Canning having agreed in thinking themselves not at liberty to make public any opinion expressed by them to each other, in a confidential conference, respecting any other Government.

The Undersigned requests Mr. Rush to accept [etc.].

814

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

LONDON, March 5, 1824.

The Undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Secretary Canning's note of yesterday's date,² accompanied by a copy of the papers respecting Spanish America which were yesterday communicated to both houses of parliament.

The Undersigned will take care to transmit to his Government a copy of this note, as well as the papers received with it, and he has the honor [etc.].

815

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*³

LONDON, March 6, 1824.

SIR: I yesterday received from Mr. Secretary Canning a note dated the fourth instant,⁴ of which a copy is enclosed, transmitting to me a printed copy of the papers laid before Parliament on the 4th respecting Spanish America. I enclose also a copy of my answer to Mr. Canning, dated yesterday.⁵

In comparing the printed extract of the "memorandum of the conference between the Prince de Polignac and Mr. Canning," with the original paper forwarded *in extenso* with my No. 354,⁶ I find no differences between them, except verbal or immaterial ones (unless the substitution of *Conference* for

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX, enclosed in Rush to Adams, March 6, 1824 which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 815.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 813.

³ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 813.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 814.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 799, under date of October 9, 1823.

Congress wherever the latter word occurs should be thought otherwise) until we come to the passage where the United States are mentioned. The whole of this passage and thence to the end of the document, is left out in the printed copy. The reason for this omission Mr. Canning mentions in his note to me, in manner as will be seen.

I have no further information on the Spanish American question than is contained in these papers not having yet heard of the answer of the Court of Madrid to Mr. Canning's note to Sir William à Court of the 30th of January,¹ or even if any has been received. Whatever I may hear on this point I will promptly communicate to you. Nor do I yet know, with absolute certainty, whether a Congress, or a *Conference*, is or is not to be held on this question by the powers of Europe, though my belief is that none will be, which belief I still suppose to be Mr. Canning's.

I beg to avail myself of this opportunity of mentioning that our Minister at Buenos Ayres, Mr. Rodney, has written to request that I would cause him to be supplied with regular files of two daily London Newspapers, the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Courier*, under the impression that the public is to pay the expense. I have declined complying with his request on this footing, & so informing him, that the government as I know from experience in this Legation, does not allow our Ministers the expense of even one English Newspaper. But I added, that I would make his request known to the government, as I have thus done.

I have the honor [etc.].

816

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

LONDON, June 30, 1824.

SIR: Parliament was prorogued on the twenty fifth instant, and enclosed I have the honor to transmit a copy of the King's speech, as sent to me by Mr. Canning.

Since my despatch of 17th of May,³ I have heard nothing from this government relative to Spanish American affairs. The debates in parliament upon this subject, of which there have been several during the session just closed, will have attracted your notice; and I have only to say that these debates have afforded the only authentick source which has been open to me of obtaining information as to the intentions of this cabinet in regard to recognizing the new states. The most recent of these debates was one in the house of Lords on the day before the prorogation, in the course of which Lord Liver-

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 811.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

³ Not printed.

pool said, that the delay in taking any further step towards recognition arose from the fact of no report having yet been received from the commissioners sent out by this government to those states for the purpose of obtaining information as to their condition. He declared at the same time, as Mr. Canning had already done in the house of commons, that Britain was under no obligation to any other power that could prevent her recognition of those states, whenever it should appear to the ministry to be consistent with the interests and character of the country to recognize them. It is thus that the question seems to hang, and I am able to communicate nothing more definite in relation to it.

A minister from Mexico, Mr. Michilena, has lately arrived in this country in a British frigate. General Alvear, appointed Minister from Buenos Ayres to the United States, is also at present here, on his way to the United States. At what precise time he designs to embark, I am not able at this moment to say.

It will have been seen by the publick prints, that this government has disavowed all connexion with the plans of Iturbide.

I have the honor [etc.].

817

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, July 10, 1824.

SIR: With every anxiety to execute in a manner satisfactory to the President the trust devolved upon me by your secret instructions of the 17th of December,² I begin to feel, under all circumstances, some embarrassment in doing so. When these instructions got to hand, events were not altogether the same as at the period when they were framed. The change as it appears to me has continued to go on, until now the danger of any forcible interference by the powers of Europe to controul the destinies of Spanish America, seems nearly if not totally to have passed away. Yet Spain keeps up the visionary assertion of her supremacy, and may continue to do so, in spite of facts, for years to come. She also continues her urgency upon the powers of the continent to aid her in the recovery of her supremacy, to which they give no complete or authoritative refusal, their policy probably lying in this course, whilst it cannot be rationally believed that they design to take any steps in concert with Spain for the resubjugation of the colonies, against the avowed determinations of the United States and Great Britain upon this subject.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

² Not printed. It instructed him to pay the salary and expenses and direct the activities of Alexander McRae, a secret agent sent to attend and report the sessions of any European conference that might be held regarding the "affairs of Spain and South America."

In this state of things I begin to feel a doubt as to the necessity of Mr. McRae remaining any great length of time in Europe on the important objects that brought him here; at the same time I cannot undertake to say that these objects have positively ceased.

He has been once to France since his arrival, and is now here again, having returned about a week ago. He contemplates going again to the continent shortly, for which he has my sanction, more especially as the late unfavorable news from Peru may serve to give a temporary revival to the hopes of those who would wish to put down the independent cause in America.

This despatch has no other object than that, of merely drawing your attention to the embarrassments under which my own judgment may in the end labour in the delicate matter in question, so as to open a door for the benefit of your advice and assistance, if thought necessary. Should I not receive further instructions from you I shall continue to act on my own best discretion in conjunction with Mr. Brown,¹ who, however, I am under the impression begins to share some of my own doubts as to the course which, before long, it may become most expedient for us to take.

Mr. Hurtado has, within the last fortnight, been received by Mr. Canning at the foreign office. It was understood that the interview was only informal, yet it is a step that must be considered as meaning something, particularly as Mr. H. is henceforth likely to be invited to further interviews of the same nature, which I understand is to be the case. Mr. Ravenga was never admitted to an interview with the foreign secretary even upon this footing. I also learn that Mr. Hurtado has received through an official source at Paris, an intimation that his presence would be acceptable in that capital for a little while, and he accordingly sets out for it immediately in expectation of receiving some communication from M. de Villele. Of what nature it is to be, he is at present uncertain. I have heard surmises that it may probably hint at the expediency of establishing thrones, instead of Republicks, in America, and placing Bourbons upon them!

I have the honor [etc.].

818

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, July 31, 1824.

Mr. Hurtado having received another and pressing invitation to go to Paris, and being advised to the step by Mr. Texada the Colombian Minister to

¹ James Brown, United States Minister to France.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

Rome now at Paris, has yielded his scruples and informs me that he will accordingly go, next week. Mr. Irisari [Yrisarri] has returned from Paris, and it appears that he was not detained there against his will. Mr. Hurtado had so informed me, but learns from Mr. Irisari [Yrisarri] that it was not the case.

Mr. Gameiro and General Brant, envoys or commissioners from Brazil, are here, engaged in negotiations with Portugal for effecting a recognition of the independence of their country. The commissioner on the part of Portugal is Count Villa Real, the Portuguese Minister Plenipotentiary at this Court. I have but little information as to the progress or aspect of these negotiations. Lately I understood through a source that I considered authentick, though not through either of the parties themselves, that Portugal, under the advice of England, was not indisposed to accede to the broad principle of Independence, provided Brazil would give a sufficient equivalent. But what the equivalent is that Portugal expects, and whether it be of a nature respecting which it is likely the parties can ever agree I did not learn. Some of the meetings of the commissioners have been held at the foreign office, which may serve to show how this government interests itself in their proceedings.

819

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, December 30, 1824.

SIR: Mr. Secretary Canning invited me by note to call upon him at the foreign office this day, and it appeared that his object was to make to me a communication of great importance.

It was to inform me, saying that for the present he did so in a confidential manner, that this government had taken its determination to acknowledge the Independence of three of the new American States.

This was the first intimation given to me by him of this determination, and the earliest notice I have had of it under any form that I considered authentick. I hasten to impart it to you for the information of the President.

The three states are, Mexico, Colombia, and Buenos Ayres. Mr. Canning said, that it was barely possible that the issue of events in Peru might suspend the acknowledgment in regard to Colombia; but that this was a contingency no longer looked upon as at all probable.

The precise moment at which the acknowledgment would be made known to the world, he did not indicate, but gave me to understand that it was close at hand.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXX.

He said that it would not be done by any formal declaration issued by this government, but by opening negotiations with each of these new states, in their own capitals, for the purpose of forming commercial treaties between them and Great Britain. Diplomatic organs would be necessary for this measure, and the establishment of diplomatic relations would follow, as was usual. In entering into these treaties, Mr. Canning expressly disavowed for Great Britain the principle of aiming at any exclusive preference or benefits.

He said that I was the only representative of any foreign power to whom the above communication had yet been made, a priority due to all that had passed between us heretofore upon this subject, and the multifarious and high interests which it involved. The representatives of the European powers would, he added, be next informed of it, and in a manner due to the friendly relations in existence between them and Great Britain.

I lose no time in writing this despatch in the hope that it may be in season for the packet of the first of January, which cannot be the case should it be too late, as I fear, for the Liverpool mail of this evening.

I naturally infer that this great step of justice as well as policy at length adopted by Great Britain, will be officially promulgated to the world when parliament meets. This will be early in February.

I have the honor [etc.].

820

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, January 18, 1825.

SIR: Since my despatch of the 30th of last month,² I have received no further information on the subject to which it relates. The determination of this government respecting the new states of America, although purporting to have been imparted to me in confidence, it was plain had been known to others before. It was circumstantially announced even in the newspapers as soon as this month set in, and no longer remained a secret to any portion of the publick. On the 31st of December the communication was made to the ambassadors of the European powers, and an official note has, I understand, been addressed to them upon the occasion. This note I have not seen. The newspapers announce that a treaty between England and Buenos Ayres has already been actually signed, at Buenos Ayres. This I did not understand Mr. Canning to say, but only that negotiations were immediately to be opened, with the three states named.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 819.

The measure of recognition by Great Britain has undoubtedly been urged on not only by the general example of the United States, but specially, I believe, by her knowledge of the fact that treaties of commerce were in agitation between these new communities and the United States. Her jealousy of us, (a topick to which I may return on some other occasion,) will widely extend itself under this new and great epoch in the affairs of the world.

In the meantime, British merchants and manufacturers, British capitalists, in short, the whole British publick, are eagerly turning their eyes, under this impetus from their government, to the American hemisphere. They are endeavouring to link Britain to these new states, and these new states to Britain, by every tie that excited cupidity can devise, and enormous opulence carry into effect. Nothing was ever like it before, not even the days of the south sea scheme. The publick stocks of these rising states, and the mining companies formed in London under their auspices, have become the great objects of attention with monied men, for which even the British funds have been, for the day, neglected. Shares in some of the above companies have advanced to seventeen hundred per cent within a few months, and are bought with avidity at this price. In some of them I hear it said that noblemen of great estates, and directors of the bank of England, participate; also that princes of the blood press forward to obtain shares. Companies are also forming for opening the passage between the two oceans. Millions of money are ready to be embarked in this object, towards which I also hear that British engineers are already actually engaged in their preparatory labours, in different parts of the Isthmus. The only struggle seems to be, for the favor of obtaining new contracts and loans and shares;—the absorbing theme, South American commerce and riches. Twenty millions of pounds sterling are stated to have been drawn into this vortex, and how soon the sum will be doubled no one can tell. A portion of all this eagerness, is doubtless the effect of momentary lures, and will spend itself; but it serves to give warning of the vast commercial and political changes that are approaching. Nor are there wanting men of sober minds who justify nearly all of it under the anticipations which they form of the resources of those new communities when they shall come in due time to be more fully developed by the unrestricted aid, and hearty and interested cooperation, of British wealth and British resources.

What will be the precise course of the continental powers under this measure, I am not able to say. That they dislike it is certain, and not less so that it must lead to further alienation between them and Britain. I learn through a good source, that they particularly object to the terms of the official note in which it has been announced to them, and will not withhold their comments. But it is my confident belief, that it will produce no steps of coercion or hostility, as against the new states themselves. This I take to be a point decided upon by them, first from the impossibility of their being able

to strike at the new states with any effect, and next from their unwillingness to adopt seriously a policy which would result in ranging the United States against them. In the breach which is perhaps slowly, but surely, ripening between them and Britain, they can read the shortsightedness and danger of such a policy.

I have the honor [etc.].

821

*Francisco de Zea Bermudez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid*¹

[TRANSLATION]

January 21, 1825.

SIR: I have had the honour to receive the Note which you addressed me on the 11th Instant, enclosing a Copy of a Despatch from H. B. My's Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 31st of December, and have communicated the contents thereof to the King my August Master.

At a moment when H. My. completely restored to the legitimate rights of His Throne, was occupied, with incessant zeal, in healing the wounds left by past Revolutions, and in restoring upon a solid foundation the prosperity of the People whom Divine Providence has entrusted to his care;—when he was beginning to gather the fruits of His efforts by the tranquillity of Spain, and was meditating and preparing the means of restoring Peace to America;—when, in short, every thing presented the flattering prospect that peace and good order would replace throughout the World, the Wars, convulsions, and misfortunes which have afflicted it for so many years, at that moment has this communication reached His Royal ears.—

Far was H. My. from expecting from His powerful and antient Ally The King of Great Britain, a determination such as that which his Minister has communicated to the Spanish Govt.—a determination to enter into Negotiations for the conclusion of Treaties of Commerce with His rebellious Subjects, who after having perfidiously seized upon the Government in various parts of his American Dominions, now affect to consider themselves the arbiters of the destinies, and to defend the political interests of those very people whom they oppress and destroy. The surprise therefore of H. My. at this communication, has been equalled only by the grief which it has caused to his Royal mind; a grief fully justified by the fact of its having been anticipated by Mr. Canning in his abovementioned Despatch. H. My. however hopes that the British Cabinet, reflecting in its wisdom upon the nature of this measure, —its opposition, in the opinion of Spain, to the true political and commercial

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in Rush to Secretary of State, May 2, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 830.

Interests of England, as well as those principles of eternal justice, which are the foundation of the conduct of all civilized Govt^s. and the guarantee of the social existence of Nations,—the fatal consequences which must result, from carrying them into execution, to the tranquillity and prosperity of Europe,—and lastly, the sacred obligation to observe Treaties inviolably;—will not refuse, before she takes a definitive resolution on the subject, to listen to, and take into mature and deep consideration, the well-grounded representations of Spain.

The whole World beheld with admiration, and, let it be permitted to Castilian pride to add, with envy, the heroick firmness with which Spain, making common cause with England, resisted for six successive years, the Usurper of the Throne of France, the destroyer of Europe, and the disturber of the Peace of the whole Globe. The constancy of the Spaniards, and their innate affection for their king, triumphed over the immense Power of Buonaparte in the Peninsula, and was an example to the rest of Europe, that their united efforts might succeed in hurling the Usurper from the Throne of St. Louis. The wise and persecuted Louis XVIII, and the illustrious Princes of his race, to whose persevering and heroick firmness in adversity, Europe has been so much indebted, returned to occupy that Throne, fulfilling the wishes and hopes of France. And what did England during the whole period of this strife of revolution against order? She fought with glory: she generously lent her Treasures and her blood to destroy the Usurper: she resisted, with unshaken firmness, the recognition of the momentary triumph of violence over justice; she disowned the Man who put himself at the head of the strongest *de facto* Government which had been seen for ages, as well as other *de facto* Governments created and set up by him; she gave an asylum on her hospitable Territory to legitimacy, in the person and Family of the Monarch of France, and other Sovereign Princes; and she contributed at length to restore them to the affections of their respective subjects. This did England at that period; and can she now, in contradiction to such wise principles, and noble proceedings, sanction the existence of some governments, *de facto* the offspring of rebellion: infants in strength, but old in crime,—supported by ambition, and defended by blood and anarchy. What would have been the fate of France, and of Europe, if England, instead of resisting the Revolution of Buonaparte, had assisted it? and what will now become of that same Europe, if H. B. M. now takes up the cause of a handful of Rebels? Justice is one and the same at all periods, and the Government and people of England, who have always been just, cannot cease to be so.

As just as England was in her conduct, so was She in her language. In the harangues pronounced in her illustrious Parliament, in her publick papers, in her diplomattick Notes and Declaration, in all her writings, she has constantly maintained that Rebellion does not constitute a right. With respect to Spain and her American Possessions, not only has the Cabinet of London de-

fended this principle, but has moreover recognized and sanctioned it by positive stipulations. The Treaty concluded in London between Their Catholic and Britannick Majesties, dated the 14th of January 1809, contains textually the following words: "H. B. My. pledges Himself not to recognize any other King of Spain and the Indies except H. C. My. Ferdinand VII, His Heirs, or such legitimate Sovereigns as the Spanish Nation shall recognize." And the 3rd of the Additional Articles to the Treaty of Madrid, of the 5th of July 1814, signed on the 28th of August following, says expressly: "H. B. My. being anxious that the evils and discords which unfortunately prevail in H. C. My's Dominions in America, should altogether cease, and that the Subjects of those Provinces should become obedient to their *legitimate Sovereign*, H. B. My. pledges himself to adopt the most efficacious measures in order that his subjects should not furnish the disaffected in America with Arms or Ammunition, or any implement of war."

There cannot be a more evident demonstration than results from the Above-cited Article, of the incoherence and injustice of the measure which the British Gov^t. now announces, since a recognition of the Governments *de facto* established in Spanish America, would be equivalent to disowning the legitimate rights of the King of Spain and of the Indies; it would be fomenting War and desolation in those vast Countries; it would be giving food to the evils and discord which prevail in H. My's Dominions; it would be patronizing disobedience, and protecting insurrection; it would be more than giving arms and ammunition to the disaffected; in one word, it would be breaking solemn promises, and violating formal Treaties.

But even if it were not a case of infraction, even if views of policy and personal convenience rendered that lawful to-day which was prohibited yesterday; what are the motives which England alleges for adopting this measure? On the one hand, the consolidation of the Institutions of the Pretended American States, and the fitness of those States to maintain the Treaties which they may conclude with other powers: and on the other hand, the protection which the British Government owes to the Commerce and Navigation of its Subjects, these are the motives which Mr. Canning brings forward.

But where is this consolidation to be found? It is not three Months since the pretended Mexican Government declared itself constituted; and the very Individuals who then set themselves up as Governors, have ceased to exist.

Iturbide's visionary Empire vanished for ever with the Life of that ambitious Chieftain. Bravo, the supreme Dictator, yielded the post of Supremacy to Victoria, but the latter is still threatened by his Rival. All is disorder, ambition and anarchy, and the various Provinces are reduced into so many factions.

In the State called Colombia, the Individual who assumes the title of Liberator and Protector, is at thousands of leagues from the Capital, towards which he is retreating, flying from the arms of the Royalists; and the only

fruit which he has derived from his plans of conquest over Peru, is shame and dishonour, besides the sacrifice of thousands of wretched beings, who, torn from their homes, have perished in the deserts, victims of the tyranny and ambition of that adventurer.

As to Buenos Ayres, England herself hardly can tell who it is that commands, or what form of Government exists there at present.

Nevertheless, she must be apprized that a person called Albear [Alvear?], who, a short time ago, was proscribed, is now called upon to defend those who banished him; and she cannot be ignorant that that unhappy Country is a prey to the rapacity of a few ambitious individuals: and that, in the state of progressive decline to which anarchy has been leading it, it may perhaps ere long be equally a prey to the Indian Savages who threaten it, and who, with impunity, make frequent inroads on its Territory.

And are these consolidated Governments? Are these the Govt^s. which present sufficient stability and security to induce Great Britain to treat with them? Can the dignity of the British Govt. expose itself to be compromised by the difficulties which must inevitably occur on the part of its Agents in their relations with those ephemeral and inconsistent Governments? Will the just interests of Great Britain herself, and of the World in general, be treated with more equity and regularity by rebellious Subjects and insurrectional Authorities, than by a legitimate Sovereign.

In the last Session of the English Parliament, it was declared, that no such stability and security existed.

Why, therefore, if they now exist, does not the Government bring forward the facts upon which it grounds the assertion? If it be wished to prove to Spain the existence of this boasted security of the rebellious Govt^s. this firmness in their Institutions, (which they cannot have acquired by regular means, in the few months that have elapsed since the said Session) why not point out the extraordinary circumstances which have led to the establishment of such an order of things? Let England publish those facts, for Spain and Europe are ignorant of them; and unless she does so publish them, her assertions must be considered as inexact, even by those who are the most ignorant or the most indifferent with regard to this great question.

The Commissioners whom England sent out to those Countries, of which, some were withdrawn by their own Government, and others began by public acts which that same Government reprobated, nearly all of them departing from their ostensible character of impartial Observers, converted themselves into Chiefs and Promoters of the several parties—yet these very Commissioners must have sent intelligence and reports which contain proofs of the supposed consolidation of the American Govts. if it in truth and reality existed.

The second motive alleged by the British Cabinet for the intended measure is the protection and furtherance of the Interests of British Commerce.—

But have not English Vessels constantly been, and are they not still admitted into all the Ports which the disaffected occupy? And are they not equally so by means of the Decree of the 9th of February last, into all the ports which acknowledge and obey the King's legitimate authority?

To prove whether they have been treated in the former or the latter with the greatest consideration, and the greatest respect shewn to the rights of property, reference need only be made to the measures of pillage and robbery dictated by Bolivar, when he was compelled to abandon Lima, comparing those measures with the protection given by the Royalist Generals to all Foreign Property but especially English: and let reference also be made to the reception which the British Consul & Commissioners met with at that place compared with the vexatious grievances of which the other Commissioners had to complain in the territory of Mexico.—

The Spanish Gov^t. abstains on the present occasion from entering into the details of various cases in which English Merchants, infringing an express Treaty, and the Laws of their own country, have introduced arms and ammunition into the Insurgent Provinces; and it equally abstains from enumerating the many losses, calamities and deaths which have resulted from that scandalous traffick, even among the countrymen of the offenders. But it cannot however do less than observe, that, if England, contrary to the well founded wishes and hopes of Spain, were ultimately to determine upon recognizing the rebellious Governments, the foundations on which rested the above quoted Decree of the 9th Feby. and the basis of absolute equality thereby established in favor of all Foreigners, would, in fact, be destroyed, and British Commerce would have no just grounds for complaint if it experienced modifications in regard to that decree in the Countries subject to his My's. dominions, such as the Injury occasioned to Spain through the measure in question, might necessitate, H. M. paternal solicitude requiring that he should at all times consider what is due to his people, to justice, and to his amicable relations with other powers.

The King, my master declares that to effect the happy restoration of those his dominions by conciliatory means, has been the object of his deep and incessant meditations, as well as of his most diligent endeavors; and H. M. further declares that, at the very moment when he received so unsatisfactory a communication He was preparing to give new and irrefragable proofs of his firm determination to comply, in a spirit of the most scrupulous good faith, with all that he had announced in that respect; and also to extend, by means of Tariffs, simple and equitable regulations, and the admission into his ultramarine dominions of Consular agents from England and the other allied Powers, a special protection to the Freedom of Commerce in which He had hastened to allow those Powers to participate.

All this however could not be the result of purely speculative combinations; and surely the British Gov^t. could not expect that, Spain, in the midst of

various other subjects to which her attention was preemptorily called, should at once, and of a sudden, have decreed measures, which in order to be just and wise must emanate from a mature examination and a perfect knowledge of the respective Interests of the several localities, and a consideration of the cause which should offer the most solid securities towards establishing, in a lasting manner the individual general prosperity of H. M. Spanish American subjects duly combined with the desires and interests of Gt. Britain, and H. M's. other allies.

Spain would never have refused the mediation of England for the important object of the pacification of the Colonies, if the offer had not always come accompanied by the inadmissible condition of recognizing their Independence and separation from the Mother Country.

The Cabinet of Madrid calls the whole of Europe to witness that, the very first moment that H. M. was delivered from the Revolutionary Yoke under which he had suffered for more than three years, H. M. directed his attention and exertions to persuading all the Powers of Europe, including England, of the necessity of taking into consideration collectively the important question of the State of South America and of agreeing upon the method of restoring Peace to those unhappy Regions, combining their own Interests with those of Europe at Large, and with the just rights of Spain.

England knows that she has been three times solicited by the Spanish Gov^t. to join in a conference at Paris for this purpose, and also that, even after she had refused, from political considerations, to take a part in that conference, Spain offered to secure, under the Guarantee and Good Faith of Treaties, such concessions on the part of H. C. My. to his American Subjects, and such commercial advantages to the whole of Europe, as should be compatible with the Interest and Right of that Kingdom.

England knows also that the King my Master, desirous to avail himself of the efficient intervention and powerful influence of His illustrious Ally the King of G^t. Britain for so important an object, and being not only faithful in the observance of Treaties, but constant in giving publick proofs of His Friendship for England, intimated through yourself, Sir, to your Gov^t. the possibility of bringing about certain modifications and concessions favorable to English commerce with European Spain, unattended with any prejudice to the Commerce of other Nations.

Spain has therefore done all that depended upon her towards manifesting her prompt disposition to combine and conciliate Her own Interests with those of the rest of Europe in this affair, and if she has not found that co-operation on the part of England she had promised herself, and which she desired, at least it is not with her that the Responsibility will rest.

Even now she is still prepared to enter into the already solicited conference;—even now she resumes her solicitations to that effect, and even now, from the intimate conviction which she entertains of the sentiments of her August

Continental Allies she ventures to affirm that they will readily lend themselves to such changes and modifications as England may desire provided they be not detrimental to the imprescriptible rights of the King of Spain and the Indies.

H. M. considering that no act of proceeding of a third power can alter or weaken, much less destroy, the Right of His Sovereignty feels that he ought not to renounce them, nor will he ever do so. Justice and the imperious obligations wh. have been transmitted to him by his illustrious predecessors, prescribe this line of conduct, and it is equally prescribed by the proofs which H. M. daily receives of the unconquerable fidelity of his subjects in the New, as well as the Old World.

The Americans vie with the Europeans in giving demonstrations of that Virtue which is engraved in indelible Characters in the Hearts of all Spaniards. The brilliant Victories gained by H. M's Armies in Peru, the details of which are generally known, the loudly proclaimed desires of the larger and uncontaminated part of the population of America, anxious to reunite itself to the Mother Country and the progressive increase of the numbers so disposed (in the same proportion as in other parts anarchy and calamities of all kinds devour those unhappy regions) all tended to furnish H. M. with well founded presages that by degrees those countries would be restored to his paternal dominion, under which they have been happy for centuries, and will again flourish.

The loyalty and constancy of the Americans, will end by producing the same good effects which have been produced by those Virtues in the Spaniards themselves and the Union of the former with the latter will be so much the more lasting, as in both continents have been equally experienced the miserable effects of Revolutions, and Spaniards and Americans, will alike preserve forever a spirit of opposition to all dangerous innovation repugnant to their Religion, to established Laws, ancient customs, and, it may be added, to the rooted prejudices of the People.

Even though the day of Union and Conciliation should be distant, and though the intrigues of the disloyal, and the resistance offered on their part, aided by a complication of adverse circumstances should continue to postpone it, H. C. M. will never abandon the Rights of His Crown, nor will he ever cease to support, by all the means with which his legitimate authority provides him, the exertions of those American Spaniards who are faithful to their King, and attached to the true prosperity of their native Country. He will never cease to employ the force of arms against his Rebellious subjects, conformably to the principles of the Rights of Nations, inherent in the existence of all Thrones.

H. M. therefore declares in the face of the whole world that although he is ready to make to His American Subjects such concessions as may be compatible with His legitimate Sovereignty, with justice, with their real neces-

sities, and well founded claims, that He neither acknowledges, nor ever will acknowledge, either directly or indirectly the independence of the Govt^a. which have established or shall hereafter establish themselves in Mexico, Terra-firma, Buenos Ayres, or any other part of His Trans-marine Dominions. H. M. declares also, that if, what he cannot expect, the Gov^t. of H. B. M. shall persist in carrying into effect the conclusion of Treaties of Commerce with them, and the consequent diplomattick recognition which the communication of the English Minister announces, H. M. protests and will protest in the most solemn manner against these measures, by which the Treaties existing between the two Powers will be violated and the legitimate and imprescriptible Rights of The Throne of Spain attacked in the most serious manner.

But H. M. is willing to hope that the British Cabinet will reconsider this important matter and will maturely examine with enlightened equity the fatal consequences which must result to the repose of the world, and the well being of her own subjects, from a recognition as unjust as it is impolitic, of rebellious and ephemeral Governments, and not carry into effect the determination announced by Mr. Canning in the despatch which you transmitted to me, Sir, in your above mentioned Note, to which I reply by the orders of the King my Master, requesting that you will have the goodness to carry the contents of this communication to the knowledge of your Gov^t. with the least possible delay.

I have the honour [etc.].

822

*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, February 5, 1825.

SIR: Parliament was opened by commission the day before yesterday, and I enclose a copy of the king's speech as sent to me from the foreign office.

What was said by the ministers of the crown in both houses of Parliament respecting the new states of America, in the debate which followed immediately after the reading of the speech, is so fully reported in the newspapers, which are herewith also transmitted, that I need not dwell upon it. Mr. Canning's explanations in the house of commons will be found to correspond, in effect, with the communication which he made to me on the thirtieth of December.² That part of his speech will not escape notice in which he says, that Great Britain has demanded no special advantages from the new states, as the price of her recognition, but only claims to be placed on the

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 819, Rush to Adams, December 30, 1824.

same footing with other states that may chuse to follow her example. This declaration is the more to be remembered by its contrast with a sentiment, wearing an aspect somewhat different, which fell from Lord Francis Levison Gower, who moved the address in the house of commons in reply to the king's speech. The latter said, that in the course of "two separate accounts which he had seen of some of the new states, the one by a Frenchman the other by an American, he could not help remarking, that a feeling of astonishment, mixed perhaps with a natural jealousy, was expressed as to the tendency which the trade of the new states was taking towards England"; "a fortunate tendency," he added, "which he thought the treaties England was about entering into with them, would encourage and protect."

I understand from good authority that the communication which Mr. Canning made to me on the 30th of December, he had previously made to Mr. Hurtado, the minister from Colombia. I understand also that it is probable this gentleman as well as the representatives from the other new states now in London, will be regularly received by this government as soon as the projected treaties shall have been fully perfected. I further learn, that on Mr. Hurtado having remarked to Mr. Canning, that his government was ready to make peace as soon as Spain was, the latter said that he would be glad to see that event come about between the parties, and would intimate this wish to the government of Spain. But it was not understood that any mediation was to be offered by Great Britain. Whether this is the first and guarded step towards a more intimate policy which Britain designs to foster with these new states, more time will determine. It is a subject to be watched, and I will be awake to it. I ought to add, that Mr. Hurtado is furnished with powers to treat of peace with Spain.

I have the honor [etc.].

823

*Substance of a communication from Count Lieven, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

March 2, 1825.

Count Lieven stated that he had received from His Court a Despatch in acknowledgement of the Communication made through Mr. Ward,² of the Determination taken by His Majesty respecting certain of the new States of Spanish America.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in Rush to Secretary of State, April 4, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 828.

² British Ambassador to Russia.

That Mr. Ward being confined to his Bed, Count Nesselrode¹ had not been able conveniently to discuss with Mr. Ward the Matter of that Communication, and had therefore addressed to him (Count Lieven) what the Emperor wished to be declared to the British Government thereupon. That the Emperor had learnt with regret the determination of His Majesty with respect to Mexico, Colombia, & Buenos Ayres. That His Imperial Majesty could not take upon himself to judge of the Necessity which induced Great Britain to acknowledge the Independence of these several Spanish Colonies, by concluding with them treaties of Commerce.

That, in so far as His Imperial Majesty was concerned, The Emperor would, in respect to Spanish America, adhere to those Principles which had for ten years secured to the different Courts of Europe, their Rights of Sovereignty, and State of Possession. That those Principles, on which reposes the tranquillity of the World, will ever be regarded by his Imperial Majesty with invariable respect. That under the auspices of Great Britain herself, those Principles became again the Basis of publick Law in Europe. During twenty years consecutively, England did not hesitate to defend them, in conjunction with her allies. By the transactions of 1814, 1815 and 1818 She solemnly confirmed them; and History will not forget to Record that, if in Spain & in France, the cause of legitimate Authority obtained an advantageous Triumph, if Monarchs long unfortunate, recovered their Crowns & the Dominions of their Ancestors, it was more especially to the British Government that was to be attributed this memorable Reparation of the Evils caused by revolutionary Violence.

That applying the Maxims of a Policy so generous to the situation of the Peninsula and of her insurgent colonies reciprocally, Russia could not forbear to follow the Example which had been given by England, in those past Transactions. That the Emperor was the more firmly resolved to pursue this Conduct, because it appeared to him that His Catholick Majesty, absorbed by other cares, and occupied in repairing other Disasters, had not yet been able to get together the necessary means of enforcing His rights of Sovereignty, over His antient Dominions; because the only propositions which had been made to His Catholick Majesty by the Cabinet of St. James's involved the sanction by Spain of the total loss of those Dominions; & because the answers of the Court of Madrid sufficiently explained the Motives of the Determination taken by Spain, deriving them even from the Testimony of the English Agents sent to South America. That from the Period of those Propositions and Answers, Russia had observed, on the one hand, the anxiety of Spain to permit the Commerce already existing with her ultra-marine Provinces, and her offer to protect and extend it under all Circumstances which might possibly occur; on the other hand, the Victories which have replaced Peru, under the Royal Authority; the vain endeavours of the Govern-

¹ Russian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ments *de facto* to reconquer that Country, and the weakness of the Military resources of Mexico, exemplified by the continued Resistance of the Fort of St Jean d'Ulloa. That, such Circumstances could not, however, change the fixed Determinations of Russia; and that moreover, since the conclusion of the Act of the Congress of Vienna, She was firmly persuaded, that it was sufficient that a proposed Measure necessarily infringed upon the right of a third Power, to prevent its receiving the sanction of those Governments who took part in that great work of Peace & Justice.

That the motives which prevented the Emperor from participating in the opinions of the Court of London on the affairs of America, being thus shortly explained, His Imperial Majesty deprecated any discussion upon the subject.

For this last Reason, Count Lieven said that he was not instructed nor authorized to give a copy of the Despatch, the substance of which he had thus verbally stated to Mr. Canning.

824

*Substance of a communication from Prince Esterhazy, Austrian Ambassador to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

March 3, 1825.

1. That the Court of Vienna views with regret and disapprobation the course adopted towards the Countries of Spanish America, as being a deviation from the principles of Legitimacy which guide the Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe.

2. That the Court of Vienna does not pretend to erect Itself into a Judge of the Interests of Great Britain; nor to decide, how far those Interests might or might not be sufficiently urgent to necessitate a step which It could not but consider as precipitate, even in that point of view.

3. But that It could not admit the validity of such a Plea, because, affecting, as it does, in this instance, the Rights of Spain, it might, if once admitted, affect equally, in some future instance, the Rights of some other Power.

4. That the Court of Vienna, faithful to its principles, would not *acknowledge any of the Countries of Spanish America until the Mother Country shall have set the Example.*

Substituted by Prince Esterhazy:

4. That the Court of Vienna, faithful to its Principles, would not deviate from those which guided the Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe, for these last ten years.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in Rush to Secretary of State, April 4, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 828.

*Substance of a communication from Baron de Maltzahn, Prussian Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

[TRANSLATION]

March 4, 1825.

Baron von Maltzahn announced to Mr. Canning that he was instructed to inform him that his Court has learned with pain and regret of the decision taken by the Britannic Government with respect to the Spanish Colonies in America; that the Cabinet of Berlin could not regard the reasons set forth by Mr. Canning as sufficient to justify a resolution which, according to its viewpoint, infringed upon the rights of the King of Spain and was in opposition to the principles of legitimacy.

That Baron von Maltzahn was instructed not to hide from Mr. Canning how greatly his Court disapproved of this decision, and to declare to him that, on its part, it was resolved not to depart from the path that the Allied Cabinets had followed and would continue to follow without variation.

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Chevalier de Los Rios, Spanish Minister to Great Britain*²

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 25, 1825.*

The Undersigned &c. is commanded by his Sovereign to deliver to the Chevalier de Los Rios for the purpose of being transmitted to his Court, the following reply to the Official Note addressed by His Excellency M. Zea to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid on the 21st of January.³

So large a portion of the Official Note of M. Zea was founded upon a denial of the facts which had been reported to the British Government, with respect to the state of the several Countries of Spanish America: and upon an anticipation of events expected by the Court of Spain to take place in those Countries, by which the credibility of the reports transmitted to the British Government would be effectually disproved; that it has been thought advisable to wait the issue of the expected events in Spanish America rather than to confront evidence with evidence, and to discuss probabilities and conjectures.

Of that issue, decisive as it appears to be, the Undersigned is directed to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in Rush to Secretary of State, April 4, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 828.

² *Ibid.*, May 2, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 830.

³ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 821.

say no more than, that it is a great satisfaction to the British Gov^t. that it had actually taken place before the intentions of the British Government towards the other Countries of Spanish America were announced. Those intentions, therefore, cannot by possibility have had the slightest influence upon the result of the war in Peru.

With this single observation, the Undersigned is directed to pass over all that part of M. Zea's Note, which turns upon the supposed incorrectness of the information on which the decision of the British Government was founded.

The questions which remain to be examined, are, whether in treating with *de facto* Governments, now established beyond the danger of any external assailment, Great Britain has violated either any general principle of international Law, or any positive obligation of Treaty.

To begin with the latter as the more specifick accusation.

M. Zea brings forward repeatedly the general charge of violated treaties: but as he specifies only *two*, that of 1809, and that of 1814, it may be presumed that he relies on them alone to substantiate this charge.

First as to the Treaty of 1809.

That Treaty was made at the beginning of the Spanish struggle against France, and was directed wholly, and in terms not to be misapprehended, to the circumstances of the moment at which it was made. It was a Treaty of Peace, putting an end to the War in which we had been since 1804, engaged with Spain. It is expressly described, in the first Article, as a Treaty of Alliance during the War in which we were engaged jointly with Spain against France. All the stipulations of the Treaty had evident reference to the declared determination of the then Ruler of France to uphold a branch of his own Family upon the Throne of Spain and of the Indies;—and they undoubtedly pledged us to Spain not to lay down our arms until that design should be defeated in Spain, and the pretension altogether abandoned as to America—a pledge which it is not, and cannot be denied, that Great Britain amply redeemed. But those objects once accomplished, the Stipulations of the Treaty were fulfilled, and its obligations necessarily expired, together with the matter to which they related.

In effect, at the happy conclusion of the War in the Peninsula, and after the restoration, by British assistance, of H. C. M. to the Throne of his Ancestors, the Treaty of 1809 was replaced by the Treaty of 1814. And what does that Treaty contain? First, the expression of an earnest wish on the part of His Majesty that Spanish America may be reunited to the Spanish Monarchy; and, secondly, an engagement to prohibit British Subjects from supplying the Spanish Americans with Munitions of War.— This engagement was instantly carried into effect by an Order in Council of 1814. And in furtherance of the like object, beyond the obligation of the Treaty, an Act of Parliament was passed in 1819—prohibiting the service of British subjects in the ranks of the resisting colonies.

That the wish expressed in this Treaty was sincere, the proof is to be found, not only in the measures above mentioned, but in the repeated offers of Great Britain to mediate between Spain and her Colonies— Nor were these offers of Mediation, as M. de Zea alleges, uniformly founded on the single basis of the admission by Spain of the Independence of the Spanish Provinces.

Years had elapsed, and many opportunities had been missed of negotiating on better terms for Spain, before that basis was assumed to be the only one on which negotiation could be successfully opened.

It was not assumed in 1812, when our Mediation was offered to the Cortes.

It was not assumed in 1815, when Spain asked our Mediation, but refused to state the terms to which she was willing to agree.

It was not assumed in 1818, in the Conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle in which Conferences the question of an arrangement between Spain and her Americas was, for the first, and last time, discussed between the Great Powers of Europe.

After the silence, indeed, which Spain observed as to the opinion of the Powers assisting at those Conferences, when laid before her, two things became perfectly clear: the first, that Spain had at that time no serious intention of offering any terms, such as the Spanish American Provinces were likely to accept; the second, that any subsequent reference of the subject to a Congress must be wholly fruitless and unsatisfactory.

From that time forth, Great Britain abstained from stirring the subject of Negotiation with the Colonies;—till in the month of May 1822, Spain spontaneously announced to Great Britain that she had measures in contemplation for the pacification of her Americas, on a basis entirely new:—which basis, however was not explicitly described.

In answer to that notification, Spain was exhorted by Great Britain to hasten as much as possible her Negotiation with the Colonies, as the course of events was evidently so rapid as not to admit of a much longer delay: but no suggestion was even then brought forward by Great Britain, as to the adoption of the basis of Independence.

The first suggestion of that basis came, in fact, from the Gov^t. of Spain itself, in the month of November 1822, when the British Minister at Madrid received an intimation that the Cortes meditated opening Negotiations with the Colonies, on the *basis of Colonial Independence*;— Negotiations which were, in fact, subsequently opened, and carried to a successful termination with Buenos Ayres, though they were afterwards disavowed by H. C. My.

It was not till after this last mentioned communication from the Spanish Government, that Great Britain expressed the opinion which she entertained as to the hopelessness of negotiating upon any other basis than that then first suggested by the Spanish Gov^t.

This opinion stated, (as has been said,) in the first instance, confidentially to Spain, was nearly a twelvemonth afterwards, that is to say in the month of

October 1823—mentioned by the Undersigned in a conference with the French Ambassador in London,¹ the substance of which conference was communicated to Spain, and to the other powers. It was repeated and enforced, in the Despatch from the Undersigned to Sir W^m. à Court in January 1824.²

Nothing therefore can be less exact than the supposition that Great Britain has uniformly put forward the basis of Independence, as the *sine qua non* condition of her Counsel and assistance to Spain in negociation with her Colonies.

To come now to the second charge against Great Britain—the alleged violation of general international Law. Has it ever been admitted as an axiom, or ever been observed by any nation or Government, as a practical maxim, that no circumstances and no time, should entitle a *de facto* government to recognition?—or should entitle third powers, who may have a deep interest in defining and establishing their relation with a *de facto* Government to do so?

Such a proceeding, on the part of Third Powers undoubtedly does not decide the question of right against the Mother Country.

The Netherlands had thrown off the Supremacy of Spain, long before the end of the 16th Century but that Supremacy was not formally renounced by Spain until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Portugal declared in 1640, her independence of the Spanish Monarchy, but it was not till 1668, that Spain, by Treaty, acknowledged that Independence.

During each of these intervals, the abstract rights of Spain may be said to have remained unextinguished. But third Powers, did not, in either of these instances, wait the slow conviction of Spain, before they thought themselves warranted to establish direct relations, and even to contract intimate Alliances, with the Republic of the United Netherlands, as well as with the new monarchy of the House of Braganza. The separation of the Spanish Colonies from Spain has been neither our work nor our wish— Events in which the British Government had no participation, decided that separation—a separation which we are still of opinion might have been averted, if our Counsels had been listened to in time. But out of that separation grew a state of things, to which it was the duty of the British Government (in proportion as it became the plain and legitimate interest of the Nation, whose welfare is committed to its charge) to conform its measures, as well as its language, not hastily and precipitately, but with due deliberation and circumspection.

To continue to call that a possession of Spain, in which all Spanish occupation and power had been actually extinguished and effaced, could render no practical service to the Mother Country, but it would have risked the peace of the World. For all political Communities are responsible to other political Communities for their conduct, that is, they are bound to perform the

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799, under date of October 9, 1823.

² See *ibid*, doc. 811, under date of January 30, 1824.

ordinary international duties, and to afford redress for any violation of the rights of others, by their citizens or subjects.

Now either the Mother Country must have continued responsible for acts over which it could no longer exercise the shadow of a controul; or the Inhabitants of those Countries, whose independent political existence was, in fact, established, but to whom the acknowledgment of that Independence was denied, must have been placed in a situation, in which they were either, wholly irresponsible for all their actions, or were to be visited for such of those actions as might furnish ground of complaint to other nations, with the punishment due to Pirates and Outlaws.

If the former of these alternatives, the total irresponsibility of unrecognized States, be too absurd to be maintained; and if the latter—the treatment of their inhabitants as Pirates and Outlaws—be too monstrous to be applied, for an indefinite length of time, to a large portion of the Habitable Globe; no other choice remained for Great Britain, or for any other country having intercourse with the Spanish American Provinces, but to recognize, in due time, their political existence as States; and thus to bring them within the pale of those rights and duties, which civilized nations are bound mutually to respect and are entitled reciprocally to claim from each other.

The example of the late revolution in France, and of the ultimate happy restoration of His Majesty Louis XVIII, is pleaded by M. Zea in illustration of the principle of unextinguishable right in a legitimate Sovereign, and of the respect to which that right is entitled from all Foreign Powers. And he calls upon Great Britain in justice to her own consistency, to act with the same reserve towards the New States of Spanish America, which she employed, so much to her honour towards Revolutionary France.

But can M. Zea, need to be reminded, that every Power in Europe, and, specifically, Spain amongst the foremost not only acknowledged the several successive Governments *de facto* by which the House of Bourbon was first expelled from the Throne of France and afterwards kept for near a quarter of a century, out of possession of it, but contracted intimate Alliances with them all; and above all, with that which M. Zea, justly describes as the strongest of *de facto* Governments, the Government of Buonaparte, against whom not any principle of respect for the rights of legitimate Monarchy, but his own ungovernable ambition, finally brought combined Europe into the field?

There is no use in endeavouring to give a specious colouring to facts which are now the property of history.

The Undersigned is therefore compelled to add, that Great Britain herself cannot justly accept the praise which M. Zea is willing to ascribe to her in this respect; nor can she claim to be altogether exempted from the general charge of having treated with the Powers of the French Revolution.

It is true, indeed, that up to the Year 1796, she abstained from treating with Revolutionary France, long after other Powers of Europe, had set her

the example. But the reasons alleged in Parliament, and in State Papers for that abstinence, was the unsettled state of the French Government: and it cannot be denied, that, both in 1796 and 1797 Great Britain opened a negotiation for peace with the Directory of France, a Negotiation, the favorable conclusion of which would have implied a recognition of that form of Government: that in 1801, she made peace with the Consulate, that, if, in 1806, She did not conclude a Treaty of Peace with Buonaparte, Emperor of France, the negotiation was broken off merely on a question of terms; and, that, if from 1808 to 1814, She steadily refused to listen to any overtures from France, She did so declaredly and notoriously on account of Spain alone; whom Buonaparte pertinaciously refused to admit as party to the Negotiation.

Nay, further, it cannot be denied that even in 1814, the year in which the Bourbon Dynasty was eventually restored, Peace would have been made by Great Britain with Buonaparte, if he had not been unreasonable in his demands: and Spain cannot be ignorant, that even after Buonaparte was set aside, there was question among the Allies, of the possible expediency of placing some other than a Bourbon on the Throne of France.

The appeal, therefore, to the conduct of the Powers of Europe; and even to that of Great Britain herself, with respect to the French Revolution, does but recall abundant instances of the recognition of *de facto* Governments by Great Britain, perhaps later and more reluctantly than by others, but by Great Britain, herself however reluctant after the example set to her by the other Powers of Europe, and specifically by Spain.

There are two other points in M. Zea's note, which appear to call for particular observation. M. Zea declares that the King of Spain will never recognize the New States of Spanish America, and that H. My. will never cease to employ the force of arms against His rebellious subjects in that part of the World.

We have neither the pretension, nor the desire to controul H. C. My's conduct. But this declaration of M. Zea comprises a complete justification of our conduct, in having taken the opportunity which to us seemed ripe, for placing our relations with the New States of America on a definite footing. For this declaration plainly shows, that the complaint against us is not merely as to the mode, or the time, of our advances towards those States: It shows that the dispute between us and Spain, is not merely as to the question of fact, whether the internal condition of any of those States be such as to justify the entering into definite relations with them; that it was not merely a reasonable delay, for the purpose of verifying contradictory reports, and of affording opportunity for friendly Negotiations, that was required of us. It shows that no extent of forbearance on our part would have satisfied Spain; and that defer our advances towards the New States as long as we might, we should still have had to make them without the consent of Spain;—for that Spain is determined against all compromise, under any circum-

stances, and at any time, and is resolved upon interminable War with her late Colonies in America.

M. Zea concludes, with declaring that H. C. My. will protest in the most solemn manner against the measures announced by the British Gov^t., as violating existing Treaties; and the imprescriptible rights of the Throne of Spain.

Against what will Spain protest? It has been proved that no Treaties are violated by us; and we admit that no question of right is decided by our recognition of the New States of America.

But, if the argument on which this declaration is founded, be true, it is eternal; and the offence of which we are guilty, in placing our intercourse with those Countries under the protection of Treaties, is one, of which no time and circumstances could, in the view of Spain, have mitigated the character.

Having thus entered with great pain and unwillingness, into the several topicks of M. Zea's note, the Undersigned is directed in conclusion, to express the anxious hope of his Government, that a discussion, now wholly without object, may be allowed here to close.

The Undersigned is directed to declare to the Spanish Minister, that no feeling of ill will, or even of indifference to the interests of H. C. My. has prompted the steps which H. My's. Government has taken, that H. M. still cherishes an anxious wish for the welfare of Spain: and that H. My. still retains the disposition, and commands the Undersigned again to renew to H. C. My's. Government the offer to employ H. My's. good offices, for the bringing about of any amicable arrangement, which may yet be practicable, between H. C. My. and the Countries of America which have separated themselves from Spain.

The Undersigned [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *March 26, 1825.*

The great powers of Europe appear to be reconciling themselves reluctantly, but still reconciling themselves, to the recognition of the new American states by Britain, and the prospect is becoming less and less of any immediate interruption of peace from this event. What I hear is, that Russia having entered her protest against it, rather intimates her desire to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

say, for the present at least, nothing more about it; and that France having also protested against it, is little inclined to do more, but on the contrary will perhaps not be slow to take up a policy more in unison with her true interests. As to Austria and Prussia they are said to have declared, that *they* will never recognize these insurgent colonies, until the parent state does, any other course being contrary to legitimacy; but that they intend any breach with those states who have recognized them, or who may, is not I believe imagined.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, April 4, 1825.

SIR: Mr. Secretary Canning invited me to an interview at the foreign office the day before yesterday, his object being as I found to apprise me of the manner in which the recognition of the new American states by Great Britain has been viewed by the powers of Europe, as well as what has passed between Great Britain and Spain in consequence of it.

He stated that in the month of February, Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador, having been charged with the sentiments of his court upon the measure, waited upon him in order to make them officially known to the British government. The Count was proceeding to execute this duty, by reading the despatch in which these sentiments of his court were contained, when Mr. Canning inquired whether it was intended that he should be furnished with a copy of the despatch. The Count replied, that he was not instructed or authorised to give a copy of it, but simply to make known its contents. Mr. Canning, on this avowal, declined hearing it read, remarking that as its contents might call for discussions between their two governments, that of Great Britain would manifestly be at a disadvantage by such a course; that he, Mr. Canning, would necessarily find himself under embarrassment, personally, at being called upon to make report to the king, and to his colleagues in the cabinet, on the exact nature of so important and grave a state paper from memory alone, whilst the record of it was in the hands of Russia, and that since the count was not at liberty to give a copy of it, the only mode left by which the parties would stand on ground more equal, would be for the count to detail to him its contents verbally. This was therefore the mode which he, Mr. Canning, would prefer. The count accordingly adopted it. When the conference was over, Mr. Canning put

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

upon paper the substance of the count's verbal communication, and sent it to the count for his corrections, by whom it was returned corrected accordingly.

This was the statement with which Mr. Canning introduced the delivery to me of the paper thus drawn up and verified upon the occasion. A copy of this paper, under date of the second of March, is enclosed.¹ Precisely the same narrative is applicable to interviews which he afterwards had with the ambassador of Austria, and the minister plenipotentiary of Prussia, both of whom were in like manner charged by their respective courts to make known their sentiments on the act of recognition by England, but without giving copies of their despatches. The papers under date of March the third and March the fourth,² which are also enclosed, were verified in like-manner with the Russian paper, so that these three papers will serve to make known the sentiments of these three courts under the measure, in the only form in which as it would seem they have become officially known to Great Britain. To none of these papers does Great Britain judge an answer necessary.

As to France Mr. Canning said, that he should find it difficult to describe what her precise course had been. She had protested against the measure, but in verbal communications only, having abstained hitherto from all expression of her opinions in any written form, and he added that he had now little expectation that she would express them to Great Britain in writing. In the end he did not hesitate to say unequivocally, that he considered all danger to the peace of Europe as wholly gone by; he meant all immediate danger arising out of the measure in question, and he intimated that France was perhaps less disposed than any of the powers to make it a cause of breach.

As regards Spain, Mr. Canning put into my hands for perusal her remonstrance, which indeed is sufficiently explicit. It was drawn up in January and addressed to the representative of England at Madrid. It complains of the measure as unjust and indefensible under all views; as contrary to the treaty stipulations of 1809, and 1814 between Great Britain and Spain; as not warranted by the actual condition of those rebellious colonies, in some of which Spanish power was still ascendent, and in all of which there was to be witnessed nothing but anarchy; as ill-chosen in regard to time, when the virtuous and loyal Spanish Americans in those colonies were giving such new proofs of their fidelity to the cause of the parent state, and when the parent state was harrassed at home by the effects of a criminal revolution, but just suppressed; as unnecessary with a view to secure to British subjects the trade of the colonies, since Spain was ready to grant in this respect, if she had not already granted, every reasonable and just boon to Britain; as contrary to the great principles of social and political order, on which the happiness and existence of nations depended, principles which had hitherto found in Britain a

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 823.

² *Ibid.*, docs. 824 and 825.

zealous and efficient advocate, especially during the whole progress of the French revolution, and at the epochs more recent of 1815 at Vienna, and 1818 at Aix la Chapelle; as out of character in short with the whole policy by which Britain had ever heretofore aided in sustaining the great European system; and as specially repugnant to her duties and alliance to Spain. I advert only to the most striking heads of the remonstrance, and ought not to omit to add, that it declares that Spain never will at any time acknowledge these insurgent colonies to be independent. I abstain from any more particular account of it, or from any account of the answer which this government has given to it, as I am to be furnished with copies of each. These Mr. Canning promised me, though they were not made out for my use on Saturday. I will forward them as soon as received.¹ The British answer is dated the 25th of March, and is occupied in combatting point by point the doctrines and assertions of the remonstrance. Its concluding passage contains an offer on the part of England to lend her good offices at the present period towards a pacification between Spain and the new states, foregoing passages of it having brought into view the offers of England to the same effect, at earlier stages of the contest.

Mr. Canning said nothing further to me on any part of the subject, which the papers that I sent, or those which I am still to forward, will not explain. No allusion of any kind is made to the United States in any part of the British answer; nor did Mr. Canning advert in conversation to our act of recognition, or to any of the past conferences or correspondence between himself and me, or to any of the opinions of my government, upon this subject.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, April 12, 1825.

Sir: A person high in diplomatic station here has informed me that, some months ago, probably six or nine, England made an offer to Spain to guaranty to her the possession of Cuba, and to send British troops there for that purpose, should it become necessary; but that the offer was declined by Spain.

Considering that such a measure would be, in effect, transferring Cuba to England, sooner or later, I asked my informant by what inducements Eng-

¹ See above, pt. VIII, docs. 821 and 826, Zea Bermudez to British Chargé, January 21, 1825, and Canning to Los Rios, March 25, 1825.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

land had hoped to draw Spain into a consent to it. He replied that he did not know, and either was, or feigned to be, but vaguely informed upon the point. He repeated however, with great confidence, the broad fact of such an offer having been made by England. It is the first time that I have heard of it. Lord Liverpool's declarations to me sometime ago upon this subject will not be forgotten. These, although they served to quiet my apprehensions for the moment did not allay them permanently, and since they were made to me I have not been unmindful of the importance of giving proper attention to the subject, and communicating to you whatever authentic information might at any time reach me in relation to it; but none has reached me that I have considered of this character until that which I now impart. I will not fail to endeavour to obtain, in a manner more full and precise, a knowledge of this alleged offer of England to guaranty to Spain the possession of this Island. The declarations of Lord Liverpool above mentioned were communicated by me on the 10th of March 1823.

It is a rumour of the day, that the ambassadors of the great continental powers, England being excluded, are shortly to meet at Milan, for political conferences, whither also the emperor of Austria is to repair. That the recognition of the new American states by England, whilst it has not and will not produce war between her and the continent as an immediate and avowed cause, has nevertheless planted the seeds of deep animosity between them, is obvious. Hence the above rumour is very likely to be true.

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*Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, May 2, 1825.

SIR: I now beg leave to enclose copies of the correspondence that⁷ passed between this government and that of Spain on the recognition of the new American states by the former, consisting of the notes described in my despatch of the 4th of April,² which Mr. Canning, according to his promise, has sent to me.

I have the honor [etc.]

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 828.

*John Adams Smith, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at London ad interim, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, July 10, 1825.

SIR: In regard to the application made by Mr. Baring in his place in the House of Commons on the night of the 1st of July to which I have heretofore alluded, Mr. Canning came down to the House on Tuesday the 5th inst. in order to state in answer to the question put on a preceding evening by Mr. Baring, why the individual of great respectability accredited to this country by the State of Buenos Ayres, had not been presented at the last Levee? For the reason why, the individual in question had not been presented, the fact was this, that he had no regular credentials. The State of Buenos Ayres had sent this gentleman a paper appointing him Minister Plenipotentiary to this country, but making him Minister Plenipotentiary also to France; and as far as his Mr. Canning's advice went, the same full observance of all forms and arrangements should be required from them as from the oldest, best secured, or most despotic governments existing. In all the relations of England with these new States, this fact could not fail to be recollected, there had been a great deal more of Commercial and speculative than of political actual transaction.

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACTS]

CHELTENHAM, August 9, 1825.

SIR: Upon my landing at Liverpool I wrote you a private letter informing you of our arrival, and adding that owing to the roughness of the Passage and my uninterrupted sea sickness I should be obliged in hopes of recovering my strength to delay for a few days my Journey to London. . . . I

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII. John Adams Smith of Massachusetts: Commissioned secretary of legation in Great Britain, September 8, 1815; acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from May 14 to December 22, 1817, and from May 13 to November 11, 1825; appointed secretary of legation at Madrid; commissioned secretary of legation in Spain, April 8, 1825; appointed secretary of legation at Paris; commissioned secretary of legation at France, June 12, 1828; acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from June 28 to October 1, 1829; appointed secretary of legation at St. Petersburg.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII. These notes exchanged between Canning and King were embodied in the text of the latter's dispatch to Clay instead of being enclosed in it.

concluded to send my son to London with the Despatches confided to me for Count Lieven and our Minister at Paris. . . . Accordingly upon the 29th of July I received Mr. Canning's letter of the former day, and by return of the Post sent him my answer to wit:

MR. CANNING TO MR. KING

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 28th 1825.*

DEAR SIR: The pleasure of renewing the very old acquaintance, which authorizes me (I hope) so to address you, induces me to take Cheltenham in my way to the North of England. I hope to arrive there on Monday and to pay my respects to you that evening, or early the following day, as may best suit your convenience.

In the mean time I take the liberty of sending for your Perusal, the enclosed extracts of letters lately received by me from Mr. Addington.

The sentiments of your Government as therein reported *are ours*. I shall be exceedingly glad of an opportunity of talking them over with you, and I wish that we may be able to agree to some mode of giving to them a salutary effect.

I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. I shall not leave town till after the arrival of the Post on Saturday— But I beg you will not take the trouble to answer this letter *for form's sake* unless there be any thing that you may be desirous of bringing under my consideration before we meet. G. C.

EXTRACT OF A DESPATCH FROM MR. ADDINGTON TO MR. SECRETARY CANNING, DATED WASHINGTON, MAY 2D, 1825

The fate of Cuba and Porto Rico was a subject of deep interest. It could hardly accord with the views of Great Britain any more than with those of the United States, that those Colonies should fall into the hands of Colombia or of Mexico; and yet if Spain long delayed the Recognition of those States, an attempt would assuredly be made by one of them on those Islands. Viewed on all sides this latter was a subject of great difficulty and delicacy.

EXTRACT OF A DESPATCH FROM MR. ADDINGTON, DATED WASHINGTON, MAY 21ST, 1825

. . . This subject had of course been canvassed both by People and Government at various times in the United States, as in England, and both Parties, Mr. Clay believed, had come to the same conclusion, namely, that it would be better in every respect that Spain should retain Cuba.

Should this turn out in the course of events to be impracticable, and impracticable it would be, if the King of Spain persevered in his insane determination still to withhold his Recognition of the Independence of Colombia and Mexico, in that case two other alternatives presented themselves, both of which would be open to great difficulties and embarrassments: The first was the establishment of an Independent Government in Cuba under the joint guarantee of the United States and Great Britain, and perhaps some of the Spanish American Republics;

and the second the transfer, by sufferance of that colony to Colombia or Mexico, whichever should attack it. He would tell me fairly and without hesitation, that however much he should deprecate such an issue, he would prefer that to the Island falling into the hands of any of the great maritime powers, and especially Great Britain, as of course Great Britain would to its coming under the Dominion of the United States. His views with respect to the Policy to be observed towards Cuba were therefore in brief Recapitulation these: First—The *Status quo*. Secondly—Independence under the guarantee of two or several large Powers. Thirdly—annexation to the Colony of Colombia or Mexico. These views he announced to me without reserve as one Private gentleman to another.

MR. KING TO MR. CANNING

CHELTENHAM, *July 29th, 1825.*

No. 2, Bath Villa.

DEAR SIR: I have just received your letter of yesterday and cannot lose a moment in the expression of my sense of the kind recollections in which it has originated.

The occasion, as I hope will justify the avowal of the satisfaction with which I shall meet you in the office for Foreign Affairs, especially as it permits me to rely upon the frankness and directness with which the business of our intercourse will be sure to be conducted.

By the extracts from Mr. Addington's letters which you have sent for my perusal, and for which be pleased to accept my thanks, you have anticipated the subject which had seemed to me most important at the present moment—while there are other topics upon which we may desire an early occasion to discuss, there is none which I would press upon your attention at the present moment.

I have the honor [etc.].

August the 2d. Mr. Canning arrived last Evening and sent me a message that he would call on me at 10 o'clock of the Evening of his arrival or at 9 o'clock the next morning, having named the morning, he came to my House at 9 o'clock this morning. After the ordinary salutations I expressed my thanks for his making me this visit, and repeated my acknowledgments that he had sent for my perusal the extracts of Mr. Addington's letters to him, and my satisfaction that the United States and Great Britain thought alike on the subject of Cuba and the New States, that I could not do better than to put into his hands an extract from my Instructions explanatory of our views on these subjects, in doing which I complied with the desire of my Government to communicate fully and freely with the Government of Great Britain, in return for the like communication on their Part. The extract omitted the Instruction to Mr. Middleton and alluded in general terms to the employment of the influence of the United States to engage Russia, France and Great Britain to influence Spain to make Peace with the New States by acknowledging their Independence. Mr. Canning *soon* replied

that such a hope was desperate, that Russia was unchangeable on this point. We have understood that by the early education of Alexander, he was led to the adoption of a faith altogether different from that of which he is at present the Champion; at the negotiation of Peace with France, he was for the exclusion of the Bourbons, now he avows the doctrine that crowns and succession can lawfully be regulated by Kings and Emperors only, so that he is the last person from whom a change may be expected. I asked whether Austria, Prussia or France would be likely to admit of change in this Theory; he answered that France had one foot in the water and one foot on the land, as respects the water foot she seemed inclined to agree or rather not to disagree with England, that Austria would feel the power of Russia, tho' perhaps she may fall short in the strength of her faith. Prussia is slow in her movements and not as zealous in the cause, with which she is ranked as may have been supposed.

France has lately sent Commissioners to Saint Domingo offering to acknowledge their Independence for a large sum of money and a provision to introduce French manufactures at a Tariff reduced below that of other countries. She has lately committed a blunder by sending a convoy from Martinique to Cuba with Spanish ships and troops which had arrived at Martinique from the Philippines. Great Britain remonstrated against her sending this aid as departing from the duty of Neutrality and as in fact taking part in the war between Spain and the New States. The French Government in reply stated that the Governor of Martinique has mistaken his orders, which authorised him to send *French Troops* to the succour of Cuba, *should their condition* require it. England replied that France would take part with Spain or not as she might choose, but it must be done openly. That the sending French Troops to Cuba for their succour, would be taking part in the war; and it must, and would be so understood. This Truth blundered out, on the fact of insubordination of the Spanish Troops from the Peninsula manifesting itself in Cuba—at which crisis now past, the French may have issued these orders. Mr. Canning observed that while England despaired of the favorable interposition of Russia and of the temper of Spain to make peace with the new states by acknowledging their Independence, they felt themselves so greatly reinforced and sustained by the views of the United States, and the agreement which existed between the United States and England in these views, that latterly they had directed all their efforts to prevail on Spain to conclude an armistice with the new states, which would in the end lead to Peace, that it had occurred to England, by a Note drawn up and approved by England, the United States and France in such form as should be approved that Spain may consent to such armistice, especially if coupled with the same, it be provided that Cuba and Porto Rico shall remain under the Dominion of Spain. That it was not till the Treaty of Munster that Spain consented to the Independence of the Netherlands,

an armistice or truce for nearly seventy years having preceded the acknowledgment of Spain. Her Dilatory character, and the delays with which any alteration of her government could be effected, stand in the way of the Recognition of the Independence of the Colonies.

It should moreover be recollected, that under the influence of this character Spain herself towards the close of the American war, when pressed by France to join her in acknowledging the Independence of the United States, dissented, but proposed to join in a recommendation to England to conclude an armistice with the United States. The example of Spain on that occasion, will justify England in following her example in this. I asked Mr. Canning what probability existed that France could be prevailed upon to unite with England and the United States in the adoption of such Note. Mr. Canning made use of expressions of his belief, spoke of the manifestation of her desire to bring to a satisfactory close the question of Saint Domingo, her manifestation of the desire to build up her navigation and commerce, the wish she shewed to recruit her Colonies and to pacify the West Indies. To these Remarks he joined with emphasis the influence which he said was so fully due to the union of England and the United States in their views respecting Cuba, Porto Rico and the New States upon the continent.

Mr. Canning enquired whether I should soon write to my Government. I replied that I should do so immediately after our present conference was finished, and as the American and English Governments tho' agreed in the Policy to be pursued in relation to Cuba and the New States, did not agree on the measure now to be adopted to promote this Policy. I was desirous in order to avoid mistake, that he should put in writing, the reasons which he had assigned to me in opposition to the measure proposed by the United States, and in favor of that which was proposed by England. Mr. Canning replied that as he should pass two or three days in this neighborhood, he would write to me accordingly. This happened a week ago and I have heard nothing farther from Mr. Canning. I am nevertheless anxious to communicate to you the substance of this conference, that will be open to the correction of Mr. Canning's communication, which shall be forwarded to you as soon as it may be received by me.

Mr. Brown having left Paris for some time for the Waters of Savoy and my progress having yet afforded me no opportunity to confer with Count Lieven and others, you will perceive that I am obliged in preparing this Despatch to rely upon the authority of England—but it becomes the more important that you receive this letter, in order that I may obtain the earliest instructions of the President concerning the measure recommended by this Government. Should it be resumed, as I conclude it will in some form in which I may be called upon to take a part, which I shall be cautious in doing without the orders of my Government.

With great Respect [etc.].

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

CHELTENHAM, *August 11, 1825.*

SIR: Yesterday I received Mr. Canning's promised communication. On comparing it with my Report² of the conference between us, you will perceive the effort of Mr. Canning to sustain the measure pursuing by the English Government in preference to the proposed measure of the United States. The information received from Lord Granville at Paris is to be regarded as a continuation of the endeavour of the English Government in support of the measure which they have adopted, and now recommend to the United States. Mr. Brown³ being absent from Paris I have no means of countervailing Lord Granville's information upon this important subject.

MR. CANNING TO MR. KING

Confidential.

WORTLEY HALL, *August 7th, 1825.*

MY DEAR SIR: I have deferred the execution of my promise a day or two longer than I intended, because I found reason to believe that before the end of the week I should hear something more certain from Paris as to the way in which the French Government were likely to receive Mr. Brown's proposition. I did hear yesterday from Lord Granville on this subject: and there is I apprehend no doubt but that the French Government have returned a negative answer to Mr. Brown, alleging as the ground of their refusal, that Mr. Brown's Proposition implies a recognition of the Independence of the Continental States of Spanish America.

In short, my dear Sir, it is as I took the liberty of telling you at Cheltenham:—If your government founds its sole hope of preserving Cuba to Spain, on that of being able to persuade the great Powers of the European Continent to concur in persuading Spain to adopt new councils in respect to her late Provinces on the continent of America; you may depend upon it—that foundation is absolutely unsound. France is indeed that one of the great Powers which has the most obvious interest in procuring such an adjustment between Spain and her Americas, and which, if France could venture to act from the sense of her own interest alone, would have the best disposition to do so. And she does not act for or from herself. The awe in which she stands of the Continental Alliance prevents her. Of that Alliance the moving soul is Russia. And the United States are grievously mistaken if they imagine that the Emperor of Russia is upon this—as perhaps they may have found him upon other matters—open to the blandishments of flattery, so far as to be led to use the influence he possesses, and is proud to be

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 832, King to Clay, August 9, 1825.

³ James Brown, United States Minister to France.

thought to possess in Europe, in a direction quite different from that which his principles, his prejudices, and *perhaps* his interests prescribe. I say perhaps his interests, because I must fairly own that; having once missed the golden opportunity of taking the lead—or going hand in hand with us and the United States in our line of Policy, I see no very great temptation to induce the Emperor of Russia now to change the course which he has advisedly chosen; and to expose himself to the just reproaches of Spain, for having urged her on in her blind folly, until she was ruined past reparation, and then when her ruin has been accomplished, turning round and urging her to tread back her steps,—too late.

Every human motive, I confess seems to me to conspire to keep the Emperor of Russia in the path which he has chosen: and though I dare say that the usual appeals to his magnanimity, generosity, power, predominance &c. &c. &c. which have soothed and won him on former occasions, will soothe him still—they will (in my opinion) not win him to any other system of action in respect to Spain, and her late colonies.

Such—I say is my opinion and speculation. But in aid of speculative opinions, I have the fact—stated by the French Ministers (whether to Mr. Brown I know not but stated without much reserve) at the time of giving their answer to Mr. Brown, that Russia *is* inflexible in her Policy respecting Spain and her Colonies; and that she continues to preach to Spain, not only *no recognition* of their Independence but active war for their subjugation. We must look at things therefore as they *are*, and not as we would wish them to be; and we must consider what we can do, to preserve Cuba to Spain; short of bringing about, through the intervention of her Continental Allies peace between Spain and her emancipated colonies—which is hopeless.

Of the value of this object—the preservation of Cuba to Spain—we, I know (that is the government of England and that of the United States) think alike. And we are too honest, and respect each other and ourselves too much, not to avow that we think alike, for the like reasons.

You cannot allow that we should have Cuba. We cannot allow that you should have it. And we can neither of us allow that it should fall into the hands of France.

Our mutual and reciprocal respect for each other is a security for our mutual abstinence. But France is swayed so much by the humour of the day, and proceeds in a course of policy so devious and vacillating, that she is really capable of *blundering* into a maritime war, without having seen its danger much less calculated its consequences. I will give you two instances of this most inconvenient propensity.

A detachment of Spanish Troops, on its way (I think) from the Philippine Islands, to reinforce the garrison of the Havannah, touched at Martinique. The Governor of Martinique (who is I believe Captain General of the French Forces on the West Indies) not only received and refreshed these Troops—which was an act of blameless hospitality; but when the detachment made sail again, sent a French ship of War to convoy it to its destination: which, if the convoy was to do the duty of a convoy—that is to defend the detachment under its protection against the only enemy that could assail it—was neither more nor less than an act of War against that enemy. Viz. against the New States of Spanish America—

Suppose a Colombian Frigate to have fallen in with this convoy—

you see plainly what must have followed. And I am perfectly satisfied that the French Captain General did *not* see that he was thus putting the peace of the maritime and colonial world to hazard.

We represented this matter to the French Government not in a tone of complaint—for it was no business of ours if they chose to make a defensive league with Spain, and to abide the consequences;—but with a voice of friendly warning—pointing out to them, those consequences of an unadvised procedure, which we really believed them not to have had in contemplation. They certainly had neither those consequences nor the procedure itself in their contemplation: for they were ignorant of the fact; they doubted—they even denied it,—grounding their denial upon this—that their Captain General had no instructions to give convoy to Spanish Troops or Vessels.

Shortly after however, they admitted the fact to be as stated by us. Count Dongelot the Captain General had written home reporting what he had done; and they had written out to him to take care not to do so any more. So far so good. But was Count Dongelot alone to blame? Not so—for when the French Ministers denied having given him any instructions to convoy Spanish armaments, they added—that they were the more surprised that he should have taken upon himself to act as he did in this affair, because he *had* clear instructions for the *only* case in which there was any probability of his being called upon to interfere in Spanish Colonial concerns: and what do you think, those instructions were? Nothing less than to send French Troops to the Havannah if the Governor of that place should ask his assistance to put down *internal* disturbance! Well, surely might Count Dongelot conceive that the order, in a given case to occupy the Island of Cuba, with a French force, implied if it did not actually involve, an injunction to assist the Spaniards to occupy it themselves!

We have taken the liberty to expound to the French Ministers the dangerous tendency of those avowed Instructions to Count Dongelot; and we have obtained an assurance that they too shall be withdrawn.

But the fact of having given them indicates such an insensibility to the real state of things in the Colonial World—and such a looseness and precipitancy—such a promptitude to act upon impulse, without weighing probabilities and combining results—that I protest I never feel quite assured that I may not, on rising up in the morning, find that a French force has landed at the Havannah, in consequence of some orders hastily given, for contingencies ill defined, or of some discretion indiscreetly reposed in the judgment of a local commander.

Now against this danger—and it is by far the most imminent—it is in our power (in that of your government and mine) to guard; if we are contented, in the first Instance, to confine our endeavours to that object.

France, professes, as we do, to wish above all things, that Cuba should continue to belong to Spain. She disclaims, as we do, any desire to get possession of it. Spain is disquieted by the apprehension that we (that is that *either* Great Britain *or* the United States) may take advantage of her weakness to wrest Cuba from her. She has not the same fears of France; or has them in so much less a degree that it is by no means impossible that, in some moment of panic with respect to us, and you, she should herself call in France to aid her in the safe keeping of Cuba.

Here therefore I say is the most instant danger. Let us guard against that.

France, if appealed to, can hardly refuse to disavow in an authentic form, designs imputed to her and to us—if we (meaning always you *and* we) concur in the same disavowal.

What I would propose therefore is the signature by the three powers, either of three Ministerial Notes—one between Great Britain and the United States, one between the United States and France and one between France and Great Britain—or one Tripartite Note signed by all—disclaiming each for ourselves, any intention to occupy Cuba and protesting each against such occupation by either of the others.

Such an Instrument would settle the question as between the great maritime Powers of the old World and the New.

The only danger which would then remain to Cuba, would be from the War with the New Independent States of Spanish America. When that was the single danger, I should not despair of working upon Spain—not through the Alliance—not through France. But after the proof that we should have given of our disinterestedness and good will in relation to Cuba—by our own unassisted efforts (“*our*” comprehending in this instance as heretofore the Union of *your* counsels with ours, and the union of those of France too, if France shall by that time have taken courage to act with us, without leave of her Continental Allies) I should not despair, I say, of working upon Spain so far as to induce her to put an end to that single remaining danger, by consenting, I will not venture to affirm to a *peace* (involving immediate recognition,) but to a *suspension of hostilities*, and of this I am firmly persuaded, that to obtain any chance of success, we must separate two questions not necessarily connected with each other, *Viz.*, the danger to Cuba from the suspected ambition of the old powers, from that which impends over it (but of which Spain thinks comparatively little) from the New. So long as peace with the New Powers is made a condition of the assurance of safety from the old—our exhortations will be heard with suspicion, and repelled with resentment: whereas, once soothed and softened by a solemn and unequivocal assurance as to the purity of our designs and as to the benevolence of our wishes (yours and ours) the Spanish Government may be induced to listen to advice, in which it can—no longer pretend to trace a lurking motive of self interest; and to admit into a deliberation how Cuba can best be secured from invasion by Colombia or Mexico, Powers who have bound themselves by a common obligation neither to take, nor to permit the taking of Cuba, to either of themselves.

This is the course which we intend to pursue on this question: and it is one in which I invite you to join us.

I have the honor [etc.].

*John Adams Smith, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at London ad interim, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, August 13, 1825.

SIR: Mr. Nelson² on his return from Spain left London on Thursday the 11th on his way to Liverpool, by the route of Cheltenham, to embark in the packet ship to sail for New York on the 16th instant.

The Mexican Treaty with this country has been received since I had the honor of writing to you, by Mr. Morier the Commissioner on the part of this Government, but the Treaty has been objected to in certain modifications by Mr. Canning, and will be returned for the required alterations. I take this occasion of saying, that in a conversation which I had the opportunity of holding yesterday with Mr. Rivadavia, the agent from the State of Buenos Ayres, who will embark in the course of next week, to return to Buenos Ayres, he gave it to me as his opinion that the State of Buenos Ayres would not send in the course of next year a Minister or diplomatic agent to this country, and that it was not his intention to leave one here on his departure; he supposed that a Minister would very soon go from Buenos Ayres to the United States.

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain*³

Confidential.

STORRS, August 21, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR: I addressed to you, just this day fortnight, my promised letter on the subject of Cuba.⁴

It would have been a satisfaction to me to learn that it had reached you safely. I trust that it is not owing to any recurrence of your indisposition that I have not yet had the pleasure of hearing from you.

In the interval which has elapsed since I wrote to you, I have ascertained, through his Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, that there will be no unwillingness on the part of the French Government, to sign a tripartite engagement, between our three Governments, to the effect proposed in my letter to you.

I have in consequence prepared for consideration the draft of such an en-

¹ MS. Despatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain.

³ MS. Despatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in King to Clay, August 24, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 836.

⁴ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 833, embodied in the text of King to Clay, August 11, 1825.

gement—one copy of which I transmit to his Majesty's Ambassador at Paris—another I have the honor herewith to enclose.

I explain to Lord Granville for the satisfaction of the French Ministers that by reserving the right which both you and we have proclaimed and exercised of landing in pursuit of Pirates, who may have taken refuge on the Coasts of Cuba & C. we shall give a better proof of the frankness and sincerity, in which we mean to deal with Spain, than if we either omitted all mention of a practice, to which we *have had* occasion to resort, and to which (unless the evil be suppressed) we may have occasion to resort again; or introduced into the engagement a stipulation that Spain should do something more effectual than she has hitherto done, for the suppression of Piracy—which (while utterly ineffective for its object) would give to the whole instrument the air of a *conditional promise* instead of (what we wish it to be) a direct and unqualified assurance, on the point on which the apprehensions of Spain are alive. You will do me a great kindness if you will let me know how far this *projet* meets your approbation; and whether you, or Mr. Brown (apprized as you both are of the sentiments of your Government upon this subject) would feel yourselves authorized to sign such an Instrument, without reference home.

I am persuaded that when signed, it would have a powerful effect in tranquillizing the mind of H. C. M. and would thereby render the task of those who undertake to counsel Him for his good, I will not say easy—that would be too sanguine a speculation—but—less hopeless than it is and must otherwise continue to be.

I have the honor [etc].

[The enclosed draft of a tripartite engagement follows:]

Projet of Engagement
either Tripartite
or Between, 1. France and England
 2. England & the U. S^{as}.
& 3. the U. S^{as}. & France

The Undersigned [etc.].

Governments—Are authorized by their Respective (Courts) to interchange with each other the following declaration. In order to tranquillize the apprehensions entertained by the Court of Spain lest any power at peace with H. C. My. should take advantage of the difficulties in which H. C. My. is involved by the war in which He is engaged with the late Spanish Colonies on the American Continent, to occupy with a Military Force the I. of Cuba, or any other of the Insular Possessions of Spain in the W. I. now acknowledging the authority of the Mother Country, the U. S. &c. . . . do each in the name of the Sovereign, engage in the face of the World, that their respective Govts. will not, on any account or pretext whatever, introduce into the Island of Cuba, or into any other of the Insular Possessions of Spain in the W. I. any military force; nor will they see with indifference any attempt at the

introduction of any such Force by any other power that is, like themselves at peace with Spain.

It is understood that this declaration is not to preclude the occasional landing of small parties from the ships of war of friendly Nations cruising off the Coasts of the Spanish Islands, in actual pursuit of Pirates, who may seek shelter in those Coasts.

But it is distinctly provided, understood & promised, that such shall only take place either in aid, & in that case with the consent, of the local authorities of the Island; or, in cases of immediate necessity, at such a distance from the Seat of any local authorities, as may render previous communication with them, impracticable; and that the stay of any such party so landed shall not exceed the time absolutely required for the single purpose of pursuing the pirates.

And the U. S. each for his own (Court) engage that instructions to the effect of these provisoes, shall be sent by their respective Gov^{ts}. to the Com^{drs}. of their respective Naval forces in the ——— Seas.

836

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, August 24, 1825.

SIR: I have received a further confidential communication from Mr. Canning which is annexed² and to which I have made the reply that follows.

MR. KING TO MR. CANNING

LONDON, 20 BAKER STREET,
August 24th, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR: I received in due course your promised communication of the 7th [9th?] instant, and last evening had the honor to receive your letter of the 21st.

Although the policy of our respective Governments relating to the claims of Spain in America is understood to agree, the extent of the means by which this policy is to be promoted seems materially to differ from each other; the desire on my part deliberately to revise and compare the two plans suggested by the Government of the United States and that of Great Britain before I replied to your communication of the 7th of August, was the occasion of my delay, and will I hope also excuse a more particular answer at this time to your letter of the 21st instant.

I have been desirous of conferring with Mr. Brown the American Minister at Paris on this important subject, but his want of health having obliged him to leave Paris for the waters of Savoy, I have been unable to communicate with him, or to avail myself of his information &

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 835, Canning to King, August 21, 1825.

proceedings, or of those of Mr. Middleton the American Minister at St. Petersburg, concerning the same.

In these circumstances I must decline the adoption of any definitive measure in relation to the subject, and refer the whole to my Government for their instructions— I may however enquire whether the limitation of the arrangements of the *Projet* which you have sent me respecting Cuba and the Insular Possessions of Spain in America, leaving as it does the New States upon the Continent so entirely unnoticed and without provision, may not afford cause to apprehend an immediate attempt of Colombia and Mexico to invade Cuba; an event that would give rise to questions, which would not only throw all the West India Islands into disorder, but which may excite painful anxiety in some of the United States.

I have the honor [etc.].

837

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, September 4, 1825.

I have become acquainted with the gentlemen who represent Chili, Colombia, and Mexico; with the person who represented Buenos Ayres, I was not acquainted, and he as well as the Minister from Mexico, whom I did not meet, have returned home; the former (whose letter of Credence is said to have been addressed to both France and England) without leaving any one behind, charged with the affairs of the United Provinces. None of these Persons have in fact been received as Ministers, for various reasons which have been assigned to them. The Treaty with Buenos Ayres being ratified, assurances are said to have been publicly given by Mr. Canning, that on the production of the usual Letter of Credence, the person offering the same would be received. Chili has not yet formed a Treaty with England. One has been concluded with Colombia, but waits for some further act of the Colombian Government, before it can be sent here for Ratification. Mr. Hurtado, the person named as Minister, informed me that he is in daily expectation of receiving it, when he expects to be immediately received. The Mexican Treaty is gone back for the correction, which as it stands, would sanction the rule that Free Ships make Free Goods; this alteration effected, the Chargé of Mexico expects that their Minister will be immediately received. England insists: First, upon the conclusion of a treaty, and next, that the new Ministers severally comply with all the formalities of the old states in the form of their Credentials. At least this is stated among the Reasons why none are yet received.

With great Respect [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Private & confidential.

STORRS, September 8, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 24th of August² was very satisfactory to me, as announcing your arrival in Town, and implying therefore, as I hope, the removal of the indisposition which had detained you at Cheltenham.

In other respects, I confess, it has rather disappointed me: as I flattered myself that you might find yourself at liberty to concur in so simple a measure, as the reciprocal disavowal by our two governments of designs which most assuredly neither of them entertains, without any previous reference to Washington.

My wish that you could have done so, and my sense of the importance of such a joint declaration on our parts, are not diminished by the information which I have received from France, since I last wrote to you, which is, in effect, that, after having encouraged the overture of the British Ambassador in a manner which led him to believe that France would willingly concur in such a declaration, Mr. Damas has suddenly changed his language, and formally declined to accede to our proposals.

Although I should not have thought of proposing originally, the signature of such a declaration between Great Britain and the United States *only* without proposing it at the same time to France, yet, France having declined to become party to it, I should have felt no difficulty in signing it with America alone.

Of that, however, after your letter, there seems to be no question.

How any thing *can* be said of the New States of Spanish America, in such a Note as I propose to you to exchange, I do not see.

Spain and those New States are at open War.

I know of no mode of intervention between states so situated towards each other (consistent with that neutrality which is professed alike by England and N. America) except amicable mediation: which intervention, so far as England is concerned, has been offered over and over again, and as often rejected by Spain. One hope, which I founded upon the measure which I proposed to you, was, that it might tranquillize Spain with respect to the suspected designs of powers *not at war* with her, upon Cuba: and *so* incline her mind to receive with more complacency the offer of *their* mediation (yours as well as ours, if you think fit to make the offer of it) between her and the States, *with which she is at war*.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in King to Clay, September 13, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 839.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 836, embodied in the text of King to Clay, August 24, 1825.

Thus, incidentally the New States of America would be greatly interested in such a measure: but the nature of the measure itself would be changed, by introducing any mention of them into it, in the first instance.

For how could that mention be introduced otherwise, than either 1st by saying openly "We take this measure with respect to Spain *in order* to induce her to make peace with her late Colonies":—a purpose very right to be entertained—but the avowal of which, prematurely, would frustrate the intention of those who entertain it, or 2dly by making our professions with respect to Cuba *contingent* and dependent upon the consent of Spain to make peace with her late Colonies: in which case the assurance would be converted into something very like a menace—or what would be understood as such by Spain.

For he who makes an uncalled-for declaration, that he will *not* do a certain thing, *provided* the party to whom he offers the assurance, *will* do some other thing; is generally understood to imply that unless his proviso is complied with, he will do the thing, that he is ready conditionally to forego, or at least will think himself at liberty to do it. Now, if neither of these forms would be likely to work a favorable change in the disposition of Spain, in what other way could the new states be introduced into any joint declaration of ours—unless we are prepared to say that *they shall not* do, that which we declare *we will not do*—get possession of Cuba?

This to be sure, would be exactly what Spain would desire. But can this be what the Government of the United States intends? or would it be any thing other than a direct and undisguised taking of a part in the war between Spain and the New States, on the side of Spain?

I state these difficulties to you, as they strike me, on considering the last sentence of your letter. Perhaps I have not rightly collected its purport.

In referring home for further instructions, I take for granted that you have not been unmindful of the private and friendly and entirely confidential character of my former letter. I beg you to consider this in the same light.

I shall be perfectly ready, on my arrival in town, to concert with you the mode of bringing the topicks of our correspondence, in a formal shape before our respective governments; either by addressing to you an official Note, containing the suggestion submitted by me in my first letter:—or by receiving such a Note from you, forwarded on the instructions of your government.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, *September 13, 1825.*

SIR: Nothing has occurred since the date of my last, worthy of communication, except the annexed [enclosed] private and confidential letter from Mr. Canning,² to which I annex a copy of the answer I have sent: tho' from changes which have occurred since my conference with him, there seems little prospect of pursuing the correspondence with advantage. It is evident from the last communication of Mr. Canning that he feels some anxiety respecting the friendly and confidential nature of his letters to me; on this head I shall with confidence assure him of the discretion of my government, and that no publication will be allowed by which his confidence and friendly disposition will be abused, or violated: tho' there may appear in his correspondence, some want of caution, I hope nothing may happen, that may impose upon him the employment of greater circumspection. If he is willing to confide in my discretion, I surely can confide in that of my government. Mr. Canning and colleagues, are all out of Town, but are expected on the 17th or 20th. With great respect [etc.].

MR. KING TO MR. CANNING

20 BAKER STREET, *September 13, 1825.*

MY DEAR SIR: I yesterday had the honor to receive your private and confidential letter of the 8th Inst^t. Instead of recurring to the Note proposed to have been signed by the Three powers respecting Cuba, it seems to me preferable to go a little further back upon the subject; as this will the better enable me, to put you in possession of my way of thinking upon the question.

The United States and Great Britain as I understand them, are of the same opinion upon this point, namely, that it is entirely hopeless that Spain under any circumstances, is able to recover her dominion over her late Continental Colonies in America.

But though agreed on this point, they are inclined to pursue different means, to promote the policy which they respectively wish.

The United States earnestly desire that Great Britain, France and Russia should unite with them, in the endeavour to prevail on Spain to consent to the separation and Independence of the New States; without entering into the reasons, which operate so powerfully upon Spain to give her consent, it may be observed, that these powers being free to offer this advice, Spain cannot be justly offended by it; and the same being known to the New States will have the effect to tranquillize them, and to allow time for the influence of these powers, or of such of them as adopt the measure, in cooperation with the course of events, to have their natural effect.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 838, Canning to King, September 8, 1825.

Great Britain for the moment despairs of the interposition of Russia; (tho' the views of the Emperor must be temporary) and proposes a plan which however just in respect to the United States and Great Britain is wholly gratuitous on their part, and can gratify nobody but Spain: under this plan Cuba and the other Insular possessions of Spain in the West Indies will be exposed to invasion from the New States, and Spain herself to the harrassment of her commerce in Europe, as well as in other quarters.

The plan of the United States is calculated to pacify the New States, by leading them to wait for the influence of the interference of their friends; so that should even the Plan of Great Britain be adopted by the three Powers, or by two of them, the Plan of the United States would have the same effect.

If the success of France at Saint Domingo has changed her late views, it will neither change the condition of Spain, nor that of her associates, who from year to year are becoming more impotent, and less able to reconquer her colonies, or to persuade them to imitate the ignoble example of the inhabitants of Saint Domingo. This view of the subject, joined to the want of information from my Colleagues have had their influence in deciding my course to refer your friendly and confidential correspondence to my government; in doing which I rely upon it, that its private and confidential and friendly character will be protected from violation or abuse.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

Confidential.

WELBECK, September 15, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the day before yesterday.²

I confess, it surprizes me to find that my letters have been actually transmitted to your Government. They were not written with that intention; not that there is any thing in them (in substance) which I should have wished to withhold from the knowledge of Mr. Adams & Mr. Clay: but that, if I had intended an official communication, I should naturally have expressed the same opinions in language less ungarded.

The confounding of confidential with official letters has a tendency to restrict correspondence wholly to the latter; and thereby to deprive two Public Ministers who might be disposed to open themselves unreservedly to each other, of one most advantageous mode of ascertaining each other's sentiments, and of preparing the way for an understanding between their Governments.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in King to Clay, September 18, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 841.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 839, embodied in the text of King to Clay, September 13, 1825.

However—what remains to be added to our present correspondence, is very little.

Having been incessantly occupied, for the last three years, in endeavouring to persuade the Spanish government to adopt those views with respect to the late continental colonies of Spain, which you concur with us in thinking the only sound and rational views, it is quite unnecessary to say that we heartily wish success *to any* new attempt to produce on the mind of His Catholick Majesty that impression, which, we have attempted to produce in vain.

If I did not entertain any very sanguine hopes of such success from your appeals to Russia & France—when first you mentioned them to me,—my anticipations are certainly not contradicted, by the result so far as it [is] disclosed.

France has, as I presume you know, decided *against* your plan of joint interference; and the proposal of it has (if I am not misinformed) been received in Russia as coolly—as (to say the truth) it was natural to suppose it would be, after what is known of the character of the counsels which Russia has been hitherto in the habit of giving to Spain.

I do not presume to enquire what is the further intention of your government, when this plan shall be understood to have failed.

It is unnecessary to say that you will find a perfect readiness on my part, to receive and consider favourably any proposition, which appears to us besides being conceived (as no doubt it will be) in the spirit of peace and good will to Spain, as well as to her late colonies, to afford a reasonable prospect of success.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *September 18, 1825.*

Last evening I received a confidential despatch from Mr. Canning of the 15th instant,² copy whereof you have annexed.

With great Respect [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 840.

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

Confidential.

LONDON, September 21, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR: I have had the honor to receive your Confidential letter of the 15th Sept.² To much of this letter I give my ready concurrence; respecting Spain and her late Continental Colonies, I have nothing to desire to amend; concerning France likewise except in respect to the uncertainty of her measures, I could add very little perhaps nothing to what you have so well said; of the great Northern Constellation my deference for the elaborate instruction of my Government to my Colleague Mr. Middleton, and the uncertainty as I apprehend of any fixed policy in Russia, have created in my mind more hesitation, than perhaps I might have experienced, having my mind singly fixed upon the understood views of this Court. The policy of the Empress Catharine, which embroil'd all, taking care to keep herself as far as possible out of the strife, seems in more respects than one to have descended to the present times.

You seem to think less well that I should have sent your private, friendly and confidential letters to Washington.

You well know that it is the duty of a Foreign Minister to make such report, as would communicate to his Government the substance of what has passed between him and the government to which he is sent, without committing his correspondent: this you may be assured has been done and in as strong language as you yourself would have employed. And it was because I believed, that the language which you made use of would produce a stronger and better effect, particularly in respect to France, than any *précis* of the correspondence that I could have prepared; that I forwarded these letters to Washington. I know the men with whom I correspond, and you may rely upon our discretion.

We have apprized Mexico and Colombia of our interference with Russia and elsewhere, and thro' our Minister Mr. Nelson and the Minister Zea Bermudez have informed Spain, that we renounce all desire to occupy Cuba, preferring the *status quo* of the country.

Of the ultimate views of my government beyond the endeavour to prevail upon Spain as you are informed to accede to the Independence of the former Spanish Colonies, I am without information; but have reason to conclude that in any measures which may be suggested respecting this matter, we shall act in full and unreserved confidence with England.

In one of your letters you were good enough to say in reference to our correspondence that you would concert with me such draft thereof, as we might

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in King to Clay, September 26, 1825, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 842.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 840.

suppose to be suitable for the information of our respective governments. From want of attention I omitted to reply to this paragraph, but I assure you that any such measure will be readily agreed to on my part.

I have the honor [etc.].

843

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *September 26, 1825.*

SIR: Enclosed I send you my reply² to Mr. Canning's letter,³ which was transmitted in my No. 6.

844

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*⁴

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *October 12, 1825.*

Passing to other matters, I spoke of the New States, and intimated a wish distinctly to know if the United States and Great Britain understood each other upon this matter—and if not, in what their differences of opinion consisted.

Mr. Canning then explicitly avowed his opinion, that the two Countries were of the same way of thinking; that the New States were Independent, and that nothing was likely to alter it: That as soon as the Treaties with Mexico & Colombia are completed and their Ministers with the Minister of Buenos Ayres present themselves with the usual credentials, they will be received.

The occasion of the delay of Mexico, proceeding from *an error* before alluded to, committed by their Minister Mr. Morier, led to the expression of surprise on the part of Mr. Canning as the counterpart of the Colombian Treaty arrived yesterday, Mr. Hurtado must be able to finish it by exchanging Ratifications. So that I conclude, notwithstanding the mystification of

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 842.

³ *Ibid.*, 840.

⁴ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

Mr. Canning's correspondence with Prince Polignac, that the Recognition and reception of Ministers from the New States, are decided upon; unless some notion of turning the affair to pecuniary profit, in imitation of St. Domingo shall be again revived; the reported object of Sir Charles Stewart's mission to the Brazils seems to countenance this conjecture. If as is supposed to be the case, this matter becomes the subject of discussion at the Congress of Panama, it will I doubt not be correctly and definitively settled, tho' from an expression of Mr. Canning, I might infer that he does not feel as decidedly on this point, as we do.

845

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, October 29, 1825.

Mr. Canning said that he had come to town, to meet Mr. Hurtado, the Colombian Minister, and to exchange the Ratifications of the Treaty which had just been received from Bogota; but that Mr. Hurtado was unwell, so that the exchange could not immediately be concluded, that as there would be a Court, in the first or second week of November, he hoped that Mr. Hurtado would not only be well enough to complete the exchange of Ratifications, but to be presented to the King at the same time when I shall be presented, of which he said he would send me due notice.

Mr. Canning added his expectation of the arrival in the next Packet of a Minister from Buenos Ayres, in which case, as the Treaty with Buenos Ayres is already concluded, the person expected from Buenos Ayres, would be joined to Mr. Hurtado, and so would make three American Envoys at the same Presentation; I asked Mr. Canning when the Minister from Mexico might be expected, he replied that as Mr. Morier had lately returned to Mexico in order to correct the Treaty in respect to Free Ships, that this may require four or six months. Mr. Canning observed that as the Brazils had been invited to send a Minister to Panama, that they, England should recommend to them to do so, as I conjecture it may be for the purpose, of urging the Congress to agree in some scheme, in imitation of St. Domingo, to give commercial and pecuniary advantages to Portugal & Spain for their Independence: for it is not improbable that England would encourage Portugal to consent to the Independence of Brazils upon considerations of this nature, whereby all Spanish & Portuguese America becoming Independent, would be open to the commerce & manufactures of Great Britain.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

England is too firm in her opinion that Spain cannot reconquer the Colonies to be misled by this vision, and has from time to time shown an inclination to convert her consent into profit. If after Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres have in fact obtained, against the utmost efforts of Spain, their Independence, that they should now consent to imitate the Patriots of St. Domingo, would be to suppose that the Races have changed and that the African is, and deserves to be preserved, to the old and admirable Castilian character.

It is said that an authorized Person is expected from Peru and another from Guatemala, with whom Great Britain is ready to conclude Commercial Treaties—these of course will be followed by Ministers, and the effect upon France can hardly be mistaken; indeed in England it seems to be suspected that France feels herself urged by Russia to measures respecting Spain, which must be burthensome and may become injurious.

846

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, November 12, 1825.

SIR: It is a long time since the King has held a Court in London. I have been in town since the 19th of August, and yesterday was the first day when I could present my letter of Credence. The audience was as usual, on my part little was said, and that little as complimentary as facts would justify; the Reply of the King was unexceptionable.

In presenting the President's Letter to the King relative to the recall of Mr. Stratford Canning, which I took this occasion of doing, I added such observations respecting the conciliatory deportment of Mr. Canning during his mission as my own experience warranted; this appeared to be well received, and the King in reply expressed corresponding opinions relative to the deportment of Mr. Rush; and in this way I understood the account to be balanced. It was no small satisfaction, that the Envoy of Colombia was presented, and delivered his letter of Credence at the same time that I presented mine; so that not only has Great Britain concluded Treaties with the New States, but in the case of Colombia has received her Minister, this is a great Point: and puts an end to difficulties which hitherto for some unknown cause, seem to have stood in the way of the Reception of Ministers from these States

With great respect [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, November 14, 1825.

SIR: On the 8th instant the Russian Ambassador sent me a note desiring a conference and proposing to call upon me for this purpose the next day; as I had received previous marks of his consideration, I replied that I would at three o'clock the following day call upon him. At that hour I found Count Lieven prepared to receive me, having before him copies of Mr. Middleton's note (founded upon your instructions) to Count Nesselrode, and of his reply to Mr. Middleton; the last being dated in September. The Count asked me whether I had seen the former, and on my answer that I was acquainted with your instructions to Mr. Middleton, Count Lieven proceeded to the reading of the reply of Count Nesselrode. I asked Count Lieven if he felt himself at liberty to give me in confidence a copy. He observed that as the Note, of which he had read me the copy, was given to Mr. Middleton in order to be transmitted to his Government, the giving of a copy was doubtful, until this should have been done. Count Nesselrode's reply to Mr. Middleton referred to the communications of Spain having been made to the Allies, and not to them separately, and as one of the allied powers. Russia did not feel authorised to reply to matter which had been addressed by Spain to the Allies in concert. No mention was made of the purport of the Spanish communication, nor of the tenor of the reply. But something was said in Count Nesselrode's reply concerning the doctrine of Legitimacy, and the unfitness of Russia's taking upon herself to make a separate answer. I understood as did Count Lieven from the tenor of the reply that both Mr. Middleton's note and Count Nesselrode's reply, would be communicated by the latter to the Allies, after which, Russia might be expected to answer further.

All the world knows that each of the Allies including Spain concluded Treaties with Anti-Legitimacy before the Battle of Waterloo, and it now appears that they afterwards would have made a new Treaty with Bonaparte; had they not deemed his demands to be extravagant.

When the Allies finally decided to exclude Bonaparte, they deliberated, and we have reason to conclude, on the recommendation of Russia; upon the introduction of some other Power than the Bourbons, to succeed to the ancient house. This deliberation failing, the House of Bourbon had the good fortune to be restored. How greatly does this strengthen the argument which constitutes your instruction to Mr. Middleton? and what confidence is requisite to authorise the Allies at this period to urge the doctrine, which they call Legitimacy, and to deny those principles of natural laws, upon which so many nations have acted, and which they themselves have recently

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

confirmed. It would be unbecoming that I should say more upon the importance of this great & decisive document of Mr. Canning's Note to the Chevalier Los Rios dated Foreign office March 25,¹ and which is found in all the Newspapers.

Contemporaneously occurred the Ratifications of the Treaty between Great Britain & Colombia and what is of greater, and as I regard it, decisive importance, the actual reception and recognition, of the envoy Mr. Hurtado, by the King of Great Britain.

The envoy of Buenos Ayres is understood to be on his way, and will of course be received and recognized, as in succession those from the other New States, complying with the previous and reasonable requirements of Great Britain will in like manner be recognized.

Notwithstanding the consequences and effects of these measures, not a word respecting them appears in the papers of France, or Spain: that nothing should be published in Spain, will surprize no one, for nobody pretends to explain the constantly depreciating course of her Government: But the press of France must be compelled to silence, otherwise the disclosures now before Europe, would awaken men who are not all wholly subdued.

With great respect [etc.].

848

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *December 5, 1825.*

SIR: Last evening I received a letter from Mr. Middleton dated 29 Oct./ 10 Novr. enclosing a copy of Count Nesselrode's reply to the letter of Mr. Middleton. As you doubtless have this correspondence, it cannot be requisite that I should trouble you or myself with a copy. Of its tenor Mr. Middleton expresses an opinion quite as favorable as it deserves. Notwithstanding his information that copies having been sent of your letter, and of the Count's reply to Vienna, Paris and Madrid, and that Mr. Middleton's information enables him to state that the American correspondence is approved by one Individual highest in influence at Vienna; we have moreover reason to conclude that this communication has not been without effect in France, and tho' the expulsion of Zea and the restoration of Infantado are in the ordinary course of the downward affairs of Spain, taking the sub-

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 826.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

ject as we now find it, there can be no doubt that the cause of South America makes a favorable progress, and that it cannot be much longer baffled.

How much of this influence is due to the downright and faithful policy of the United States, we need not say: But much has been its power here, and upon the continent, tho' acknowledged not without reluctance.

849

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, December 21, 1825.

There is a manifest feverishness and impatience in South America: Chili is less stable, than at this late hour she ought to be; Buenos Ayres, Brazil, and the Banda Oriental are more disjointed; and the upper Peru separates itself from the Provinces of La Plata. In Mexico Mr. Poinsett represents to me, that an old intrigue is newly brought forward by French influence in favor of Francisco de Paula, the youngest of the Spanish Bourbons. But Mr. Poinsett may in this respect be deceived by the intriguers, tho' his information may be more accurate of an article in the Treaty with England, establishing a preference of intercourse between the old Spanish Colonies; a measure, to which England ought never to have consented. Of Spain I can add nothing, except that she loses the chief support of the Holy Alliance, and in this respect loses not a little— If the Black Sea comes into the White, England must make war to oppose it—this will be the beginning of new troubles in Europe.

850

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, December 25, 1825.

SIR: Some days since I received from Mr. Poinsett a ciphered Despatch, relating to an Intrigue set on foot in Mexico by France, in favor of Francisco de Paula, the youngest of the Spanish Bourbons; altho' the same had been

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

again and again detected, France still persisted—yet circumstances in every way discredited the Intrigue. On conferring with Mr. Canning respecting it, he observed, that it was without foundation, and without credit. I have at this moment, reason to believe that France is on the point of deciding to send commercial agents to Mexico, to form a Treaty with that Country. Having asked a conference of Mr. Canning, I was yesterday received at the Foreign Office; Having enquired whether he had received from Count Lieven the reply of Count Nesselrode to Mr. Middleton, and learning that he had not seen it, I proceeded to communicate the same, together with Mr. Middleton's letter to me.

851

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 10, 1826.*

The Undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in answer to the enquiry contained in Mr. King's Note of yesterday, "Whether the English Ambassador delivered to the French Government a Note, confirmatory of the purpose of *the Note* directed to be communicated to that Government, by the American Minister, Mr. Brown," has the honor to inform Mr. King:

1st. That he is not aware of any *Note* having been presented by Mr. Brown to the French Government.

Mr. Brown had received from his government the Despatch, a copy of which Mr. King was so good as to shew to the Undersigned; But whether Mr. Brown executed his Instructions by stating to Mr. Damas the contents of that Despatch, or by communicating it *in extenso* to Mr. Damas, the Undersigned is not precisely informed:—He *believes* by the latter mode.

2dly. That of course Lord Granville *cannot* have *presented a Note* to Mr. Damas, "confirmatory" of Mr. Brown's communication (in which ever way that communication was made); as an official Note is a much more formal measure than the communication of a despatch, and as it would be quite unusual to take a stronger measure as subsidiary to a weaker one.

3dly. That Lord Granville certainly did let Mr. Damas know, that Mr. Brown had put him (Lord Granville), and that Mr. King had put the Undersigned, in confidence as to the nature of his (Mr. Brown's) Instructions; and that Lord Granville had received Instructions to say that they were perfectly in accordance with the sentiments of his Government.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in King to Clay, January 12, 1826, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 853.

The French Government have however been long in full possession of the opinion of the British Government respecting Cuba,—Mr. King will recollect, that the Undersigned in the month of August, opened the question with the French Government, at the same time that he opened it with Mr. King; and proposed to them, as well as to Mr. King, the Signature of a Tripartite engagement, the terms of which, no less than the proposal itself, sufficiently expressed the determination of the British Government not to take Cuba itself,—nor to suffer the appropriation of it to themselves by either of the other two great Maritime Powers.

As to the appearance of a French Squadron at the Havannah, explanations were asked and given on that subject, between the English and French Governments, several months ago.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew [etc.].

852

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain*¹

LONDON, January 12, 1826.

It was by order of his Government that the Undersigned envoy of the United States asked the last conference with the office for Foreign Affairs, in order to make the communication from his government, which, he then had the honor to make; including the information of the American Government in regard to that of Great Britain; the decision of the United States respecting the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico by France; the Instruction, which, Mr. Brown the Envoy of the United States at Paris had received to be communicated to the French Government; which, the Envoy of the United States in London had directions to read, and did read, to Mr. Canning.

This conference opened fully to the Government of Great Britain, the views and policy of the United States in the matter to which the same related; and the whole has been fully reported by the Undersigned to his Government, and in pursuance thereof he made the enquiry, concerning which Mr. Canning's Note of yesterday, contains his reply.

It might have conformed more fully with the views and policy of the American Government in asking the conference, had the Envoy of the United States been authorized to add, that the Government of Great Britain had

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII, enclosed in King to Clay, January 12, 1826, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 853.

communicated to that of France, their expected decision, that it would not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico by any other European Power than Spain, under any circumstances whatever.

With high consideration [etc.].

853

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *January 12, 1826.*

From Mr. Brown to whom I transmitted the Instruction respecting Cuba and Porto Rico, I receive no information—nor have I any thing from St. Petersburg. You at Washington can speak with equal confidence with us, as to Spain. Those who are alike without information, are equally ignorant.

Mr. Hurtado yesterday told me that pursuant to the Instructions of Colombia, he had requested Mr. Canning to renew his efforts to make peace between Colombia & Spain. That he believed that Cuba would otherwise be attacked by Colombia & Mexico, and that as their Naval Force would enable them to occupy the Island, that from the state of the population, they might take their own time to attack the Moro. The consequence of this attack cannot be misunderstood, by the friends of order in this quarter of the World.

854

*George Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain*²

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 13, 1826.*

The Undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honor to acknowledge the official Note³ received this morning from Mr. Rufus King, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States at this Court.

In answer to the latter part of that communication, the Undersigned has-
tens to acquaint Mr. King, that the only reason why the Undersigned did not

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² *Ibid.*, enclosed in King to Clay, January 14, 1826, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 855.

³ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 852.

in his Note ¹ of the 10th Instant, (detailing what had *late*ly passed at Paris with respect to the instruction furnished by the American Government to their Minister at that Court), state "that the government of Great Britain had communicated to that of France their expected decision, that it would not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico, by any other European Power than Spain, under any circumstances whatever,"—was, that a full communication of the views and intentions of the British Government precisely to that effect, had been made by His Majesty's Ambassador to the Government of France, so long ago as in the month of July last, previously to the proposition of the Undersigned to Mr. King for a Tripartite engagement.

To have repeated that intimation on the present occasion, would have been to appear to take at the suggestion of a Third Power, and as subsidiary to the declarations of that Power, a step which the British Government had already taken long before, singly and of their own accord. The British Government is highly gratified by that concurrence of sentiment on the part of the United States, of which they never doubted: and though they certainly would have preferred the Tripartite engagement proposed to Mr. King in August, it is perfectly satisfactory to them that, at any time and in any mode, that concurrence has been signified to France.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew [etc.].

855

Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States ²

LONDON, January 14, 1826.

SIR: Enclosed I send you the Note ³ last evening received from the Office for Foreign Affairs, in answer to my Note ³ of the preceding day—and likewise the Documents that have been published at St. Petersburg relative to the Russian Succession.

With great respect [etc.].

¹ See above, pt. VIII, doc. 851.

² MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

³ See above, pt. VIII, docs. 854 and 852.

*Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *February 21, 1826.*

SIR: Mr. Poinsett having informed you of the course of proceedings in Mexico, particularly of the difficulties which he has experienced with Mr. Ward, the Representative of England, which difficulties he has communicated also to me, I concluded as well on Mr. Poinsett's account, as the justice due to the occasion, that I could adopt no measure, preferable to the communication of the matter to the British government, and accordingly I put the whole of Mr. Poinsett's letters to me, into the hands of Mr. Canning, asking of him a conference respecting the same. After some delay produced by the meeting of Parliament, and the pressure of the commercial and pecuniary embarrassments of the country—the conference occurred, when Mr. Canning expressed his satisfaction with the conduct of Mr. Poinsett in all respects, with the single exception of his establishing a Lodge of Free Masons, this he had no inclination to condemn, but as it was a measure liable to the interpretation of political views, it was discouraged by them, as respects their own agents—that the course of Mr. Ward had been incorrect, he ought to have left the whole matter in which he interfered, to his own government—that the Treaty concluded with Mexico, had not been ratified, but sent back by them to be remade, under the Instructions forwarded to Morier and Ward. In the remaking of the Treaty, they would balance the difficulties which they met in their way, and the precise import therefore of the new made Treaty, could not beforehand be ascertained. When remade, it would be sent to England for examination. When England would send a new mission to Mexico, of which Mr. Ward would have the option of remaining as Secretary of Legation, and Morier would return home. A communication to this effect will place Poinsett at his ease. Yesterday I received from Mr. Everett the Despatch² that I now forward, which was left open for my perusal. So much thereof as the occasion required, was communicated to Mr. Hurtado the envoy of Colombia, and he was called upon to say whether he has powers from his Principals to make Peace. Mr. Hurtado answered that he had Powers to accept, but not to propose Peace—that in respect to the Duke del Infantado, he did not believe him to be sincere and in earnest, that his real object is to gain time, but to conclude nothing. The opinion ascribed by him to the King, in Hurtado's belief, is little worthy of confidence—of this conclusion he stated several facts in confirmation of his opinion. Hurtado is persuaded that the Inquisition is about to be, and soon will be established in Spain. And that the Council have no thoughts of Peace with America. I

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXII.

² See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1141.

confess, while I have no evidence, to place against the conviction of Mr. Everett, that I am afraid he may deceive himself, and that the desired event of Peace between Spain and America is further off than he seems to believe—of the intimated Treaty of Commerce and Indemnity with the United States, we shall soon be able to judge of the sincerity of the Duke. England is so much in advance of Europe in her commerce and connection with the New States, that she does not shew much anxiety for Peace, between Spain and them. Not so with the Power on the other side of the Channel, which by character restless, is jealous of England, and employed in intrigues to gain an influence in the New States—of Prussia and Austria they belong to the Alliance, and the latter is as hopeless as Russia itself; over which, darkness and profound obscurity are supposed to prevail.

857

*Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, October 16, 1826.

In the mean while the new American States are but little thought of here. Neither the admission in French Ports of Mexican and Colombian vessels in a manner almost tantamount to a recognition nor the important intelligence of a Treaty of perpetual League between four of those States, have elicited a single remark from any of the leading and otherwise intelligent newspapers. The State of their Stocks and the prospects of the operations of the Mining Companies engross exclusively what of public attention is bestowed on their concerns. Spain is considered as incorrigible not only by this government, but also by France and Russia. Any attempt, at least at this moment, to prevail on her to consent to an armistice, or to take some rational steps on the subject of her lost Colonies, is looked on as wholly hopeless. Indeed I understood that this government had signified to that of Spain that, after all, the present state of things was not unfavorable to Great Britain, that whatever she had proposed in that respect was from general considerations, and for the interest of Spain; and that, seeing how this had been received, such or similar proposals would not be renewed. This declaration, I am told, has made more impression on Spain, than any of the steps previously taken, without however producing any positive result. No approach has been made by this Government towards me for any renewed effort in Concert having for object the pacification of the American Hemisphere.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXIII.

*Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, *December 16, 1826.*

SIR: Mr. Camacho, who has been appointed Minister of Mexico here, is not yet received as such, this Government not recognizing any from the New American States until they have concluded a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. That concluded between the United States and Mexico has been brought here by Mr. Camacho, who has communicated it to the British Government, and has since made one with them, which will probably be signed on Monday next (18th). It is, I am told on the same basis as ours, though differing in some particulars, but granting, as I am assured, no privileges which by our treaty we do not enjoy.

Mr. Camacho was presented to the King at the general levee of the 22nd ult^o. (the first held for the last twelve months), as the late Minister of foreign affairs for Mexico. The new Spanish Minister, Count d'Alcudia did not attend the levee, clearly in order to avoid meeting Mr. Hurtado, the Colombian Minister, after whom, too, he must have been placed, as he is the last arrived.

As Mr. Camacho unfortunately speaks neither English nor French, our communications have been carried on principally through Mr. Rocafuerte, who had preceded him here as Chargé, who is to leave this place for Mexico on the 20th with the treaty, and who is very intelligent. He consulted me, some days ago, in Mr. Camacho's behalf, on the propriety of their sending an Agent to Russia, wishing to know whether I thought this an opportune time to try to obtain some measure, similar to that lately adopted by France and leading to an ultimate recognition of Independence. I knew of nothing later than the Emperor's answer to the overture of the United States on that subject, and that, only from hear-say. This I told him, and that, although perhaps information of the present disposition of Russia might be obtained through our Minister at St. Petersburg, I had no instructions in that respect and could not act. I added that, from what I had been able to collect since my arrival in Europe, it appeared probable to me, that Russia would no longer oppose the recognition of the independence, that perhaps she might advise Spain to that effect, but that, having no pressing commercial interest, such as had induced France to admit the New American flags, it was hardly to be expected that she (Russia) was as yet prepared to act in open contradiction to the unfortunate and hasty declaration of the late Emperor.

Mr. Rocafuerte, after having observed that there was no hope that Spain would within any short time be induced to take any steps implying in any degree a relinquishment of her pretended Sovereignty, said, that they attached

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXIII.

more importance to a recognition by other great Powers, on account of their internal situation and of that of South America generally. There was, he said, still a strong party in Mexico who, under colour of the alledged want of a strong Government, wanted to destroy the existing Republican institutions. He then spoke, though in respectful and friendly terms of Bolivar, of the baneful influence which his late measures might have even on Mexico itself. The New Constitution of Bolivia was Monarchy in disguise. He appeared to have succeeded in breaking up the Peruvian Congress and in introducing there the same system, with dictatorial powers in both for himself. He was pursuing the same steps in Colombia, and using every endeavour, that the proposed Convention should still more consolidate her government, instead of reforming it by adopting the federative system.

I must observe that similar opinions on those subjects seem to be very generally entertained here particularly by the Americans. Mr. Hurtado thinks, however, that, notwithstanding the declaration of Guayaquil, the Convention will adopt a system, which, if not properly federal, will make the Government less *central*, as it is called, than now. Being himself not a native of the coast but of the vicinity of Bogota, he may be considered as impartial, when he decides in favor of the federal plan.

Should however the result be to consolidate and to give to Bolivar in Colombia the same powers that he has acquired in Peru and Potosi, the Republic of Colombia will be Bolivar himself; and the question may arise in that case, whether you should still think it proper to retain that Power in the list of those to whom our North Eastern boundary question may be referred.

Since the steps, which *threaten* a war between Spain and Great Britain, have been taken, I have had another conversation with Mr. Rocafuerte on the subject of Cuba. He evidently wishes that it might be united to Mexico. But when I observed that that island might be a bone of contention between them and Colombia, that, in case of War, Great Britain might claim the right to conquer it as well as either of them, and that the United States, who did not desire Cuba for themselves, would be decidedly opposed to its becoming a British Colony, and might find it difficult to maintain that opposition and at the same time to acquiesce in an attack by any of the American States, he spoke at once of the propriety of making the island independent under the joint guarantee of all the American States and of Great Britain. This is certainly a plan which deserves consideration, as the only one which can give a permanent security to the United States. I told Mr. Rocafuerte that all that passed on that subject between us was mere conversation, as I had certainly no instruction or authority to say what were the intentions of my Government in that respect; (the independence) but that if his Government thought this to be a practicable *projet*, that Cuba was ripe for it, that it could be done without disturbing the state of society in reference to the

black population, they might make an overture to the Government of the United States and at once ascertain its views on that subject. In my next interview with Mr. Canning, I intend to speak very explicitly in reference to the occupation of Cuba by any foreign power whatever, and may perhaps ascertain what are his views as to its ultimate destinies.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *December 22, 1826.*

It was, I said, understood between Great Britain and the United States, that Cuba should not fall in the hands of either. I did not suspect that even the right, which a state of war generally gives to attack the enemy anywhere, would make any change in that respect, and that it could be the intention of England to attack the remaining Spanish Colonies. "We have already too many" was Mr. Canning's observation. Yet, when I proceeded to say, that it would be satisfactory to have positive assurances to that effect, I received no answer. This induced me to enter more at large on the subject, and to try to impress strongly on his mind, that it was impossible, that the United States could acquiesce in the conquest by, or transfer of that Island to any great maritime Power, and that the new American States, particularly Mexico would be equally averse to it. All this was expressed in strong but general terms, and as if I took it for granted that England had no such object in view for herself and was disposed to act in concert with us. On that account I added that in the state of dissolution where Spain was, and considering the continued war between her and the New American States, it might be proper to consider whether it was practicable to keep Cuba much longer in that state which we had heretofore considered as the most desirable to England and to us. If not, the question would be, whether the island should be attached to Mexico or to Colombia, or whether the white population was strong enough to maintain independence without danger from the blacks. Although I could draw no assurance respecting the views of Great Britain as to herself, Mr. Canning said that the subject was worthy of great consideration and that he would certainly attend to it. His reluctance to speak more decisively must perhaps be ascribed, partly to his usual caution, partly to some recollection of what had passed between him and Mr. King in regard to that island. I must add, that I have no positive

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXIII.

information of the personal understanding to which I alluded, as existing between the two countries on that subject; and that a report in circulation and communicated to me, that there was an intention on the part of England to occupy Cuba, though probably without foundation, was one of my inducements to speak thus early on the subject.

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*Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LONDON, *December 30, 1826.*

SIR: Reports of an intention on the part of this Government to attack Cuba are still in circulation, more indicative, I think of popular feeling than of the views of the Ministry. Yet, and notwithstanding his habitual reserve, there was no reason why Mr. Canning should not, in our conversation, have most explicitly disavowed any such intention. In all I said, I took it for granted that there was a positive understanding between the United States and Great Britain that neither should occupy that island. The only papers in my possession on that subject are your three letters to Mr. King of 10th May,² 17th and 26th³ Octer. 1825. Neither those which passed between Mr. King and Mr. Canning, nor the communications which may have taken place, either at Washington, or through Mr. Rush, between the two governments, have been put in my hands. There would certainly have been an advantage in signing the agreement proposed by Mr. Canning, (which I know only from your letter to Mr. King) not with the view he suggested in reference to Spain, but for the purpose of binding Great Britain. You will see by today's papers that Chateaubriand in his speech to the house of Peers said "that England could not take Cuba without making war on the United States and that she knew it." This I had told him when he was Minister and included France in the declaration. He would have agreed to the tripartite instrument. You renewed the declaration in a more official shape to his successor. What was the result I do not know; but I would apprehend no difficulty from that quarter if you should agree and England was still of the same opinion. To be at ease on that question is important. Whether afterwards the island remained with Spain, became independent, or was

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXIII.

² This probably should have been May 11, with which was enclosed a copy of Clay's instruction on the subject to Middleton at St. Petersburg, for both of which see above, pt. I, docs. 141 and 142.

³ See above, pt. I, docs. 146 and 148.

annexed to Mexico, though there is a choice between the alternatives, would be far less essential.

In the mean while, might not a hint be given to Govr. Vives to be on his guard?

I have the honour [etc.].

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*Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to Great Britain, to James Brown,
United States Minister to France*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private.

LONDON, *February 2, 1827.*

MY DEAR SIR: The want of a safe opportunity has prevented my addressing you earlier on a subject, less important perhaps now than it threatened to be some weeks ago, but which may still deserve your attention.

As soon as I could obtain an interview from Mr. Canning, after his speech on the King's message relating to the affairs of Portugal, I mentioned to him that, as the question of war between Great Britain and Spain must now depend on the course Spain might pursue, our attention should be turned to the consequences, as affecting the relations between the United States and Great Britain, which might grow out of a state of actual war. Repeating then what you know to be the views of the United States respecting Cuba, I said that, although those of Great Britain were known to accord with ours, and although there had been an understanding between the two countries that neither should attempt to take possession of that island, yet it would be satisfactory to receive assurances that the intentions and conduct of Great Britain would not be changed by a state of war between her and Spain. I then made some further observations on what might be done in concert with a view to the ultimate fate of Cuba, in case it should be found impossible to prevent her remaining a dependency of Spain. Mr Canning thought proper to make no satisfactory answer to this overture, and only said that he would take the subject into his serious consideration. It must be observed, that having not found here any part of the correspondence of my predecessors, I know nothing positively of what had passed between them and this Government on that subject. I have no knowledge of the understanding, which, in speaking to Mr Canning, I took for granted, but from hearsay and what may be inferred from a despatch from Mr. Clay to Mr King, in relation to the proposal by Mr Canning of a tripartite agreement between Great Britain, the United States and France,² which I have not

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXIII, enclosed in Gallatin to Clay, February 5, 1827, which see below, pt. VIII, doc. 862.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 835, annexed to Canning to King, August 21, 1825.

seen and which Mr Clay appears to have declined. But I see that you were instructed to make some declaration to the French Government on that subject. This Government has no wish, if they can avoid it, to be at war with Spain, still less that such an event should involve them either with the United States or France. And it is probable that this last country would not forget, in the course of her discussions with England, the danger of her taking the opportunity of a Spanish war to seize that most valuable of all colonies. Yet, as nothing that can be done ought to be neglected on our part, it has struck me that, if practicable and proper, it would be advantageous that France should be reminded of that subject, as it might have a double beneficial effect. A view of that danger might make France more earnest in her efforts to induce Spain to cease giving just causes of offence and to pursue a course calculated to preserve peace. And, in case of war, the representations of France to England, cooperating with ours, would cause this Government to reflect seriously before they should take any step, that might compel France, as well as ourselves, to depart from our intended neutrality. I submit these observations to your judgment, hoping however that the danger has lessened, and that we may soon receive instructions adapted to a state of things, which had not been anticipated at Washington. It is very clear that an attempt to occupy Cuba would be as offensive, if not more so, to the New American States than to us. This cannot but be well known to the British Government: but considering the relative situation of the parties at this moment, no energetic representations can be expected from the Ministers of those States at this Court on that point.

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*Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, *February 5, 1827.*

I have also the honour to enclose the copy of a letter,² which, having had a safe conveyance, I wrote to Mr. Brown. All the recent official accounts, received by this Government from Lisbon and Madrid, concur in representing the disposition and conduct of Spain to be such as to give well founded hopes that peace will be preserved. Yet no positive account had, as late as this day, reached the foreign office of the Portuguese insurgents who had reentered Spain having been actually disarmed and the arms restored to the Portuguese authorities.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXIII.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 861, Gallatin to Brown, February 2, 1827.

That war should have been avoided is a matter of congratulation, since the United States might have been involved in it by the course which Great Britain would perhaps have pursued: and nothing could have been more unpleasant, in addition to the great evils of war, than to have been engaged in one, in which we would have appeared in opposition to the new American States. This shows how useful it would be, if practicable, to have some positive agreement with Great Britain, which should secure the United States against the danger of her attempting under any circumstances to occupy Cuba.

I have the honour [etc.].

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*William Beach Lawrence, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at London ad interim, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LONDON, August 14, 1828.

I understand that Spain has made a proposition to English Capitalists for a loan of 20,000,000 sterling, in which she is willing to include the Cortes bonds at 35 per cent. The offers made by the London contractors are said to have connected with them two conditions of a political character; first a reform in the Administration in Spain and secondly the recognition of the independence of the American States or, in lieu thereof, the hypothecation of the revenues of the island of Cuba. I am assured that these proposals have been submitted to the Cabinet of Madrid, but my informant was unable to satisfy my inquiries as to the extent of what was required under the first head. As far, however, as I could learn, no change in the *political institutions* is contemplated. For the recognition of Spanish America strong representations have also been made, within a short time, by the merchants of Cadiz; but nothing has been recently contemplated to be done through the mediation of the European Governments, nor do the Ministers of the new Republics expect any early alteration in their relations with the mother country, unless it should be effected by the financial distresses of Spain.

I have heretofore alluded to the great change which took place in the consideration enjoyed by the Representatives of the Spanish American States in this country, on the death of Mr. Canning. Since the Cabinet has been settled on its present footing, the neglect of them has been still more decided and is strongly felt by these Ministers, whose confidence and friendship I

¹ MS. Dispatches from Great Britain, XXXV. William Beach Lawrence, of New York: Commissioned secretary of legation in Great Britain, July 8, 1826; instructed to act as chargé d'affaires *ad interim*, and acted from October 4, 1827, to September 2, 1828; left his post, October 15, 1828, having previously resigned.

have deemed it a political duty to conciliate by all proper means in my power. The three Spanish American Ministers or Chargés recognized at Court, are never included, except on the most formal occasions, in the invitations even of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Though personal civilities have been extended by Lord Aberdeen, since his accession to office, to all the Representatives of European Powers and to me and though the Court circular announced that he had entertained all the Foreign Ministers, the gentlemen referred to have been wholly unnoticed. I mention this circumstance, trivial in itself, as it will explain better than any observations that I can make the feeling of the present Cabinet on a subject, in which the United States for commercial, as well as political reasons have a strong interest.

The appointment of Lord Strangford to Brazils is regarded by my American colleagues as a gross indignity offered to all the new republics. These general opinions in favour of the principles of *legitimacy* and against all "democratical institutions" have been long known. But Lord Strangford, not content with the avowal of abstract principles, took occasion at the last Session of Parliament, when presenting a petition respecting South American Privateering, to indulge in the most violent abuse of all the new States and of the policy which had led to their recognition. As a part of the new Ambassador's duty is to attempt the reconciliation of Brazils and Buenos Ayres, the choice is most extraordinary, Lord Strangford having, on the occasion alluded to, charged the members of the Government of the latter State with deriving a direct pecuniary profit from the mode in which the war is carried on.

I have the honour [etc.].

PART IX
COMMUNICATIONS FROM MEXICO

COMMUNICATIONS FROM MEXICO

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*Francisco Mariano Sora, Mexican Curate, and José Bernardo Gutierrez,
Mexican Lieutenant Colonel, to James Monroe, Secretary of
State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

NATCHITOCHES, LOUISIANA, *September 27, 1811.*

SIR: It is a year since the Mexican Kingdom attempted to shake off the European yoke, all the more hateful and burdensome as under the present circumstances it has committed every manner of cruelty, sacrificing lives without number, and putting many towns to the sword.

We, horrified at its behaviour, have had to seek safety for our lives by taking refuge in the United States, and being unable to bear such inhumaneness as is now being practiced on our people in the name of the nation, and with the greatest form at our command we call for the protection of Congress, with an earnest request that we be supplied with arms, men and money, or as much as may be, especially arms, and our offer on the part of the same nation is that everything will be returned in good time, and that treaties of union and friendship advantageous to both nations will be drawn up.

Sir, we know full well that we are without these matters of form that are needed when representing a nation; but the good of humankind and the interest we bear in our own people are our authority to ask for protection whereby we may find it, and entertaining no doubt of Your Excellency's generosity and that of a people fond of their own kind, and who have gone through this same misfortune, which on this date surrounds us, will not deny us the assistance we ask of them until men of greater talent and more learning in political matters have the honor to appear before your august Senate with ample powers from the nation.

Sir, we who are among the small of our nation have ventured all of a sudden to lay this prayer at Your Excellency's feet, hoping that it will be granted that favorable reception which is imperatively demanded by the cry of oppressed mankind from a generous heart. Your Excellency may believe that as soon as circumstances permit, there shall come persons authorized to negotiate subjects concerning the happiness of both peoples, and in the meanwhile we beg Your Excellency to keep all this secret, as it best suits our purpose.

Sir, we have availed ourselves of this opportunity to tender to you our humble respects [etc.].

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Mexico City, I. This was addressed to "the Honorable Tomas Monroï, Secretary of State."

*Juan Pablo y Anaya, Mexican Agent to the United States, to James Madison,
President of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

NEW ORLEANS, *March 18, 1815.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: DEAR SIR: Since we began to work on the plans of revolution for our independence, we always consider it necessary and indispensable under many heads to have relations with this country. We sought the means, but could not find them on account of the oppression and espionage in the midst of which we lived under the Spanish Government, and we met so much opposition in these parts that we had the misfortune to have our two secret boards in two principal cities of the United States, as well as all the victims of tyranny, discovered. In the midst of these misfortunes we were lucky enough not to be discovered until six months later, when we suffered the same misfortune as the first ones, which compelled Señor Hidalgo and us to take up arms, and our plan remained in suspense. Since then Señor Hidalgo and the Governments that have succeeded one another in the Mexican Independence have strained every effort to place in communication the political relations of that nation with this one, by ordering at every hazard three delegations which all have been so unfortunate as to fail and be unable to reach the States. In pursuance of the same important purpose, I was commissioned to seek means that would be available, and both at the cost of much labor and danger, I have had the good fortune to do so by opening the Port of Nautla on the coast of Vera Cruz. On that auspicious occasion we had the misfortune not to be thoughtful enough to provide ourselves with proper commissions from the Supreme Congress of Mexico, but considering that the enemy had to gather all his forces so as to hamper us in that important step, the Most Excellent the Commander in Chief, to whom I reported the message taken to go to the States, the officers, men and people of the provisions in my command were of the opinion that I should go to New Orleans so as to insure communications, because while I was abroad, even though the enemy should capture the port, we could communicate along the coast, which is rather free, and it being impossible for the enemy to cover it in such a way as to prevent the decisions of the Supreme Congress to reach some part of it in reliable vessels.

All difficulties had been overcome to the point of my succeeding to come here where again I began to strike snags which hampered immediate compliance with the main object of my commission, namely, that of finding a reliable vessel to bring to your capital the commissions or delegations of my Government, either through the efforts of the enemies of the liberty of my country, of whom there are many in this town, or through the events of the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Mexico City, I.

war with the English. But that which did me the most harm was the first, for when a schooner which cleared from the port of Nautla after my arrival came over on a commission of the Commander, she was attached by the Court of the District on the petition of the Spaniards, and the case has been continued until now; since then the English have drawn the blockade closer, and neither the circumstances nor my honor permitted of my leaving in those critical moments until now when I have had to take other steps, and even buy a bark to carry me so that I may report to my Government, and also the instructions which are required for the greater formalities of the diplomatic intercourse.

Therefore, Most Excellent Sir, I beg Your Excellency to deign to extend all that protection that is at your command, and in the exercise of your powers to go as far as establishing relations between the two countries. Your Excellency will permit me to say that between us and these States there is no other difference than that of language, but the interest, rights, etc., are all alike. I am quite sure that Your Excellency will agree with me that the plan that we must adopt, agreeable to Nature and our common interests and rights, *is that of absolute severance of America from Europe*.

I believe that at the least there shall be in this capital within two months some resolution of the Mexican Congress, for although the enemies have effectively tried to intercept communications, they were not able to do so because the independent troops have offered a brave defense and destroyed enemy expeditions, according to the latest reports that have come in letters from European Spaniards of Vera Cruz.

On principles of commiseration I brought here a monk who had declared himself a revolutionist and disturber of public order so as to save him from the death penalty, which he was to undergo for his many crimes in the belief that his separation and his pondering over the favor that had been done him would improve his behaviour, but it was in vain, for as soon as he found himself here enjoying the favor of the law of the land and the protection of royal Europeans, he gave out a paper against me filled with slanderous impostures and lies, and in my fear that some copy of it may have been handed to you, I take the liberty of enclosing a reply which I made to it in vindication of my conduct.

Most Excellent Sir, I renew to Your Excellency my humble prayers, infinitely appreciating this opportunity to have the honor of gladly placing myself at your disposal, and wishing that you will proudly press upon me the orders that you may be pleased to give me, and you may be assured that with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction they shall be carried out by him who is Your Excellency's true and obedient servant.

P. S. Although I am going to Mexico, Mr. Lecler remains in charge of the affairs, notice of which I give to Your Excellency for your guidance.

*José María Morelos, President of Mexico, José María Linaga, and Remigio de Yarza, Secretary of Government, to James Madison, President of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

PURUARÁN, MEXICO, *July 14, 1815.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The Mexican people, weary of the enormous weight of Spanish domination and having forever lost the hope of being happy under the rule of their conquerors, broke through the barriers of moderation and, facing difficulties and perils which seemed insuperable to the efforts of an enslaved colony, they raised the cry of freedom and bravely undertook the work of regeneration.

We relied on the protection of Heaven which could not withdraw it from the well-known justice of our cause nor ignore the rectitude and purity of our intentions exclusively bent on the good of mankind: we relied on the mettle and enthusiasm of our compatriots who had decided to die rather than to again bear the shameful yoke of slavery: and finally we relied on the powerful aid of the United States, which as they wisely guided us by their example would favor us with their generous assistance upon signing treaties of friendship and alliance in which good faith would preside and where the reciprocal interests of both nations would be remembered. The disasters that go with the vicissitudes of war and in which we have been perhaps thrown by our very lack of experience, never lowered our spirits but always rising above adversity and misfortune we have carried on the fight for five years and have acquired the practical conviction that there is no power capable of suppressing a people that have decided to shake off the horrors of tyranny. Without arms at the beginning, without discipline, without a Government, fighting with bravery and enthusiasm we have enlisted large armies, we have caused surprise by attacking fortified places and at last have managed to awe the pride of the Spaniards who are already losing heart although they may in their public papers affect serenity and announce that the day is coming nearer and nearer when the fire that inflames our breasts is about to go out and predict the end of our exertions. Our system of government having, as might be expected, begun with the most shapeless rudiments has gone on perfecting itself in degrees as fast as the worries of war permitted, and it is now under a constitution built of maxims that are in every way liberal and which has been as far as possible fitted to the genius, manners, and customs of our people not less than to the circumstances of the revolution. With time it will undergo amendments and improvements as fast as experience enlight-

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I. This reached the Department of State with Herrera to the President of the United States, March 1, 1816, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 867.

ens us but we shall never swerve by a line from the essential principles which constitute genuine civil liberty.

In the meanwhile we flatter ourselves that the sanction and promulgation of our constitutional law and the effective organization of our government have driven consternation into the poisoned hearts of our enemies, dealing a deadly blow to their hopes while it has filled with joy the hearts of our people whom it has inspired again with special ardor to carry on our grand enterprise.

Just at that time we have been afforded the opportunity we had sought thousands of times to open relations with the government of these happy provinces, and, availing ourselves of the valuable moments brought on by a series of incidents woven by the hand of providence, we hasten to carry out our intention with the satisfaction of feeling that this attempt will not meet the same fate as others that preceded it but that, happily carried to the end, it will meet our purposes by furnishing us with the facility of completing the original plans of our political restoration.

We find encouragement beyond description to insist on this application in the intimate conviction that we always have cherished that the North and Mexican Americas being friends and allies would work reciprocal influence on the matters that concern their own happiness and will offer unconquerable opposition to the aggression of covetousness, ambition and tyranny; so much so that we have ventured to believe that that important league will win the approval of the worthy representative of the Anglo-American nation and all its citizens who stand so high for their enlightenment and social virtues.

The sincerity and philanthropic spirit which are the characteristics of both nations, the facility and promptness with which they may extend aid to each other; the fine union that it will bring about of two peoples, one privileged by the fertility and productions of the soil that are as rich as they are varied, and the other distinguished by its industries, its culture and genius which are the most fruitful source of the wealth of the states, all combine to warrant our ideas which open even now a most promising prospect if the two republics manage to unite through treaties of alliance and commerce, which, resting on reason and justice, will prove the sacred ties of our joint prosperity.

The supreme Mexican Congress, engaged in those grand views and in order that this Government may in accordance with the custom justly adopted by the nations enter upon negotiations and sign treaties with these provinces, has appointed as Minister Plenipotentiary the Most Excellent Lic. Don José Manuel Herrera empowering him with the fullest powers and has also provided him with the needful instructions to that effect.

In consequence the said supreme Mexican Government in the name of the said Congress and of the nation that it represents brings the foregoing to Your Excellency's high knowledge with a prayer that with the six legal documents accompanying this paper you may kindly acquaint the general Con-

gress of the United States with the whole matter and that you recommend to their august assembly our claim to have the independence of the Mexican America recognized, the above named Most Excellent Lic. Don José Manuel Herrera received as Minister Plenipotentiary of the said America near the Government of the said States and by virtue thereof to proceed in the most suitable form with the negotiations and treaties which will insure the happiness and greatness of the two Americas.

May God guard Your Excellency many years.

National Palace of the Supreme Mexican Government at Puruarán on the 14th day of July, one thousand eight hundred and fifteen.

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*José Manuel Herrera, appointed Mexican Minister to the United States, to James Madison, President of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

NEW ORLEANS, *March 1, 1816.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Having been designated by the Mexican Republic to come to the Government of the United States and negotiate affairs of extreme importance, I set out on the 16th of July of last year and after crossing a vast expanse of land in order to reach the Vera Cruz coast and having been detained there over a month on account of the fire which destroyed the vessel which was to bring me, I finally managed to sail on a schooner that appeared as I had resolved to return to the interior, having given up every hope that I could be afforded such a coveted opportunity.

On the first of October last I reached the city with the intent to remain there only the time absolutely needed to take the necessary measures for continuing my trip to Washington and placing in Your Excellency's hands my credentials together with a letter from my Government² and other papers, but in spite of my wishes and efforts and notwithstanding the very nature of the business with which I am entrusted, I was unfortunately frustrated in my intentions and hampered in my movements so much so that I have been four months in New Orleans, the obstacles which delayed my departure growing more and more numerous. This truly unpleasant situation, all the more as in my opinion it may cause injury of the greatest consequence to the interests of mankind, has induced me to return to Mexico for the object of removing

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

² See above, pt. IX, doc. 866, under date, July 14, 1815. The other papers which accompanied this and are preserved with it in the archives are two decrees of the same date, one describing the official seal and the other the flags of the new state, and a decree of July 3, 1815, relating to cruisers.

in person some difficulty which, if I avail myself of the services of any other person, might check the earlier success of my negotiations with the Government there from which I am sure I shall receive the needed assistance and which certainly could not exempt me from doing what certain circumstances demand, which circumstances have come together quite unexpectedly.

As my arrival in this country and the object of my mission have been made extremely public I deem it my duty to tell Your Excellency what has happened while leaving out useless details which would only break up the earnest and delicate matters which engage Your Excellency's attention.

I have also seen fit to enclose the official letter addressed to Your Excellency by my Government and the papers therein mentioned, all in copies and through Señor Don Guillermo Robinson, to whom I am indebted in addition to other services for undertaking to put those papers in their proper course, the only object of which is to inform Your Excellency of the particulars they contain until the moment shall come when I present the original to Your Excellency in all the forms that are customary.

In the meanwhile I have the honor to tender to Your Excellency my profound respects [etc.].

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*James Smith Wilcocks, subsequently Consul of the United States at Mexico City, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, October 25, 1821.

SIR: The love of my country, the spring of every noble and generous action, induces me to communicate to you, for the information of the President, and for the benefit that may result to the Government and citizens of the United States, the following circumstantial and exact account of the happy revolution that has lately occurred in this kingdom of New Spain, which, by the blessing of God, the intrepidity, talents, and exertions of its patriotic chief, General Don Augustin Iturbide, the enlightened policy of its mother country, and the liberal and philanthropic ideas of its late captain general, Don Juan O'Donojú, has ended in its complete and entire emancipation.

That you may have a clear and distinct view of the subject, be fully impressed with the justice of the cause of this hitherto afflicted and oppressed people, and have also a general idea of the face of the country, its inhabitants, productions, &c., it may not be improper to state that, since its conquest, (which, if my memory serves me, was in the year 1521,) it has been governed by sixty-two viceroys, and innumerable commandant generals, governors, and superintendents of provinces, who, according to general tradition, have

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 836. At this time the writer had no official connection with the Government; but he was on January 28, 1823, appointed consul of the United States at Mexico City, the first incumbent of this post. His residence, according to the official record, was Pennsylvania.

been, with very few exceptions, as many merciless and mercenary tyrants, the rapacity and unfeeling barbarity of whom nothing could have withstood for such a length of time but a land enriched by the beautiful hand of nature to a most extraordinary degree, and a people born and brought up, until of late, in all the intolerance of superstition and ignorance, and accustomed from their earliest infancy to the innumerable, and I may say almost incredible impositions of both church and state.

Few foreigners have, perhaps, had an opportunity of seeing as much of the kingdom as myself, having travelled on horseback from the port of Guaymas, on the Gulf of California, to almost every part of Sonora, and afterwards through the provinces and superintendencies of New Biscay, New Galicia, San Luis Potosi, Queretaro, and Mexico, to this city, a distance at least of seven hundred leagues, passing through all the principal cities, visiting the most celebrated mines, and conversing familiarly with all classes of people.

The provinces of Puebla, Mexico, Mechoacan, San Luis Potosi, and Guajalajara, may be termed the central ones, and, of those I have seen, the best watered, most fertile, most productive, and most inhabited; those that border on the Gulf of Mexico are Merida de Yucatan, Oaxaca, Vera Cruz, New Santandero, and Texas; the second, from all accounts, beautiful in the extreme; and the third and last very fertile, but almost entirely uncultivated: those on the Pacific ocean and Gulf of California, New Galicia, Sinaloa, and Sonora, fertile in parts, but very scant of water; and the extensive internal ones of New Leon, New Biscay, and New Mexico, that reach to the latitude of forty-two degrees north, which have for the most part the same defect, and which may be called a general one throughout the kingdom, there being in most parts but little rain, and in no part, excepting Texas, what we would call rivers. Where there is an abundance of water, however, the country is wonderfully fertile, producing in many parts two or three crops a year, and yielding each time four and five hundred for one, with the singular advantage of a diversity of temperature within very short distances, produced by the greater or less elevation of the lands, the centre of the kingdom being from eight to twelve thousand feet above the level of the sea; so that it is not uncommon to see in the same market all the fruits, grains, and other productions of temperate, hot, and cold climates, as is the case in this, and most of the principal cities.

Before the insurrection of the year 1810, the kingdom contained six millions of inhabitants; and it is worthy of remark, that Providence has been no less lavish in the distribution of her gifts as respects mankind, than in the fertility and production of the earth; the natives of this country, not excepting even the Indians, being endowed with a quickness of perception and ability to acquire and make themselves masters of the arts and sciences that is very notable, and far exceeds that of the inhabitants of Old Spain, and perhaps many other countries. At the above-mentioned period, the king-

dom may be said to have been at its acme of prosperity; the royal revenue exceeding \$20,000,000, and the money coined at the mint of this city upwards of \$28,000,000 annually; it has, however, ever since been on the decline, in consequence of the devastations committed by both parties in the long and cruel war carried on between the Europeans and Americans, so that the population cannot now be computed at more than four millions, the revenue at more than half of what it was, and the money coined yearly at from \$5,000,000 to \$8,000,000; this year it will probably not exceed \$4,000,000.

I have been informed that a very correct history of this insurrection, up to the unfortunate expedition of General Mina, has been written by a Mr. Robinson, and published in Philadelphia; it is useless, therefore, to say more on the subject than that its commencement was undoubtedly caused by the abuses daily committed in all branches of the Government in this kingdom, by the disorder in which Spain was thrown in consequence of the invasion of the French, and by the imprudent measures adopted in this city, one of which was the arrest of the Viceroy Iturigaray, and many of its principal American inhabitants. It is also worthy of remark that, in proportion as it was prolonged, the evils increased, and its symptoms became more malignant; the various incidents of the struggle, imbruing its character with blood, produced other passions, and among them those of rancor and hatred, which, irritated and inflamed by the inconsideration, imprudence, and want of policy on both sides, divided the kingdom into two parties, the Europeans and Americans, whose respective opinions formed essentially the war that destroyed both.

Among those that contributed most to quell the insurrection was the before-mentioned General Don Augustin Iturbide, then colonel of the regiment of Celaya, and native of the city of Valladolid, in the province of Mechoacan. Born of European parents, and animated by a mistaken zeal, he was induced to embrace the royal cause, and, with a fervor and impetuosity peculiar to his character, committed many arbitrary and violent acts, that in a great degree tarnished what would otherwise have been deemed brilliant achievements, and over which it is necessary to draw a veil, his subsequent conduct having entirely effaced them from the memory even of those most aggrieved. Indeed, it would appear that a sense of the injustice he had committed, an innate conviction of the impropriety of adhering to the party he had espoused, and a remorse of conscience, were the principal causes of the change in his political sentiments; for we see him all at once assuming a different character, and at a moment when his sovereign had heaped upon him innumerable honors.

The impossibility of re-establishing peace and quietness in the kingdom by the force of arms was fully ascertained during the viceroyalty of the Captain Generals Venegas and Calleja, of whom it may be said that they rather dispersed than conquered the Americans, the country being in a complete

state of revolt, and full of chieftains that commanded from three to six hundred, and even a thousand men each, and bands of robbers that infested the highways in September, 1816, when the Viceroy Apodaca arrived. To this disinterested, good, and virtuous man is due the pacification of the kingdom; his penetration, skill, and humanity having suggested to him the propriety of laying aside the arms that had hitherto been in use, and of winning the affections of the people by means of persuasion, pardons, and premiums, who, without general officers, money, or any immediate expectation of establishing the liberty of their country, and weary of the wandering and wretched life they had so long endured, embraced readily the opportunity that presented of returning to the bosoms of their families. No sooner was the plan adopted than its wisdom became palpable; entire towns and districts yielding to the solicitations of the agents appointed by the Government for carrying it into execution, so that at the end of two years all was tranquillity, and you could travel in every direction without escort of arms, except that of Acapulco, between which and this city the chieftains Guerrero, Asensio, and a Colonel Bradburn, of Virginia, that came with General Mina, with about fifteen hundred men, had taken refuge, and fortified an almost inaccessible mountain, from whence they made predatory excursions. To reduce these to obedience was the ultimate object and wish of the Government; and, with this view, General Iturbide was invested with the important military command of the department of the south, that contained about three thousand veteran troops, and had its head-quarters in the town of Iguala, distant about thirty leagues from this city, on the direct road to Acapulco. It is proper to mention here that, a few months previous to his nomination, news had been received of the regeneration of Old Spain, and of the establishment of the constitution in that country—a circumstance that created great alarm in this among the clergy and friars; the lower class of people were also taught to believe that the planting of it here would be attended with the entire destruction of their long-established form of religion.

The viceroy, (Apodaca,) who was now graced with the title of "Conde del Venadito," was also opposed to the new system, and discovered so much reluctance in the change of his measures, that his unwillingness and tardy mode of proceeding became evident to all, and gave occasion to many just and violent complaints that were made by its admirers, who publicly accused him of its infraction; while the American writers, taking advantage of the liberty of the press, and the confused and unsettled state of public opinion, called aloud for independence as the only certain remedy for the numerous evils that surrounded them.

The crisis was too important and obvious to escape the penetration of our hero, Iturbide, who was also instigated to an immediate execution of the plan he had, in consequence, formed, of liberating his country forever from its

thralldom, by the mutiny of several of the officers of the regiment of the "four military orders," that had before given many unequivocal proofs of disaffection and insubordination, which was supposed to extend to the soldiers of that corps, and by the departure of a convoy for Acapulco with near a million of dollars, that was intended to be embarked in a ship bound to Manilla, that he resolved on detaining. He immediately, therefore, concerted his measures with the clergy and friars, and, with the specious pretext of upholding them in their privileges and immunities, secured their favor and protection. He also communicated his design to such of the governors of the provinces as he thought likely to aid him in the execution of it, and, on his arrival in Iguala, persuaded a great part of the troops under his command to join him in the undertaking, in the belief that the Government secretly favored it—a circumstance that they at first readily gave credit to, from their knowledge of the anti-constitutional sentiments of its leading members, but in which they were soon after undeceived, and, in consequence, not more than a thousand remained faithful of those that espoused his party. The design was also made known to Guerrero, Asensio, and Bradburn, who pledged themselves to support him in the enterprise; and, thus prepared, he openly declared the independence of the kingdom, swearing it in the most solemn manner at the head of his army, in the said town of Iguala, on the 24th day of February last, seizing, at the same time, and appropriating to the use of the nation, the treasure destined for the Manilla ship.

His next step was to form a plan for the installation of the new Government, (a copy of which I enclose,¹) and to give to his army the style and title of the "army of the three guarantees," from the protection it was to afford to the Catholic religion, to the independence of the kingdom, and to the indissoluble union between the Europeans and Americans. A copy of the plan was immediately sent by him to the viceroy, with a letter, stating all that had passed, explaining his motives for having formed and adopted the new system; inviting him and the Government to aid and assist in its establishment; and, finally, naming the said viceroy, the "Conde de Cortina," and the president of the royal audience, the members that were to compose the regency, reserving to himself the command that he had assumed of the national army.

The viceroy, had he been left to himself, would, I believe, have assented to the proposal, from the vehement desire he has ever manifested to avoid the effusion of blood, and the miseries concomitant to a renewal of the war, as well as from the conviction that the plan and policy adopted by Iturbide could not fail to gain him innumerable friends, and to enable him, finally, to accomplish his views. It was necessary, however, to call to his counsel the members of the various tribunals of which the Government was composed, as well as the principal military officers, all of whom, counting on the versatility that had been conspicuous in the American character up to that period, re-

¹ Not printed in this collection.

solved, unanimously, to maintain the then existing Government, in the belief that the few troops that had adhered to Iturbide would leave him the instant the royal army should approach Iguala.

The old favorite system of blood and murder was also upheld; but to this the viceroy would not consent, and an amnesty was offered to all, not excepting Iturbide. The Field Marshal Linan was named commander-in-chief, and a numerous staff and army was committed to his charge. He was, however, so slow in his motions, that a detachment of troops sent by Iturbide had taken possession of the town and castle of Acapulco, and he himself, and the remainder, were on their march in the direction of Valladolid before the army of Linan moved from its cantonment in the neighborhood of this city.

The cry of independence was no sooner raised in Iguala than it spread in all parts, and an army was formed in the provinces of Puebla and Vera Cruz, by the Colonels Herrera, Bravo, and Santa Ana, that took possession of the cities of Orizaba, Cordova, and Xalapa; which was a most important conquest, the two former being the depots of the Government tobacco, of which a prodigious quantity fell into the hands of the Independents, with a large sum in specie—circumstances that were attended with the double advantage of being a powerful succor to them, and an irreparable loss to the Government, which counted on the remission to, and sale of, the tobacco in Mexico as its principal means of supporting the war.

In this state of things, it was resolved to divide the Government army into three divisions: one of which, under the command of Colonel Margues, was to retake Acapulco; another, commanded by Colonel Hebia, to march against the cities of Orizaba, Cordova, and Xalapa; and the third to return for the defence of this capital, on the supposition that Iturbide might suddenly change his route, and take the city by surprise. It, however, soon appeared that his intention was very different, and that his object was to pass Valladolid, and unite with a Colonel Bustamente, of San Luis Potosi, who had risen at this critical period, and proceeded against the city of Guanajuato with a considerable part of his regiment of dragoons, declaring independence in all the cities and towns in the Bajio, the inhabitants of which received him with open arms. On arriving at Guanajuato, it also surrendered to him; and, as he was joined by the garrisons of the several places he passed through, Iturbide, on meeting him, found himself at the head of an army of five thousand men, including the divisions of Colonel Barragan and Major Parres, that left Valladolid with what troops they could seduce, as soon as they knew of his intention to pass that way. With this respectable force it was determined to attack that city, which was the best fortified of any in the kingdom, and had a garrison of seventeen hundred men. It however made no defence, and its commandant, Colonel Quintanar, and all but about six hundred of the troops, went over to Iturbide.

At Guanajuato, where is one of the richest minerals in the kingdom, a mint

was established, that proved afterwards very serviceable to the Independents, and injurious to the royal party; the silver from all the neighboring mines taking the direction of that city instead of Mexico.

Acapulco remained but a short time in possession of the Independents, the castle having capitulated before the arrival of the division of Colonel Margues to two Spanish frigates that accidentally arrived there from Panama. San Juan del Rio, a fortified town between this city and Queretaro, was next invested; the siege, however, lasted but a few days; the greater part of the garrison, being Americans, deserted, and joined the Independents, obliging the few that remained to capitulate.

The division of Colonel Hebia that had marched, as before stated, against the cities of Orizaba, Cordova, and Xalapa, surprised Colonel Bravo, with about fifteen hundred Independents, in the town of Tepeaca, about nine leagues from Puebla, who, unprepared for action, retired with his troops to a large convent of the order of San Francisco, that was constructed by Hernando Cortez, soon after the conquest, in the form of a fortress, to serve as a place of refuge for him and his followers in the event of any sudden emergency. Hebia had with him his own regiment of "Castile," and other European troops, that equalled in number those of Bravo. A field-piece was, however, necessary to make a breach in the wall of the convent, and, to obtain this, he sent immediately to Puebla, asking, at the same time, for a reinforcement of five hundred men, that the success of the action might be placed beyond all doubt. Bravo, suspecting his intention, resolved on a sortie, with the determination to cut his way and escape, as Iturbide had given positive orders to all his officers to avoid the effusion of blood, and to act solely on the defensive, from the double motive of conciliating the enemy and avoiding the butchery of his countrymen; sensible where one European should be killed, four or five Americans would fall, the number of the latter in the King's service exceeding greatly that of the former. In the first and second attempts he made, he was unsuccessful; the third, however, proved more fortunate, and he got off with the loss of fifty or sixty men, killing as many of those that were opposed to him.

This was the first action that had occurred, and the result proved highly important to the independent cause; the gallant conduct of their troops inspiring a universal confidence, animating their companions in arms throughout the kingdom to a singular and unexpected degree, and demonstrating to the political and military officers of the Government of Mexico that they had to contend with a brave and determined enemy.

Disappointed and chagrined at the result of the action, and undeceived as to the sort of troops he had to deal with, Hebia proceeded on his march to Cordova, where he was killed in the first assault, and his army obliged to retire from the siege by Colonel Herrera, and the valiant troops that defended the city. While these scenes of glory were achieving in the provinces of Puebla and Vera Cruz, the siege of the city of Queretaro, one of the most beautiful in

the kingdom, and the third in rank as respects size, opulence, and commerce, was pushed with much vigor by Iturbide in person. Its garrison was composed of nine hundred Europeans, draughted from various regiments, and about six hundred Americans, all under the command of Brigadier General Loaces, a native of the kingdom of Peru, colonel of the regiment of Saragossa, and a brave and experienced officer. He had determined to make a vigorous and desperate defence; and, as the fate of the kingdom depended in a great measure on that of this city, the Government resolved to abandon that of San Luis Potosi, and to succor Queretaro with the European regiment of Zamora that was stationed there. The order to this effect was no sooner despatched than Iturbide knew of it, and concerted measures to surprise the troops on their march, which were so well executed that they found themselves surrounded when they least expected it by a body of three times their number, and compelled to surrender at discretion. This happy occurrence for the Independents was a deathblow to the Government, who found itself at once deprived of the important capital and province of San Luis Potosi, that were immediately occupied by the Independents, and without the means of contributing to the relief of Queretaro, which capitulated shortly after; the American part of the garrison joining Iturbide, as usual, and the Europeans going on parole to Celaya, until such time as they could be transported to the Havana. These troops, to their eternal disgrace, proposed afterwards to their colonel to rise and march to Mexico; but he, like a man of honor, sent the letter to Iturbide, who immediately ordered them to be disarmed and dispersed.

The next action of any importance was in the neighborhood of Toluca, fourteen leagues from the city, between the regiment of Fernando VII., commanded by Colonel Castillo, and a body of the Independents of an equal number, under the orders of Colonel Filisola, which was indecisive, both parties claiming the victory, after an obstinate battle, in which more than two hundred were left dead on the field, and the Independents in possession of two cannon, that their opponents were obliged to abandon.

At this period, General Negrete, commander of the troops in the province of Guadalajara, rose with the whole of his army, obliged the commandant, General Don José de la Cruz, to fly from the capital of that name, where, and in all other parts of the province, independence was sworn; the commerce of the port of San Blas was also declared free to all nations. Cruz took the road leading to the internal provinces, with the intention, it was said, of uniting with Brigadier Don Joaquin Arredondo, commandant general of the eastern provinces, of raising an army in union with him, and of returning, either to reconquer his own province, or to the aid of that of Mexico. Arredondo had, however, already caused independence to be sworn throughout his district, and, on hearing this, Cruz made a halt in the city of Zacatecas, but, being pursued by Negrete, fled to Durango, the capital of the province

of New Biscay, carrying with him a large sum in specie that he found in the treasury at Zacatecas, which city soon after surrendered to a detachment that was sent against it by the commandant of San Luis Potosi.

On the death of Hebia, the command of the regiment of Castile devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Luna, who, on the fall of Queretaro, was ordered to return to Mexico by forced marches, in the expectation that Iturbide would now attack the capital. Similar orders were also sent to Colonel Margues, in whose division was a principal part of the insubordinate regiment of the "four military orders." The male inhabitants of Mexico, from the age of sixteen to fifty, were also ordered to enrol themselves in the militia, without exception of distinction of persons, and every possible precaution was taken to prevent a surprise and maintain the city until such time as an answer should be received to despatches that had been sent to Spain, or troops should arrive that were expected from the Havana.

All this, however, was not sufficient to allay the rancor that a certain part of the community had conceived against the viceroy, nor to convince them of his upright intentions, or extinguish the sparks of insubordination I have already hinted at in some of the European troops, which, from the first, was more immediately directed at his person than at the Government. A report was, therefore, industriously circulated that he was in secret correspondence with Iturbide, and that there was no real intention to defend the city, notwithstanding the preparations that were ostensibly making for its protection: the whole a prelude to the scandalous revolution of the 5th of July, which had for its object the arrest of that most excellent man, and, without doubt, was accomplished by dint of money paid by the merchants to the officers that took part in the affray, who had the temerity to secure the persons of their colonels and other principal military men opposed to their project, to assault the palace and make a prisoner of the viceroy, and afterwards, the audacity to place against its gates and the corners of the principal streets, for the information of the public, who were so many witnesses of their atrocity, a paper setting forth that he had of his own accord, and at the respectful petition of the officers of the European regiments, delivered the political and military command of the kingdom to Field Marshal Don Francisco Novella, the person they had pitched upon as the leader of the faction.

This gentleman had under his command the various corps of artillery and engineers that existed in the kingdom; and as his education and occupation until now had been altogether confined to that line, you will readily imagine him entirely unfit for the discharge of the arduous and complicated duties of viceroy of these extensive provinces.

Indeed, he himself was sensible of his incompetency, and very prudently declined the offer; as unsuitable, however, as he was, there was no other person they could avail themselves of that was less so, and the same necessity that compelled them to name him obliged him to accept the appointment.

From a Government constituted by the insubordination of a few soldiers that had the vanity to compare their iniquitous conduct with the noble enthusiasm of the Spanish nation, which, tired of obeying tyrants that abused the goodness of their monarch, rose in a mass to recover the rights of which they had unjustly been deprived, no good was to be expected; and we see it employed from its very commencement in destroying the constitutional regimen, of which it did not leave a vestige, and in substituting the most arbitrary and tyrannical system that it is possible to imagine; all of which was fomented and sanctioned by a body that Novella had created, with the denomination of the "Junta Consultiva," composed of a few individuals who had contributed with their money to place the power in his hands, were furious at seeing approach the expiration of their authority, and with sentiments diametrically opposed to the system of liberality and philanthropy at present predominant.

At the time these scenes of horror were transacting in the capital, and to which I myself had like to have been a victim, notwithstanding the great prudence I observed in my deportment, a bloody occurrence took place in Vera Cruz in consequence of the storming of that city by a party of troops commanded by an inconsiderate but brave young officer named Santa Ana, who scaled the walls and got complete possession of the town, but was afterwards obliged to retire with great loss, his soldiers having abandoned their arms with a view to plunder, and the inhabitants setting upon them when in that defenceless state.

The city of Puebla de los Angeles, the largest in the kingdom except Mexico, next attracted the attention of General Iturbide, in front of which was a large army of Independents composed of the divisions of the Conde de la Cadena, Herrera, Bravo, Filisola, and others, that only awaited the orders of their general to make the attack, and to prevent which, and the loss of many valuable lives, he went in person, preferring, in all cases, the plan he had from the first adopted of reducing his enemies by means of persuasion and negotiation rather than by force of arms. The fate of Puebla was all-important to the Government in the critical situation in which it found itself, being one of the chain of fortified towns that connect Mexico with Vera Cruz, to which port it had resolved to retire with the European part of the army and inhabitants, in the event of not being able to sustain itself in the capital. Puebla was, therefore, well garrisoned, served with an excellent park of artillery, and defended with many cannon of a large calibre, so that its commander-in-chief, Brigadier Don Ciriaco Llano, the Marquis de Vivanco, and other experienced officers stationed there, had, until the last, sanguine hopes of being able to defend it. Iturbide, however, called to his assistance a part of the army he had left in Queretaro, and surrounded the city with so many troops that resistance would have been nothing short of an act of madness; it therefore capitulated.

On the surrender of Puebla, the army of Iturbide, which had now augmented to the number of about eighteen thousand, and which was composed entirely of veteran troops that had been disciplined in the King's service, and had gone over to him clandestinely, or joined him on the fall of the various cities he had conquered, received orders to march in separate columns to different towns in the neighborhood of Mexico, with the intention of manifesting to the Government of that city the folly of any further resistance. It was, however, entirely in vain that the general had adopted this prudent measure; in vain that one or two praiseworthy citizens had ventured to reason on the subject with Señor Novella; and in vain that he was assured he could not rely on more than one-third part of the troops that composed the garrison. War! war! was the cry of him and his Junta Consultiva, and the motto they wore on their hats, and that worn by all their officers and troops, was, "*Vivir y morir fieles y útiles.*"

Iturbide, after having rested a few days in Puebla, and partaken of the effusion of gratitude manifested towards him by the good people of that city, was on the point of leaving it, with the intention of fixing his head-quarters near the town of Chalco, and directing from thence the attack that was to have been made on Mexico, when he received a letter from Lieutenant General Don Juan O'Donojú, who had recently arrived at Vera Cruz, informing him that he had been named by the King of Spain captain general and political chief of the kingdom, and had accepted the appointment at the solicitation of his friends, the representatives of America in the Cortes of Spain; that he had risked his health and life, and sacrificed his convenience, at a period when he intended to retire from the public service, without any other desire than that of acquiring the love and esteem of the people of New Spain, and without other sentiments than those of tranquillizing the disastrous inquietude that reigned in the kingdom—not by consolidating or perpetuating the despotism that existed, or prolonging the colonial dependence, or falling into the errors or imitating the defects of many of his predecessors in supporting a system of government, the tyranny and injustice of which arose from the barbarity of the age in which it was established, but by reforming the ideas of the misled, calming the passions of the exasperated, and pointing out to the people generally the mode of obtaining with security, and without the horrible sacrifice they were making, the happiness which the illustration of the era in which they lived had induced them to seek after, and which no rational person could disapprove. He also required Iturbide to appoint a place at which they could have an interview, and realize the sincere and ardent desire he had to prevent the evils and misfortunes inseparable to a state of hostility, until such time as the treaty they might conclude, founded on the basis of the plan published in Iguala, should be ratified by the King and Cortes.

What a blow was this to the existing Government of Mexico, and to those

that preceded it since the year 1810! what a contrast to their iniquitous and shameful mode of proceeding! The wise and beneficent O'Donojú, reading the public papers of the Independents, applauding the enterprise of their hero Iturbide, confirming his ideas, commending his virtues, and desiring his friendship, as he does in the conclusion of his letter; while the intrusive Novella and his Junta Consultiva, in imitation of their barbarous predecessors, Vanegas and Calleja, were persecuting with unrelenting fury, and almost to death itself, those that communicated with the Independents, or in whose possession should be found any of their seditious writings; proscribing the chiefs of the revolution, and heaping upon them every species of reproach and ignominy!

But the scene had changed; the star of liberty that rose in our own country had happily spread its influence in the more eastern and western hemispheres, and displayed to the world the criminal conduct of the Caligulas and Neros that had for such a length of time dishonored Spain and abused human nature.

This letter of O'Donojú, with another that he wrote to Sr. Novella, was sent by Iturbide to the Mexican Government, accompanied with a proposal for the suspension of arms until such times as the definitive treaty should be signed in Cordova, the city named by Iturbide as the point of conference. Novella would, however, hear nothing of the sort, and the letters were declared spurious, notwithstanding that Sr. Alcocer, a venerable curate of this city, who had been intimately acquainted with O'Donojú in Spain, proved to the Junta the identity of the signatures, by showing others that he had in his possession; which contumacy on the part of Novella exasperated Iturbide so much that he set off for Cordova, leaving orders with his generals for the immediate occupation of the towns of Tacuba, Tacubaya, Azcapuzalco, and Guadalupe, neither of which was distant more than half a league from Mexico, and all of them in possession of the European troops.

This was an unexpected circumstance to Novella and the Junta, who had the folly and vanity to suppose they could frighten the Independents from the execution of their plan by means of the silly proclamations they almost daily issued, in which they affected to despise their number, challenged them openly to commence the attack, and declared the Generals Luaces and Llano traitors to their King and country for having surrendered the cities of Queretaro and Puebla. The heroes of Tepeaca, Cordova, and Toluca were, however, not so easily scared, and a column of fifteen hundred men sent by Colonel Bustamente against Azcapuzalco presented to the inhabitants of Mexico the sight of a most bloody and desperate action that took place between them and an equal number of the regiments of Castile and military orders that composed the garrison of Azcapuzalco, the result of which was at least six hundred killed and wounded, and the abandonment of the town by the Europeans. A few days after, an attempt was made to dislodge the Europeans

that were stationed in Guadalupe, by means of cannon placed on a neighboring hill; and while this operation was carrying on by a part of the Independents, and others were taking possession of Tacuba and Tacubaya, from both of which towns the Europeans had retired, an aid-de-camp arrived with a copy of the treaty of Cordova, concluded between General O'Donojú and Iturbide, and an order from the former to Sr. Novella, commanding him to obey him as captain general of the kingdom, to cause him to be recognised as such by the troops, to cease all hostilities from the instant he should receive the order, and to adopt measures for the evacuation of the city. This peremptory mandate on one side, and the near approach of the Independents on the other, placed Novella, the Junta, and their European troops in an awkward predicament; inasmuch as, if they obeyed the order, they would be subject to arrest and trial for the scandalous imprisonment of the late viceroy; and if they refused compliance, to be treated as rebels against the King's authority: their object, therefore, was to shelter themselves from the punishment they had justly deserved in the best manner they could. And, with this view, although they were perfectly convinced of the presence of O'Donojú in the kingdom, and of the reality of the treaty signed in Cordova, they nevertheless affected to doubt the truth of one and the other, alleging that all might be a stratagem of Iturbide; and on this frivolous pretext refused to evacuate the city. On the deposition of the Conde del Venadito, the Junta Provincial Ayuntamiento, and other bodies corporate, hesitated to acknowledge the authority of Novella, but were obliged to do so eventually, from the fear of the bayonets he had at his command.

Now, however, that they were surrounded by the Independents, and backed by O'Donojú, they openly protested against his proceedings, and, in consequence, he was obliged to ask for an armistice, and compelled to send one of the Junta Consultiva to Puebla to ascertain, as he said, the identity of the captain general. This envoy, who had hitherto been one of the most strenuous supporters of the measures of Novella, and one of the most active members of the Junta, received such a fright from the lecture O'Donojú gave him, that he immediately returned, explained fully to Novella all that had passed, and forever afterwards ceased to meddle in the matters at issue. Novella was also inclined to succumb, and would have renounced his employ, had it not been for fear of the troops; he having lost all authority, and they having usurped the command, so that the city was in the utmost anarchy and confusion, and dreading at every instant a general massacre and pillage, with which it had been threatened daily for near a month, and which would most assuredly have succeeded had it not been for the proximity and number of the Independent army, that cut off all possibility of escape for the European troops, whose idea was to commit all sorts of enormity, rob what they could, and take the road for Vera Cruz.

Things had got to that pass that it was impossible to confide in a servant,

and dangerous to do so in a friend; every thing like social intercourse was at an end; those that could with any sort of convenience leave the city, fled: and those that were obliged to remain, sought security in their houses; so that, in this once populous metropolis, there was scarce a soul to be seen. In this state of things, the Generals O'Donojú and Iturbide arrived at Tacubaya, and the former had an interview with Sr. Novella, in the course of which he gave him to understand the impropriety of his conduct in resisting the legitimate authority as long as he did, the impossibility of defending the city, and the certainty of the massacre of the Europeans, should it be taken by assault; remonstrated with him respecting the insubordination of the troops, pointed out to him the illegality of their conduct, and enjoined him to prevent the effusion of blood, by exercising the little influence he had with the subaltern officers and soldiers, in the understanding that he would not take upon him to scrutinize their conduct in the arrest of the late viceroy, but leave them to exculpate themselves in the best way they could on arriving in Spain. The following day news was received of the surrender of the city of Durango and General Cruz to General Negrete, after an obstinate resistance, in the course of which many lives were lost, and the declaration of independence in the western internal provinces, under the command of Field Marshal Alexo Garcia Conde; so that if the soldiers of Novella had before any hope, it now entirely disappeared, and, in order to avoid a disgraceful capitulation, were obliged to acknowledge the supremacy of General O'Donojú, obey his orders by evacuating the city, and march to that of Toluca, there to wait until it was convenient for them to embark.

To complete the independence of the kingdom, there was now wanting the declaration of the province of Merida de Yucatan, which followed almost immediately the surrender of Acapulco, the castle of Perote, and Vera Cruz; the two former of which capitulated soon after, and the latter has, without doubt, ere this followed their example, advice having been received yesterday by the Government that it was on the eve of surrendering. The province of Guatemala, which has always been a separate viceroyalty from that of Mexico, was also sensible of the general impulse, and, desirous of becoming an integral part of the Mexican empire, has likewise sworn independence, which, without doubt, will extend to its neighboring provinces, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Veragua, so that we may from this instant consider North America, with the exception of Canada, as divided into two grand and important commonwealths, that may, with the aid of those that are forming in South America, be able, in the course of time, to give the law to the opposite continent.

I am very far from believing myself possessed of the qualities necessary to treat with the energy and exactness that it merits a subject of the importance of that on which I have ventured to write, and certainly should not have had the temerity to have touched upon it, had it not been for the particular

situation in which I found myself, an eye-witness of all that passed, and from the conviction I have ever been under, that each individual is bound to contribute towards the good of his country to the utmost of his ability, be it great or small. With this view, therefore, I shall, now that I have finished my narrative, take the liberty to add a few remarks, and to say, in the first place, that the revolution which I have attempted to describe is not one of those that have been accomplished by means of unbridled passions, cruelty, rancor, or revenge, but, on the contrary, has, from its commencement, been accompanied with brotherly love, patriotism, disinterestedness, truth, and good faith; so that the more I reflect on its origin and progress, the more is my admiration excited, and the more am I tempted to exclaim that America has produced two of the greatest heroes that ever existed—*Washington* and *Iturbide*. Secondly, that the new Government is established on a sure and solid foundation, the people being highly delighted with it, and the subordinate chiefs, officers, and soldiers having one and all implicitly followed the example of moderation set them by their magnanimous leader, who, to obviate strife, envy, and emulation, has absolutely refused the crown, and insisted that the Emperor shall come from Spain, as he first proposed in the town of Iguala. Indeed, the plan there published has been adhered to with the most religious scrupulosity, except the slight variations made in it by the treaty of Cordova, at the suggestion of General O'Donojú; and the empire is, in consequence, governed by a regency of five of its most distinguished and enlightened statesmen, who have elected General Iturbide President, and appointed him commander-in-chief of the land and sea forces, and by a convention of thirty-six of the principal personages in the empire, as respects talents, rank, and riches. The independence is to be sworn in this city on the 27th instant, and the Cortes are to meet on the 24th of February next, the anniversary of the declaration in Iguala. In the mean time, the convention will be employed in enacting the most salutary decrees; and among those already passed is one declaring the commerce of this empire free to all nations; another, doing away all the arbitrary taxes, impositions, and excises imposed by the former Government; a third, reducing the duties from sixteen to six per cent.; a fourth, for the encouragement of the miners, relinquishing to them the quota of silver formerly paid to the King, with other imposts that amounted to seventeen per cent.; so that many poor minerals that could not be worked before, can now be used to advantage; and a fifth, recognising and making the new Government responsible for the debt contracted by the old one, of thirty-six millions of dollars.

That there is a strong bias in the minds of the people of this country in favor of the Government and citizens of the United States in preference to all other nations, is beyond a doubt; and that the convention, of which four-fifths are native Americans, and the Regency, which is composed entirely of them, are actuated with the same sentiments, is also certain. On this

subject I have had various conferences with the leading members of the administration, whose sentiments will be fully explained to you shortly by Don Juan Manuel de Elizalda, the minister plenipotentiary that is already named, and now preparing to go to Washington, where I have no doubt he will be received and acknowledged as the representative of a free and independent nation; the Mexican empire being so at this time to all intents and purposes, in the first place, by the unanimous wish and consent, power and authority, of its inhabitants; and, secondly, by the treaty signed at Cordova, between the Generals O'Donojú and Iturbide, the deputed agents of Spain and this empire.

Your most obedient [etc.].

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*José Manuel Herrera, Secretary of State of Mexico, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

MEXICO, November 30, 1821.

SIR: Our Provinces having withdrawn from the Spanish Government, the Capital being occupied by our armies, and the authorities being established, which conformably to the Plan proclaimed in Iguala, and to the Treaties concluded in Cordova are to govern this vast Empire until the installation of the constituent national Congress; the Governing Regency immediately thought it a primary obligation upon them to communicate with all despatch to the Nations these great events, which have gloriously terminated our war of liberty, an object of the utmost importance which for eleven years has kept the politicians of the whole world in suspense.

The People of Mexico are now free and independent; but animated with the tenderest sentiments of humanity, and guided by principles of the purest philanthropy; at the same time that they refuse to submit to the yoke of foreign domination, they are desirous of being united to all Governments by means of friendly alliances and connections, which being founded on reason and good faith may insure the inestimable gift of peace, may be the fruitful source of prosperity to the Universe.

The United States of North America have a preferable right to demand of the Mexican Empire these considerations the more just and reasonable because they are supported by the well known maxims of policy; and even nature herself has separated these nations from Europe by immense seas, and placed them upon the same continent: this has doubtless taken place that they might make common cause in reciprocally supplying their necessities, and cooperating for their mutual felicity.

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

With these laudable views I have the honour to communicate to you, Sir, by order of the Governing Regency, the triumph of the Mexican Patriots commanded by the immortal Iturbide, to whose talents, virtues, and indefatigable vigilance, a Colony, enslaved for three centuries, owes the restoration of its rights, and its elevation to the rank of a Sovereign nation, as its population, its wealth, and its intelligence demand.

Herewith are sent a collection of the numbers of the *Imperial Gazette* published to this date, and some other publications which afford an idea of the present state of this Empire, in order that you may be enabled to lay the whole before this Supreme Government, until our envoy come, who will not delay coming legally authorized, and according to the formalities prescribed by the Law of Nations to manage the affairs which it is proper to promote, by communicating the relations that are to be brought forward between two Nations destined to be united in the bonds of the most intimate and cordial fraternity.

The Bearer of this is Don Santiago [James] Smith Wilcocks worthy, from his honour and probity, of this confidence which I promise myself he will execute with the zeal which he has manifested to me.

Deign, Sir, to accept [etc.].

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*José Manuel Herrera, Secretary of State of Mexico, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

MEXICO, September 24, 1822.

The letter of the 23d of April last² in answer to that of the 30th of November³ which I had the honour to address to you accompanied with Imperial Gazettes and other public papers containing important information concerning this new State, was handed to me by Mr. James Smith Wilcocks with a collection of official prints relative to the public affairs of that country.

Much as I have been gratified with the polite expression announcing the cordiality of the just and well founded relations which will very soon unite our two friendly nations, the information that the worthy President of the United States will appoint a Minister to represent their interests near this Government, has been exceedingly flattering to me, and as it is desirous of giving to its neighbours of the North the most solemn proof of the desires which it entertains for their friendship and good understanding, it has appointed with due power and authority as Envoy Extraordinary and Min-

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

² Not printed in this collection.

³ See above, pt. IX, doc. 869.

ister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency Don Manuel Zozaya, who will have the honour of delivering you this in person, hoping that he will meet in that Republic the most kind reception, which the noble and generous sentiments, manifested towards this new Empire gives reason to expect by anticipation.

I had already formed a high opinion of Mr. Smith Wilcocks, and given him unequivocal proof how much his virtues were appreciated. In future my exertions shall be redoubled to render him comfortable, that he may understand how powerfully the recommendation, which you have been pleased to give me of this person, weighs with me.

I pray you, Sir, to accept [etc.].

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*Letter of credence to José Manuel Zozaya, Mexican Minister to the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

MEXICO, September 25, 1822.

Augustine by Divine Providence and by the Congress of the Nation, First Constitutional Emperor of Mexico and Grand Master of the Imperial Order of Guadalupe.

Whereas having come to the occupation of the Throne of the Mexican Nation by the free and solemnly declared votes of all its inhabitants it is one of my first cares to promote and solicit the recognition of the Independence among the Foreign Powers with which the Empire is desirous of establishing and maintaining relations of amity and good understanding: it being my duty to appoint for this purpose Ministers duly authorized who in quality of Envoys Extraordinary and previously obtaining the recognition of said Powers, may stipulate and adjust with the Ministers who on their part may be appointed, the Treaties and Conventions most advantageous to the respective States: Therefore having full trust and confidence in you D. José Manuel Zozaya my honorary Counsellor of State, that you will faithfully execute so important a mission, from the proofs which you have given of capacity and zeal in the service of your Country, I have given you as by these presents I give and grant to you all my power in virtue of the authority vested in me as the elected and sworn Emperor of the Mexican Empire, that going to the City of Washington the Capital of the United States of North America, in the character of my Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the Supreme Government of that Republic, you solicit the recognition of the Independence of this Empire of Mexico, and having

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

obtained it, that you treat, conclude and sign in my name the stipulations and conventions which the interest of both Nations may require with the Minister or Ministers equally authorized for that purpose, considering as I now consider as valid and binding whatever you may thus treat, conclude and sign, and offering upon my word that I will observe and fulfil it, as if it had been concluded and signed by myself, urging and causing to issue the letters of ratification in due form and commanding them to be delivered that they may be exchanged at the time agreed upon. In faith of which I have ordered to despatch these presents signed by my hand, sealed with the seal of the Empire and countersigned by my underwritten Secretary of State and of Despatch of interior and exterior relations in Mexico the twenty fifth of September, one thousand eight hundred and twenty two, second of Independence. Agustín—José Man¹. de Herrera—Your Imperial Majesty appoints as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the Government of the United States the honorary Counsellor of State, Don José Manuel Zozaya.

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*José Manuel Zozaya, Mexican Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, April 4, 1823 [?].

SIR: Before undertaking my journey for New Orleans which will be on Wednesday next, I have received from the actual Secretary of State of the Government of Mexico the following communication: "By the accompanying Documents your Excellency will be informed of the change of Government which has taken place in the Mexican Nation you will therefore give to that Cabinet information of our Political regeneration which all the Nation has received with the greatest enthusiasm and jubilee. God preserve your Excellency many years. Mexico 4th of April 1823. third of Independence and second of liberty. José Ignacio García Yllueca". I have the honor of transcribing to your Excellency this communication and to accompany it with such Documents as may prove useful.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

*T. Reilly, Vice Consul of the United States at Vera Cruz, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

ANCHORAGE OF SACRIFICIO, *October 2 & 3, 1823.*

SIR: The departure of Mr. Taylor for the U. S. & the Commission of Vice Consul, which that Gentleman left me, render it my duty to inform You, that, on the 25th of September two days after the sailing of the U. S. Ship *Hornet* from V Cruz the Spanish Garrison of St Juan de Ulloa [San Juan de Ulúa], commenced hostilities against that City, by a fire of shot & shells, which with short intervals of rest, has continued to this day, it is true with very little injury as yet, to the City. The Mexican forts have always answered this fire, it is impossible to foresee the termination of this warfare, but as it may in its consequences compromise American property to a large amount, I doubt not, the subject will receive from our Government, the attention which it merits.

Herewith I transmit you, copy of my letter on this subject,² to the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Naval forces in this quarter.

I have the honor [etc.].

*T. Reilly, Vice Consul of the United States at Vera Cruz, to Commodore David Porter, commanding the United States Squadron at Thompson's Island*³

ANCHORAGE OF SACRIFICIO, *October 4, 1823.*

SIR: Forty eight hours after the sailing of the U. S. Ship *Hornet* from the Port of Vera Cruz, the Castle of St John de Ulloa [San Juan de Ulúa] opened its fire, on the Town & forts of Vera Cruz, which has continued from the 25th of last month to this day, at intervals, always answered by the Mexican forts, the injury done on either side is very trifling but commerce is driven from V. Cruz & must resort to other Points. Alvarado, a Bar harbor, 36 miles SE from this place, admitting vessels of 11 feet, is the Point, which in all probability, will be most resorted to.

It is impossible to foresee, the termination of these hostils. & should the Spanish Authorities of Cuba, support the Governor of Ulloa, in his mad attack, it is somewhat probable, that a blockade of Alvarado & of the Mexican Coast generally may be undertaken, in such an event, the property of Citizens of the U. S. to a considerable amount, may be placed in imminent hazard, & will require to relieve it from jeopardy, some interference on the part of our Government & of our naval force.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Vera Cruz, I.

² See following document (874).

³ MS. Letters, Vera Cruz, I. Enclosure in Reilly to Adams, which see above, pt. ix, doc. 873.

There are at present, in the Port of Alvarado, the Sch^r *Fame* of Philad^a., & a Sch^r from N Orleans—the Brig *George* & the Sch^r *Tom*, both of Philad^a., sail from this Anchorage, on to'morrow for the same Place, several vessels richly laden are dayly expected from the U. S. & a large amount in Specie belonging to our Citizens & intended to be shipped for our Country is dayly looked for from the Interior.

I deem it my duty to apprize you of these circumst^{ts}. Your Patriotism & vigilance, leave no doubt, you will promptly adopt, such measures as the case may require.

With much respect [etc.].

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*T. Reilly, Vice Consul of the United States at Vera Cruz, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

ALVARADO, October 13, 1823.

SIR: I had the honor to address you, c/o Sch^r *Camella*, informing of the rupture & hostilities, between the Spanish garrison in the Castle of Ulloa, & the Mexican Government, the latter has, on the 25th ulto, issued a Declaration of War against Spain, & the contending Parties, are dayly engaged at Vera Cruz, in the exchange of shot & shells.

I again beg leave, to solicit the necessary attention of our Government, to the commerce of the U. S. in this quarter, Alvarado will at present, with difficulty admit vessels drawing 10 feet, those of greater draft must proceed to the anchorage of Punto Lozardo W. NW of this 21 miles, or to that of Sacrificio, in the same direction 30 miles, where they will find shelter from the heavy gales of this season, but no protection from pirates or the depredations of Spanish Cruizers, which may be sent on this Coast, A Vessel of War of the U. S. would be sufficient to protect our Trade to this Country, which is already of great value & will probably increase much, in consequence of the prohibition against the Spanish Flag. The most convenient station, for such Vessel of War, would be at the Anchorage of Sacrificio, 3 miles SE of Vera Cruz.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Vera Cruz, I.

*William Taylor, United States Consul for Vera Cruz and Alvarado, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

NEW YORK, October 25, 1823.

. . . For several days prior to my departure, there was much disorder in Vera Cruz. All intercourse was prohibited with the Castle. The old Spaniards fled there for protection. And Lamaur, the General of the Castle, like most other animals when about to loose [*sic*] their prey, flew into a most[?] passion—& threatened to batter down the Town, unless Gouvern^t should desist from what *he* called *their* offensive measures. Which amounted only to this, to wit, Gouvern^t determined to make Sacrificio—(4 or 5 miles from Vera Cruz) a Port of entry—to shut up Vera Cruz, prohibit all intercourse with the Castle, and thus, leave Lamaur to Lord it over the empty harbour of Vera Cruz, a measure that will, if persevered in by Gouvern^t soon put them in possession of the Castle. On the evening of the 23rd ult^o was the time Lamaur threatened to fire upon the City. When the *Hornet* sailed, his matches were lighted, and yet notwithstanding all this “dreadful note of preparation” I am inclined to the belief—that nothing further has transpired—because the Houses in Vera Cruz belong mostly to Spaniards.

I am [etc.].

*William Taylor, United States Consul for Vera Cruz and Alvarado, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ALVARADO, March 29, 1824.

I was two days in Vera Cruz—from 6 in the evening until 8 in the morning the Castle kept up a constant fire. Throughout the day not one gun was fired—by other party. The City has not suffered as much as might have been expected—five hundred dollars would repair the damages sustained by any one House.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Vera Cruz, I.

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*William Taylor, United States Consul for Vera Cruz and Alvarado, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ALVARADO, *October 20, 1824.*

. . . Yucatan still continues her intercourse with Cuba, but Santana, having from some cause or other resigned the Govern[or]ship of that State, His Successor, who has not yet sailed hence, will doubtless shut the Ports of Campeachy & Sisal ag^t Spanish Commerce, when the event of last winter may reasonably be expected to be renewed.

The castle of San Juan de Ulúa remains *in statu quo*. If it is ever given up, it will not be until this Gouvernement shall have acquired the aid of some maritime Power. Their own exertions amount to nothing. There is a strong and marked preference shewn to the English owing to their loans.—Whilst our recognition of their Independ^e passes for nothing, since it was unaccompanied by aid of any sort.

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*William Taylor, United States Consul for Vera Cruz and Alvarado, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ALVARADO, *April 8, 1825.*

The Agents of this Gouvernement are trying the force of Intrigue with the new General of the Castle of San Juan de Ulúa, Coppenger. It is whispered about that their prospects are good.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Vera Cruz, I.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to James Smith Wilcocks, United States Consul at Mexico*¹

PUEBLA, May 15, 1825.

DEAR SIR: I have this moment received your letter of the 12th. instant,² in which you mention your conversation with the Secretary of State, on the subject of my reception. I wish you would say to him, that the government of the United States will be much flattered and I highly gratified, that this government should adopt the republican simplicity of our form of receiving foreign Ministers; provided that form be general. To receive every minister from a foreign state exactly in the same manner as that state receives ministers accredited to it, would be very objectionable. Every court in Europe has its own forms, which are applicable to all. The rank of the Envoy makes the only distinction in his mode of reception. For instance, a Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America is received with the same forms and ceremonies at the court of St. Petersburg as a Minister from Austria, Paris or London, altho' the reception of a Russian Minister at Washington is attended with precisely the same ceremonies as that of all other Ministers, that is to say, with as little as possible. The same observation applies to the courts of London, Paris, Madrid &c The Minister from Mexico was received by the President of the United States at Washington in the same manner and with the same forms and ceremonies as those from Paris, St. Petersburg or London.

I repeat, therefore, that if it be the intention of this government to regard my reception as a precedent, I shall not be satisfied, but highly gratified, to be received with the utmost republican simplicity. But the government of the United States, after its generous and disinterested conduct towards these countries; after having by negotiation and example so largely contributed to the recognition of their Independence, would have just cause of complaint, if any distinction, derogatory to its character, were to be made between the reception of its Envoy and that of any crowned head in Europe.

I am [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I, enclosed in Poinsett to Secretary of State, June 4, 1825, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 884.

² The following is the portion of Wilcocks's letter of May 12 referred to:

As the British Commissioner had been received here with great ceremony, I asked the Secretary of State, in an informal conversation I had with him, in what manner you would be received. He replied, that as yet no particular form or etiquette had been established by the Government for the reception of foreign Ministers; but in your case, similar attentions in every respect should be paid to you, as were manifested by our government to their Minister at Washington—which, I presume, will be none at all.

*Address of Guadalupe Victoria, President of Mexico, to the British Chargé
d'Affaires, May 31, 1825*¹

The ties which have heretofore bound this nation to a power of Europe being dissolved forever, she has assumed of right that rank, to which the Laws of nature and the will of her people entitle her, and placed herself on the list of independent and sovereign nations.

Already we have reached this fortunate state, and the justice of that great people who sustain the liberties of the world, has yielded the respect due to our rights and to the stability, which their profound policy has recognized in the United Mexican States.

We are placed beyond the reach of dangers—the revolution is terminated—our institutions are organised—the sources of our national wealth are opened, and every interest is identified with the honor and existence of the Republic. By these results our Independence and our Liberty are confirmed. The glorious struggle has resounded throughout the world, and its ultimate objects are accomplished. Great Britain has recognised us free and independent.

I have every reason, then, to be assured, that the mutual friendship of both nations will be perpetuated by the causes, which have led to the expression of these sentiments. My best wishes are cordially identified with the prosperity of the British nation.

I cannot but express my satisfaction, that a person so worthy has been charged with the affairs of Great Britain near the Republic.

*Address of Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Guadalupe
Victoria, President of Mexico, June 1, 1825*¹

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: In presenting to your Excellency the credentials which have just been read, it affords me the highest satisfaction to place them in the hands of a person so distinguished, not only for his heroic efforts in the cause of the Independence of his country, but for his devoted attachment to civil liberty.

The United States of America recognise the right every nation possesses to adopt the form of government it may judge best adapted to its circumstances and most likely to secure the happiness of its people. It cannot however,

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I, enclosed in Poinsett to Secretary of State, June 4, 1825, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 884.

be denied, that they regarded with deep interest the political movements of this country and the final decision of the Mexican people. It is with unfeigned satisfaction, that they have seen the only free government that borders on them, erect itself into a sister republic, and it has been peculiarly flattering to them, that it should have made choice of a Federal Constitution so similar to their own. They ardently hope, that it may contribute in an equal degree to the prosperity of the people it governs.

The principles, upon which the right of Independence has been maintained in these countries, are not only identical with those, upon which that of the United States of America was asserted and achieved, but rest upon the same imperishable foundation—the sovereignty of the people and the unalienable rights of Man. To a cause reposing upon such a basis, the people of the United States could not be indifferent. From the first dawning of the Independence of these states, their sympathies have been with great unanimity and constancy enlisted in its favor; they have watched its struggles and vicissitudes with intense interest, and have rejoiced like brothers in its successful termination. The sentiments of the Government of the United States of America have been in perfect harmony with those of their people, and their political course such as was prescribed by their relative duties to all parties. At an early period of the struggle between Spain and her colonies, they considered it in the light of a civil war, in which both parties were entitled to equal rights. They have never ceased by their negotiations to exert their influence with Spain and the other nations of Europe in favor of the American States; and have frequently represented to the former the policy of concluding a peace with her late colonies.

As soon as it appeared, that Spain had no longer any prospect of maintaining her dominion over these countries, and that they had established governments of their own, and within a year after Mexico had declared her Independence, the United States acknowledged it by a solemn act, which passed their Congress with unexampled unanimity. They have since declared, that they would not regard with indifference any attempt on the part of the powers of Europe to wrest it from them. In this act of recognition, they took the lead of the whole civilised world, and gave an example, which has since been followed by the freest government of Europe, and which, by this act, has shewn itself to be the most magnanimous.

It is by no means my intention in this recapitulation of the course of policy pursued towards these countries by the United States of America, to boast of services rendered, or to solicit any favors in return. The United States will require no privileges for their citizens from this government, which they will not be willing on their part to accord to the citizens of Mexico. They wish only to see the friendly relations between the two countries so extended and harmonized as to promote the welfare of both; and that the first foundations of the permanent future intercourse between them should be laid in principles

not only benevolent and liberal in themselves, but consistent with the policy and interests of both governments.

The President of the United States of America has confided to me full powers to conclude Treaties of limits and of commerce, and I cannot but congratulate myself in having been chosen by him to form the first political relations between two sister republics, which, from their position, their policy, and their mutual interests, must forever be united in the strictest bonds of friendship.

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*Reply of Guadalupe Victoria, President of Mexico, to the address of Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, June 1, 1825*¹

Two nations fortunately bordering on each other, find themselves still more strongly united by the important relations of that liberty, which both enjoy, by the fundamental laws which govern them, and by that community of interests, which, in the balance of the world, has identified the fortune and the destiny of the United States of North America with the destiny and fortune of Mexico.

This great people, on being relieved from their humiliating guardianship, fixed their eyes on the examples set them by the people of the North, and the remembrance of the Father of American Liberty, of George Washington, is as grateful to them as that of the heroes, who have here laid with their blood the foundations of Justice, Peace and Philanthropy.

I must Excellent Sir, in conformity with the wishes of the United Mexican States, congratulate myself, with all to whom the liberty of America is dear, that the bonds that unite these nations, which have with so much dignity raised their heads and sustained the lights of the new world, should be drawn closer and closer.

It is with the utmost satisfaction, that I recognise in your Excellency the Representative of a friendly and sister Republic, and that I offer you the sentiments of my highest consideration.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I, enclosed in Poinsett to Secretary of State, June 4, 1825, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 884.

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, June 4, 1825.

DEAR SIR: On the 1st of June, I was received by the President of the United Mexican States, at a public audience, at which the foreign Ministers, Secretaries of the government, and Deputations from the Ecclesiastical, civil and military authorities of the general government assisted. Mr Ward, the Chargé des Affaires from His Britannic Majesty, had been received the day before, with precisely the same forms and ceremonies. I understand the only difference to have been, that on his reception, those who were cited alone were present; whereas on the 1st, the room was crowded to suffocation with Senators, Members of Congress, and respectable inhabitants of the city. I availed myself of the opportunity to set the conduct of the United States towards these countries in its true light. I thought such an exposition absolutely necessary after the speech of the President of these states to the British Chargé on the preceding day.

IT IS MANIFEST THAT THE BRITISH HAVE MADE GOOD USE OF THEIR TIME AND OPPORTUNITIES. THE PRESIDENT AND THREE OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE TREASURY AND ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS ARE IN THEIR INTEREST. WE HAVE A VERY RESPECTABLE PARTY IN BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS AND A VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE IN FAVOR OF THE STRICTEST UNION WITH THE UNITED STATES—THEY REGARD THE BRITISH WITH DISTRUST.

The papers² that accompany this are marked A. B. C. D. A. a letter to Mr Wilcocks, on the subject of my reception at this court. B. The President's speech on the reception of the British Chargé, who did not reply or pronounce any discourse. C. my discourse to the President. D. His reply.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, June 15, 1825.

This government has received official information of the dispersion of the royalist forces, commanded by Gen. Olañeta in Upper Peru. The main body

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I. The portion of this document printed in small capital letters was received in cipher.

² See above, pt. IX, under the respective dates May 15, (doc. 880); May 31, (doc. 881); June 1, (doc. 882); and another of same date (doc. 883).

³ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

of his army, which was in Cochabamba, has gone over to the Patriots. Bolivar writes, that there is no longer any occasion for his presence in Upper Peru, and declines marching his forces any further into that country. He considers the war terminated there, and urges this government to send their deputies to Panama earlier than was before proposed (October next), expressing his earnest wishes, that the meeting may not be delayed later than July next. The object of hastening the meeting of this American Congress is, doubtless, to concert measures for attacking Cuba.

Proposals were made to these States by the government of Colombia, through their Minister here, to make a joint attack on Cuba. The subject was fully discussed by Congress in secret session, and they finally resolved that such an enterprise would be inexpedient at present. One reason urged was the fear, that Great Britain might be opposed to the Independence of Cuba, as they suppose, that nation would apprehend a similar movement in Jamaica. THE FACT HOWEVER IS THAT THEY HAVE AMBITIOUS VIEWS ON THAT ISLAND, AND WOULD PREFER UNDERTAKING THE EXPEDITION WITHOUT THE AID OF COLOMBIA. THE PEOPLE OF CUBA HAVE AGENTS HERE AND IN COLOMBIA IN ORDER TO SOLICIT THE AID OF THOSE GOVERNMENTS. I AM DISPOSED TO BELIEVE THAT THEY FLATTER BOTH WITH THE EXPECTATION, THAT CUBA WILL UNITE ITSELF TO THEM. HERE THEY CONFESS TO ME THAT THEY HAVE DONE SO WITH A VIEW OF STIMULATING THIS GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE THE EXPEDITION. THEY ASSURE ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN HIS WORD TO USE HIS INFLUENCE IN FAVOR OF THE PROJECT WITH CONGRESS WHICH IS TO BE ASSEMBLED IN JULY OR AUGUST, AND TOLD THEM THAT ONE MILLION WAS SET APART TO DEFRAY THE EXPENSES OF THE EXPEDITION. THE INDUCEMENT HELD OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA TO BECOME A PART OF THIS CONFEDERATION IS, THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAVING RECOGNISED THE INDEPENDENCE OF MEXICO, THAT OF CUBA WOULD BE SECURED, IN THE ACT OF BECOMING A STATE OR STATES OF MEXICO. I TOOK OCCASION LAST NIGHT TO SPEAK TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE SUBJECT. HE DID NOT DENY THAT I WAS ACCURATELY INFORMED AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF SOME MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT TO ANNEX CUBA TO MEXICO, BUT ASSURED ME THAT HE, HIMSELF, WAS OPPOSED TO IT. THE GREATER SECURITY AGAINST THIS EVENT WILL BE IN THE JEALOUSY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA, AND IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. BOTH OUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO BE OPERATED UPON. I HAVE NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATING WITH OUR MINISTER AT BOGOTA.

*Lucas Alamán, Secretary of State of Mexico, to Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico*¹

NATIONAL PALACE OF MEXICO, August 16, 1825.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: I have the honor to enclose to your excellency, numbered 1 to 5, copies² of the communications received by this Government from their agent in Jamaica, and of a paragraph from a Kingston Gazette, which he sends with them. Whatever degree of credit may be given to the intelligence of the union of French maritime forces in Martinique, to the number of 28 sail, and which is founded on two notices, confirmatory of each other, the fact appears undoubted that a French squadron, composed of two ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, and two brigs, passed Cape St. Nicholas, sailing in the direction of Havana, since, as your excellency will see by the copy No. 4, the commander of the Colombian schooner-of-war, the *Zulma*, gives official notice to his Government of his having fallen in with it, and of having spoken one of the frigates. By the paragraph of the Jamaica Gazette, copied in No. 5, your excellency will see that it is said, although on information less certain, that French troops had disembarked in the island of Cuba, and that its capital was about to be garrisoned by French troops. Supposing only so much of all this to be true as is absolutely incontestable, which is, that a French squadron, composed of nine large vessels and two smaller, has appeared off the coast of the island of Cuba, sailing in the direction of the Havana, and immediately the question occurs, What is the object of this force? Undoubtedly, it will not be pretended that it is to protect the French commerce in the West Indian seas, for it is very well known that in them it has no other enemies but the pirates, who are enemies to all nations, and against these, it is clear, there would not be sent large vessels united in squadron; neither can it be said that these vessels have for their object the island of St. Domingo, because it would always be asked wherefore they were directed towards the Havana? And even should such excuses be alleged instead of an admissible explanation, they would only, in the present state of these countries, call to mind the *cordon sanitaire*, under pretext was organized on the frontiers of Spain, the very Army which was to invade it. If it is pretended that a French squadron may go to the Havana without causing well founded alarm, because that place is in the possession of Spain, it should be remembered that Havana is the headquarters of the Spanish forces in the present war against the American continent. From thence have issued the reinforcements and every description of supplies for the Spanish Army which fought in Colombia, and from thence the Spanish garrison of the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa still maintains itself; so that even in the case when the Spaniards of the Havana would receive no direct aid from the French forces,

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 364.

² Not printed in this collection.

these, by placing that bay under shelter, give to the former the means of attacking us, by leaving them at liberty to dispose of their ships-of-war against us, and even of their land forces. This reasoning would be much stronger, if, as reported, the fortresses of the Havana have been garrisoned by French troops, under whatsoever pretext those may have been delivered up to them; for such a measure can produce no other effect than to leave the Spanish forces free to undertake expeditions against the continent. Under whatever aspect this extraordinary and secret union of French forces in Martinique be considered, and, much more, their employment on the island of Cuba, the President of this Republic can do no less than see in it an act positively hostile against the independent States of America, or, at least, so suspicious that it justly demands the attention of this Government. That of your excellency has declared, in the most solemn manner, that it will never consent that any third Power interfere in the existing question between Spain and the independent States of America which formerly were part of her dominions. The conduct of France, in the step to which I refer, is certainly an interference which, for being dissembled, is not more excusable. The President, therefore, directs me to inform your excellency of these important events, and to request that you will be pleased to bring them to the notice of your Government, from whose friendship he hopes that it will ask of that of his most Catholic Majesty such explanations as the case requires, which may serve also as a rule of proceeding to these States, which, in the meantime, under these circumstances, will find themselves obliged to adopt that line of conduct with respect to France which may be dictated by prudence and the necessity of preserving their dignity and political existence.

The President flatters himself that the Government of your excellency will see in this step a new and distinguished proof of the confidence and reciprocity of interests which happily exists between both nations.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Lucas Alamán, Secretary of State of Mexico*¹

MEXICO, August 17, 1825.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note of the 16th instant,² together with the copies of the communications which this Government has received from its agent in Jamaica, and of a paragraph from the Gazette of Kingston, numbered from one to five.

¹*American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 365.

² See above, pt. IX, doc. 886. The enclosures are not printed in this collection.

In compliance with his excellency the President's desire, I shall immediately transmit them to my Government, not doubting that the President of the United States will take measures to obtain the explanations which his excellency the President of these States solicits him to ask from his most Catholic Majesty.

I beg your excellency to assure the President that in the declaration made by the late President of the United States, in his message to Congress of the 2d of December, 1823, respecting the policy it would become the United States to adopt in the event of any interposition of the Powers of Europe in the contest between Spain and the independent States of America which formerly formed a part of her dominions, he spoke the sentiments of the whole nation; and that the present President cherishes the same feelings towards these countries, and entirely coincides in the views and principles laid down in that message.

Although the reunion of so large a French force in the island of Martinique, and the information received by this Government of the appearance of a numerous squadron of the ships-of-war of that nation in the vicinity of the island of Cuba, are certainly calculated to alarm the fears and to excite the suspicions of this Government as to the ulterior views of his most Catholic Majesty, and not only justify but call for measures of precaution, I cannot abstain from observing to your excellency that these movements do not necessarily imply hostile intentions on the part of France towards these countries, and that it will be politic that the measures this Government proposes to take with regard to France should not be of a nature to give just cause of complaint to his most Catholic Majesty, if it should hereafter appear that the reunion of so large a force in Martinique and the movements of the French squadron in the West India seas were entirely unconnected with any designs of that Government against the Americas.

I trust his excellency the President will attribute this expression of my opinion to the only motive which can actuate me—my earnest solicitude for the peace and security of this country.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, August 17, 1825.

SIR: I received this day a note from the Secretary of State, dated on the 16th instant, a translation of which accompanies this letter, together with my

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 364.

reply,¹ marked A. and B. The intelligence communicated by the agent of this Government at Jamaica of a large French force being collected at Martinique, and of the appearance of a squadron of French vessels-of-war off the western cape of the island of St. Domingo, directing their course towards Havana, has produced a great sensation here, and a strong disposition exists on the part of the Executive and of Congress to take very decisive measures against the French residents and against the commerce of that nation; a disposition which I shall use every exertion to soften and restrain within due bounds.

The Chargé d'Affaires of his Britannic Majesty despatches this evening a courier for London, by the way of New York, to convey intelligence of these events to his Court. He waits for my letters, and I have not time, therefore, to write so fully by this opportunity as I could have wished.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACTS]

MEXICO, August 21, 1825.

The correspondence respecting the reported movements of the French fleet on the West India seas, which accompanied my last letter, was attended with circumstances which I had not then time to communicate.

The intelligence was received on the 15th instant by the Secretary of State. On the morning of the 16th he called upon the chargé d'affaires of his Britannic Majesty and showed him the letters from the agent of this Government at Jamaica. Mr. Ward came immediately to me to consult what was to be done, and expressed a wish that we should act in concert. As I had not seen the Secretary nor the letters to which he alluded, I could only reply that I was perfectly willing to do so, provided this Government, in their communications with us, placed both our Governments on precisely the same footing. He immediately went to the palace and saw the Secretary of State, to whom he explained his desire that the notes to be addressed to us should be *verbatim et literatim* the same. Late in the afternoon the Secretary called on me and exhibited the letters he had received from Jamaica, and which induced him to believe that France entertained hostile intentions against this country. In this conversation I assured him of the friendly disposition of the United

¹ For Alamán's note of the 16th and Poinsett's reply of the 17th see above, pt. IX, docs. 886 and 887.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 909.

States, and that they would not view with indifference the occupation of the island of Cuba by France, especially if it was the result of any hostile views towards Mexico; but, at the same time, hinted that the imprudent conduct of some of their commanders might have induced Spain to cede that island to the French, rather than have it wrested from her in the manner proposed by Santa Anna, of which they were fully aware. . . .

When Mr. Ward was informed that the Secretary had said nothing to me of his interview with him, nor of his intention to make the notes to be addressed to us on this subject similar, he waited on the President and reiterated his request. The President, after assuring him that this should be done, declared that he himself was ignorant of the arrival of this important intelligence until he saw it published in the *Sol*. . . .

On the ensuing day, notes, couched in exactly the same words, were received by both Mr. Ward and myself. I objected to the language and waited upon Mr. Alaman to state my objections. The original note—after stating that we had declared, in the most solemn manner, that we would never consent that any third power should interpose in the question between Spain and her former colonies, and that the conduct of France, on this occasion, is certainly an interposition, which, however cloaked, is not the less inexcusable—goes on to say: “The President, therefore, instructs me to inform your excellency of these important occurrences, so that, by bringing them to the notice of your Government, it may demand of his Most Catholic Majesty such explanations as the case requires.”

I told the Secretary that the declaration of the President and the known friendly disposition of the Government and of the people of the United States towards these countries did not confer upon this Government the privilege of demanding our interference as a right. He expressed his readiness to alter the phraseology of the note, and it was done. . . . The note to his Britannic Majesty’s chargé d’affaires was afterwards altered in the same terms, and the substance of our answers corresponded.

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[DECODIFICATION²]

MEXICO, September 22, 1825.

SIR: I have just received information which I deem important you should be made acquainted with, as early as possible. A Secret Agent of this Gov-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² With exception of the first sentence and the complimentary ending.

ernment writes to the Secretary of State that the (views) of France on this Country (were) revealed to him, as he declares, by M^r. de Villele. They are to prevail upon the King of Spain to renounce his right to Mexico in favor of Francisco de Paula, the youngest of the Spanish Mise-r-bo-ns (Bourbons); to send that Prince to Havana, where a large force is to be collected; to land him at the head of this force on some part of this Coast; to endeavour to negotiate with England, by stating that France feels every disposition to follow the example of Great Britain, by recognizing the independence of the Spanish Colonies, but that the form of Government those States have thought proper to adopt presented a serious obstacle to her taking such a measure; but which might be removed by the establishment in those Countries of limited Monarchies. The Circumstances which induce me to give some degree of Credit to this Communication are, that this Agent is an old Spaniard, and writes to Alaman, who was known during his residence in Europe to have been of (the) Bourbon faction in this Country; the proposal made formerly by France, that this Prince might be permitted to travel in Italy and France, to visit his Relations there, which at the time was refused by the King of Spain; he was the prince dis-na-ted (designated) by the Spaniards (*who*) in the plan of Iguala, the existence of a faction in this Country in favour of the Bourbons, and because this plan will enable France to co-operate against the American Republics secretly, money alone being required to carry such a scheme into execution. From [*sic*] obvious reasons, Great Britain will be opposed to a Bourbon being placed on the throne of Mexico.

Alaman laid this Communication, dated the 17th June, before the President on the 15th Instant, who the next day submitted (it) to the British Chargé d'Affaires. Nothing has been said to me on the subject by the President or Minister, altho' I see the latter daily. I was aware of the existence of this Communication for some days past, but could not discover the nature of it until this morning.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, September 24, 1825.

SIR: Yesterday the Secy of State communicated to me the information contained in my despatch N^o. 20.² The Circumstances were slightly varied, only, however, as to the date and channel thro' which this Govt. had received the Intelligence. He made on the same day a similar Communication to the

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² See above, pt. IX, doc. 890, Poinsett to Clay, September 22, 1825.

Chargé d'Affaires of His Britannic Majesty, not being aware that the President had previously shown to that Gentleman the Letter of their Agent in Paris.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain*¹

MEXICO, October 10, 1825.

DEAR SIR: I wrote to you, a few days ago, an account of the difficulties I had encountered in my negotiations with this government, all arising out of their pre-existing treaty with Great Britain. As circumstances have occurred which render it necessary that I should again address you on the subject, I will briefly recapitulate what has passed, lest my former letter should not have reached its destination.

In the 4th article of the Treaty between Great Britain and Mexico, the principle of the most favored nation is established, with an exception in favor of those nations which formerly were Spanish possessions, to which Mexico, from the fraternal ties that unite them, might accord privileges not be to extensive to Great Britain. My objections to this exception were, that it was contrary to the interests of America that such distinctions should be made, and that, altho' from the circumstance of Treaties having been concluded upon a different basis with the other Republics of America such a provision would be of no avail, still a war between the United States and any of those Republics might dissolve those treaties and place it in the power of Mexico to favor our enemies without violating her engagements with us.

On asking H. B. M.'s Chargé des affaires how he came to consent to this provision in the Treaty, he assured me, that the Plenipotentiaries on the part of G. B. only consented to its insertion because they were shown the Treaty between Mexico and Colombia, concluded and ratified here, and which contained this agreement. They were compelled therefore to accept this condition or make no treaty. I then urged him to address a note to this government, setting forth the reasons which alone had induced the Plenipotentiaries of H. B. M. to accede to this exception, and inviting this government to expunge it from the Treaty, since, by the non-ratification of their Treaty with Colombia, those reasons no longer existed. Mr. Ward adopted this course. Some time after, the Plenipotentiaries of Mexico proposed to me, to allow them to insert the exception, with the condition to be mutually bound by what should be finally agreed upon between G. Britain and Mexico. Of

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I, enclosed in Poinsett to Clay, October 12, 1825, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 893.

course, I rejected so degrading a proposition, and, among other reasons, stated, that if G. Britain ratified the treaty with an exception so injurious to her commerce, her only motive could be to create distinctions, which might divide the Republics of America, whereas it was our interest and that of both the Americas, that they should be closely united. This opinion became public, for there are no secrets in Mexico, and opened Mr. Ward's eyes to what he imagines to be the true interests of Great Britain. In consequence, he withdrew his note, and set about forming an European party in opposition to that he thinks organised by me. Both those measures are, in my opinion, impolitic and calculated to prejudice the interests of Great Britain. The withdrawal of his note has confirmed the opinion I had expressed, and the attempt to form a party strictly European in this country will only produce the effect of confounding Great Britain with the other European powers, whereas it appears to have been her policy, as it is manifestly her interest, to separate herself as much as possible from them in relation to American affairs. I never have confounded Great Britain with the powers of Europe that are hostile to the independence and liberties of these countries. I have considered her interests identified with ours in the cause of American emancipation and in the defence of free government, and came here disposed to make common cause with her Envoy for the extension of liberal principles of trade for the mutual protection of our industry and capital and for the diffusion of more tolerant religious sentiments. In this sense I have hitherto acted; but if Great Britain seeks to divide the Americas, or strives to destroy the principles of Republican Government which are taking root in these countries, or to create a party strictly European and therefore adverse to our interests, her Ministers must not complain if we exert all our influence to counteract their views. If I were inimical to the interests of Great Britain in these countries, I would invite such a contest; I am not, and therefore deprecate it. It does not appear to me to be consistent with the policy of Great Britain to provoke it; I can venture to predict, that it will not prove her interest to do so.

Learning that Mr. Ward was about to dispatch a courier to London and presuming that his object was to communicate to Mr. Canning his fears with regard to the influence he supposes me to have acquired here, and its probable effects upon the interests of Great Britain; as well as the new views he had taken in relation to the Treaty, I sought an interview with him and frankly explained my opinion of the course he seems disposed to pursue—of its impolicy and inefficacy. I am afraid, he thinks that I have made a tool of him, and is vexed and mortified because he was induced to send in the note protesting against the exception made in the 4th article of the Treaty; there certainly was no intention on my part to injure him or the interests of the nation he represents by advising him to take that step. In my opinion, the interests of Great Britain have been much more seriously affected by the withdrawal of that note.

I thought it useful that you should be made acquainted with what has passed here, in the event of Mr Canning saying any thing to you on the subject. I am aware, that Mr. Ward has very exaggerated notions of the extent of my influence here, and I fear, not very correct ones of my disposition towards Great Britain. You, who have long known me, will not hesitate to believe that whatever influence I may possess, has been acquired fairly and that it will be exerted honorably. It certainly shall not be exerted against the interests of Great Britain, unless, by the acts of her own agents, they become confounded with those of the European powers that are hostile to this Hemisphere.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[DECODIFICATION]

MEXICO, *October 12, 1825.*

SIR: Circumstances have occurred between the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain and myself which have induced me to write to Mister King. A copy of that letter marked A is herewith inclosed.² Knowing that we have very important negotiations pending in London and aware of the character of M^r. Canning I thought it proper that M^r. King should be in possession of the facts and be enabled to give any explanation that may be required. I informed you shortly after my arrival of the state of parties here. The English had been so long in peaceable possession of the field that they had secured an overwhelming influence in the Cabinet. The President from peculiar circumstances was disposed to favour them. Immediately after the fall of Iturbide and while Victoria was in Jalapa he had several interviews with a certain D^r. MacKey who declared himself to be agent of the British Government. He communicated the result to the newly established executive at Mexico. By that correspondence it appears that the English agent proposed that Mexico should grant certain commercial privileges to Great Britain as the price of the recognition of her independence, by the latter. Victoria was rather disposed to comply with these terms but the other members of the executive thought differently and the agent was despatched to London with an ambiguous answer inviting that Government to send Commissioners assuring M^r. Canning of the disposition to receive them in the most friendly and cordial manner and insinuating the possibility of their obtaining whatever privileges they might demand. Victoria therefore on the arrival of the Com-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² See above, pt. ix, doc. 892.

missioners considered the establishment of the friendly relations between the two countries as peculiarly his own work and was most forward in the attentions that were shown them. You are aware of the extent of those last attentions and of the enthusiasm with which they were received. When Mr. Ward who went to England with the report of the Commissioners returned to Mexico he brought a very flattering and friendly letter from Mr. Canning to the President which produced the effect he had supposed it would and bound Victoria still more closely to the English interests. The British Commissioners paid great court to Tornel the secretary of the President a vain and venal man who exercises great influence over his chief. Aleman who is certainly a man of talents but suspected with reason of an European bias gave in to the views. I before told you that he received a salary from a British mining company. Esteva the secretary of the Treasury was intimately united with Eldeman [Alamán?]. Not satisfied with the influence they enjoyed a scheme was coasted (planned) by them in conjunction with Santa Maria the Minister from Colombia and the Countess of Regla a pretty creole possessed of great shrewdness and exercising great influence over Victoria to turn out Don Pablo de la Llave the Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical affairs and to appoint the Bishop of Puebla in his place. This man is an European by birth and an insidious and dangerous enemy to these countries. He played a distinguished part in the elevation of the usurper Iturbide. At the period of the formation of this plot, I was made acquainted with what was passing. La Llave had retired to the country awaiting the event without an exertion but Ramos de Arispe another priest his friend a man of an active intriguing character who had been a deputy of one of the Mexican provinces in Spain and while there brought frequently in collision with the Bishop of Puebla, opposed himself vigorously to the appointment of the latter and finding that he could not prevent it procured himself to be appointed chief officer in that department this movement and a declaration made by Llave that he would appeal to the public and expose the intrigues of the trio prevented the Bishop from accepting the appointment [*sic*]. He had taken a house here and was expected when Esteva went to Puebla suddenly and in consequence of that interview as it is supposed the Bishop refused the appointment. The party formed in the senate against Aleman was gradually becoming formidable and he must have yielded to it and have retired. His fall was however hastened by a personal pique between him and Mr. Ward which induced the latter to exert his influence direct and indirect with the President to obtain his dismissal. Aleman became aware of the combination against him and resigned. Esteva who saw that the fall of his associate was inevitable had already abandoned him. Ramos Arispe used every effort to induce the President to appoint Michelena the late envoy to London to the post vacated by the resignation obstacle (of) Aleman but Victoria has a personal feeling against Michelena. He both dislikes and fears him and there-

fore resisted the efforts of Arispe and his friends. He has appointed a young man from Jalapa very little known one Camacho. Michelena and Arispe have been selected by the President to go to Panama but the latter assures me that they will not both go. It is rumoured that in order to induce Michelena to go on this Mission Arispe is to be appointed Minister of grace and justice in the place of la Llave who resigns. Arispe is a man of talents daring and intriguing. He professes the warmest zeal in the cause of America declares himself anxious to promote my views and has been useful to me but I do not repose entire confidence in him or his professions. The fall of Alaman struck the European party with terror. Esteva hastened to assure me of his earnest desire to see our countries united and an American system formed on the principles he knew I had at heart. The President sent me word that he wished to have an interview with me and notwithstanding I requested that he would appoint a time when it might be convenient to him to receive me, he insisted on coming to me. Our interview was very friendly and in the course of it he gave me repeated assurances of regard for the United States and of his American sentiments. He had been indisposed towards me by the language I was compelled to hold in relation to the island of Cuba. I explained the sentiments of my government on that subject and he declared himself satisfied. I believe that their plans on Cuba may now be controlled and the executive is not quite so ardent in the prosecution of them. The President is a very good man with no bad dispositions but he is very vain and is badly surrounded. He listens to the tales of his secretary Colonel Tornel and of Esteva; the first is a very bad man without a single redeeming quality. He is striving to supplant Obregon in the Mission to the United States. I believe him to be in the pay of the British Charge d'Affaires. Esteva is a man of great activity and of some talents; he came over to the American party only because he perceived the impossibility of sustaining himself independently of it but on the day that he declared himself to me, he told the grossest falsehoods of me to Mr. Ward which occasioned in a great measure the difference between that gentleman and myself. The state of society here is scarcely to be credited. I hardly know a man however high his rank or office whose word can be relied on and many of the leading members in both houses will receive a bribe to advocate a private claim with as little scruple as you would have received a fee to argue a cause before the Supreme Court; from such men I would have kept aloof had I been permitted to have done so, but they sought me and I found it necessary to form a party out of such elements as the country afforded or to leave the English masters of the field. The latter are now as much alarmed as they were formerly confident of their ascendancy. They cannot conceal either their mortification or fears and Mr. Ward has despatched a messenger to Mr. Canning with the most exaggerated accounts of my influence. I only wish one half of what he believes were true. His want of tact and overwrought exertions may contribute to establish that

influence he so much dreads. We have received intelligence that the treaty between Mexico and Great Britain has not been ratified in London. Mr. Morier will probably return to renew the negotiations.

Mr. Ward after making a sort of *amende honorable* thro' a mutual friend Mr. Francis Baring has just called upon me and I unhesitatingly assured him that the alterations in the treaty which his Government was desirous to obtain should not meet with any opposition on my part but on the contrary should have my cordial support. They relate as I understand to the 7, 8 and 14th. articles of that treaty.

It is I believe settled that Michelena and one Domingues who was Minister of Justice under Iturbide govern (go) to Panama.

The country is tranquil and I see no cause to fear any convulsion except that in a republic without virtue and with a large standing army, there is always danger. I have represented forcibly to these people that they cannot assemble a large force on any one point without great danger to the liberties of the country and that the return of a successful or of a defeated army from Cuba would be attended with risk; the first would be elated and devoted to the chief who had led them to victory and in the event of defeat they might attribute their disasters to the Government at home and be disposed to effect a revolution. There is some danger too from that provision in their constitution which forbids the reelection of the President. Victoria and his friends will abandon the power they now have with great reluctance. It is evident to me that he looks upon the termination of his reign with disgust and I never lose [*sic*] an opportunity to flatter him upon his attachment to liberty as the surest foundation of his future fame because it appears to me that his virtue requires to be sustained. Ramos Arispe who like all shrewd creoles sees beyond the truth says that the attachment of Victoria to the English springs from his ambition that the continental powers of Europe are all desirous of seeing monarchies established throughout America and each anxious to see those dignities conferred upon one of their own family. Great Britain in order to avoid such a result might assist in placing a Mexican upon the throne of Mexico he assures me that he knows these to be the views of the President. I very much doubt whether he had ever any such hopes but the augmenting strength of the republican and federal party will convince him of the impossibility of realizing them if he did ever entertain them.

I ought to inform you that in my opinion the President Victoria is not and never will be a friend of the United States. He is apparently reconciled to me but I know he dislikes me. His favorite projects were first to create a confederacy of the Spanish American States at the head of which the superior population and resources must have placed Mexico. In this idea he was encouraged by Santa Maria the Colombian Minister who is a Mexican; to conquer Cuba and annex that island to Mexico and if possible to induce Guatemala to unite herself with Mexico. The development of these plans

and their defeat, as I hope, he attributes in a great measure to me. Santa Maria has resigned, but Colombia ought to know that he is a Mexican.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, October 29, 1825.

SIR: The Junta formed here for the purpose of effecting the independence of the island of Cuba propose to send Agents to England and to the United States in order to get up an expedition to invade that island. The Cabinet likewise finding much opposition to its views in Congress has resolved on the arrival of the vessels of war now fitting out in the United States and of a squadron which is expected daily from Colombia and which has been subsidized by Mexico, to put on board of these vessels two thousand men to send them to cruize off Cuba and to land the men on some convenient point of the island where they expect to be joined by the patriots. Provided this expedition carried out a large supply of money and arms the object may be attained but as that cannot be done without the consent of Congress which the Government anxious to conduct this enterprize with secrecy will not ask, it appears to me that the attempt will fail and produce only the most disastrous consequences. What I most dread is that the blacks may be armed and used as auxiliaries by one or both parties I am somewhat afraid too that an ineffectual attempt on the island of Cuba may induce Spain to cede it to France. This Government does not know that I am acquainted with their designs and I cannot therefore speak openly on the subject but I shall endeavour to make them sensible of the vastness of the attempt they meditate.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

*Guadalupe Victoria, President of Mexico, to John Quincy Adams, President of the United States, through the Mexican Legation at Washington, November 1, 1825*¹

[TRANSLATION]

The President of the United Mexican States to our great and good Friends the United States of North America.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIENDS:

As soon as the establishment of a liberal system permitted the Government of this Nation, to pay attention to its interests, as forming a part of independent America, it was agreed in a Treaty of alliance, concluded with the Republic of Colombia, to invite the other free nations of the American Continent, that, in a general Congress to be held on the Isthmus of Panama, they should confer and agree upon matters of general interest to America. The splendid and decisive victories of the Liberating Army of Peru, by securing the independence of South America, have enabled the republics, which have been there formed, to meet by their representatives in this Assembly, and the President of Colombia, who exercises the Executive Power in Peru, as well as the Vice President of Colombia who at present exercises it in that Republic, have invited these States to take advantage of circumstances so fortunate and proceed to hold the Congress at the Isthmus of Panama as soon as possible. We have acceded to their desires, and as among the matters with which the Congress is to be engaged some questions may arise, which are interesting not only to the Republics which were formerly Spanish possessions, but to all America in general, we have thought it our duty to invite you to come to that meeting, judging it very proper that in this manner the general opinion of all the American States should be declared, principally upon the interference which the nations of Europe may pretend to exercise in our domestic concerns; upon colonization by them on the American Continent, and upon those points of international law, the declaration of which will avert wars and dissensions, and will give security to the peace and prosperity of the People. The interest, which these States have solemnly professed to take in all these questions, flatters us with the hope that this our invitation will have all the effect which we desire, earnestly requesting you to take this matter into consideration, for which purpose we give all our instructions upon all those points, which can be properly given previously, to our Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary Dⁿ. Pablo Obregon to whom we pray you to give entire faith and credit.

Done in the National Palace of Mexico the 6th of July 1825, 5th of Independence. Guadalupe Victoria. A true copy. Mexico 6th July 1825, from the sickness of the superior Officer, I. José Ceruti.

A true copy, Washington, 1 Nov. 1825.

S. MERCADO.

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

*Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the United States, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1825.

The Undersigned, Minister plenipotentiary, has the honor to inform the Honble Secretary of State, that he communicated to his government, the result of the verbal conferences which they held, when he made known the resolution of the governments of Colombia and Mexico, to form a Congress of Representatives of the new communities of this continent, where subjects of a general interest to the powers of America, and others of exclusive concern to the new States, arising out of their present and independent relations, were to be discussed. The Government of the Undersigned conceived that it would be agreeable to the United States of America, to take part in the discussions of this Congress, being so much interested in the first and principal subject that will occupy its attention.

The President of the United States of Mexico, being informed of the disposition of this Government, to discuss points of the first-mentioned kind in a Congress as proposed, and of its readiness to send to it, representatives, preserving always its present neutrality with Spain, provided it were formally invited thereto by the Republics of Colombia and Mexico, and apprized of the business which would engage the Assembly, instructs and commissions, anew, the Undersigned, to present this invitation, and to suggest the subjects intended for deliberation.

The Government of the Undersigned never believed, and wished not to solicit it, that the United States of America would take any other part in the business of the present Congress, than the discussion of subjects, which, from their nature and import, were pointed out by the preceding administration, as of general interest to the Continent. The part, therefore, that a neutral nation may take in the question and war of independence, between the new powers of the Continent and Spain, will be one subject for the consideration of the Congress.

The government of the Undersigned conceiving, that the powers of America are, in common, resolved upon resistance, it should be matter of consideration, how the greatest possible force should be given to this, and the evil be thereby evaded or successfully opposed. The only mode of effecting this, is to concert in anticipation; and for the States to guaranty mutual co-operation. They would otherwise operate partially, and much less effectively.

The prevention of colonization in America, by European powers, is another subject of discussion, in which the United States will participate.

In addition to these two principal points, the Representatives of the United States of America may deliberate upon others originated by the existence of new Communities, and which it is not easy to enumerate. The government

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

of the United States of Mexico has furnished its commissioners with full powers and instructions, in relation to them, which it hopes will also be furnished to the plenipotentiaries of the other powers.

The Congress will assemble at the City of Panama, where, by this time, the Representatives of Colombia, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico, have arrived. They will occupy themselves in the preliminary regulations of the Assembly, and perhaps, proceed to deliberate upon questions exclusively pertaining to the belligerents.

The United States of America can send their Representatives to that City, to take part in those questions which were declared to the World, some time since, as affecting the interests of all America. In this declaration, the United States were first. Besides these questions, they may assist in the discussion of others, that will arise out of the formation of the new Communities. These governments, by the meeting of the Congress, will effect the desirable object of demonstrating by acts, the facility and decision, with which the powers of this Continent can operate, combinedly, in the common cause.

For this purpose, and in fulfilment of what was agreed on, at the verbal conferences which the Undersigned, Minister plenipotentiary, held with the Honble Secretary of State, he invites this Government, to send its Representatives to the Congress of Panama, investing them with the authority as suggested, and expressing in their credentials, the two principal points. The Minister from Colombia will make the same invitation, and corresponds in sentiment with the Undersigned; who hopes, herewith, to have fulfilled the requirements of the Honble Secretary.

The Undersigned has the honor [etc.].

897

*William Taylor, United States Consul for Vera Cruz and Alvarado, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ALVARADO, November 18, 1825.

SIR: I have the honor, and it affords me the greatest satisfaction to inform you that the Castle of San Juan de Ulúa has at last capitulated. The Mexicans are to take possession of the Castle tomorrow. The Spanish forces are to be sent immediately to Havana, for which Vessels are already chartered. The Garrison appears to have been literally starved out. There were 260 on the sick list. I am not well informed of the different articles of the Capitulation, the fact itself having but just reached the place by mail.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Vera Cruz, I.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[DECODIFICATION]

MEXICO, December 2, 1825.

SIR: The Cabinet of Mexico immediately after the surrender of the Castle of Ulloa proposed to Congress to undertake an expedition against the island of Cuba. The report of the Committee of the House of Representatives to which it had been referred was that at present the proposition of the Executive was inadmissible. The House debated the question for two days in secret session and yesterday the report was agreed to twenty four to twenty two. The minority was not opposed to the spirit of the report of the Committee but proposed to strike out the words at present. Of the two secretaries who took part in the debate to sustain the proposition of the Executive the secretary of war urged the necessity of getting rid of at least six thousand men and a number of officers whose presence he considered dangerous to the liberties and peace of the republic. Fortunately the House was aware of the still greater danger of collecting at one spot so large a force of the character described by the secretary and of the imminent risk that would attend either their success or defeat.

An attempt was made by Ramos Arispe now Secretary of justice and ecclesiastical affairs to withdraw the proposition but the House jealous of its privileges insisted upon deciding the question. The object of the executive in desiring to withdraw the proposition when it was evident that it would be rejected was to undertake a partial expedition in the manner I formerly described without appearing to act in direct contradiction to the opinion of Congress. I believe that this proposition would have met the same fate in Senate.

I have the honor [etc.].

*William Taylor, United States Consul for Vera Cruz and Alvarado, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

ALVARADO, December 7, 1825.

SIR: Confirming the foregoing duplicate of my respects of the 18th ultimo,³ I have now to inform you that the Garrison of Ulúa at the time of the Capitulation, consisted in officers & men of no more than 306— Of whom 180

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² MS. Consular Letters, Vera Cruz, I.

³ See above, pt. IX, doc. 897.

were on the sick list, and were removed to the Hospital of Vera Cruz, the remaining 126 were shipped aboard an English Brig to the Havana, where in all probability they have arrived ere now.

I have the honor [etc.].

900

*Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the United States, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *January 4, 1826.*

SIR: I have the honour of answering your note of the 20th ult.^o ² in which you communicate to me the favourable hope of a happy issue in the negotiation undertaken by this Government with the Russian Cabinet, through its Minister at St. Petersburg to solicit of His Imperial Majesty his interposition in promoting peace between Spain and the powers of the American Continent, formerly a part of that Monarchy; and in using his influence with his allies towards a general recognition, all of which you communicated to me in the month of May last, by reading to me the instructions which had been given to that effect to the American Minister near His Imperial Majesty. I imparted to my Government a step so friendly and agreeable to the philanthropy and position of these States; and although I have as yet received no answer thereto, I repeat to you what I had the honour to mention verbally, that Mexico was only desirous of peace, and that I acknowledged to this Government its interest and mode of acting in the cause of the Continent and of liberty.

I shall make known to my Government the wishes of the President that any other expedition be suspended which may be projected, as well as that which is said to be fitting out at Carthagera, to assist the independence of one or both the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, as the means best adapted to obtain the negotiation mentioned.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I. The same is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 857.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 150, Clay to Salazar, Minister from Colombia, on the same subject and of the same date.

*Sebastián Camacho, Secretary of State of Mexico, to Joel Roberts Poinsett,
United States Minister to Mexico*¹

[TRANSLATION]

MEXICO, *January 13, 1826.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The government of the United Mexican States, desiring to see its relations with other nations of the earth cemented on solid principles of justice and frankness, could not read with indifference the discourse, which the Plenipotentiary of the United States addressed to the King of Spain on presenting to him the credentials of his mission.

Although the government is very far from giving to it that meaning, which has been generally attributed to it, and which has justly surprised and called the attention even of the countrymen and friends of that Minister, it cannot avoid noticing the obscurity with which one clause, said to relate to these States, is presented, involving ideas unfavorable to their Independence and sovereignty, and rendering doubtful the recognition of their political existence made by the United States.

The government, firmly persuaded of the good faith which presides over the conduct of the Cabinet of Washington in all its acts, would deeply regret to suppose for a single moment, that the principles so solemnly proclaimed and pursued without interruption by its wise policy, had declined to the opposite extreme. It renders all the justice which that cabinet so worthily merits, as it does likewise to the people, who have given the most incontestable testimony of their generous sentiments by pronouncing themselves so decidedly opposed to the discourse in question; but on that very account, and because it appreciates the friendship of its neighbours, it desires in all its relations with them the utmost clearness and certainty, in order to avoid such interpretations as might, even in the opinion of the vulgar, render doubtful their sincerity, and, especially, in that of the Powers of Europe so easily led astray by any appearance calculated to flatter their views.

With this intention, and because it is probable that the American government may have hastened to remove the doubts which such a note might create, I have the honor to be authorised to request Y. E. to inform me, if your government has sent you any explanations of an event which has become so very notorious, and which, the relations of the two countries require, should not remain in such a state of uncertainty.

I take advantage of this opportunity [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I, enclosed in Poinsett to Clay, January 14, 1826, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 903.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Sebastián Camacho,
Secretary of State of Mexico*¹

MEXICO, January 14, 1826.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 13th inst.² in which Y. E. refers to a discourse said to have been pronounced by the Minister Plenipotentiary of the U. States of America on his presentation to H. M. the King of Spain.

So far am I from having received any explanations of the tenor of that discourse from my government, that I was even ignorant it had been pronounced until I received Y. E.'s note. It is true that I have read different versions of Mr. Everett's discourse in the public journals of the U. States, accompanied with very severe animadversions by the Editors: but I had until now supposed that the publisher in Madrid had interpolated the words to which Y. E. directs my attention. I could not imagine that a Representative of the U. States of America would have uttered words which every act of his Government denies. I must presume that Y. E. is better informed in this particular than I am, for if explanations are to be demanded from one nation of another, upon a mere news-paper report, the harmony which ought to subsist between them, might be interrupted at any time by the editor of a foreign gazette.

But as I am bound to suppose that Y. E. is in possession of more positive information on this subject, I will hasten to apply to my government for the explanations which Y. E. is authorized to ask if I have yet received. In the mean time, I do not hesitate to assure Y. E., that if the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States did use the language attributed to him, he did not express the sentiments of his government, and I confess myself at a loss to conceive after what has passed how such an incident could render the sincerity of my government doubtful even in the minds of the vulgar, or be considered by any one as calculated to deceive the powers of Europe.

In March 1822, the Government of the U. States by a solemn act, recognized the Independence of Mexico—and the same year refused to nominate Commissioners to carry into effect the Treaty of Washington of 1819, respecting the boundary line between the U. States of America, & what were then the possessions of H. C. M. in America, because it was deemed due to the Independent Government of Mexico to form with her alone a treaty of Limits. To the protest made by Don Joaquin de Anduaga against the act of recognition by my government of the Independence of the States, formerly Spanish possessions, Mr Adams, the actual President of the U. States, then secretary of State, replied in these words: "The Government of the U. States far from consulting the dictates of a policy questionable in its morality, has yielded to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I, enclosed in Poinsett to Clay, January 14, 1826, which see below, pt. IX, doc. 903.

² See above, pt. IX, doc. 901.

an obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as independent States, nations which after deliberately asserting their right to that character, had maintained & established it against all the resistance, which had been, or could be brought to oppose it. This recognition is neither intended to invalidate any right of Spain, nor to affect the employment of any means, which she may yet be disposed or enabled to use, with the view of re-uniting those provinces to the rest of her dominions. It is the mere acknowledgement of existing facts, with the view to the regular establishment with the nations newly formed, of those relations political & commercial, which it is the moral obligation of civilized & Christian nations to entertain reciprocally with one another." Words cannot be more explicit, & Don Joaquin de Anduaga in his reply, says, "I had the honor of receiving your note of the 6th inst., in which you were pleased to inform me that this government has recognised the independence of the Insurgent provinces of Spanish America. I despatched immediately to Spain one of the Secretaries of this Legation to carry to his Majesty news as important as unexpected, & until I receive his Royal orders upon the subject, I have only to refer to my protest of the 9th March last, still insisting upon its contents, as if its substance were repeated in the present note."

These facts are notorious—they were published to the world at the time, & the government of the U. States of America has, in every instance, acted in conformity with this declaration. There is no example of their having sought to disguise their views of this important subject to any of the powers of Europe. But on the contrary, they have openly declared their determination not to permit any other nation to interpose with armed hand between Spain & the Americas—and it is not unknown to your Excellency that on a late occasion, the interposition of a great European power was solicited by the U. States to obtain from Spain an acknowledgement of the Independence of her former possessions in America.

The open, frank & dignified course pursued by the U. States of America towards all foreign governments since the commencement of their political existence, forbids the injurious supposition that they would authorize one of their agents in Europe to use language calculated to throw a doubt upon the Independence & Sovereignty of Mexico so formally recognized by them, & that at a moment when they were exerting their good offices to secure the freedom of the American States, & publishing to the world their determination to defend it against any other power than that of Spain.

When on a late occasion, the Government of Mexico, alarmed at the appearance of a French squadron, unusually large in time of peace, in these seas, applied to the government of the United States to ask an explanation of his Majesty the King of France of then apparently hostile movements, that application was promptly complied with; & the appointment of Plenipotentiaries to represent the United States of America at the Congress of Panama, which has been resolved on by the President, will proclaim to the world, that

they regard all the States of this hemisphere equally independent of Europe as themselves.

Whilst taking these great public measures with the generous purpose of supporting the Independence of the Americas, my government will learn with surprise, that the unauthorized language of one of its Representatives should have led the government of Mexico to doubt its sincerity, or to regard for a moment the relations of the two countries to be in a state of uncertainty.

What further proof of the sincerity of the U. States can this government require, than their refusal to carry into effect the Treaty of Limits concluded & ratified with Spain, & the appointment of a Plenipotentiary near this government to settle the Boundary between their territories & those of Mexico? Spain and all the powers of Europe are aware that in my person, the U. States of America have a Minister Plenipotentiary in Mexico fully authorized to treat with this government, & to settle permanently the boundary which shall hereafter divide the territories of our respective countries. This fact furnishes them a convincing proof, that my government does not entertain a doubt of the Independence & Sovereignty of the U. Mexican States. For it is well known that such solemn compacts are celebrated with none other than independent & sovereign nations.

Permit me respectfully to suggest to Y. E. that the conclusion, ratification & publication of the Treaties which I am empowered to negotiate with this government, will place the relations of the two countries beyond all doubt or uncertainty. That act consummated no words that may fall inadvertently from a Minister of the U. States at the Court of Madrid, can be interpreted so as to render the sincerity of the U. States of America doubtful even in the opinion of the vulgar, or to flatter the ideas of the Powers of Europe, that are hostile to the Independence of these States.

I take advantage of this opportunity [etc.].

903

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, January 14, 1826.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith the translation of a note received yesterday from this government, marked A, together with my reply,² marked B.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² See above, pt. IX, docs. 901 and 902. The reply was dated January 14.

Although aware of the very unfavorable impression produced generally in this country by the publication of Mr. Everett's address, I confess, this note from the Secretary of foreign affairs surprised me a good deal. I had had a conference with that gentleman a few hours before, during which he did not, even in a remote degree, allude to this subject.

904

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, January 28, 1826.

The question of the invasion of Cuba has been again agitated in the Mexican Congress: it was brought forward in Senate on a motion to permit

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I. The following certified translation of the report of the Committees of the Mexican Congress was enclosed with Poinsett's dispatch:

The Committees of War and Constitutional points united have *again* had under consideration the resolution submitted by M^r. Verduco and M^r. Gomez Favia that the gov^t. be authorised in conjunction with that of Colombia to send an expedition against the Island of Cuba, in order to protect its independence from the Gov^t. of Spain, and to assist the Inhabitants, who have given so many proofs of their desire to be free. The Committees have had before them the Secretary of War in order to inform themselves of the State of the forces and resources of the Republic to undertake this expedition, and without entering upon the propriety and utility of it, which have been sufficiently discussed in the former sessions and of which the Senate is satisfied, they confined themselves to enquire, if there were a sufficient number of Troops to undertake this expedition in combination with some other new state of South America. The Secretary set forth, that in the opinion of the government, there existed a sufficient number of troops and ample resources to make a considerable disembarkment on the coast of Cuba, sufficient to form a point of reunion for the inhabitants of that Island, who might think proper to join the cause of Liberty, who undoubtedly are numerous: but that the gov^t. would not undertake the expedition alone, in order to avoid the risk, however remote, of an unfortunate result. On this account it was deemed advisable to come to an agreement with President Simon Bolivar jointly to undertake the expedition in the event of Congress approving it. That in Yucatan from its proximity to the Island of Cuba the Gov^t. had concentrated a respectable force in order to resist any attempt that might be made by the enemy, and to facilitate the expedition to Cuba, if Congress should permit troops to be sent out of the limits of the Republic; and finally that even from motives of economy and security gov^s. were convinced that the attempt ought to be made. Because by driving the enemy out of the Island or taking possession of a part of it the Spaniards whose force and resources are trifling would find full occupation in preserving the City of Havana on one or other point; whereas now by threatening Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala, they compel those States to maintain respectable armies, the expences of which in two or three years amount to a greater sum than the expedition would occasion at once, with the difference that this state of anxiety in the first case is continual, whereas in the second it is more than probable, that the enemy would disappear from our signs or at least we should see such division within the family as would effectually prevent them from entertaining any hostile intentions against us. These considerations added to the existence of a treaty of alliance with Colombia have induced the Committees to decide in favor of the propositions of Verduco and Gomez Favia and we beg leave to offer the following resolutions. First, the Government is hereby authorised in combination with that of the Republic of Colombia to undertake a military

the Executive to send troops beyond the territories of the Republic, which was almost unanimously rejected. A distinct proposition was again discussed to day in secret session of Senate and passed. The substance of it is to grant permission to the Executive to undertake an expedition against Cuba *jointly* with Colombia. The Secretaries of gov^t were present on both occasions and warmly advocated the measure. If the house concurs the Plenipotentiaries to Panama will be instructed to concert measures with those of Colombia for the joint expedition. These Plenipotentiaries have not yet left Mexico.

With great regard [etc.].

905

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, February 1, 1826.

SIR: As I had anticipated, the English Plenipotentiaries have not been able to conclude a treaty, and, I understand, it is settled, that one of the Mexican Plenipotentiaries shall accompany Mr. Morier to England; probably, Don Sebastian Camacho, Secretary of State and Foreign Relations. I regret this arrangement on many accounts, but particularly, because it will occasion still further delay in the settlement of the several claims I have preferred according to your instructions.

I saw the President yesterday, and he assured me, that our negotiations should be renewed in a few days.

He spoke freely on the subject of Cuba, and asked me what were the views of the United States in relation to that Island. I stated them very fully according to my instructions on this subject. He expressed himself perfectly satisfied, and assured me, that the government of Mexico had no intention to conquer or keep possession of that Island—that the object of the expedition which they contemplated, was to assist the revolutionists of Cuba to drive out the Spaniards, and, in case they succeeded, to leave that people to govern themselves. I observed, it was to be regretted that this declaration had not been made earlier, as the silence of this government on the subject and the anxiety it had manifested to undertake the expedition

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I. The portion of this document printed in small capital letters was received in cipher.

expedition in order to assist the efforts of the Inhabitants of Cuba to achieve their Independence. Secondly, in the event of the cause of Liberty succeeding in the Island the governm^t. is particularly directed to cause to be established in it a national Representation on the Basis of the Rights of the People of the new Republics of America. Mex^o. January 26, 1826

against Cuba had led me to form a very different opinion of their intentions. He then proposed to me to express in writing the views of my government in relation to Cuba, and that he, on the part of this government, would repeat what he had now stated with regard to the intentions of Mexico. Although it would certainly be desirable to receive such a pledge from this government, I objected to commit my government as to the future guarantee of the Independence of Cuba, in the present stage of this affair. He then asked me to write to my government for instructions on the subject, which I promised to do.

There are two reasons which render this government particularly anxious respecting Cuba at this time. One is, the rumours which have been circulated in the public papers of the United States, that we have proposed to guarantee to Spain the possession of Cuba and Porto Rico on condition of her acknowledging the independence of her former colonies in America. The other is, information they have received from their Chargé d'affaires in Colombia, that an expedition of two thousand men are about to embark for Cuba, with the intention of taking possession of some post on the Island and blockading the ports, and, in this manner, to foment and aid the revolution. He adds, that, doubtless, this expedition will be hastened in order to anticipate Mexico, and advises, that this government should take precisely the same measures on its part without delay, as he believes it to be the object of Colombia to attach that Island to her already vast possessions. I learnt this latter circumstance some little time after my conversation with the President.

IN MY OPINION THE LARGE FORCE COLLECTED IN HAVANA IS CALCULATED TO GIVE THEM SOME UNEASINESS. YUCATAN IS NOT IN A VERY TRANQUIL (STATE) AND AN EXPEDITION OF THREE OR FOUR THOUSAND MEN WOULD FIND NO DIFFICULTY IN GETTING FOOTING THERE.

A motion was made in Senate some days ago to grant permission to the Executive to march the troops of the Republic beyond the territories of the United Mexican States, which was lost; but a motion to permit the government to undertake an expedition against the Island of Cuba jointly with Colombia prevailed. This resolution will not pass the Chamber of Deputies, but if it is rejected in that body, it will be resumed by Senate, and if it again passes by a majority of two-thirds, it becomes a law as much as if it had received the consent of both houses. It is supposed, that the House will delay taking it up.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, February 25, 1826.

SIR: I informed you some time since,² that Senate had passed a resolution authorising the Executive to undertake an expedition against Cuba jointly with the Republic of Colombia. In order to avoid the operation of the 58th and 59th. articles of the Constitution, which provide, that if an act which originates in one house be rejected in the other, it shall again be taken up by the house in which it originated, and if it passes by a majority of two-thirds, it shall become a law, unless rejected by more than two-thirds of the other house, the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution, 36 to 20, to postpone the further consideration of the question until the Executive could submit to the consideration of Congress the plans which may be agreed upon at Panama.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, March 8, 1826.

SIR: The last mail brought me your despatch N^o. 9, under date of the 30th. December⁴ last, together with the accompanying documents.

I have lost no time in communicating to this government, verbally, the reply of Count Nesselrode to your note respecting the recognition of these governments by Spain, as well as the inference drawn from it both by Mr. Middleton and yourself, and did not fail to urge the reasons suggested by you for suspending for the present any projected expedition against the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

I have done so in conformity with your instructions and the wishes of the President, although, from my knowledge of the character and views of this government, I did not entertain any expectation of producing the effect you appear to have anticipated from this communication. It was received with great coolness. The reasons urged to induce this government to suspend their military operations against the Spanish Islands in the Atlantic, are such as would, I fear, rather serve to hasten them, provided the Executive

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² See above, pt. IX, doc. 904, Poinsett to Secretary of State, January 28, 1826.

³ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

⁴ Not printed in this collection.

of this confederation possessed the constitutional power to send troops beyond the limits of the Republic.

This government does not fear the power of Spain, and is indifferent as to the determination of that country on the subject of the recognition of the new American States. Nor do they apprehend any danger from the Holy Alliance of Europe, both because they take it for granted that their designs will be watched and kept in check by the United States and Great Britain, and that the commerce of Mexico holds out too great a temptation to the principal commercial nations of Europe to permit them to take any measures which might deprive them of its advantages. The greatest apprehension of the Executive of this Republic appears to be, that the interference of the allied powers may compel Spain to make peace with her former colonies, and to recognise their Independence on condition of the possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico being guaranteed to her, which would deprive Mexico of the advantage and glory of emancipating those Islands.

An Officer, sent by the Republic of Colombia, arrived a few days ago in Vera Cruz, and is hourly expected here. The Colombians state, that they have twelve thousand men in Carthagena (say one half), ready to be embarked for Cuba; and the object of this Envoy is to solicit from this government, in fulfilment of the Treaty of Alliance, the co-operation of the military and naval forces of Mexico.

This communication finds the government here disposed to grant every aid in their power to this enterprise. They not only desire to participate in the glory of the conquest, but fear, that if Colombia, unassisted, should liberate Cuba, she might be disposed to hold possession of the Island. The only assistance, however, the Executive can grant, without consulting Congress, is, to send their fleet to co-operate with that of Colombia, which, I think, they will be disposed to do if they can do no more.

I am induced to believe, that the house of Representatives will persist in its opposition to any expedition being sent from Mexico against Cuba or Puerto Rico; but I presume, they will be again called upon by the President to discuss the question.

Immediately after the decision of the house, respecting the resolution of the Senate to permit this government to undertake an expedition against Cuba jointly with Colombia, which deprived the Emigrants from Cuba of all hopes of assistance from Mexico, it was determined by these persons to fit out a private expedition to assist the patriots of the Island with such forces and means as they could obtain. The plan was to get possession of some point on the Island, to raise the standard of revolt there, and after taking up a strong and impregnable position, which they designate as being in possession of the Maroon negroes, to despatch Envoys to Mexico and Colombia to demand succors, and to the United States and Great Britain to obtain a loan of money and arms. The arrival of intelligence from Colombia of

an expedition being in readiness in Carthagena to sail for Cuba, has made them still more anxious to carry this design into immediate execution. They dread the supposed rights Columbia might acquire, by the conquest of Cuba, over that Island, and think, that if the standard of revolt were first raised by the Inhabitants of Cuba and assistance only afforded by Colombia, that Republic could have no other claim than that of indemnity for expenses incurred in the expedition, and the Island would be left independent. Availing themselves of the well-known jealousy of Colombia which exists here, these Emigrants have this day made an application to this government to assist them to realise their project and thereby enable them to anticipate Colombia. If they fail in this application, it is proposed to send one of them to the United States to endeavour to organise the expedition there.

Promptness is not to be apprehended from this government, and you shall have timely notice of all their movements. I have great hopes in the wisdom and pertinacity of the House of Representatives. The best informed of its Members dread the return of a victorious or of a defeated army.

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, March 18, 1826.

I have again seen the President and Espinosa, the Gentleman who is charged with the Portfolio of Foreign Relations during the absence of Camacho, on the subject of your last despatch. These interviews have confirmed the opinion expressed in my last note.² This government would not desire a peace with Spain, if it interrupted their views with regard to Cuba.

I urged the effect this act of hostility was likely to produce in Europe and particularly upon the minds of the allied sovereigns at a moment that they were occupied with devising the means of bringing about a peace between Spain and her former colonies, and suggested the propriety of postponing any contemplated expedition until the result of the proposals, submitted by the Emperor of Russia in consequence of our mediation, should be known. The President coldly replied, that he would give to these suggestions their due weight in considering this subject, and that he regarded this interposition of the United States as a new proof of their friendship.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

² See above, pt. IX, doc. 907, Poinsett to Clay, March 8, 1826.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, April 8, 1826.

SIR: Yesterday the appointment of Dn. Sebastian Camacho, the present Secretary of State, to be Plenipotentiary in London, was approved by Senate. It appears, that the President, before he had communicated his intentions to Senate, had solemnly engaged himself to send one of the Secretaries composing the Cabinet to continue the negociations and conclude the Treaty in London.

The British Chargé des Affaires went so far as to say, that none other but a Minister of State would be received, and, that by refusing to ratify the nomination of Camacho, the Senate would occasion a rupture between the two powers—conduct, which could only be imputed to the secret influence of those who sought to divide the old world from the new, in order that they might govern the latter—meaning, of course, the United States.

The hints thrown out from time to time by the English, of the ambitious views entertained by our government, would be disregarded, if they were not corroborated by statements made by the Agents of Mexico in the United States. The most active and the most mischievous of these is a person by the name of Cortes. I am constantly made sensible of the ill offices of this man towards the United States. His last intelligence is, that the President of the United States is in active correspondence with Gen^l. Vives, who is inclined to deliver the Island of Cuba up to the United States—that I am a party to this political intrigue, which accounts for my using every exertion to put a stop to the expedition against that Island. This account, absurd as it is, comes in such a plausible shape, from the means of intelligence this person is supposed to possess, that the government gives credit to it.

I heard a few days ago, that some disagreeable information had been received by the President from the United States; but did not learn the particulars until this morning. I have thought it advisable to communicate this circumstance to you, in order that you may know the character of this Agent.

I have been again apprized, that Mr. Obregon will shortly be recalled, and was asked by one of the Ministers to suggest whom I would wish to succeed him. This I refused to do.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, I.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, May 6, 1826.

SIR: I have this instant seen Washington papers of the 20th and 30th of March, containing the debate upon a resolution offered by Mr. Wickliffe, and directed to learn upon what authority I had declared that the United States had pledged themselves not to permit any other Power than Spain to interfere with the independence or form of Government of the new American Republics.

This inquiry was avowedly made in order to ascertain whether I was expressly authorized by the President of the United States to make such a declaration; and although you have no doubt been able clearly to show that no such authority, implied or direct, was ever given to me, I cannot rest satisfied without stating explicitly that, in the observations I made during my conference with the Mexican plenipotentiaries, I alluded only to the message of the President of the United States to Congress in 1823.

That message, dictated, in my opinion, by the soundest policy, has been regarded, both in Europe and America, as a solemn declaration of the views and intentions of the Executive of the United States; and I have always considered that declaration as a pledge, so far forth as the language of the President can pledge the nation, to defend the new American Republics from the attacks of any of the Powers of Europe other than Spain. That the people of the United States are not bound by any declarations of the Executive is known and understood as well in Mexico, where the Government is modelled upon our own political institutions, as in the United States themselves. I need scarcely, therefore, disclaim all intention to have deceived the Mexican plenipotentiaries by the argument I used on that occasion.

But, in order to correct any erroneous impression these words might have made upon the minds of the Mexican plenipotentiaries, I explained to them, in the course of our conference this morning, their precise meaning; that the declaration of Mr. Monroe, in his message of 1823, to which I had alluded, indicated only the course of policy the Executive of the United States was disposed to pursue towards these countries, but was not binding upon the nation unless sanctioned by the Congress of the United States; and that when I spoke of the United States having pledged themselves not to permit any other Power than Spain to interfere with the independence or form of Government of the new American Republics, I meant only to allude to the above cited declaration of the President of the United States in his message of 1823, and to nothing more. Don Jose Ignacio Esteva, one of the plenipotentiaries at that period of our negotiations, replied, that he had so understood it, but

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 365.

it was not thought by the Mexican plenipotentiaries at the time that such a disposition, nor even a more solemn pledge so to act, entitled us to any special privileges, as it was so obviously the interest of the United States to assist in defending the Americas against the attacks of United Europe.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, November 15, 1826.

Of the Revolutionary movement in Guatemala, I presume you have been made acquainted. I send you herewith the official documents² as published here, lest they may not have reached you from Guatemala.

In Guayaquil, there has been a movement in favor of adopting the Bolivian Constitution and of electing Bolivar President for life. The Liberator quietly told them, that such offers could only be made him by the General Government at Bogotá.

In Lima, it was stated, that a conspiracy was discovered against Bolivar, and the most influential among the liberal party were arrested on that pretext. As soon as the news was received that the Constitution of Bolivia was adopted in that Republic, and Bolivar elected President for life, the Limenians imposed the same dignity upon him. It is true, that the other provinces have not been heard from; but there exists in these countries a slavish love of imitation of all that is done in the Capital.

As it may be possible that you have not received the Constitution of Bolivia, I send it herewith. It should have been translated at this office, but it was received only to-day. The copy alluded to in my last belonged to this government, and was the only one in town.

It appears to me, that Bolivar's plan is to unite Bolivia, Lima, and Colombia in one great federative government, and to establish himself as the President for life of that vast empire. I am induced to think so, both because the Constitution of Bolivia would seem to favor such a scheme and because the movements in Lima and Guayaquil appear to have been the work of his agents.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, II.

² Not printed in this collection.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, *March 28, 1827.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith despatches received from Lima,—which will give you details of the revolution lately effected there by the Colombian troops. I accompany them with a translation of a declaration published by the Officers of that division of the Colombian Army. This is an important document, as it will probably be decisive of the question which now agitates that country. I have reason to believe, that the measures proposed by Bolivar were in opposition to the opinions of the wise and the good in Colombia, and that Santander and a large majority of both Houses of Congress would be disposed to prevent the accomplishment of his plans. Secure of the support of that division of the army which is in Peru, they will most probably openly oppose the adoption of the Bolivian Constitution; and Bolivar will either have to retrace his steps, which on former occasions he has proved himself capable of doing, or he will be foiled.

I have always been of opinion, that the great Republic of Colombia, composed as it is of States whose interests are adverse and conflicting, could not long hold together; and there now appears to me to be preparing a separation into three parts, which are indicated by natural and political divisions.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

MEXICO, *May 12, 1827.*

SIR: I transmit herewith a translation of an act of Congress,³ depriving all native born Spaniards of their employments, military, civil and ecclesiastical.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, II. The enclosures mentioned are not printed in this collection.

² *Ibid.*, III.

³ The following translation is the enclosure mentioned:

LAW OF THE MEXICAN CONGRESS

ARTICLE FIRST. No individual, who is by birth a Spaniard, shall fill any office or employment in the appointment of the general government, in any branch whatsoever of the administration, civil or military, until Spain recognises the independence of the nation.

ARTICLE SECOND. The provisions of the former article are extended to ecclesiastical offices and employments of the regular and secular clergy, so far as regards the exercise of their economical, gubernatorial and judicial functions. This provision does not comprehend the reverend bishops.

tical. The passage of this law is a consequence of the late conspiracy. The great objection to it, is the augmentation of expense it occasions, which, in the present state of the finances of this country, cannot but be regarded as a serious evil. The government is induced to incur this great additional expense, in order to avoid the danger which might arise from the discontent of these people—a danger, which will be produced by the measure in despite of the conciliatory provision.

This government has this instant received advices by a special Messenger, despatched by Captain Porter, that an expedition is fitting out in Colombia for the invasion of either Cuba or Porto Rico; that an embargo is laid in all the Atlantic ports of that Republic; that the Captain-General of Porto Rico has asked assistance of General Vives; and that Admiral Laborde, with all his squadron, has been called off to Havana. In the present state of General Bolivar's affairs, I should not wonder if he were to attempt something of the sort. His means are certainly inadequate to make a serious impression on the Island of Cuba; but it is possible, that the emigrants from that Island, of whom I spoke in a former despatch, may have prevailed upon him to make a rash attempt. In that event, the invaders could found their hopes of success only upon arming the negroes. An expedition against Porto Rico is to be deprecated, but is not of such vital importance to the United States. The means of Colombia are better suited to such an enterprise; for although I regard the fortifications of the town of San Juan as much stronger than those of Havana, the Island is not so well garrisoned, nor in other respects provided with the equal means of defence as Cuba.

This government will view any such attempts on the part of Colombia with great jealousy.

I am [etc.].

ARTICLE THIRD. The government is authorised to remove, until the period designated in the first article, the curates, missionaries and religious teachers of the district and territories of the federation.

ARTICLE FOURTH. The sons of Mexicans, casually born in the peninsula and now in the republic, are not comprehended in the preceding articles.

ARTICLE FIFTH. The officers who are removed from service in virtue of this law, shall enjoy full pay, and their term of service shall continue to be counted.

ARTICLE SIXTH. The offices made vacant by the enactments of this law, shall be provisionally discharged in conformity with the laws.

ARTICLE SEVENTH. The curates, whom the government may remove, in virtue of the powers that the third article grants to it, shall continue to receive all their emoluments in the same manner as before their removal; and the assistants or substitutes shall be paid from the public treasury.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, *June 16, 1827.*

SIR: There arrived here last night a Messenger despatched by Mr. Camacho, the Plenipotentiary of this government who negotiated the Treaty lately concluded between Great Britain and Mexico. This gentleman, before he left London, concluded a commercial agreement with the Minister of Prussia at that court; and in Paris, has entered into similar arrangements with France, of which the despatches that arrived last night bring the official advices.

By this informal arrangement, which will probably place the commerce and shipping of France upon the footing of the most favored nation, the cabinet of the Tuilleries will silence the clamors of the merchants and manufacturers of that kingdom, who were loudly demanding the recognition of these countries, and will secure all the advantages of a commercial treaty without committing the nation with Spain or the other members of the holy alliance.

This people, by accepting such agreement, will deprive themselves of the means now in their power of aiding the clamors of the liberal party in France, which might perhaps compel that court to treat with the Americas on the terms of independent nations.

I will not hazard a conjecture as to the conduct of this government in this delicate affair. I am inclined to think, that the Executive will be disposed to sanction the agreement made by Mr. Camacho, and the Congress to insist upon Mexico being treated with by France on the footing of an independent nation.

The latter course appears to me to be the wisest. For if these countries could be prevailed upon, as it is possible they may be in the Congress of Tacubaya, to frame their treaties with the nations which have recognised their independence upon the footing of perfect reciprocity, an increase of tonnage and importation duties upon all foreign vessels might compel those nations that have an extensive commerce with Spanish-America to enter into similar treaties with them; and as it would be a general measure, it could not be complained of.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, III.

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, June 20, 1827.

. . . I have not yet been able to learn with any precision what are the propositions sent by Mr. Camacho; but am pleased to find, that this government is not disposed to enter into any informal arrangement, which might have the effect of postponing the recognition of their independence. France has offered to Mexico her friendly offices with the court of Rome. This may hasten the completion of the instruction for the Envoy from this country to that court, who has been detained for want of them in Brussels since the spring of 1825.

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, July 8, 1827.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy, original and translation of a manifesto² issued by the Legislature of the State of Vera Cruz. This most extraordinary document was published, ostensibly, to vindicate the State from the charge of having acted rebelliously by expelling from its territory a federal officer, for no other motive than, that he was enrolled among the members of a party adverse to that which governs the State of Vera Cruz. But the real object of this publication appears to have been to expose what the Legislature of Vera Cruz suspects to be the policy of the United States towards Mexico, and my efforts to carry that policy into effect.

Viewing the peculiar situation in which this government is placed with regard to the State of Vera Cruz, which has committed acts of rebellion against the sovereignty of the Federal Government, I have abstained from demanding satisfaction for this unprovoked and unjustifiable insult offered to the United States by a member of this Union; and have contented myself with replying to the suspicions and assertions of the Legislature of Vera Cruz, and with proving them to be as false and unfounded as they are absurd and infamous. You will receive herewith a copy of my reply, both original and translation.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, III.

² Not printed in this collection.

[The following is the translation of Poinsett's reply:]

AN EXPOSITION OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS THE
NEW REPUBLICS OF AMERICA

MEXICO, July 4, 1827.

So long as the attacks which have been made in Mexico upon the character and policy of the government of the United States of America and upon the honor and reputation of the Undersigned, were confined to anonymous publications, they excited no other feeling than that of contempt, and have been passed over with silent scorn. But when the respectable Legislature of Vera Cruz embodies in a solemn appeal to the Mexican Nation the substance of these unfounded calumnies, he feels that he would be wanting to himself and to the government he represents, if he forbore any longer from vindicating the character and conduct of the United States in their relations with these countries, or if he suffered such misrepresentations to go forth to the world, sanctioned by so respectable an authority, unanswered and unrefuted.

Vera Cruz *suspects*, that a "sagacious and hypocritical foreign Minister, (alluding to the Undersigned), equally zealous for the prosperity of his own country as inimical to that of Mexico, calculating that the aggrandizement and glory of his nation must be in the inverse ratio of the glory and aggrandizement of the United Mexican States, so that the former would lose all the latter might gain and *vice versa*; calculating that the agriculture of Mexico must swell its limits so immensely as to render insignificant and almost null that of the North, provided Mexico is permitted to move forward peaceably in the new order of things; calculating, that in time the commercial and friendly relations between Mexico and Great Britain might prove disadvantageous to the interests of his country, conceived and brought forth the most terrible and disorganising project for the Republic—the project of propagating and maintaining hatred and want of confidence and consequently division and parties between the simple and worthy Mexicans—he established the rite of York"!!!

It is not the intention of the Undersigned to analyze the effects, which, according to the opinion of the Legislature of Vera Cruz, have been produced by the establishment of this rite, nor to enter into the question whether or not it has proved "*more dangerous and destructive than would have done the landing of twenty batallions of Spanish troops in the country*". He will confine himself to a plain exposition of the conduct of the United States of America towards these countries and of his own during his residence here, and endeavor to answer by a simple statement of facts the *suspensions* of the Legislature of the State of Vera Cruz, which appear to be founded on the vituperations of *venal writers*, "*who*", to use the words of that Legislature, "*in order to maintain themselves, are under the dreadful necessity of prostituting their consciences by calumniating and sullyng the conduct of good men.*"

From the first dawning of the independence of Spanish-America, the feelings and sympathies of the people of the United States were enlisted in favor of the cause of liberty, and the sentiments of the government were in perfect harmony with those of the people. Their policy, their

interests and their feelings all concurred to lead them to favor the cause of the independence of these countries; and a short exposition of their conduct will prove, that they used every effort to assist that cause consistent with the character of neutrality which their duties towards Spain obliged them to maintain between the contending parties.

As early as August, 1818, the United States made a formal proposal to the British Government for a concerted and contemporary recognition of the Independence of Buenos Ayres, at that time the only one of the South-American States which, having declared its independence, could be regarded as having actually achieved its emancipation from Spain. It did not suit the policy of the British Government to accede to this proposal, and they declined it.

This avowal on the part of the United States of its readiness to recognise the Independence of Buenos Ayres became a subject of consideration at the deliberations of Aix-la-Chapelle, and there is reason to believe that the plan which was proposed and matured there of a joint mediation of the European Alliance between Spain and her colonies for restoring them to her authority, failed from the well-known intentions of the United States and the refusal of Great Britain to accede to the condition of employing *force* eventually against the South-Americans for its accomplishment.

On the 30th. of January, 1822, a resolution passed the House of Representatives of the United States, of which body the Undersigned was then a Member, requesting the President to lay before the House the communications from the Agents of the United States with the governments south of them, which had declared their independence; and those from the Agents of such governments in Washington with the Secretary of State, tending to show the political condition of their governments and the state of the war between them and Spain.

In transmitting to the House the papers called for by this resolution, the President, in his Message of the 8th of March, 1822, declared his own persuasion, that the time had arrived, when in strict conformity to the law of nations, and in fulfilment of the duties of equal and impartial justice to all parties, the acknowledgment of the independence declared by the Spanish-American colonies could no longer be withheld.

On the day after the President's Message of the 8th of March was received by the House, the Spanish Minister, Anduaga, addressed to the Secretary of State a remonstrance against the measure it recommended and a solemn protest against the recognition of the governments of the insurgent provinces of South-America. He was answered on the 6th of April by a letter recapitulating the circumstances under which the United States had "yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest order, by *recognising as independent States* nations, which, after deliberately asserting their right to that character, had established and maintained it against all the resistance which had been or could be brought to oppose it."

On the 24th of April, this Minister gave notice, that the Spanish government had disavowed the Treaty of the 24th of August between O'Donoghue [O'Donojú] and Iturbide, and had denied the authority of the former to conclude it.

On the 12th of February, 1822, the Spanish Extraordinary Cortes

adopted the report of a committee, proposing the appointment of Commissioners to proceed to South America to negotiate with the revolutionary patriots concerning the relations to be established thereafter in regard to their connexion with Spain. They declared at the same time all treaties made with them before that period by Spanish Commanders, implying an acknowledgment of their Independence null and void, as not having been authorised by the Cortes; and on the next day, they passed three resolutions: the first annulling expressly the Treaty between O'Donoghue [O'Donojú] and Iturbide; the second "that the Spanish government, by a declaration to all others with which it has friendly relations, makes known to them, that the Spanish nation will regard *at any epoch*, as a violation of treaties, the recognition either partial or absolute of the independence of the Spanish provinces of Ultramar, so long as the dissensions which exist between some of them and the Metropolis are not terminated, with whatever else may serve to convince foreign governments that Spain has not yet renounced any of the rights belonging to it in these countries"; the third resolution recommended to the government to take all necessary measures and to apply to the Cortes for the needful resources to preserve and recover the authority of Spain in the Ultramarine provinces.

These measures of the Cortes were not known to the President of the United States when he sent to Congress his Message of the 8th of March; but they were known to the Congress of the United States, when it passed almost unanimously the resolution by which they frankly and unreservedly recognised the independence of the American States, without making their acknowledgment the price of any favor for themselves although at the hazard of incurring the displeasure of Spain. In the passage of this resolution, the Undersigned took an active part.

This review of the proceedings of the United States in relation to the independence of Spanish-America, has been taken not only to show the consistency of the principles by which they were uniformly dictated; and that they have always been disinterested and eminently friendly to the new Republics, but likewise to disprove the *suspensions* of the Legislature of Vera Cruz.

How different, then, has been the conduct of the United States from that which is imputed to them by the State of Vera Cruz! If they really had regarded the aggrandizement of these countries as destructive of that of their own, is it probable they would have been so short-sighted as not to have foreseen that the best and easiest mode to prevent this aggrandizement was to assist Spain to maintain her sovereignty over them?—or at least not to exert their utmost efforts to favor the acquisition of their independence? The Legislature of Vera Cruz gives the Undersigned credit for sagacity and zeal for the prosperity of his country, at the same time that it accuses him of being hostile to that of Mexico, with the exertion of a small portion of that sagacity, he ought to have formed the opinion in 1822 which is now attributed to him. He must have been aware, that the measure which he urged with so much zeal would be followed by other nations—that the recognition of the New States of America would contribute to secure the independence of Mexico and to call into existence all those resources of this great nation which he is now represented desirous of destroying as incompatible

with the prosperity of his country. In a discourse pronounced in favor of the recognition of the independence of the American States, he used these words:

It has been supposed by some, that the independence of these colonies would injure the prosperity of the United States; possessing a more fertile soil and raising the same productions, they would drive us from the markets of Europe. It has been said, that colonies are safer neighbors than free States, and that so long as they were bound down by the oppressive restrictions of Spain, they would neither be dangerous rivals nor formidable competitors. It is unwise, therefore, in us to offer them any encouragement. Not only the best feelings of the heart revolt at such a conclusion, but it is manifestly false—it is our interest that they should be free. With an extensive line of coast, with numerous navigable rivers facilitating their internal trade, with a population of more than fifteen millions, almost without manufactures, with a demand for one hundred millions of dollars, and without the means of carrying on their foreign commerce, these countries present a market for the skill and industry of our merchants, which promises the greatest advantages. . . .

The intercourse of the provinces of Spanish-America with these countries will augment their means of information, and will enlighten them on the subject of government, on public welfare and private happiness. With the increase of knowledge, will arise free and well-organized institutions, the refinements and various wants of civilization. This cannot fail to produce a demand for all the manufactures of this country, and for all the objects of trade.

He has seen no reason since to change the opinion he expressed on that occasion.

If the Legislature of Vera Cruz, instead of listening to their suspicions, had consulted the history of the policy pursued by the United States in their intercourse with foreign nations, they would have seen that government pursuing an open, frank and magnanimous course towards them all, neither attempting to wrong the most feeble, nor suffering wrong from the most powerful. Neither do they fear a fair competition with any nation. If nature has denied them the fertile soil, the fine climate, and the rich mines of gold and silver which Mexico possesses, they are more than compensated, in their estimation, by the noble harbours and bays which indent their coast, by the bold and navigable streams which facilitate their internal trade, and above all, by the industry and enterprize of their hardy and virtuous population. Guided by enlightened views of political economy and by motives of the soundest policy, they are desirous to see their neighbours wealthy and powerful in order that they may be more efficient allies and more profitable customers. They are more advanced in the arts and in commerce than Mexico or Colombia, but what would this profit them, if neither Mexico nor Colombia possessed the means of purchasing their manufactures or of employing their shipping? They are united to these nations so intimately by common interests, that if the liberties of America were to be attacked through them, the United States would be compelled to stand forth in their defence. What, then, would it avail

those States, that their neighbours should be reduced to poverty and weakness?

The Legislature of Vera Cruz suspects that the commercial and friendly relations which exist between this country and Great Britain may in time prove disadvantageous to the interests of the United States. In what manner, the sagacity of the Undersigned is at a loss to understand. Here, too, the government of the United States, if the *suspensions* of the legislature of Vera Cruz have any foundation in truth, has proceeded with equal improvidence. So far were the United States from believing that the friendly relations which might be formed between Great Britain and the New American States, would ever become prejudicial to their interests, that they invited Great Britain to join them in recognising the independence of these countries. They afterwards urged the Cabinet of Saint James to follow their example, and they have constantly and earnestly used their good offices to induce the governments of Europe, including Spain, to treat with those of Spanish-America on the footing of independent nations. They exulted in seeing their example followed by Great Britain; and are satisfied, that the interests of the two countries, with respect to the New States of America, are identified.

Having thus answered the *suspensions* of the Legislature of Vera Cruz by a simple statement of facts, the Undersigned feels it a duty to himself to disprove the assertion made by that Legislature, that in order to engender discord among the worthy inhabitants of Mexico, who were living in perfect harmony before his arrival *under the dominion of the Scotch Masons*, he established the rite of York!

The rite of York existed before his arrival in this country. He found five Lodges already established, and he did nothing more than send for charters for them from the Grand Lodge of New York at their request, and install the Grand Lodge of Mexico.

If the Undersigned had found in Mexico a despotic government, he would not have taken even this small part in the establishment of masonry in the country; but he could not suppose that any objection could be made in a republic against the formation of an institution so purely and perfectly republican as that of the ancient York Masons. If this institution, dedicated exclusively in his own country to charitable and philanthropic purposes, has here been perverted to those of political combinations, he has had no part in its application to such uses, and embraces with eagerness the opportunity now afforded him of declaring that he never has assisted in any Lodge where political principles were discussed or political combinations formed, and that since the public voice has accused the ancient York Masons of following the pernicious example of the Scotch Masons by using their institution for political purposes, he has withdrawn himself entirely from their meetings.

He did not, therefore, "*conceive and bring forth this project*"; and whether the establishment of the rite of York in Mexico has been productive of good or evil, he has stated the only part he had in its creation. And he can declare, that he has never taken any part in the internal concerns of Mexico,—unless to advocate, in a Republic, on every fitting occasion the superiority of a republican form of government over all others, to explain the practical benefits of the institutions of the United

States and the blessings which his countrymen have enjoyed and still continue to enjoy under them, be considered an interference with the internal concerns of this country.

That the Undersigned or the government he represents should be desirous to see established in this country a monarchy, and a Bourbon or a descendant of Iturbide planted on the throne of Mexico, is too absurd to merit a serious answer. The government of the United States holds, that every nation has an undoubted right to choose whatever form of government it may judge proper, and they have not interfered nor will they ever interfere with that right; but both that government and the people of the United States are republicans, and hailed with the most heartfelt satisfaction the establishment of a *federal* government in Mexico. On this subject, the opinions of the Undersigned stand recorded.

The mistake committed by the Legislature of Vera Cruz in supposing the prevailing party to be governed by the Undersigned, is apparent from the single circumstance of the extraordinary delay which has attended the conclusion of the negotiations which brought him to this country.

It is with deep regret, that the Undersigned has found himself under the necessity of exposing the fallacy of the Manifest issued by the Legislature of the State of Vera Cruz. The Legislature of a respectable and sovereign State ought to have been more cautious than to publish serious charges against the character and conduct of a foreign government on *suspensions* which are not only unfounded, but which have been clearly and uncontrovertibly disproved; or to hazard assertions affecting the reputation of a foreign Minister, unsubstantiated by the slightest proof and which have been shown to be utterly false.

917

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, *April 24, 1828.*

The treaty or Commercial arrangement entered into between this Country and France will not be carried into effect. The present Secretary of State will not even submit it to Congress. The fact appears to be, that M^r. de Villele engaged that the influence of France should be exerted to prevent Spain from sending more troops to Havana or to any other point, where they might be employed to the annoyance of these Countries. If this influence has been attempted to be exerted on the part of France it has not been successful. The policy of not entering into any commercial arrangements with France or with any other nation, which does not virtually imply an acknowl-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

edgement of their independence is so obvious, that I believe Cañedo would have acted in the same manner even if the French government had not failed to comply with the secret stipulation made by M^r. Villele.

This government is about to appoint another Envoy to Rome. Boca Negra, a distinguished member of the house of Deputies. Indeed they ought to be well represented at that Court and not by a Clergyman. Boca Negra is as good a choice as the President could well have made. It has been resolved likewise to send an Envoy to Paris, in order to explain the motives of this government in not ratifying the engagements entered into by M^r. Camacho: and to propose to treat with that court on the terms of one independent nation with another. It is supposed, that France can no longer refuse to do so, as the principal objection made by M^r. Villele to adopt that course was stated by him to be the occupation of Spain by the French forces.

918

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, October 28, 1828.

SIR: This Government has received two letters from Europe, which have alarmed them very much. The first from London, states, that Spain has effected a loan to the amount of five millions Sterling, on condition of applying a portion of the sum to satisfy the claims of the English and French merchants. It is supposed that these claims will absorb about one half of the loan, and that the balance will be employed in an attempt to reconquer this Country. The plan of attack is even detailed. The second letter is from Madrid. It sets forth that an expedition against Mexico has been resolved upon, by that cabinet, and that this determination was taken in consequence of a report made to the King, by some inhabitants of Mexico, who had lately landed in Spain; probably some of those who were banished under the late law, and whose conduct on this occasion proves the necessity that existed to adopt that measure. These persons state: that the enthusiastic feeling in favor of the Independence of Mexico, had subsided very much, while that in favor of the old Country, had augmented. That the higher orders have lost all confidence in the Government, from the corrupt and scandalous conduct of those who are in command; and that the experience of every day, evinced the impracticability of a representative system [in?] a Country when the people, besides being too ignorant to be governed by democratic Institutions,

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV. The portion of this document printed in small capital letters was received in cipher.

have in the last twenty years, learned nothing more than disorder and anarchy, and a contempt for the laws, and those who administer them. They represent the Executive to be weak and prevaricating; and that from the wretched state of their finances and the corrupt management of them, it would be impossible to offer a long or a serious resistance against a well combined attack of Spanish troops, especially, if by a strict blockade, they were deprived of the resources they now derive from duties on imports. They recommend that the expedition should consist of fifteen thousand men, with a reserve of five thousand on the coast and five thousand in Havana. That they should land at or near Vera Cruz and march directly towards the Capital, when they would be joined by the loyal in great numbers; and that they should confine their operations to reconquer and secure the southern and central provinces, leaving for the present independent the States of Sonora and Linaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Coahuila and Tejas. They further state the policy which in their opinion ought to be observed towards the nobility, clergy and other inhabitants of Mexico, in order to reconcile them to the change and to secure to the crown of Spain, the permanent possession of the Country.

Of the truth of these reports you are better able to judge than I can be; BUT I AM SORRY TO SAY THAT I THINK SUCH AN EXPEDITION WOULD HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF SUCCESS. WITH THE MISERABLE STATE OF THEIR FINANCES YOU ARE ALREADY ACQUAINTED. THEIR ARMY IS AS BAD AS IT CAN BE, AND FROM THE HATRED ENTERTAINED BY THE NOBLES AND CLERGY TO REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS THE INVADERS WOULD FIND A NUMEROUS AND POWERFUL PARTY IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY. TWENTY THOUSAND MEN WELL COMMANDED, WELL PAID AND WELL SUPPLIED WITH PROVISIONS AND MONEY MIGHT MARCH TO MEXICO, BUT SPAIN COULD NOT KEEP POSSESSION OF THIS COUNTRY FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME.

I am [etc.].

919

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MEXICO, November 5, 1828.

SIR: I transmit herewith the translation of a proclamation issued by President Victoria, in consequence of the intelligence which this Government had

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV. For his preceding dispatch referred to, see above, pt. IX, doc. 918, Poinsett to Clay October 28, 1828. The following is the translation of the proclamation of Guadalupe Victoria of October 25, 1828, mentioned:

FELLOW CITIZENS: The Supreme Government has received intelligence from its secret agents in Europe, from respectable persons resident there and from the public papers, of the active preparations which Spain is making, to attempt on the territory of our Republic the barbarous project of reconquest; and to effect it, there is no doubt

received from Europe, and which I communicated to you in my last. This document gave rise to a singular discussion in the Senate. The Secretaries of State were sent for; the motives of the President for publishing such a paper were questioned, and by some members he was declared to be equally culpable with Santa Ana, and to have encouraged the revolutionary movement of that chief.

that she has already assembled some forces at the Havana, which are waiting the arrival of others. There is nothing new in this delirium, and nothing that is not consequent upon the mad obstinacy with which she has suffered herself to be possessed with it. And indeed if the importance of such repeated threats, or what is more of a positive act of hostility, ought to be appreciated by what may be worth in themselves, her wishes, her machinations and her efforts, far from believing that any necessity existed for giving you this warning, I should hold it as certain that the impotency of such wretched attempts, could only induce you to regard them with thorough contempt. But that which fixes the attention particularly in this last intelligence, and obliges me to submit it to the patriotic consideration of my fellow Citizens, is the information in relation to the principal reliance for success in these projected attempts.

That reliance rests on our intestine troubles; the resentment and division they produce; the rancour to which they degenerate; the distrust occasioned between the several classes of the State, towards each other, by unjust accusation and recrimination, and even between persons united by the dearest ties; the bitterness of party spirit which poisons every thing it touches; in a word, on that disorder and insolence which trampling upon the most respectable laws, attack without shame the Government itself, and threaten the dissolution of Society.

From a knowledge of these circumstances very much exaggerated by the delusions of her wishes, arises the haste with which Spain prepares this expedition. This is the impulse which urges her to the enterprise. She well knows that her efforts of themselves would be vain; but expects to find the vigor they may want in the fitness of the moment; she believes that the occasion will furnish all she may need; she believes that divided among themselves, those who with so much anxiety sighed for independence and who achieved it with so much glory and at so much cost, no longer contemplate it as the object of their enthusiasm and adoration, but that their own passions and resentments have supplanted the idol; she believes they no longer love their Constitution, their laws and their Government; but that they postpone them to the gratification of overthrowing those who may oppose their pretensions or opinions; and she believes that this disunion, dissipating the national spirit, enervating the strength of the State, obstructing all the sources of its prosperity and destroying all the Springs which ought to impel the Mexican Republic forward on her majestic march to the high destinies which await her, will cause her to be the prey of the most abominable tyranny.

Such is the belief of the Spanish Cabinet, and such the calculation on which it founds its present efforts and hopes. It belongs to all my fellow citizens to prove it false, and this I exact from all, and every one. Prove it false yes highly false, and not by words alone, but by open acts. Let Spain know and let us prove to other Nations, that if domestic dissensions have arisen in the Republic, how violent soever they may appear, they have not in any respect affected that union of national opinion or that reciprocal kindness which forms the Mexican character; that opposing opinions and pretensions have always a limit at which they terminate, and which they will not exceed; that this limit is the constitution and the laws, in the presence of which all will cordially embrace, and united, sustain them at all hazards, bringing back to the same limit all who have unfortunately strayed beyond it, and that they will never harbour in their hearts any sentiment contrary to them, or on their lips a word which contradict the respectable voice of the law.

Let Spain know that if she chooses to fight the Mexicans, she must fight them united and rallying round their Government; and that she must enter the lists with such power only as she possesses in herself.

Fellow Citizens, listen to the sincere and affectionate exhortation of him whom you have honored with your confidence, and from whom you have received so many proofs that he is incapable of deceiving you. Be governed by it, and I will answer, not only for your triumph, but that the projects of the common enemy shall be dissipated like smoke.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, December 30, 1828.

SIR: I transmit herewith the translation of a letter addressed to me by the former Minister of Central America at this Court.² I have been always aware of the existence of a party in Guatemala which prefers dependence upon Mexico to the dominion of the democracy of their own Country, and of the ambitious designs of Mexico to extend their territories by the acquisition of those provinces. The Mexican Minister who was in London at the time that a British Consul General was appointed to Guatemala went so far as to remonstrate with Mr. Canning, against a measure, which he regarded as opposed to the Interests of his own Government; but without openly avowing what the intentions of Mexico were with regard to Central America.

I am aware too that for the last two months active negotiations have been carried on between this Government and the chiefs of the servile party in Guatemala thro' their agent Don José Maria del Barrio the present Minister. Without having been able to ascertain their exact nature I have no doubt that they tend to affect the Independence of Central America. Mexico does not appear to be aware to what she exposes herself by attempting to establish the principle that a part of one federation is at liberty to depart from the original contract and to unite itself to another whenever it may think proper. I have expressed my disapprobation both of the principle and of the conduct pursued by this Government with regard to Guatemala, and as far as it has been in my power, without committing my own Government have opposed their views; but it is time the subject should be considered by the President, and instructions sent to this Legation, as to the course to be pursued in the event of Mexico interfering in the affairs of Guatemala, and resolving to admit the offers of the servile party in that Republic. Central America cannot be appropriated by either of the great powers which border upon it, nor partitioned between them, without materially affecting the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere. I beg leave respectfully to suggest that an intelligent accredited agent ought to be sent to Guatemala, as soon as possible; some one who might contribute to calm the disturbances which distract that Country.

As the conventions of Panama were not ratified by this Government, a treaty of defensive alliance has been concluded between Mexico and Colombia. It was negotiated by Dⁿ. Pedro Gual and is confined to a pledge of mutual assistance in the event of either of the contracting parties being invaded by Spain.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

² See above, pt. IV, doc. 437.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, *March 10, 1829.*

SIR: In order that the new administration may become acquainted as early and with as little trouble as possible with the actual condition of this Country, I have determined to recapitulate the principal events which have occurred during my residence here, and to trace the causes which have led to them.

The character of this people cannot be understood, nor the causes of their present condition be fully developed without recurring to the oppression under which they formerly laboured. It would lead you into error to compare them with the free and civilized nations of America and Europe in the Nineteenth Century. They started from a period nearer to the age of Charles the fifth, and it is even a matter of some doubt whether this Nation had advanced one step in knowledge and civilization, from the time of the conquest to the moment of declaring themselves Independent. No portion of the Spanish dominions in America was watched over by the Mother Country with such jealous care as Mexico. Its comparatively dense population, its extensive and fertile territory, its rich and varied productions, and especially its mineral wealth, rendered it a source of great profit to Spain; while the history of the ancient splendour of Mexico, and the glory of its conquest could not fail to enhance the value of its possession in the eyes of that chivalrous people. In order to preserve that possession every precaution was taken that human prudence could devise to prevent the access of strangers to Mexico and to keep the people in profound ignorance of their own strength and resources as well as of their relative position with regard to other Nations. Until the publication of the voyage of Baron Humbolt, the Nations of Europe and even their immediate neighbours were ignorant of the very names of many of the fertile districts and populous Cities which he first described. In the permission granted to this gentleman to explore these Countries the pride of the Court of Spain appears to have overcome its habitual caution, and the Baron seems to have in view the gratification of that pride in the highly coloured and exaggerated accounts he put forth of the institutions, the wealth, the resources and the growing prosperity of the Spanish Colonies. It is true that Baron Humbolt saw these Countries before they were desolated by the wars of the Revolution, still to judge from what remains, his accounts of the number and excellence of the public Institutions, of the very advanced state of the arts and sciences in Mexico, and of the splendour and magnificence of the style of living of the nobles altho, they may not have been altogether creations of his own imagination, are very highly exaggerated pictures.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

The nobility and gentry then as now, inhabited spacious hotels, built after the fashion of those of the mother Country, solid and substantial; but still more destitute of all comfort or convenience. Their style of living was not generous or hospitable, altho they sometimes gave costly and ostentatious entertainments. From their absurd pretensions to rank and from their unmeaning jealousy of each other, there never did exist that social intercourse among the higher orders, which in every other Country forms the chief charm of life. Here every man of distinction considered it beneath his dignity to visit his friends or neighbours, and remained in his own house, where in a large gloomy apartment dimly lighted and miserably furnished he received a few visitors of inferior rank who formed his tertulia of every night. It is not to be wondered at therefore that the sons of these men equally uneducated with themselves, fled from the gloomy mansions of their fathers to the Theatre, the coffee houses or the gambling table; and this circumstance united to the absence of all excitement to industry, from the preference given by the Council of the Indies to Europeans for all appointments, rendered the Aristocracy of Mexico an ignorant and immoral race. The same state of society existed among the higher orders of the clergy and marked their character in the same unfavorable manner. The regular clergy formed from the very dregs of the people, was then and is now disgustingly debauched and ignorant. They have lost the influence they formerly possessed over the common people, and so sensible are they of the universal contempt which they have brought upon themselves by their unworthy conduct, that they would not oppose a thorough reform of their orders if the Government had courage to attempt it.

But what more particularly distinguishes the condition of the people in the Spanish Colonies is the character of the labouring classes. That portion of America conquered by Spain was inhabited by a people in a high state of civilization for the age in which they lived. The higher classes fell a sacrifice to the cruelty and rapacity of their Conquerors, and the common people were reduced to a state of the most abject slavery. The existence of this degraded race had a singular effect upon the character of the Spanish Settler. The poorest white man scorned to be placed on a level with the unfortunate Indian. His colour ennobled him, and Spaniards and their descendants would have perished rather than degrade their caste in America by working in the field, or by following any other laborious occupation in which the Indians are habitually employed. Here therefore is wanting that portion of a community which forms the strength of every nation, but especially of a Republic, a free and virtuous peasantry. The Indians cannot as yet be regarded in that light. They are laborious, patient and submissive, but are lamentably ignorant. They are emerging slowly from the wretched state to which they had been reduced; but they must be educated and released from the gross superstition under which they now labour before they can be expected to feel an interest in public affairs. The only political feeling which these peo-

ple now possess is a bitter hatred of the Spaniards or *Gachupines* as they call them, a hatred which has never ceased to exist, and which has been kept alive both by tradition and by constantly recurring instances of cruelty and oppression. Less attention has been paid by this Government to the establishment of primary schools than in any other part of Spanish America. This has been a lamentable oversight, for not only do the great mass of the population require to be educated in order that the real principles of a representative Government may be carried fully into operation; but to inspire them with a decent pride and to induce them to more constant labour and to employ their earnings in rendering their habitations comfortable and in purchasing clothing for themselves and families. At present seven eighths of the population live in wretched hovels destitute of the most ordinary conveniences. Their only furniture a few coarse mats to sit and sleep on, their food indian corn, pepper and pulse, and their clothing miserably coarse and scanty. It is not that the low price of labor prevents them from earning a more comfortable subsistence in spite of the numerous festivals in each year, but they either gamble away their money, or employ it in pageants of the catholic church, in which pagan and christian rites are strangely mingled. All these evils if not cured entirely, would be greatly mitigated by education.

The colleges and other academic Institutions were liberally endowed; but their administration has always been defective and the education the Mexican youth receive at them is very superficial. Previous to the Revolution the Creoles were discouraged from the attainment of knowledge. An acquaintance with foreign languages and general science rendered them dangerous in the eyes of their superiors and operated against their success in life. Since that event they are much changed for the better. The improvement in the condition of the lower orders of the people is very remarkable, altho' they are still far behind all other civilized Nations.

It appears then that the successful precautions taken by Spain to prevent all intercourse between Mexico and other Countries prevented the light of knowledge from penetrating into this Country. Not only were the Mexicans deprived of the means of keeping pace with the rapid progress of knowledge in other Countries during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; but the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed scarcely allowed them to retain the station they occupied at the time of the conquest. The emigrants from Spain who alone were permitted to settle in the Country were among the most ignorant and vicious of that people, who are notoriously a century behind the rest of Christian Europe. They were for the most part the favorites of great men, and came to lord over the creole, to occupy all the offices of honor and emolument and to keep the natives in subjection. As has been already remarked one mode of effecting this object was to keep them even more ignorant than they were themselves. They were assisted in their efforts to this effect by a variety of causes. The want of means of acquiring

knowledge, the absence of all excitement to exertion, the facility of procuring the means of subsistence almost without labour, a mild and enervating climate and their constant intercourse with the aborigines, who were and still are degraded to the very lowest class of human beings, all contributed to render the Mexicans a more ignorant and debauched people than their ancestors had been. Another cause operated still more strongly to produce this effect. The puerile ceremonies of their worship, and the excessive ignorance and shocking profligacy of the clergy. The creoles were taught from their infancy to reverence their pastors as Superior beings and it is not therefore surprising that their pernicious example should have produced such melancholy results. When therefore we examine the actual condition of this people, we ought always to bear in mind the point from which they set out. They were in every respect, far behind the mother Country which is notoriously very inferior in moral improvement to all other Nations. They were not even equal to the other Spanish colonies in America, because their comparative importance and their vicinity to the United States rendered Spain more vigilant in preventing all intercourse with foreigners as well as the introduction of all works, which could enlighten their minds and inspire them with liberal ideas.

It was owing to these circumstances that the feeble attempts which were made to render Mexico independent of the Metropolis from the year 1810 to the year 1821, were the work of parish priests and of the poor Indians. Not one of the nobles and very few, if any of the gentry took part with the Insurgents. It is true that the Revolution was ultimately effected by them; but it was produced by different causes than those which first roused the people to take up arms against the Spaniards. The real motives of the clergy, nobles and European Spaniards to take part in the Revolution of Iguala, are to be found in their desire to protect themselves against the operation of the Constitution and the decrees of the cortes of Spain, which were calculated to reduce their power and influence, as well as to deprive them of part of their vast possessions. Iturbide's ambition frustrated their hopes of seeing a Bourbon seated on the throne of Mexico in conformity with the plan of Iguala, which was drawn up by them. And such of them as were not personally benefitted by his usurpation, became his enemies and used all their efforts to destroy him. After his downfall these same men remained united and have been unremitting in their exertions to establish a Monarchy and to seat a Bourbon on the throne of Mexico. Finding public opinion opposed to their views and decidedly pronounced in favor of Republican Institutions, they attempted to establish a central form of Government, which they were aware would ultimately lead to a consummation of their wishes. Foiled in this attempt by the adoption of the Federal Constitution, they strove to elect a creature of their own to be President of the newly created Mexican States. General Bravo they knew would be governed implicitly by them, and they

spared no exertion to have him elected. They were however again defeated, and immediately formed a powerful opposition to the administration of President Victoria.

General Victoria had been himself attached to this party and had, altho' with different views been in favor of a central Government. He accordingly chose his Secretaries from among the members of that party. Don Lucas Alaman one of the Aristocracy was made Secretary of Interior and Exterior relations; Don Manuel Gomez Pedraza who had opposed the revolution of the people and afterwards taken part with Iturbide, Secretary of War; Don José Ignacio Esteva a personal friend of the President, Secretary of the Treasury; and Don Pablo de la Llave, a high church man, Secretary of Justice & ecclesiastical affairs. It is proper here to mention, that the party in opposition to President Victoria of which these persons were all members, were organised and connected together in a Society under the rules and regulations of the Scotch Masons, and were therefore called *Escoseses*. At this period the affairs of Mexico wore the most favorable aspect. Loans had been effected in London to a sufficient amount to enable the Government to augment the number of their troops, which they did without necessity, to arm and clothe them, and to purchase ships of war. The large sums of money introduced into the Country by the English Mining Companies, contributed in no small degree to the prosperity of the people. Their trade increased to a surprising degree, and the whole Country wore the appearance of abundance. The treasury was overflowing, pensions and salaries were paid with punctuality, and both the Government and people appeared to think that the millions they had borrowed, formed a part of their annual income. The *Escoseses* considered this State of things as the effect of their political combinations and without thinking of the future, called upon the people to admire their work. But the party in opposition looked upon these proceedings with gloomy forebodings. They were excluded by the President from that participation in the Government to which they thought themselves entitled, and as they felt conscious of superior strength, were resolved to overthrow their adversaries. Still in a state of revolution and ignorant of the force of public opinion, and of the means of producing a great moral change in an elective Government, they determined to effect the contemplated Revolution by the strong arm. Such was the state of this Country when we entered it in the Spring of 1825. We soon perceived that we were objects of distrust and dislike to the ruling party. Composed as it was of the Aristocracy, the high Clergy, the Monarchical faction and the Spaniards, it was natural they should look coldly upon the representative of a Republic. They did more, they displayed a hostile feeling towards us, and actually talked of receiving us in a style different from that in which the English Chargé d'Affaires had been received. The Cabinet of St. James had been beforehand with us; they had concluded a Treaty with this Government

and had established their relations here, on the most favorable footing. The President himself had a great partiality for that connexion. He had been the medium of the first communication between the two Countries and he regarded himself as the instrument of effecting the friendly relations which had so lately been established with Great Britain. M^r. Canning too had condescended to write to him and he felt highly flattered by the distinction. This correspondence had fostered, if it had not created, the jealousy with which he regarded the United States. He believed that we were the natural enemies of Mexico, and that the aggrandizement of this Country was incompatible with our Interests and would be counteracted by us, by every means in our power. In combination with the Secretary of foreign relations Don Lucas Alaman he had formed a plan to negotiate a new Treaty of boundaries by which we were to be reduced to the margin of the Mississippi, for they believed that by the Treaty of Washington, we had unjustly deprived Spain of a large portion of her territory. They were exceedingly surprised therefore when no objection was made by this Legation to renew the negotiations on that subject altogether, with a declaration that in that event, the United States would assume the line of the Rio Bravo del Norte, as the boundary; as the reasons which had induced them to cede to Spain their rights to that Territory did not apply to this Country. They were assured that we regarded the Treaty of limits as binding upon both parties, because it had been concluded when Mexico formed a part of the dominions of Spain, but that no objection would be made on our part to annul it. The Congress more wise compelled the Executive subsequently to confirm that Treaty. The party in power availed itself of this question and publicly accused us of ambitious views and of jealousy of the rising greatness of Mexico. In proportion to the repugnance with which the Aristocratic faction regarded us were the cordial advances of the democratic party, and if our principles had not induced us to seek our associates among the latter, we should have been driven to do so by the conduct of the former. Under these circumstances it became my duty to consider the policy which it behooved the United States to pursue towards these Countries and especially towards Mexico, from various reasons the most interesting to us of them all. It was an undeniable fact, that Great Britain had used great exertions to acquire an ascendancy in them all, and had to a certain degree succeeded in doing so. It was known to me that M^r. Canning even before my arrival in Mexico, had sought to excite a sentiment of hostility towards the United States, with a view of strengthening the Interests of England, and the question to be resolved by me, was, whether I should permit a European Nation the most unfriendly to our prosperity to acquire unbounded influence in a neighbouring Republic, or whether I ought to oppose views so hostile to the Interests of America.

The great Powers of Europe have established their separate influences

over the inferior Nations of that continent after a long struggle with each other; and it must be manifest, that the contest for power will be renewed by them in America. Are we to take no part in this contest? Are we to sit tamely by and see Great Britain and France contending for sway in the Americas, nor to concern ourselves in a question which may hereafter so essentially effect [affect] our Interests? Is the policy of the United States in relation to Europe and to these Countries to be the same? I think not. If we do not exercise a direct and salutary influence over the councils of the American States we ought not to permit any European Nation to do so. Is it not obvious that if Great Britain should establish such a dominion over this Country as she exercises over Portugal, that this state of things might prove highly detrimental to our Interests? That this ambitious Nation has attempted and will continue to exert her vast means to effect this object cannot be doubted. In my opinion the United States ought not to permit it, and with this view of the Subject I have acted. I found the British united with the Aristocratic and Monarchical party who governed the Country, and I felt gratified that this party should act towards us in a manner, which not only justified, but to a certain degree compelled us to seek our friends altogether among the Creoles and Democrats.

In this struggle with the English no injury was ever intended or done to their commercial interests; on the contrary, whenever mistakes occurred which was sometimes the case, from the ignorance of these people, they were always fairly and frankly explained by this Legation, in order that no prejudice might result to the British Merchants. And the only advantage taken of our position was to warn the Government against any encroachment on their rights, and to point out to them the baneful effects which must ensue from permitting any foreign nation to acquire an influence over their councils.

We had not been long in the Country, before we became aware of the determination of the democratic party to effect a revolution by force. On this occasion, this Legation felt it their duty to interfere, and to advise a milder course. A Revolution such as was contemplated would have plunged the Country into a civil war, the result of which could not be foreseen, would have paralyzed commerce and have brought still greater discredit upon the Republican Institutions of the new States of America. The history of diplomacy is full of instances of the interference of foreign Ministers to sustain or to save the Institutions of the Country to which they are accredited, and few cases could be cited more important or more urgent than this. These people were told, that they had only to unite, to organize their party, to establish a press of their own, and to bring the whole weight of their numbers to bear upon the elections in order to effect a great moral change, which would assist their views much more effectually, than could be done by force; especially as they were disposed to sustain the federal constitution. Guided by these counsels they abandoned their intention to effect a Revolution by force, and

their efforts to produce a change in the Government by peaceable means, were crowned with the most signal success. Their triumph was so complete, and from that moment the progress of liberal principles so rapid, that the Europeans and Scotch party were induced to regard what was really nothing more than the natural course of events in a free and representative Government, as the direction of some secret and able adviser; and were disposed to attribute their defeat entirely to me. What confirmed them in this idea was the establishment of the grand lodge of antient York Masons, which I had installed. The circumstances attending the formation of this rite in Mexico, were fully explained to the Government in my dispatch of the 8th July 1827, N^o. 94.¹ At the earnest desire of some of the most distinguished Men in the Country, and with the full approbation of the Government, I sent for charters for the five lodges already existing in the Country, and installed the grand lodge of antient York Masons in Mexico. Their opponents had long been organised under the Scotch rite, and had used this Institution altogether for political purposes. They supposed, what proved to be the fact, that the York Masons would follow their example and being more numerous would be able with an equal organisation to carry all their measures; with this perversion of a purely philanthropic institution to the purposes of political intrigue, I took no part, but on the contrary withdrew myself from their meetings so soon as the intentions of the party became manifest.

From this moment the Europeans of every Nation, who had seen in the reign of the Scotch party the probable reestablishment of a Monarchical Government in Mexico, and this defeated party themselves, gave loose to their resentment and rancorous hatred to the Government of the United States and to me by the most scandalous private and public abuse. Even the agent of France who owed his reception by this Government to my advice, which was asked on that occasion, and to whom I rendered the most essential services upon his first arrival, joined the party in opposition, and has not ceased to write to his Government the most exaggerated and false accounts of the state of things here, and to represent me as the genius of evil. The fact is that all these gentlemen have been cruelly disappointed. They supposed that their influence would be unbounded, and the first reception of the English Mission and their early success induced them to believe that their counsels would ultimately prevail. They had the hardihood to speak in loud and disrespectful terms of Republican Institutions and continually practised upon the weak and vacillating Victoria, who certainly for a short period, thought himself the destined instrument, in the hands of God, to restore the antient Monarchy of Mexico. He saw the triumph of Republican principles with dismay, and he too became my enemy.

Attributing the failure of their plans to me, every effort was made use of, to drive me from the Country. Finding threats of no avail, the Legislatures of Vera Cruz and Puebla, were excited to remonstrate against my further

¹ See above, pt. ix, doc. 916, Poinsett to Clay, July 8, 1827.

residence in the Country, and the former published a manifest, directed principally against me, for an account of which I must refer you to my dispatch N^o. 94.¹ The memorable rebellion of Tulancingo in January 1828, had my expulsion for one of its principal objects, and I believe there is no instance on record of a foreign Minister having been so persecuted in any Country.

It is difficult to believe that this hatred has not been the effect of an improper interference in the affairs of the Country. But I trust I have proved that this most singular state of things, has arisen from my steady opposition to the encroachments of European Powers; to my successful efforts to do away with the jealousy and hatred, with which those agents had inspired this people towards the United States, to the aid I most willingly lent to the Republican party in framing their laws and illustrating their constitution, which they had borrowed from us; and to my determined resistance to that superiority which European Agents would fain arrogate to themselves in these Countries. If this Legation had consented to submit to their pretensions, and had chosen to avail itself of the kind and condescending protection which the Agent of H. B. M. proffered it, on its arrival in Mexico, we might have passed on smoothly and insignificantly. We did not think this course compatible with the dignity of our representation, nor with the Interests of the United States, and under this impression have most cheerfully encountered all the obloquy and calumny to which our conduct has exposed us, and have neither felt nor expressed any other anxiety, than that the causes of the opposition we have met with, should be fully understood in the United States, and especially by the Government.

The revolt which terminated in the capture of General Bravo and the chief military leaders of the Scotch party, at Tulancingo, must be too fresh in the recollection of every one, who has taken the slightest interest in the affairs of this Country, to require any further notice of that event here. My dispatch of the 8th January 1828, N^o. 114,² contains a full account of that ridiculous attempt to effect a Revolution against the constituted authorities of the Country, and against the will of the people.

Defeated in this as in every other attempt this party had made to re-establish their power, they determined to seek out from among the predominant party, some fit instrument to defeat the election of General Guerrero to the Presidency. For this purpose, they fixed on the Secretary of War Don Manuel Gomez Pedraza. This Gentleman's career had been a singular one. He had been an officer in the Service of Spain under the viceroys, and had taken an active part in the wars of the Revolution against the Independents. He was afterwards sent deputy to the cortes of Spain. On his return he became one of the Ministers of Iturbide and afterwards a leader of the Scotch party, which had contributed so materially to the overthrow of that

¹ See above, pt. IX, doc. 916, Poinsett to Clay, July 8, 1827.

² Not printed in this collection.

chief. He took advantage of the discovery of the conspiracy of the Friar Arenas, to abandon that party. He spoke to me in terms of reprobation of the infamous attempt made by those men to induce this Friar, to denounce me as the principal instigator of his plot, for an account of which, I must again refer you to my dispatch N^o. 94¹; and openly declared that he could no longer hold communion with men who sought by the basest means, to destroy the liberties and independence of their Country. He stated that he had hitherto been deceived by them, but that having examined the evidence in the case, he was convinced of their participation in the conspiracy, and had therefore separated himself from their Society forever.

In consequence of this declaration Pedraza was most grossly abased and vilified in the papers of his former friends; but when it was determined to make him the Instrument of dividing the York party and of defeating the election of Guerrero, they renewed their flattery and discovered in him all the virtues, that ought to adorn the chief of a great Nation. They certainly could not have made a better choice, to effect their purpose. Pedraza had acquired a certain degree of popularity, by his conduct in the discovery and punishment of the conspirators in the affair of the Friar Arenas; and subsequently in the defeat of the insurgents under General Bravo. He had therefore friends and partizans among the *Iturbidistas* and *Yorkinos*; and finally was Secretary of War, which under this Government, is equivalent to being commander in chief of the army.

Having made this choice various causes contributed to their success. In some States, for instance in Vera Cruz and Puebla, the Legislatures which voted for Gomez Pedraza had been elected before the triumph of the Democratic party in Mexico. They formed a part of the Aristocratic faction, and the vote they gave on that occasion was in conformity with the views of their party and might be regarded as an expiring effort to reestablish their power or to revenge their fall. In all the States of the Union the popular party had gained the elections and in no instance was a single one of the Representatives in those Legislatures reelected. The Secretary of War had taken the precaution to dismiss such officers as were not addicted to him, and especially to appoint military Commandants in the Several States, who were pledged to support his election, and, who did not scruple to use the force under their command for that purpose. The wealth of the Nation is for the most part in the hands of the Aristocracy and of the Spanish Merchants and was lavished to gain over votes where the Legislatures were nearly equally divided, with what success, the result has shown. To these causes is the election of Pedraza to be attributed and it was gained manifestly against the will of the people. From the moment the success of the election was known, the Senate aided by the Supreme Court, both bodies elected during the reign of the Scotch party and therefore most decidedly hostile to Re-

¹See above, pt. ix, doc. 916, Poinsett to Clay, July 8, 1827.

publican Institutions and to the wishes of the people, commenced a series of persecutions against all persons who from their talents, liberal principles or popularity gave them cause of alarm. The Governors of several States were impeached on anonymous charges, suspended from their employments and a determination manifested to persecute them to the death. This most unjust and violent exhibition of their inveterate hatred against the best patriots and most deserving men in the Country roused that spirit of resistance in the people which led to the Revolution of the 4th December. I am firmly persuaded, that if the party had used their triumph with moderation, and had conciliated instead of persecuting their adversaries, such is still the habit in this Country of submission to authority, however acquired, that they would have preserved their power. Fortunately for this Nation they were maddened by their success, and their own ill conduct brought on their destruction. The dismissal of General Lopez de Santa Ana from the command of the State of Vera Cruz, first induced that chief to take up arms; and the false accusation against Don Lorenzo de Zavala Governor of the State of Mexico, and the apparent determination to bring him to the scaffold, drove that distinguished patriot to seek his safety in rebellion. The circumstances attending his persecution and flight, as well as the occurrences of the successful attack upon the Capital, are faithfully set forth in the pamphlet which accompanies this despatch, and to which I beg leave to refer you for some particulars which I omit, in order not to make this communication too voluminous.

Such was the disposition of the people, that whenever the standard of revolt had been created on that occasion, they would have rallied round it. The chiefs who guided their efforts wisely judged that it would save the effusion of blood, to effect a Revolution in the Capital itself, and if possible before the desultory forces which were on their march from the Southern coast should approach it, as they dreaded the excesses these men might commit. So much has been said in our papers and such exaggerated accounts have been written by the Europeans in this City, of the cruelties and disorders which followed the taking of the City by the Revolutionary forces on the 4th of December, that it is necessary the facts should be fairly stated.

An enclosed space on the principal square, in front of the palace, called the Parian, a sort of Bazaar, has always been inhabited by European Spaniards, a race odious to the people of Mexico. It was natural therefore that the infuriated mob, which entered the City on the third day of the attack, should direct their rage against this depository of the goods of their enemies. The shops in this enclosure were broken open and plundered, together with some few others in the immediate vicinity of the Parian, but no other disorders were committed. One person only lost his life on the entrance of the Revolutionists, the Conde del Valle, a man on many accounts odious to the people, and on whose house top a body of troops had been stationed, to defend

that entrance into the City and who had galled the assailants with their fire and killed a great many of their Men.

Even these disorders trifling as they were compared with what a city taken by assault generally suffers, might and ought to have been prevented by the Government. All their outposts had been driven in and their defences destroyed long before the palace was assaulted. Terms of capitulation had been offered them, which they were urged to accept in order to prevent any excesses being committed by the people. These were positively refused and the Government troops continued a feeble resistance, until the square was taken, when they threw down their arms and joined the plunderers. Under all these disadvantages order was restored in the course of two or three hours. Not a stranger was injured or insulted, a rare instance of forbearance, for there was scarcely a European in the City, who had not taken a part against the people. There can be no greater proof of the revolution having been in conformity with the views and wishes of a vast majority of the Mexican people, than the universal joy, with which the news was hailed by the States, and the corresponding change which was immediately effected in all of them. The persecuted Patriots were released from the prisons to which they had been condemned by their implacable enemies, and throughout the whole extent of the Empire, not a cry was heard in favor of the fallen party, or of its chief, who had fled at the sight of the storm.

You will have remarked that one of the avowed objects of this Revolution, and one perhaps which chiefly influenced the people, was the expulsion of the Spaniards from the Country. In order to understand this feeling, it is necessary to explain, that the Spaniards who reside in Mexico have been active agents in all the political changes this Country has undergone for many years past. Under the Viceroys they interfered in all the affairs of Government and not only awed the creoles into patient submission, but controlled the Viceroys themselves. It will be remembered that such of them as attempted to contend against this influence, were deprived of their offices and sent ignominiously out of the Country by these Oligarchists, who never failed to corrupt the troops of the Government for that purpose. The sanction of the Mother Country was always given to these outrageous proceedings, to which they continued to give the colour of excessive loyalty.

The Revolution effected in this Country by Iturbide, received their concurrence and support, because they considered it to be directed against the Constitution which then existed in Spain, and which they could not endure to see established in America where it gave a semblance of self Government to the Creoles. They therefore approved the plan of Iguala, and expected to see a Bourbon seated on the throne of Mexico. Their disappointment in this hope, their utter contempt of the Creoles and their superior wealth, industry and energy of character, have rendered formidable their exertions to restore this Country to the dominion of Spain, and as a preliminary step to that

great end, to overturn its republican Institutions; efforts which have in reality occasioned all the convulsions this Country has suffered, since the declaration of its independence. From the first formation of the Scotch party, the Spaniards have formed an active and efficient portion of it; and now the Senate which was elected at a period when the Legislatures of the States were composed of the same party, refuses to pass a law of expulsion, altho' it has been so clamorously called for by the people. This resistance to the public will, may in the present state of excitement occasion some further disturbances; but what I dread most of all are the evils likely to be produced by the exhausted state of their finances. This Government has been compelled for some months back to have recourse to the most ruinous measures in order to procure the means of paying the troops. They have for this purpose anticipated their revenue for some time to come and have reduced themselves to the greatest distress and to the verge of ruin. With their usual want of foresight and reflexion they go headlong on, without making an effort to reduce their expences, or to organise their Treasury. On this subject they are deaf to all counsel; and this alone renders me uneasy and doubtful with respect to the future tranquillity and prosperity of this Country.

I am [etc.].

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, August 7, 1829.

SIR: I should be sensibly mortified in communicating to you the violent attacks which have been made upon me of late by the Aristocratic faction of this Country and especially that by the Legislature of the State of Mexico, if I could attribute them to any misconduct or even to any want of prudence on my part. But these attacks have been entirely unprovoked, and the conjectures, for you will perceive they are nothing more, which gave rise to them, are utterly unfounded. I most certainly never have given cause for the clamors, which have been raised against me by these designing men, by interfering in the remotest degree in the internal affairs of the Country; nor have I ever deviated from that frank open and manly policy, which distinguishes the intercourse of the United States with foreign Nations. All intrigue is as foreign from my character, as it is from the generous policy of the Government I represent, nor have I ever condescended to conceal the views of either in my negotiations with these States. I am, I repeat, entirely unconscious of having given any just motive for this excitement against me, on the part of

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

the faction in opposition to this Government, unless my uncompromising republican principles, and my friendly intercourse with some of the leading members of the popular party can be regarded as such. In my dispatch N^o. 166¹ I entered very fully into the causes of the enmity entertained against me by the Aristocratic, Monarchical and European faction in Mexico. It broke out into open hostility, before I had been in the Country six months, and their attacks have been unceasing ever since. This party had the power in their hands when I arrived in the Country, and by the nature of their Institutions, were dispossessed of it shortly after. They immediately attributed their downfall to me, to the organisation of Masonic lodges in opposition to theirs, and which had served them as a successful instrument of political intrigue, to my superior management which they *supposed* had been used against them, and indeed to any other cause than the true one: namely, the popular elections and form of Government, which must forever preclude the possibility of an Oligarchy governing the people.

From the unblushing effrontery with which these people assert falsehoods and reason from them as from facts, I feared they would have exercised more ingenuity in their accusations against me.

You will perceive by the accompanying translation marked A that they speak only from conjectures as improbable as they are unfounded. They believe that I am the Soul of the present administration, and its only support, and that if they could succeed in removing me, they would find no difficulty in overthrowing the Government and recovering their power. They excite the people therefore by the most absurd and improbable tales; they tell them that the United States are jealous of the rising greatness of Mexico, and have instructed me to throw every obstacle in the way of its prosperity; they have even had the audacity to assert that the Cabinet of Washington caused the death of their Minister Obregon, and from that to argue publicly that the people ought to assassinate me. But it is disgusting to repeat the infamous proceedings of these men. I must refer you to the papers which accompany this dispatch and to Commodore Porter whom I have charged with the delivery of them, and of other dispatches which have accumulated here, for want of a fitting opportunity to forward them. Commodore Porter has been in the Capital for the last four months, and has witnessed the almost incredible conduct of these men. To him therefore I refer you for a more minute detail of what has passed here, during that period.

I have had frequent conferences with the President of these States, since the publication of the remonstrance of the Legislature of Mexico, and have represented to him the impropriety of such an interference on the part of a State, with the diplomatic relations of the Federal Government; as well as the evil consequences which must spring from this example. He expressed his regret at what had taken place, and in the warmest terms assured me,

¹ See above, pt. IX, doc. 921, Poinsett to Secretary of State, March 10, 1829.

that the General Government was perfectly satisfied with my conduct, and was aware that the attack was directed against them, rather than against me; spoke in strong language of the infamy of those men who sought to interrupt the friendly relations between the two Republics and said indeed everything that he supposed calculated to sooth my feelings, and to satisfy the United States of his friendly disposition towards them. But he had not firmness enough to reply to the Legislature of Mexico, in a manner which would prevent a repetition of those insults from the Legislatures of the States towards foreign Ministers. The good sense of the popular party has hitherto prevented similar attacks being made upon the agents of European Powers. I know such propositions have been made and opposed here by all the influence of the ruling party.

This is, to be sure, a most miserable state of misrule and cannot last long. I am [etc.].

[The following is the document referred to which originated in the legislature of the State of Mexico:]

[TRANSLATION]

PREAMBLE AND RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF MEXICO

STATE OF MEXICO

On the 29th day of July last the following resolution was submitted to the house by Mess^{rs}. Bonilla, Portilla, Velasquez de Leon, Del Rio, Malo, Campos, Galeana and Cordona.

When the nation is threatened by its eternal enemies the Spaniards nothing is more important than to have united as it were in one centre the will of all the subjects of the Mexican Republic. Greater efforts have been made to persuade us of this truth than perhaps of any other, and very properly; but no one thing has been more neglected, than that of adopting adequate measures to obtain this desirable result. Let us commence, Sir, to carry into effect this union which is so much recommended, and let not the wishes of so many true patriots, who are anxious that we may all give each other a fraternal embrace, remain in the sphere of purely speculative ideas. This has to be the first defensive measure adopted by the Mexicans in order to obtain a certain triumph, and without this, all others will be useless. If this be accomplished, the world will then see the whole nation rise up like a formidable giant, to drive beyond the seas the wicked invaders of its territory.

But in the present circumstances, what measure can save us & contribute most essentially to reconcile the minds of the people. No other presents itself at this time to the imagination of the undersigned, than that of petitioning the general Government respectfully but energetically to send the foreign Minister Poinsett out of the territory of the Republic. We voluntarily abstain from entering into the details of the causes that might justify this measure, to foreign nations, and to the Government which has given to the aforementioned Minister the instructions in pursuance of which he has performed the duties of his Commission. In

order not to compromise the national honor, we will not give credit to reports, of the truth of which, we have seen no proofs. We repeat that we will not bring forward charges which might be produced against him for acts which he has been seen to practise, and for all those things of which the federal government is well informed; and in submitting this resolution we will confine ourselves altogether to state the discredit into which this foreign functionary has fallen, and the prejudices, if it be pleased to call them so, with which he is regarded by the Mexicans. We take for the basis of our statement a fact of which no one can entertain a doubt, that he is regarded by all persons as the cause of our differences, and of the misfortunes of the Country. Let this be so or not, it is very certain that all pretext for discord ought to be removed as well as all causes which might in any way disturb the domestic peace and tranquillity, so necessary in the present melancholy state of things when we are threatened by a hostile invasion. All politicians recommend to proceed with circumspection in affairs in which vulgar prejudices are mingled with the public opinion, and altho' we might prove, that public opinion has declared itself in the most positive manner against Mr. Poinsett, it is sufficient for us that the prejudices of the vulgar have been pronounced in a thousand ways against his further residence among us; that they augment daily; and that in the midst of political fanaticism a catastrophe which might compromise our dignity and the national honor would not be extraordinary. Actuated by all these sentiments we request, that in order to preserve the domestic tranquillity and public order a remonstrance may be addressed to the President exciting him to give the proper passport to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of the North, Mr. J. R. Poinsett.

The Legislature adopted this resolution with the following preamble addressed to the President.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The Legislature of the free State of Mexico representing all its inhabitants have the honor to address Your Excellency with the important object of exciting your well known zeal and pure love of Country in order that by virtue of the power conferred upon you, you may be pleased to adopt the only measure which in our opinion can suffice to reestablish confidence, to reconcile the minds of the people and to save the Republic from the dreadful evils with which it is threatened. This resolution of the Legislature has in no way been influenced either by personal feelings or motives of sympathy which are most commonly the origin of similar determinations; much less has it entered into their views to favour or to contend against the passions and interests of either party, which according to their respective opinions might regard it as a triumph, or fear it as the sanguinary spirit of persecution which distinguishes the character of all their most enthusiastic proselites.

The noble end to which this representation tends is precisely the destruction of the fertile seeds of misfortune, the effectual union of public opinion and that fraternal affection which ought to bind together the great Mexican family: and if it should excite the murmurs or enmity of those who fixed their hopes in our domestic dissensions, or of those who over and above timid and pusillanimous see in this measure the signal of a rupture with a friendly power; it will surely be applauded by every

friend of order and of the public peace, as upon these rest our federation, independence and common prosperity.

Mexico, Sir, so long the sport of parties at length detests their destructive tyranny: and undeceived and convinced by the inexplicable evils it has suffered, that its felicity is only to be found in peace, union and the common happiness of its inhabitants, regards with distrust every thing which it understands to have had any part in the misfortunes which have been occasioned by the quarrels of individuals. When a people has become obstinately persuaded of an opinion, it is difficult to make them believe in other reasons or assign other causes than those which they have imagined. Their distrust redoubles in proportion to the obstacles they encounter: and eager to shake off the iron yoke of deceit, they will not consent to submit even to the mild one of conviction. To this extreme have our fellow Countrymen arrived; torn to pieces by the fanatical fury of faction. Regarded with contempt as a people of savages or at least only half civilized, by nations which a short time before thought favourably of their destinies on account of their prudence & circumspection. Threatened by a cruel and barbarous Enemy who in its impotence still dares to compare itself with our actual condition and think itself very superior, and finally in the midst of an immense accumulation of afflictions and disasters the Mexicans reached those limits in which former illusions have no effect and without reflecting on the more hidden causes of their ruin, but fixing their attention on those that are apparent and known they direct towards them alone all their hatred and animosity and an universal clamour is raised to insist upon its separation or destruction, it is not surprising therefore that in the midst of this ferment they should forget the respect due to certain persons of distinguished and elevated character when they believed them to be the authors, or to have exercised a powerful influence in the improper direction of the public affairs in which they formerly took part, altho' in an indirect manner either by their private relations with certain individuals members of the administration and to whom is attributed in a great measure the evils we now suffer, because the unfortunate results in our public affairs have been identified by the people generally with their management, without adverting that perhaps there existed a thousand obstacles difficult to be overcome which prevented a successful issue. Call this if you will political fanaticism but it produces all the effects of exalted passions and leads to the commission of crimes, which being deemed heroic and even innocent acts are more easily perpetrated. In this manner an outcry and an alarm is observed to resound throughout the whole Republic against the Envoy of the United States, Don J. R. Poinsett. His character of diplomatic agent it would appear ought to prevent his taking any part in the affairs of the interior.

The Congress will not say that he has been as some think the soul of our administration; but it is notorious even by his own confession that he contributed towards the establishment of one of those secret societies which will figure with all the others in the history of our common disasters. From hence it is presumed that in like manner as in this unfortunate affair he will continue to take an active part in all others. And as the effects of those associations have been the continual struggle of families against families in which we have seen repeated instances of

utter demoralization and the rupture of the most sacred ties of nature, so likewise will arise others still more pernicious which may reduce us to the extremity of desperation. Arguments in support of this opinion are derived from the following considerations, the different geographical positions of our territory and that of the United States which it is well known produces so great an influence on the diplomatic relations of states; the personal qualities of Mr. Poinsett, and finally the events which have taken place here and elsewhere in relation to him. In effect the North Americans owe to their liberal institutions all that is denied to them by their climate; and it is very natural to believe that Mexico enjoying the same political system united to the advantages of her soft climate, to the fertility of her soil to the mild and docile character of her inhabitants and to all those circumstances which render society grateful and agreeable, would attract to herself an augmentation of population & wealth which would confer upon her a superior reputation and preponderance over the rest of the Republics of this Continent. The North American policy it has been said is opposed to ours and it is their interest to preserve things in their present state in order that Mexico should offer no guarantees nor any description of attraction in her society, nor any advantages in the branches of her industry which might diminish the credit and engrandizement of that nation. Upon this basis their diplomacy with respect to us must necessarily be placed and their Agents must fulfil their mission in this particular. Whether this reasoning be founded in fact or not it is certain that all hold it and feel it to be so, and hence the alarm, distrust & the hatred to each other between the political parties and between all Mexicans.

The personal qualities of Mr. Poinsett confirm this opinion. Every one confesses that he possesses talents highly exercised in negotiations of this description, by means of the many honorable commissions of the same nature which have been confided to him by his government; his highly polished and agreeable manners; his acquirements and the liveliness of his mind, the suavity of his character and the republicanism which he displays, all increase his influence in Society; and these qualities which in every other sphere render Individuals estimable, in a diplomatic Agent, who it would seem in order to be sufficiently circumspect, should separate himself entirely from the world, appear to be interested, and spring from an excessive desire to form to himself a party which he may dispose of as occasion offers and which he may use as an instrument in secret political maneuvers.

Finally the different events which have made so much noise and which have taken place in this country all having reference to his person and which render more suspicious those views which are presumed to be contrary to our well being. For time past we have experienced the strongest commotions which at every shock weaken and impoverish the nation more and more; that which was felt at the revolution of Tulancingo might have occasioned a thousand misfortunes if it had not fortunately been crushed in its cradle.

The parties then were highly irritated and powerful enough to have done each other great harm, and consequently to their Country. Had the struggle been prolonged perhaps we might have been victims of the interference of some foreign power or of the oppression of our enemies, who might have hastened their attempts against us.

Our liberties would have perished. And for whom? It is enough to state, that the principal object of that tumult was the separation of the Minister of whom we are treating. Was it not to be expected that Mr. Poinsett for his own honor would have withdrawn himself voluntarily, or that the Cabinet of Washington knowing the discord which existed in the Country and which under pretext of their Minister occasioned so many evils, would have recalled him in order to avoid fresh catastrophes and not to compromise the friendly relations between the two Countries? Is it not to be suspected that his further residence is the result of very profound and mysterious views.

The Congress of the State of Mexico, Most Excellent Sir, does not bring forward these reasons as its own because it is not its object to prove the propriety of a measure which it solicits by reasons of policy which are purely speculative. It recites only those arguments which all the Mexicans suggest in order to persuade themselves that while this agent remains in the Country discord will not cease to agitate its flaming torch among us. Without enquiring into the truth of these reports, it is sufficient for the Legislature to know the existence of so universal a clamour, that interested in our domestic tranquillity as the only mode of sustaining our threatened independence, in the federation of which it forms a large part and in the public confidence, source of all prosperity, it solicits the adoption of a measure which it believes to be the only one that can save the nation. Neither can the delicacy of the Cabinet of Washington be offended by a resolution which is not the spontaneous act of the Government of your Excellency but the outcry of a whole people which compels Your Excellency to a measure which whether with or without reason they judge altogether indispensable to their happiness, which is superior to every other consideration. Would it not be more painful and distressing that in the daring of political fanaticism a catastrophe should ensue that would stain our decorum and compromise the national honor? For does not history furnish the melancholy truth that where an easy and honorable remedy is not provided, the most criminal and violent means are employed.

God forbid that the Mexican Nation, whose splendour we ought to preserve bright and clear should pass to future ages with the slightest stain of impurity. Let us, Sir, remove all occasion. Let us take away all pretext for disturbances. Let us strengthen the union solidly, the Union! ah! how necessary in our Country in order to recover from its prostration and divisions.

This is the only wish and the noble end of the Legislature in soliciting that Your Excellency to maintain the order and domestic repose of the Republic, will be pleased to expedite passports to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, Mr. Joel R. Poinsett.

On motion ordered that the foregoing preamble and resolution should be published.

[Poinsett's reply follows:]

ANSWER OF THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO THE PREAMBLE AND
RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
MEXICO OF THE 2^d OF AUGUST 1829

It is with the deepest regret, that the Undersigned, finds himself again compelled to repel an attack, made against him personally, and against

the Nation he has the honor to represent, by a body of Men, who, whatever may be their character individually, are entitled to respect from their representation.

The Legislature of Mexico, has thought fit, to call upon the Executive of this Union, to send the Undersigned out of the territory of this Republic; accompanying this proposition by reasons, which if they have any foundation in fact, must lead to a cessation of all friendly and diplomatic relations, between the two Republics. The Undersigned feels, as an American, unfeigned regret at this assumption by the Legislature of Mexico, of the attributes of the Executive power; at this departure from the Constitution of the Country, and at this violation of the rights of Nations, because it furnishes some pretext for the assertion so often made by the enemies of America, that the new States are not fit for self Government. But with whatever indulgence he may be disposed to regard the faults of a young Nation just springing into existence; and most certainly, they have excited in his mind no other feeling than that of compassion; it is due to himself and to his Country, to reply, not to the arguments, for he has not been able to discover one, either in the first proposition, or in the resolution adopted by the Legislature of the State of Mexico, but to the extravagant notions they have deemed it decorous and fitting by a solemn act to publish to the world.

The Members of the Legislature of Mexico who signed the proposition say, that in order not to compromise the National honor, they refrain from giving credit to assertions of the truth of which they have not seen any proofs; and omit bringing the charges which might be made against the Undersigned, for the operations which he has been seen to practice, and for all those things, respecting which the Government of the Federation is well informed. They confine themselves only to the notorious facts of the odium which exists universally against the Undersigned, and the opinion they have formed that in the midst of political fanaticism a catastrophe may be expected which would compromise the National honor and decorum of Mexico. Would it not have been more decorous, to have called upon the Federal Government to furnish the proofs of the improper conduct of the Undersigned, than to adopt the assertions of venal writers, or to mistake the productions of ignorance and malevolence, for the settled opinion of a great and magnanimous people? By such a course, these gentlemen would have avoided pronouncing a gross and shameful libel upon their fellow Countrymen. Who can believe that a foreign Minister is exposed to any personal risk in the Mexican Republic? Such a threat can neither alarm the authorities of the Country nor intimidate the Undersigned; both because in the execution of his duty, he knows no fear, and because he has a perfect reliance on the generous character of the people among whom he resides, notwithstanding they are so strangely calumniated by the Legislature of Mexico. These motives which gave rise to the proposition are so entirely futile and unfounded, that the Undersigned will pass on to the reasoning which induced the Legislature to adopt it, and which is of a still more strange and extravagant character. Not to touch upon the abstract reasoning of the Legislature respecting the effects of the fanatical fury of factions, which he freely confesses he has not been able clearly to understand, he will reply at once to the charge that the diplomatic character of the Undersigned ought to have kept

him from all interference in the domestic affairs of the Country. He utterly denies, that he has ever directly or indirectly interfered in the remotest degree in the affairs of the Republic, unless as he before remarked his declared preference of Republican Institutions over all others, and his earnest desire that no part of America should be swayed by foreign influence, both of which opinions, have, he confesses been strongly expressed by him on every fitting occasion, can be called an improper interference in the domestic concerns of the Republic where he resides as a foreign Agent. But the Legislature disclaim the belief that he has been the Soul of the Administration, they confine themselves to the notorious fact, as confessed by himself, that he contributed to the establishment of one of those Secret Societies, which figure with all others of a like nature in the history of the common disasters of the Country.

It is true that the Undersigned has already stated the part he took in the establishment of ancient York Masonry in Mexico. It is true that at the request of the officers of the five lodges which he found existing in the Country, he sent for charters to New York and installed the grand Lodge. But these officers were men who enjoyed at that time, and with one only exception, still continue to enjoy the confidence of their fellow Citizens, and occupied then, as they still continue to occupy the highest posts in the gift of the people and to which they have been deservedly elevated, for their patriotism and virtues. He had no reason to believe that such men would convert this Institution to improper purposes; nor should it be forgotten, that the Institution existed and would have produced the same effects, be they good or evil, whether the Undersigned had or had not yielded to the solicitations of his friends, and sent for the Masonic charters to New York. With these men, the Undersigned has been associated in habits of intimacy and friendship, for more than three years, and is confirmed in the belief he then entertained that they have been actuated by the best motives and the purest patriotism.

To them he boldly appeals, as to Men of truth and honor, whether he has ever, directly or indirectly taken part in the domestic affairs of Mexico, as the Legislature has gratuitously supposed, merely because he sent for charters to legitimate lodges already existing in the Country, at the request of the most patriotic and most virtuous Men in these States. He appeals to them whether he has ever attended a meeting for political purposes, or for years past entered a Masonic lodge, or attempted to influence them in any other way, than by exhorting them to maintain inviolate the federal and republican Institutions of the Country.

The Legislature of Halpam states that: "In effect the North Americans owe to their liberal Institutions all that is denied to them by their climate; and it is very natural to believe that Mexico, enjoying the same political system united to the advantages of her soft climate, to the fertility of her soil, to the mild and docile character of her inhabitants and to all those circumstances which render Society grateful and agreeable, would attract to herself an augmentation of population and wealth, which would confer upon her a superior reputation and a preponderance over the rest of the Republics of this Continent. The North American policy it has been said, is opposed to ours, and it is their interest to preserve things, in their present state, in order that Mexico

should offer no guarantees, nor any description of attraction in her Society, nor any advantages in the branches of her industry which might diminish the credit and aggrandisement of that Nation. Upon this basis their diplomacy with regard to us must necessarily be placed, and their agents must necessarily fulfil their Mission in this particular. Whether this reasoning be founded in fact or not, it is certain that all hold it and feel it to be so, and hence the alarm, distrust and the hatred to each other between the political parties and between all Mexicans."

If the case were really as it is here set forth by the Legislature, this Republic ought not to permit any agent of the United States of America to reside within its Territory. But the supposition is purely gratuitous, and founded in ignorance of the relative position of the two Countries. Their productions, industry and commerce are so entirely distinct, that no rivalry can exist between them. Mexico possesses certainly within herself the means of greatness; and no one can feel a deeper interest in her prosperity than the Undersigned; he desires most earnestly that she may be permitted by those who rule her destinies, to develop all her resources, and to become a great and consolidated Nation. In this State, the two great republics of North America would contribute more to each other's prosperity and security, than they can do at present; and the Statesmen of this Country, would then be convinced, that there can be no competition between them. Mexico enjoys some advantages which the United States do not possess; and would, under other circumstances hold out great inducements to European emigrants; but nothing can be more erroneous than to suppose that the United States of America, are interested in diverting that emigration from Mexico to their own shores. The population of those States, has increased within the last thirty eight years from about four, to thirteen millions, while the emigration from abroad, has not since the revolution averaged more than twelve thousand souls a year; it will be seen therefore, that the loss of this number, supposing the whole tide of emigration to set towards Mexico, would not injure the prosperity of the United States of America. Without this aid, the population of those States at the present rate of increase, will amount in the year 1870, only forty years hence, to the prodigious number of forty seven Millions. From what then can this dread of the superior greatness of Mexico arise? It cannot be from the fear of her eclipsing our Commerce. Mexico may one day or other have a flourishing trade in the Pacific with the East; but the nature of her sea coast, will effectually prevent her entering into competition with her neighbours, in this particular, on the Atlantic. Is it that from the superior fertility of her soil, she may, as Baron Humbolt has supposed, undersell the produce of the United States in foreign Markets? There are two circumstances which forbid this conclusion. The difficulties presented by the physical construction of this Country to an easy and cheap communication, between the most fertile and productive districts, and the sea coast; and the different character of the laborers in the two Countries. The Undersigned will avoid going into any comparison between them, but confine himself to the singular fact that with every advantage on the part of Mexico, both in climate and soil, the cost of raising all agricultural products here, is very nearly double that of producing the same articles in the United States; and the cost of conveying those productions to market more than quadruple. From these great

and essential differences between the two Republics, it must be clear to every reflecting mind, that there can exist no rivalry on the part of the United States towards Mexico. They have no reasons to wish that their neighbours should be poor and turbulent; on the contrary they wish to see them wealthy and tranquil. They have always cherished and manifested towards them the most friendly feelings, and the people of this Country may rest assured, that the policy of the Government of the United States of America is free from all guile or even concealment. The very nature of their Institutions forbids it. The people have a right to know all the acts of their Government, and do know them. Every thing is published to the world, even the instructions to their Ministers abroad. The Cabinet of Washington is therefore entirely free from all political intrigue and nothing can be more frank than the intercourse of the United States with foreign powers.

Should ever the enemies of America, of whom the Legislature of the State of Mexico appear to be the blind instruments, succeed in changing the present friendly relations, between the two Republics, should ever the United States of America be driven by a series of wrongs and insults, to assert their rights or avenge their injured honor, their hostility will be as open and avowed, as their friendship is now, and has hitherto been, frank generous and sincere.

The Legislature goes on to say that the "personal qualities of the Undersigned confirm the opinion, that the United States seek to prevent this Country from rising into greatness, in order that it should not present to the world any guarantees of social order, because such a state of things, would diminish the credit and aggrandisement, of that, which he represents. That every one confesses that he professes talents highly exercised in negotiations of this description, by means of the many honorable commissions of the same nature, which have been confided to him by his Government; his highly polished and agreeable manners; his acquirements and the liveliness of his mind; the suavity of his character, and the republicanism which he displays, all increase his influence in Society; and these qualities which in every other sphere render individuals estimable, in a diplomatic Agent, who it would seem in order to be sufficiently circumspect, should separate himself entirely from the world, appear to be interested and to spring from an excessive desire to form to himself a party, which he may dispose of as occasion offers, and which he may use as an instrument in secret political manœuvres."

This is certainly a novel doctrine, and the diplomatic corps generally will be surprised to learn, that in order to avoid suspicion and to act with due circumspection, they must seclude themselves from the World, or at all events forbear to associate with the people of the Country where they reside. The Undersigned confesses that he had thought differently both of the qualities and conduct of a foreign Minister. And if in order to be tolerated in this Country, it is essential that a Minister should be morose, austere and haughty in his manners; aristocratic in his feelings and monarchical in his principles, all diplomatic relations between the two Countries must be suspended, for there are no such characters to be found among the public men of the United States of America.

The Legislature of the State of Mexico express their surprise and attribute to profound and mysterious views the permanence of the

Undersigned in this Country after the rebellion of Tulancingo. They ask how it happened that the Cabinet of Washington did not recall him, or that he himself for his own decorum did not voluntarily withdraw from the Country. The Cabinet of Washington regarded the affair of Tulancingo as the movement of a faction in open rebellion against the authorities of the Country and therefore unworthy of their notice; and however respectable the character of the persons who placed themselves at the head of it, both the character and the conduct of that rebellion, were in the highest degree contemptible.

With regard to the voluntary permanence of the Undersigned in the Mexican States, he is surprised that the Legislature who have in the preceding paragraph shown themselves so well acquainted with the duties of a foreign Minister should be ignorant that he is entirely dependent upon the orders of his Government. The Undersigned was sent to Mexico for the purpose of concluding Treaties between the two Republics and did not think himself at liberty to depart until he had accomplished that object. He does not feel at liberty to disclose the progress of the negotiations nor the causes of the delay; but will confine himself to state the fact that he has repeatedly pressed this Government to come to a decision upon them, in order that he might return to the United States. His permanence therefore has not been voluntary nor has it arisen from any profound or mysterious views; but from the simple fact, that the Government of this Union, has not thought fit to decide on Treaties concluded between the Plenipotentiaries of the respective Republics, a very long while ago. The Legislature of Mexico ask whether it would not be more painful and grievous, that in the wildness of political fanaticism a catastrophe should take place which might stain the National honor, for is not the melancholy fact proved by history that where an easy and honorable remedy, is not provided, the most violent and criminal means are employed!! Be the alternative which this sentence conveys, intended as a threat, or as a recommendation to the people to resort to it, it is viewed by the undersigned, with equal scorn and reprobation. He confides fearlessly in the honor of the Mexican people, and feels as secure in Mexico as if he were in the Capitol of Washington. He will however inform the Legislature of Mexico that History presents no example of such an event as they anticipate with so much complacency, having taken place in a civilized Country; and that such insinuations while they vilify the character of a magnanimous people, will excite the horror and indignation of the civilized world.

The Undersigned cannot take leave of the Mexican people, whom he addresses for the last time, without exhorting them to dismiss from their minds all jealousy of such foreign powers as profess friendship for them. The guile and concealment and intrigue which distinguished diplomacy in former times, is no longer practised by civilized Nations; and altho' weak and designing men interpret the most simple actions and the most honorable conduct, as the result of mysterious and profound views, tending to injure this Country, the Mexican people may rest assured that there is no Nation American or European that would degrade itself by such base practices. Above all he exhorts them to believe, that their neighbours the people of the United States of America, have always regarded them with sympathy and the liveliest interest,

and that it is utterly impossible that they should ever feel the slightest jealousy of the prosperity of Mexico.

The United States of America are in a state of progressive improvement, unexampled in the history of the world. Their federal Union instead of dissolving away, as had been predicted by European Statesmen, has gained strength with time; their commerce rivals that of the oldest Nations of Europe; their internal communications, their rivers, roads and canals, teem with the trade of a wealthy and industrious Country; their manufactures are in the most flourishing condition; their Army and Navy will bear a comparison with any in the World; their finances are most ample, almost without taxation; and above all, the mass of their population is better educated and more elevated in its intellectual and moral character, than that of any other Nation. If such be their political condition, can there be any danger, that their progress will be checked or their greatness fade away, before the rising prosperity of Mexico? Instead of feeling any jealousy or distrust of their neighbours, let them enquire to what circumstances are to be attributed their unexampled state of prosperity, and adopt them as the most honorable means of rivalling them.

They will be found to consist in liberal Institutions ably and faithfully administered; a rigid adherence to the Constitution; no one branch of Government usurping the attributes of another; a perfect devotion to the will of the people, constitutionally expressed; an universal desire to promote the common welfare, for which great purpose all are intimately united; a strict and impartial administration of justice; the liberty every man enjoys, to employ his time and his means, to the improvement of his own fortune, without the intervention of Government; the equality of all in the eye of the law; the universal elective franchise, which elevates the character of the mass of the people, and last not least, the abundant and cheap means of education which render that people capable of self Government.

In a spirit of kindness towards the Mexican People, which the insults and clamours of a faction, can never alter, he exhorts them to union among themselves, and to the practice of those virtues which have elevated the United States of America to the high rank which they now hold among the Nations of the Earth.

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*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, August 9, 1829.

SIR: On the 25th of July the Spanish Squadron consisting of a ship of the line, two frigates and some smaller vessels of war with twenty-five transports anchored off the bar of Tampico, and on the 27th landed their troops, about three thousand men, at Caboroxo, twelve leagues south of Tampico. After

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

throwing up entrenchments at Caboroxo, they have pushed forward an advance which has occupied Pueblo viejo and a small fort near the bar. Indeed all the first actions must be in favor of the invading force, as the Mexicans have not as yet more than eight hundred men to oppose to them. Thus far the Spaniards have acted with great moderation and policy. They pay well for the supplies they obtain, reward desertion liberally and hold out fair promises of pardon to all who are disposed to submit to the clemency of their Sovereign. That they have a party in the Country, no one can doubt, but it is feeble in numbers. Their strong hold is in this Capital, where every effort is making to clog the operations of the Government, and if possible to destroy it. Efforts which it is to be feared may be successful, for the ignorance and credulity of these people is surprising so that the agents of Spain and the demagogues of the faction opposed to the Government find no difficulty in deceiving them.

The Congress has been convened and has been occupied in noisy debates on trifling subjects and in mutual accusations and recriminations. The committee of finance has proposed a forced loan of two millions and a half of dollars to meet the immediate exigencies of the Government, to be raised by the States after a certain *pro rata* to be fixed by Congress.

Nothing but the grossest misconduct and the basest cowardice and treachery can betray this Country into the hands of the Spaniards. General Santa Ana has sailed from Vera Cruz with twelve hundred men intending to land at Tuspan. He has risked more than a prudent general ought to have done, for the Spanish Squadron is cruising off Tampico and may have received advice of his embarkation, notwithstanding the embargo laid upon the shipping in the port of Vera Cruz. The troops which had been assembled in San Luis Potosi to the number of four thousand men, have marched towards Tampico, under the command of Generals Garza and Valdivieso and about two thousand men under General Velasco have marched direct from hence for the same point. It is however doubtful whether these officers will act in concert. They are all of the same grade and even in the armies of more civilized Nations it frequently happens that jealousy of rank and command is stronger than love of Country.

I am [etc.].

*George Prager, Vice Consul of the United States at Tampico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

TAMPICO, August 10, 1829.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that on the 24th Ult^{mo}. a Spanish Expedⁿ. from the Havana appeared off this place and effected a landing to the Southward of the Bar without molestation. Without entering into minutiae, suffice it to say, that the Mexican troops retired by degrees almost without resistance, and finally abandoned the place on the afternoon of the 6th inst.—On the 7th inst. the Spanish army entered and I have the satisfaction of saying that hitherto all neutral houses and property have been respected by them. This calm however cannot be of long duration for unless strongly reinforced it is impossible they can hold out long against the native forces which will of course be down soon upon them in great numbers; and I fear this place will become the theatre of War. The Spanish authorities are now in the act of arranging a custom house on the basis of that of the Havana, and have appointed an Intendant and civil officers.

The Mexicans before retiring obliged all the merchants of this place to give in the Bills of Lading of monies rec^d. by them in the last *conducta* from San Luiz and insisted on the delivery of the am^t. to be sent to the Interior, and this they effected, notwithstanding the remonstrances made by the British and French consuls and myself to the contrary and they threatened to carry the same into effect by means of an armed force. On the morning of the 4th inst. they arrested in his house Francisco Mazas, citizen of the United States married in Philadelphia and long resident there—he was said to be accused of some treasonable practises against the Mexican govern^t. and being a Spaniard by birth, the popular feeling was strong against him. I demanded his person repeatedly from the civil and military authorities both verbally and by writing, but could get no answer whatever.

This citizen they marched out along with them, his arms tied and linked with a negro accused of something similar; and a body has since been found distant 8 miles from this place supposed to be that of Mazas but so disfigured by wounds and putrefaction as to make it difficult to identify it. The part of the dress however which remained on the body was known to be his, and there remains little doubt in the minds of two respectable citizens of the U. S. who found the body, but that Francisco Mazas has been barbarously murdered without even the form of a trial.

He was a man, universally beloved and respected.

There is a great deal of American property in this place and altho' the United States Government has a station so very near us as Pensacola, I regret to state to you that no vessel of war has been here for the last 6 months.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Tampico, I.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, August 22, 1829.

SIR: The Spanish troops have taken Tampico de Tamaulipas, and are fortifying the place. General Santa Ana is by this time before it with a desultory force of between seven and eight thousand men. The Spanish squadron suffered him to reach Tuspan in safety, and he has been appointed General in chief of the division of operations against the Spaniards. The position occupied by the latter is very strong, having a deep and broad river in front and a lake in the rear, and its only approach narrow roads across a morass. So long as they can keep up their communications with the Sea, they may maintain themselves in Tampico. It is not probable that they will venture to march into the interior with so small a force.

The law for raising a forced loan of two millions and a half has passed.

Two divisions are to be organised, one to be situated between Puebla and Perote, under the command of the Vice President General Bustamante; and the other in the Western provinces, under the command of General Figueroa.

The Country is in my opinion in more danger from the intestine divisions of its own citizens, than from any force the Spaniards can send against it.

The Senate obstinately refuse to accede to the propositions of the Government for the defence of the Country, and the majority of the Chamber of Deputies have resolved in the event of Senate persisting in their resolution, to secede and dissolve the Government. They propose in that case to publish a manifesto, addressed to the Nation, setting forth their motives for adopting this desperate measure; and in strong terms reprobating the unworthy conduct of the Senate. Some change and that a radical one is on the eve of taking place in this Country.

Under these circumstances and considering too that the Spanish fleet will probably blockade the coast of the gulph of Mexico, I think it my duty respectfully to suggest to the President the necessity of sending a strong naval force into these seas. The presence of an American Squadron, and especially of a ship of the line, would not only protect the valuable commerce we have with this Country from aggression on the part of the Spaniards; but would command respect from these people, and lead them to act with more courtesy towards our flag and our Citizens.

I am [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, September 2, 1829.

SIR: The Congress of this Union adjourned on the 28th Ult^o. after passing an act to authorise the President to adopt such measures as may be necessary for the preservation of the independence, of the existing system of Government and of the public tranquillity; the only exception made to this power is that he may not dispose of the lives of the Mexicans, nor banish them from the Country. This act constitutes General Guerrero, dictator in fact, until the next meeting of Congress which will take place in January 1830.

I mentioned in my last that General Santa Ana appointed Commander in chief of the Division of operations against the Spaniards had arrived safely at Tuspan. From thence he advanced along the coast to Pueblo Viejo de Tampico, which he found abandoned by the Enemy. Learning that the invading Army had advanced into the Interior, as far as Altamira, about eight leagues from Tampico de Tamaulipas, he formed a plan to surprise the garrison which the Spanish General had left in that place. Having sent orders to General Garza who commanded a body of Mexican troops a short distance from Altamira to attack that place, in order to make a diversion in his favor, he crossed the river in the night, below the Town with about 400 men. His intention of surprising the Spaniards, was frustrated, by a militia man firing his musket, by mistake or negligence, when the little squadron of canoes was within a stone's throw of the shore. The garrison was thus warned of the danger, and were in battle array when they were attacked by Santa Ana's small division. The Spaniards were driven from all their positions and the Mexican Troops had taken possession of the principal square, when the commanding officer of the former offered to capitulate. General Garza had not executed the order sent him by Santa Ana, and the action had lasted so long, that the troops which were stationed at Altamira, had time to reach the scene of action before the terms of capitulation had been concluded. Their presence, being upwards of 2,000 men, changed the face of things altogether. Santa Ana however maintained his position in the principal square, and the Spanish General demanded a parley. Santa Ana boldly declared that he would treat on no other terms than an unconditional acknowledgement of the Independence of the United Mexican States and an immediate evacuation of their Territories by the Spanish forces. To his great surprise and that of every one else, the Spanish General Don Isidro Barradas told him that he might retire to his former quarters at Pueblo Viejo, when they would renew the negotiations. Santa Ana too happy to escape so easily filed thro' the City with his little band of 400

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

men, with colors flying and drums beating and recrossed the river to Pueblo Viejo. The conduct of Barradas is unaccountable.

It is now that these people begin to open their eyes to all the abuses of the war Department. Their army of 30,000 Men, as it appeared on the return costing upwards of Ten Millions of Dollars a year, has dwindled down to something less than eight thousand effective Soldiers, and the Government is obliged to call out the Militia to assist in repelling an invading force of 3,500 Men.

The State of Xalisco is striving to form an independent League, to be composed of that State, and the States of Guanajuato, Zacatecas and San Luis Potosi. The invasion and the immediate danger to which their Independence is exposed may prevent the present success of this scheme: but this Federation is as a rope of sand, and will crumble to pieces ere long.

I cannot refrain from repeating that in my opinion we ought to have as soon as possible a Squadron on this coast. The Commerce of France and of Great Britain is protected while ours is at the mercy of the Belligerents.

I am [etc.].

927

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, September 22, 1829.

SIR: Official accounts were received last evening from General Santa Anna of the capitulation of the Spanish invading army under General Barradas, to the Mexican forces before Tampico de Tamaulipas.

A Translation of the official communication made to this Legation, by the Mexican Government of this important event, is herewith transmitted.

I have the honor [etc.].

928

*José María de Bocanegra, Secretary of State of Mexico, to Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico*²

[TRANSLATION]

MEXICO, September 22, 1829.

The Undersigned Secretary of State and of Interior and Exterior relations has the honor to remit to Y. E. by order of H. E. the President several copies

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV. For the official communication from the Mexican Government, see immediately following (doc. 928).

² MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV, enclosed with Poinsett to Clay of the same date which immediately precedes this (doc. 927).

of the official bulletin which contains the account given by the General in chief of the army of operations, of the fortunate termination of the campaign against the Spanish army under the command of General Barradas, the details of which will be communicated to Y. E. as soon as they arrive; and also copies of the proclamation which H. E. the President has addressed to the Mexicans on this happy occasion. On making this communication the Undersigned is directed to state to Y. E. that altho the Supreme Government is not surprised at this result of the invasion of the so called Vanguard of the Royal army, the fact, of its having been accomplished in so short a time, and in the midst of so many circumstances, which cover with glory the Mexican arms, commanded by the brave and tried General in chief Citizen Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, has filled it with a joy and satisfaction to describe which language is inadequate; especially when it is considered that this War, as it has resulted, far from being a political evil, has been in reality a happy event, the origin and beginning of inestimable good; having consolidated the National Independence, instead of destroying it; having strengthened, instead of weakening, the reputation and credit of the Federation; having awakened and called into action, the spirit of the Nation in favor of National Liberty; having furnished an opportunity to carry into effect serious and efficacious measures for the reorganisation of the army and of the Treasury; having called public attention to the necessity and the means of organising a plan of defence by which with greater facility and without any sacrifice whatever any other aggression which shall be hereafter attempted may be repelled; and above all, having made evident and palpable the great excellence of the Union and its inestimable effects, which may be hoped thereby to be now forever consolidated among the Mexicans, and to present to the rash invading Nation in the sequel of this glorious event, so many and such means of being undeceived, that if there exist in it a single particle of judgement and of respect for its own reputation and interest, it is to be expected, that at length, confounded, it will learn to appreciate its utter incapacity to act against those who sustain the holy cause of liberty.

H. E. the President thro' the Undersigned begs Y. E. to permit him to take the liberty to communicate to you this happy occurrence which has liberated from the inevitable risks of war, the property and the fruits of the industry of the subjects of your Nation, which was one of the gravest subjects of reflection which occupied H. E., altho' in this particular, he was tranquilised and consoled by the consideration that no provocation had been given on our part; and he hopes that Y. E. will have the goodness to transmit intelligence of this important event to the high consideration of your Government.

The Undersigned profits of this opportunity to repeat [etc.].

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, October 2, 1829.

SIR: We have at length received details of the battle, if such it can be called, which preceded the surrender of the Spanish forces under General Barradas, to the Mexican General Santa Anna.

It appears, that General Santa Anna, after constructing two batteries on the right bank of the River Panuco, at points called Piedras and Humo, immediately opposite to the Town of Tampico de Taumalipas [Tamaulipas], which the Spaniards permitted him to do, without interruption, ordered General Teran to advance with his Division, and take post at a point called Doña Cicilia situated between the new redoubt constructed by the Spaniards and the mouth of the River and the Town of Taumalipas. In this situation both parties were assaulted, on the night of the 9th September by an equinoctial hurricane, which raised the waters so as to compel the Mexicans to take refuge in the woods, and the Spaniards to abandon the fort, and move towards higher ground. As soon as the gale had abated and the waters subsided, General Santa Anna crossed over, and having ascertained that the Spanish Garrison had the night before evacuated the fort at the bar, he hoped to surprise it. He was however too late, and he then resolved to storm it. The outer works were carried, but being commanded by an interior redoubt placed upon a higher sand hill, the Mexicans were checked, and when about to renew the assault, the Spanish General who was in Tampico de Taumalipas hung out a flag of truce and proposed to surrender. His situation was critical, to be sure, being cut off from all his communications, but the Town had only been cannonaded and bombarded. It is to be presumed however, that he knew his situation to be desperate and was anxious to save the lives of his men.

The Spanish forces are to be reembarked for Havanna as soon as possible, and to maintain themselves until the shipping arrives. They delivered up their colours and arms and are to be cantoned in the several Towns in the neighbourhood of Tampico, until reembarked. General Barradas has gone to New Orleans to procure transports. Should the second expedition arrive, it is to return immediately to Havanna. The annexed plan will enable you to trace the operations of this most disgraceful invasion. These silly people were deceived by the reports of the exiled Spaniards, and by the base faction which has conducted itself in so scandalous a manner towards the United States and towards me. It was when they expected to be supported by the rebellion of Tulancingo that they made their first attack upon me, and they renewed their threats and clamours with still greater virulence on the invasion of the Country by a Spanish Army.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

The State of Xalisco failed in forming a separate league with four other States, and there is some prospect of a short period of tranquillity in this Country.

I am [etc.].

930

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[DECODIFICATION]

MEXICO, October 14, 1829.

SIR: Col. Basadre, to whom I have given a letter to you, leaves Mexico to-day on a mission to France, as it is said. This person is a deputy in the lower house, and stands high in the confidence of the President.

This Government has resolved to send a secret mission to Haiti, in order to concert measures with Boyer to excite the slaves in the Island of Cuba to revolt; and I have some reason to believe that Basadre has been charged with this commission, and that the mission to France is a mere pretext to cover the real object of his voyage. I have communicated my suspicions to the French Consul, and it is proper that the British Government should be informed of this attempt to excite a servile war in Cuba: but the conduct of the Legation of that Government at this Court, has prevented me from holding any confidential intercourse with it on this or on any other subject.

I mentioned to the Secretary of State that I was aware of the intentions of this Government in relation to Cuba, and could not but disapprove of them.

He did not attempt to deny them, and I then stated that I was well convinced my Government would not only highly disapprove of any such attempts but would oppose them. I am convinced that the state of the Island of Haiti will not permit Boyer to take any active part in aid of the designs of this Government, and that even if he possessed the power and were so disposed, one word from France would restrain him from doing so. But these designs would command the active coöperation of Bolivar, and of a host of emigrants from Cuba who are scattered over these continents and the adjacent Islands. I cannot but think the interests of the United States require that they should be promptly and effectually counteracted. Basadre carries with him twenty commissions for privateers, which he is instructed to dispose of in the United States.

I am [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

*Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MEXICO, October 14, 1829.

SIR: By the last mail I received advices from Guatemala with the enclosed note from the Secretary of foreign affairs of that Government addressed to you.

My correspondent, who is Secretary of the Treasury writes, that "all is tranquil in that country except that the sensation produced by the news of the Spanish invasion has been very great." He informs me likewise, that "the Minister of that Government at Mexico has been recalled for it has been discovered by letters from him which have been intercepted that while you were acting in favour of the interest of this country he has acted against them."

I am only surprised that this discovery should have been made so late. For at least a twelvemonth past this person has sought to persuade this Government to take an active part in the civil wars of Guatemala in favour of the aristocratic party, altho' he must have been aware that such a measure would have endangered the independence of his country.

I am informed that the civil war is still feebly carried on in the State of Nicaragua.

With great respect [etc.].

*George R. Robertson, United States Consul at Tampico, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

TAMPICO, December 4, 1829.

About five hundred Spanish soldiers are yet remaining in this Town, but the sickness is so great among them that from fifteen to twenty die daily.

I have the Honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Mexico, IV.

² MS. Consular Letters, Tampico, I.

*José María Tornel, Mexican Minister to the United States, to Daniel Brent,
Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

BALTIMORE, *August 22, 1830.*

SIR: The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Government of the United Mexican States, near that of the United States of America, has the pleasure to communicate to Mr. Brent, charged with the business of the Department of State in the absence of the Honorable Martin Van Buren, the explanations which he desired in his note of the 19th of the current month, in relation to the nature, object, and extent of the subjects proposed to be discussed at the conferences which he has solicited with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The perfect confidence of the Government of the Undersigned in the policy and in the conduct of that of the United States with regard to the cause of the Independence of the New American States, and of their international rights, will serve for a preliminary and as a basis, in the negotiations which may result from these conferences.

This happy disposition, and the most sincere harmony between the two nations and the Governments which watch over them, being admitted, it will be proper to pass to the consideration of the position of the Mexican Nation, and of the other Nations which shook off the Spanish yoke, in relation to the mother country, (Cantigua metropoli,) who has shewn herself no less obstinate since the glorious event of Tampico.

But as the English Cabinet, and perhaps that of His Most Christian Majesty, are employing the counsels of prudence, which are also those of humanity, for the purpose of inducing His Catholic Majesty to withdraw from the line of conduct which he has hitherto followed, to the prejudice of the permanent and well-understood interests of Spain herself, the Undersigned will be glad to be informed of the part which the Government of the United States may take in these negotiations—called upon, by its situation, by the identity of its interests, and by its own glory, to figure in a denouement (desenlace,) the most important which will present itself in the lapse of many ages.

As it is possible, however, that the King of Spain may disregard the wishes of his friends, and entertain hopes, though remote and chimerical, of restoring the American States to dependence, at these meetings it will be a proper matter of inquiry to examine to what point the strict neutrality of the United States may allow them to go, in a contest which the Mexican Nation will prosecute with ardor—with the valor with which she commenced it,—and with the spirit of which a great and generous people is capable.

¹ MS. Notes from Mexican Legation, I.

The details will be the necessary result of the conferences. It is proper to repeat to Mr. Brent, for the information of his Government, that that of the Undersigned is animated by the most kind feelings towards this great Nation, and is desirous that it may continue to shew itself highly worthy of the elevated rank to which its virtues, its wisdom, and its natural sympathies with the interests of liberty in the civilized world, have conducted it.

The Undersigned avails himself of the occasion [etc.].

PART X

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE NETHERLANDS

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE NETHERLANDS

934

*Alexander H. Everett, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Brussels, to
John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

BRUSSELS, *January 5, 1819.*

The meeting of Sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle was over before I reached England. You have received, I presume satisfactory assurances from the Ministers in Europe that the course taken there in regard to South America was agreeable in every respect to the wishes and policy of the United States.

935

*Alexander H. Everett, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Brussels, to
John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

BRUSSELS, *August 8, 1819.*

SIR: The Parliament of Great Britain has lately closed its annual session. The principal objects of a public nature discussed in the course of it, were the resumption of cash payments by the Bank, the reformation of the criminal code, the prohibition of enlistments for the South-American service, and the financial scheme of the year. . . .

The act prohibiting enlistments for the South American service seems to be in contradiction with the policy which has hitherto been pursued by the British cabinet in regard to the contest between Spain and her colonies; and which has been avowed and defended by the usual ministerial organs. It is also in opposition to the sentiments of the great mass of the people, which are very strongly pronounced in favour of the emancipation of the Americans. Sir Ja^s. Mackintosh was the organ of this opinion in the House of Commons and made one or two very ingenious speeches against the bill. As the Ministry have nothing to apprehend from the Spanish Government or from any other quarter on this subject, some special motive seems necessary to account for their deviating at this late period of the war from the system, upon which they have hitherto acted with so much advantage. This motive may possibly be found in the late cession of Florida to the United States; a measure

¹ MS. Dispatches from the Netherlands, VI.

which seems to have awakened their jealousy in a considerable degree; and which, if any credit can be attached to popular reports, has induced them to seek as a sort of compensation a cession to themselves of the island of Cuba. If any such demand has really been made, this act may have been intended to support it; but it is hardly possible that it can succeed. The final determination of the Spanish Cabinet even in regard to Florida has been rendered somewhat uncertain by the late change in the Ministry, the reasons of which are not correctly known: and which is attributed by some to a change in the King's policy in this respect. The unfavorable reception which has been given to Mr. Onís upon his return seems to countenance this idea; however improbable on all considerations of policy and justice.

Meanwhile great efforts have been made in England to take advantage of the remaining interval in which enlistments are allowed: and the largest expedition, that has proceeded from G. Britain on this service is now fitting out in the Irish Channel under the direction of General Devereux. This officer was one of the principal military leaders in the last Irish rebellion, and had a command at the battle of Vinegar hill. When the fate of that insurrection was decided, he left his country and has since resided mostly in the United States. His preparations are made without the least disguise, and the late newspapers contained an account of his public military levee held at Dublin. His forces are said to consist of not less than five or six thousand men. The other principal agent from South America is Count Macirone, formerly aide-de-camp to Murat: and who has just embarked from Dublin, as is said, to take the command lately held by McGregor.

936

*Alexander H. Everett, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Brussels, to
John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private.

BRUSSELS, December 8, 1823.

The attention of the political world of Europe is principally turned at the present moment towards South America—perhaps for want of any object of immediate and pressing interest at home. The King of Spain appears to have adopted a policy towards the new States quite conformable to the general spirit of his Government; and instead of recognising their independence is said to be fitting out an expedition for the purpose of reducing them again by force to submission. In this determination he is probably encouraged by some of the Continental Powers especially Russia. Mr. Pozzo di Borgo,

¹ MS. Dispatches from the Netherlands, VII.

who went on to Madrid to compliment His Majesty in the name of the Emperor Alexander upon his resumption of absolute power, made an address upon his presentation which has been published, and in which he threw out in guarded terms several hints of the propriety of recovering the Colonies. The advice of England will of course be different; and her policy is indicated with sufficient clearness by the measure of sending out a commission of inquiry to South America at the very moment when the King was resuming his power. The part that may be taken by France is more doubtful, and is still perhaps a matter of uncertainty in the Cabinet itself. It is however stated very confidently in the London *Courier* that the French Government have given positive assurances that they will not assist in subjugating the ancient Spanish Colonies. Austria and Prussia follow of course in the train of Russia. Upon the whole however there is little probability that Spain can derive from any foreign power any effectual assistance in a project of this kind: and the mere conception of the possibility of effecting it by her own resources is perhaps as strong a proof as could be given of the presumptuous inability of the King's new Counsellors.

937

*Alexander H. Everett, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Brussels, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private.

BRUSSELS, January 12, 1824.

The arrival of the President's message produced a more lively sensation in Europe than either of the events I have mentioned or any other that has occurred since the counter revolution of Spain. It seems to have given entire satisfaction to all parties in England, and the organs of the liberal opinion in France and this country—the only ones on the Continent where the avowal of such an opinion is now tolerated—have expressed the same sentiment in a rather more subdued tone. If I may be allowed to describe my own feelings, I must confess that I have been uncommonly gratified by the high and honourable stand taken by the Government upon the South American question. Nothing could be more timely than the declaration upon this subject: and it seems to be generally thought that it will be decisive against an intervention. The Ministerial prints of Paris have manifested some ill-humour in regard to this part of the message; but have found it convenient to falsify the tenor of the President's remarks before they undertook to refute them. The *Etoile*, for example, a leading government paper, discovers in the message the avowal of an intention to oppose any attempt of

¹ MS. Dispatches from the Netherlands, VII.

the Kings of Spain and Portugal to reconquer their colonies or of the British nation to extend their settlements in Canada. The *Journal des Débats* of Friday last in a short article apparently from the pen of Mr. de Chateaubriand who often writes in that paper, affected to treat the matter in a tone of pleasantry; remarking that much was said in the newspapers about war between the Allies on the one hand and the United States and England on the other respecting South America, but as far as he knew nobody thought of attacking South America—that the United States might if they chose amuse themselves by arming and sending out their fleets but that they would meet with nobody but friends at Sea. As it happened there was a long article in the leading fanatical journal, the *Quotidienne* of the same day, urging the expediency of an armed intervention by the Allies in the affairs of South America.

938

*Alexander H. Everett, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Brussels, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private.

BRUSSELS, February 21, 1824.

Since I had the honour of writing to you last the British Parliament has commenced its annual session. The King's Speech deals for the most part, as usual, in vague generalities. The passage respecting South America which has no very distinct meaning as it stands, was explained by Mr. Canning to signify that the Government had refused to assent to a proposition made by the Continental Powers to arrange by mediation the affairs of Spain & South America. He also made some remarks which were variously reported in the newspapers and gave rise to a good deal of controversy respecting a negotiation actually going on with Spain upon the same subject. These observations have since been elucidated by the publication of the Spanish decree declaring the trade of the Colonies entirely free to all nations upon the footing of equality of duties.

The text of this decree is given in the *Courier des Pays-Bas* of this day. It was obtained from the Spanish Cabinet by the urgent solicitation of the French Minister, and is rather fitted to promote the interest of France—as understood by the present Government—than that of Spain. The delicate consciences of the French Ministers would not suffer them to allow their subjects to trade with the new states without a previous permission from the King of Spain: and the only immediate object of this decree seems to be to place France in this respect upon an equal footing with other nations

¹ MS. Dispatches from the Netherlands, VII.

less scrupulous on the point of right. But even this effect would hardly follow from the decree according to its natural construction. Under ordinary circumstances it could only be considered as opening the trade with the colonies in a state of quiet submission to the parent country: and supposing that an intercourse with revolted subjects might be tolerated under it, it is evident that if it meant merely what it says—its precise object could never have been to authorise this description of commerce. The decree therefore makes no real change in the state of things, even as to the point of right; since it is only by the connivance and in consequence of the weakness of the Spanish Government that the trade with the emancipated colonies can be carried on even now: and it might have been and was carried on in the same way before. The decree taken in connexion with the circumstances under which it was issued amounts to a declaration by the King of Spain that he is wholly incapable of conquering the colonies and is willing to allow other nations to treat them as independent States, although his pride does not permit him to acknowledge them as such himself. The French Government in persuading the King to issue this decree have—without any real advantage to themselves—put him under the necessity of making a public avowal of his own humiliation and weakness. They have induced him to sacrifice appearances merely that they might save them; and this at the very time when they were pretending to treat him with extraordinary delicacy and perhaps really supposed that they were doing so. Having prevailed upon the King to wave the objection of form it is probable that they might have persuaded him just as easily to acknowledge the independence of the Colonies as to publish this decree which supposes without positively admitting it. Had they done this they would have rendered a real service to Spain, to France and to the world: but how could a liberal and manly policy be expected from a body of fanatical Crusaders? The sorry device which they have hit upon for the purpose of gaining admission into the new States is much more in character. This decree was perhaps intended to embarrass the proceedings of the British Government on the supposition that they cannot now plead as a pretext for acknowledging the independence of the colonies the necessity of protecting their commerce. Indeed this object is openly avowed in the French Ministerial Journals. It is not impossible however that the Bourbon Cabinets will find themselves disappointed in this respect. If the British Government should happen—as is likely enough—to be piqued at this attempt to outmanoeuvre them they may not improbably break at once through the cobweb restraints of delicacy which have hitherto held them back and recognise the new States without farther delay. The publication of this decree proves I think, that it is not intended by the Allies to assist Spain in recovering the Colonies by force and it wears thus far a favorable aspect.

*Alexander H. Everett, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Brussels, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private.

BRUSSELS, *March 26, 1824.*

SIR: The papers laid before the British Parliament by Mr. Canning, and which appear to have been communicated to you some time previously, have set at rest the question of the interference of the Continental Powers in the affairs of South America. England is pledged to oppose such a policy; and France has publicly declared that she has no intention of joining in it, and considers the recovery of the Colonies by Spain as hopeless. Under these circumstances the Holy Allies will probably not think it prudent to interfere in the business; and as active exertions on the part of Spain, for any purpose are entirely out of the question, the new states will, to all appearance, be left unmolested to lay the foundations of their future greatness.

*Christopher Hughes, Jr., Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at The Hague, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

THE HAGUE, *July 17, 1826.*

Prince Frederick spoke, and with evident interest, about the affairs of South America; and particularly of the defection of Paez. He made this observation: that however such events might occur, and would cause great internal, domestic agitation, in South America, yet they did not, and could not, brighten the prospects of Ferdinand; or bring him one inch nearer to the recovery of his Sovereignty; that that question was at rest; *and forever*: and that he knew of nothing more absurd, than to affect to doubt it.

¹ MS. Dispatches from the Netherlands, VII.

² *Ibid.*, VIII.

PART XI
COMMUNICATIONS FROM PERU

COMMUNICATIONS FROM PERU

941

A prospective glance at Peru—Statement of W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Chile and Buenos Aires¹

SANTIAGO, CHILE, July 1, 1818.

The Vice King, Pezuala, by the expedition which he sent to this state, under his son in law Genl Osorio, has ruined his country. He is now without officers or Soldiers—and if Genl. San Martin goes on rapidly against Lima, the Kingdom of Peru will fall without much difficulties—About 5,000 troops are under Genl Cerda in Upper Peru to hold General Belgrano, the Buenos Ayrean Commander in check, who is now in Tacuman, with about 3,000 Troops—The operations against Lima, will most probably be carried on both by land & water—That is, the Royal General will fall back to cover the capital—Belgrano advances by Potosi &c.—and 5 or 6,000 under Genl. San Martin will embark on the Pacific ocean and in 8 or 10 days they are at Calao,—They have sufficient vessels in Valparaiso at this moment to Transport that number of Troops, for they may stow them as thick as possible in so short a voyage & in so delightful a passage—They have the Lantaro, a 52 gun Ship, They have the Coquimbana 20 Guns, and the Cumberland a British East Indiaman has come out to them for sale. She is 14,00 tons—I don't know if they will buy her, besides they could get other vessels sufficient for the purpose—then they must have the command of the Sea to ensure safety in the transportation, The two vessels from N. York, with what they have, which are daily looked for can give them the supremacy—all they want is money.—and I suspect they will try to raise about \$700,000 which perhaps will do—If they do not make the attack on Lima between this & January next they may have lost the Golden opportunity.

The Commerce of Upper Peru is of immense value to Buenos Ayres—when it was before in the possession of the Patriots 100 Legues beyond Potosi O—Boxes of Linnen which sold for \$45. by the piece—fell after the Patriots lost it (in the unfortunate battles of which that of Lepi Lepi—was the last.) to 17 dollars—This example shews the importance—Had the Lantaro been well managed in her affair with the Esmiralda Talcahuano would have been Taken, and Lima been a very easy conquest—See an account of that affair in the Ministerial Gazette of Chile No 39 page 2—as it is at present I cannot say when they will take Talcahuana which must be done before they proceed against Lima. I have now no good ground of calculation—everything waits

¹ MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I. This statement was No. 16 among some miscellaneous papers following, and apparently an enclosure with, the letter of Worthington to Adams of July 4, 1818 (pt. v, doc. 457).

the return of Genl. San Martin from Buenos Ayres.—on the 11th of April. he proclaimed his return in a Month & half—&c I have received news today he will not leave there till after the 24 Ulto.

942

*Report of Joel Roberts Poinsett, ex-Agent of the United States to South America, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States, November 4, 1818*¹

[EXTRACT]

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION OF THE VICEROYALTY OF PERU

The viceroyalty of *Peru* extends 365 leagues north and south, from 3 degrees 35 minutes of south latitude, and 126 leagues east and west, between 63 degrees 56 minutes and 70 degrees 18 minutes from the meridian of Cadiz.

The bay of *Tumbez* separates it on the north from the kingdom of Granada. The river of *Loa* on the south from the desert of *Atacama*, and the kingdom of *Chili*. The *Cordillera* of *Vilacota*, in 14 degrees south, separates it from *Buenos Ayres*. On the east it is bounded by an immense desert, and on the west by the *Pacific ocean*. The face of the country is extremely unequal; bordering on the coast it is a barren, sandy desert, with a few small but fertile valleys, and in the interior are the lofty mountains and deep valleys of the *Cordillera*. The temperament varies, therefore, in the same latitude. In the habitable parts of the mountains the thermometer of *Reaumur* varies from 3 degrees below 0 to 9 degrees above. At *Lima*, and generally along the coast, the constant variation of the thermometer is from 13 degrees to 23½ degrees. The productions of *Peru* follow the nature of its different climates. Wine, oil, and sugar are the most valuable productions of the coast; corn and wheat of the valleys; and bark and cocoa of the mountains.

The annual product of the mines is valued at 4,500,000 dollars.

The population of the viceroyalty is calculated at 1,076,997 souls.

It is divided into seven intendancies, comprehending 51 districts; the latter governed by subdelegates responsible to the intendant, who is under the direction of the superintendent general, a dignity always invested in the viceroy.

The viceroyalty contains five dioceses.

Lima, the capital of *Peru*, is situated in 12 degrees 2 minutes 51 seconds south latitude, and 70 degrees 50 minutes 51 seconds longitude, and was founded by *Don Francisco Pizarro* in 1535.

Notwithstanding the frequent earthquakes which destroyed the city in the years 1586, 1630, 1655, 1687, and 1764, *Lima* occupies an area of ten miles

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 329. For the beginning of this report, see above, pt. II, doc. 243. The opening paragraphs on the colonial system apply to *Peru* as well as to *Argentina*.

circumference, including the suburb of San Lazaro. The population amounts to 52,627 inhabitants: 292 clergy, 991 religious monks and friars, 572 nuns, 84 beatas, 17,215 Spaniards and white creoles, 3,912 Indians, 8,960 negroes, and the remainder intermediate classes mixtures of the others.

The intendency of Lima comprehends 74 doctrinas, (curacies,) 3 cities, 5 towns, and 173 townships; population 149,112 souls: 431 clergy, 1,100 religious, 572 nuns, 84 beatas, 22,370 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 63,180 Indians, 13,747 mestizoes, 17,864 mulattoes, and 29,763 slaves. It is divided into eight districts in the following order:

Cercado de Lima.—This district comprehends 41 curacies, 1 city, and 6 townships, and contains a population of 62,910 souls: 309 clergy, 991 religious, 572 nuns, 84 beatas, 18,219 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 9,744 Indians, 4,879 mestizoes, 10,231 free people of color, and 17,881 slaves. The principal produce is fruit, honey, sugar, and vegetables, which are consumed in the capital to the amount of 500,000 dollars per annum.

Canete.—This district comprehends 7 curacies, 1 city, 1 town, and 4 townships. It is inhabited by 12,616 souls: 15 clergy, 19 religious, 465 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 7,025 Indians, 737 mestizoes, 992 free people of color, 3,363 slaves: produces sugar, grain, and some nitre; annual value, 350,000 dollars.

The district of *Ica* comprehends 10 curacies, 1 city, 2 towns, and 3 townships. Inhabitants 20,576: 22 clergy, 72 religious, 2,158 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 6,607 Indians, 3,405 mestizoes, 4,305 free people of color, 4,004 slaves. A copper mine is wrought in this district, which also produces brandy, olives, and some sugar, and manufactures glass and soap; annual value, 588,742 dollars 4 rials.

Yaugos comprehends 7 curacies and 25 townships. It is inhabited by 9,574 souls: 12 clergy, 13 Spaniards and creoles, 8,005 Indians, 93 mestizoes, and 1,451 free people of color: produces cattle and sheep; annual value, 20,200 dollars.

Huarochoiro comprehends 11 curacies and 35 townships, and is inhabited by 14,024 souls: 25 clergy, 220 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 13,084 Indians, 591 mestizoes, 19 free people of color, and 84 slaves. The produce of this district is grain and cattle, and it possesses rich silver mines; annual value not ascertained.

Canta comprehends 9 doctrinas and 54 townships, and is inhabited by 12,133 souls: 20 clergy, 57 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 10,333 Indians, and 1,723 mestizoes: produces Indian corn, potatoes, and cattle; annual value, 20,103 dollars.

Chanay comprehends 9 doctrinas, 2 towns, and 28 townships, and is inhabited by 13,945 souls: 18 clergy, 15 religious, 969 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 7,510 Indians, 1,081 mestizoes, 759 free mulattoes, and 3,604 slaves: produces grain, sugar, and cattle; annual value, 465,504 dollars 4 rials.

Santa comprehends 7 doctrinas and 14 townships, and is inhabited by 3,334 souls: 10 clergy, 279 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 873 Indians, 1,237 mestizoes, 108 free mulattoes, and 827 slaves: produces sugar, grain, and cattle; annual value, \$245,000.

Intendancy of Cuzco.—The city of Cuzco, capital of the former Incas, is situated in 13 degrees 32 minutes 20 seconds south latitude, 65 degrees 15 minutes 20 seconds longitude. It was founded in the eleventh century by Manco Capac, and taken possession of by Francisco Pizarro in 1534. The population is estimated at 32,082 souls: 89 clergy, 436 religious, 166 nuns, 113 beatas, 16,122 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 14,254 Indians, 203 negroes, and the remainder mestizoes and mulattoes.

The intendancy of Cuzco comprehends 102 doctrinas, 1 city, 2 towns, 131 townships, inhabited by 216,382 souls: 315 clergy, 474 religious recluses, 166 nuns, 113 beatas, 31,828 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 159,105 Indians, 23,104 mestizoes, 993 free mulattoes, and 283 slaves.

Cercado del Cuzco comprehends 8 doctrinas, 1 city, inhabited by 32,082 slaves [sic], 89 clergy, 436 religious recluses, 166 nuns, 113 beatas, 16,122 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 14,254 Indians, 646 free mulattoes, 203 slaves, the remainder mestizoes: produces grain, and manufactures some woolen and cotton stuffs.

Abancay.—This district comprehends 9 doctrinas and 8 townships, inhabited by 25,259 souls: 33 clergy, 1,937 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 18,419 Indians, 4,739 mestizoes, 50 free mulattoes, 81 slaves: produces sugar, cotton, grain, and cocoa; annual value, \$350,000.

Aymaraes comprehends 16 doctrinas and 34 townships, inhabited by 15,281 souls: 24 clergy, 1 recluse, 4,474 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, and 10,782 Indians: produces various kinds of dyes, raises cattle, and manufactures some woolen stuffs; annual value, \$145,000.

Culca and Lares comprehend 5 doctrinas and 6 townships, inhabited by 6,199 souls: 13 clergy, 347 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 5,519 Indians, and 320 mestizoes: produce grain, cotton, red pepper, cocoa, and manufacture some woolen stuffs; annual value, \$176,239.

Urabamba comprehends 6 doctrinas and 4 townships, and is inhabited by 9,250 souls: 22 clergy, 35 religious, 835 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 5,164 Indians, and 3,194 mestizoes: produce grain, cocoa, and a variety of fruits; annual value, \$89,098.

Colabambas comprehends 13 doctrinas and 14 townships, and is inhabited by 19,824 souls: 19 clergy, 186 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 18,237 Indians, and 1,382 mestizoes: produces Indian corn and grain; annual value, \$20,000.

Pararo comprehends 9 doctrinas and 19 townships, inhabited by 20,236 souls: 20 clergy, 1 recluse, 2,331 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 15,034 Indians, 2,733 mestizoes, and 117 free mulattoes: produces grain and cattle, and manufactures linen cloth; annual value, \$96,471.

Chumbibilcas comprehends 11 doctrinas and 12 townships, and is inhabited by 15,973 souls: 27 clergy, 4,471 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, and 11,475 Indians: produces grain, and manufactures linen cloths; annual value, \$18,600.

Tinta comprehends 11 doctrinas and 13 townships, and is inhabited by 36,968 souls: 27 clergy, 324 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 29,045 Indians, 5,420 mestizoes, and 152 free mulattoes: produces grain and ships, and manufactures linen cloths; annual value, \$152,309½.

Quispicanchi comprehends 10 doctrinas and 16 townships, and is inhabited by 24,337 souls: 25 clergy, 1 recluse, 37 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 19,947 Indians, 4,306 mestizoes, and 21 free mulattoes: produces grain, cattle, wool, and salt, and manufactures linen cloths; annual value, —.

Paucartambo comprehends 4 doctrinas and 8 townships, and is inhabited by 12,973 souls: 16 clergy, 764 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 11,229 Indians, 957 mestizoes, and 7 mulattoes: produces wood and cocoa; annual value, \$390,972.

Intendancy of Arequipa.—The city of Arequipa is situated in 16 degrees 13 minutes 20 seconds south latitude, 66 degrees 6 minutes 30 seconds longitude. Its population is estimated at 23,988 souls: 50 clergy, 225 religious, 162 nuns, 5 beatas, 15,737 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 1,515 Indians, 4,129 mestizoes, the remainder mulattoes and negroes.

The intendancy of Arequipa comprehends 60 doctrinas, 2 cities, 2 towns, and 8 townships, inhabited by 136,801 souls: 326 clergy, 284 religious, 126 nuns, 5 beatas, 39,357 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 66,609 Indians, 17,797 mestizoes, 7,003 free mulattoes, and 5,258 slaves.

Cercado de Arequipa comprehends 11 doctrinas, 1 city, and 2 townships, inhabited by 37,721 souls: 93 clergy, 325 religious recluses, 162 nuns, 5 beatas, 22,687 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 5,929 Indians, 4,908 mestizoes, 2,477 free mulattoes, and 1,225 slaves: produces grain, wine, brandy, sugar, cotton, and oil; annual value, \$636,800.

Camana comprehends 7 doctrinas and 8 townships, inhabited by 19,052 souls: 34 clergy, 9 religious recluses, 5,005 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 1,249 Indians, 1,021 mestizoes, 1,747 free mulattoes, and 887 slaves: produces wine, sugar, and oil; annual value, \$300,000.

Condesuyos comprehends 9 doctrinas and 18 townships, and is inhabited by 20,145 souls: 35 clergy, 3,603 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 12,011 Indians, 4,358 mestizoes, 34 free mulattoes, and 44 slaves: contains gold mines, and produces cochineal and grain; annual value, \$26,458.

Collaguas comprehends 16 doctrinas and 10 townships, and is inhabited by 13,905 souls: 40 clergy, 212 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 11,872 Indians, 1,417 mestizoes, 335 free mulattoes, and 29 slaves: produces grain and wool, and manufactures some woolen stuffs; annual value, \$70,100. The silver mines in this district yield annually 34,000 marks.

Moquequa comprehends 6 doctrinas and 6 townships, and is inhabited by 28,279 souls: 53 clergy, 29 religious recluses, 5,596 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 17,272 Indians, 2,916 mestizoes, 887 free mulattoes, and 1,526 slaves: produces grain and wine; annual value, \$705,000.

Arica comprehends 7 doctrinas, 1 city, and 26 townships, inhabited by 18,776 souls: 44 clergy, 21 religious recluses, 1,585 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 12,870 Indians, 1,977 mestizoes, 985 free mulattoes, and 1,294 slaves: produces wine, grain, cotton, and oil; annual value, \$160,500.

Tarapaca comprehends 4 doctrinas and 12 townships, inhabited by 7,923 souls: 27 clergy, 509 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 5,406 Indians, 1,200 mestizoes, 528 free mulattoes, and 253 slaves; produces wine and some grain; annual value, \$81,400. The silver mines of this district produce annually 72,462 marks.

The intendency of Truxillo.—The city of Truxillo is situated in 8 degrees 5 minutes south latitude, and 72 degrees 44 minutes longitude, founded by Francisco Pizarro in 1535; population, 5,790 souls: 133 clergy, 60 religious recluses, 129 nuns, 1,263 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 274 Indians, 704 mestizoes, 1,000 negroes, and the rest mulattoes. The intendency of Truxillo comprehends 87 doctrinas, 5 cities, 2 towns, and 142 townships, population 230,967 souls: 460 clergy, 160 religious recluses, 162 nuns, 19,098 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 115,647 Indians, 76,949 mestizoes, 13,757 free mulattoes, and 4,725 slaves.

Cercado de Truxillo comprehends 10 doctrinas and 6 townships, population 12,032 souls: 144 clergy, 60 religious, 129 nuns, 1,434 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 4,577 Indians, 1,549 mestizoes, 2,357 free mulattoes, and 1,582 slaves: produces sugar, rice, oil, cotton, and various gums; annual value, \$31,756.

Lambayeque comprehends 20 doctrinas and 7 townships, population 35,192 souls: 62 clergy, 27 religious, 2,299 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 22,333 Indians, 5,448 mestizoes, 3,192 free mulattoes, and 1,831 slaves: produces grain, saffron, sugar, tobacco, and cotton; manufactures some cotton and woolen stuffs, soap, &c.; annual value, \$397,799.

Puira comprehends 12 doctrinas and 14 townships, population 44,491 souls: 61 clergy, 18 religious, 2,874 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 24,797 Indians, 10,654 mestizoes, 5,203 free mulattoes, and 884 slaves: produces grain, cotton, and some indigo; abounds with cattle; annual value, \$72,686.

Caxamarca comprehends 17 doctrinas and 26 townships, population 62,199 souls: 23 clergy, 50 religious, 33 nuns, 7,835 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 29,692 Indians, 22,299 mestizoes, 1,875 free mulattoes, and 328 slaves: produces grain and cotton; abounds in cattle; and manufactures cotton and woolen stuffs; annual value, \$——.

Chota.—Not able to ascertain any correct information respecting this district; possesses rich mines.

Huamachuco comprehends 8 doctrinas and 23 townships, population 38, 150 souls: 64 clergy, 2,273 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 17,117 Indians, 18,367 mestizoes, 250 free mulattoes, and 79 slaves: produces grain and cocoa, and manufactures linen cloths; annual value, \$57,853.

Pataz comprehends 3 doctrinas and 13 townships, population 13,508 souls: 11 clergy, 3 religious, 987 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 4,627 Indians, 7,678 mestizoes, 194 free mulattoes, and 8 slaves: produces grain and sugar, and abounds in cattle; annual value, \$35,264. The gold mines of this district yield 250 pounds per annum, and the silver 500 marks; value of both, \$35,500.

Chachapoyas comprehends 17 doctrinas and 60 townships, population, 25,398 souls: 34 clergy, 11 religious, 1,396 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 12,504 Indians, 10,954 mestizoes, 486 free mulattoes, and 13 slaves: produces tobacco, bark, sugar, and cocoa.

Intendancy of Huamanga.—The city of Huamanga is situated in 13 degrees 1 minute south latitude, and 68 degrees 6 minutes longitude; population 25,970 souls: 25 clergy, 42 religious, 82 nuns, 169 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 20,373 Indians, 4,382 mestizoes, and the remainder mulattoes and negroes.

The intendancy of Huamanga comprehends 50 doctrinas, 1 city, and 134 townships, and is inhabited by 111,559 souls: 176 clergy, 45 religious, 82 nuns, 5,378 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 75,284 Indians, 29,621 mestizoes, 943 free mulattoes, and 30 slaves.

Cercado de Huamanga comprehends 3 doctrinas and 2 townships, and is inhabited by 25,970 souls: 25 clergy, 42 religious, 82 nuns, 169 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 20,373 Indians, 4,372 mestizoes, 30 slaves, the rest free mulattoes: possesses some manufactures; annual value, \$34,268.

Anco comprehends 1 doctrina and 4 townships, inhabited by 2,022 souls: 9 Spaniards, 1,744 Indians, 269 mestizoes: produces sugar and coffee; annual value, \$18,795.

Huanta comprehends 7 doctrinas and twenty townships, and is inhabited by 27,337 souls: 45 clergy, 3 religious, 219 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 19,981 Indians, 10,080 mestizoes, and 9 free mulattoes.

Congallo comprehends 10 doctrinas and 31 townships, and is inhabited by 12,474 souls: 31 clergy, 62 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 10,011 Indians, 2,363 mestizoes, and 7 free mulattoes: produces grain and cattle.

Andahuaylas.—This district comprehends 10 doctrinas and 18 townships, and is inhabited by 12,020 souls: 20 clergy, 3,000 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 5,000 Indians, 4,000 mestizoes: produces grain and sugar; annual value, \$74,384.

Lucanas comprehends 14 doctrinas and 44 townships, and is inhabited by 15,727 souls: 27 clergy, 862 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 12,700 Indians, 2,076 mestizoes, and 60 free mulattoes: produces grain and cattle.

Parinacochas comprehends 14 doctrinas and 16 townships, population 16,011 souls: 28 clergy, 1,057 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 8,475 Indians, and

6,451 mestizoes: raises cattle, and manufactures cotton stuffs; annual value, \$56,000.

Intendancy of Huancavelica.—The town of Huancavelica is situated in 12 degrees 53 minutes south latitude, and 68 degrees 46 minutes longitude: population 5,156 souls: 21 clergy, 18 religious, 560 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 3,803 Indians, 731 mestizoes, and the remainder mulattoes and negroes.

The intendancy of Huancavelica comprehends 22 doctrinas, 1 city, 1 town, and 86 townships, and is inhabited by 30,917 souls: 81 clergy, 18 religious, 2,341 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 23,899 Indians, 4,537 mestizoes, and 41 slaves.

Cercado de Huancavelica.—This district comprehends 4 doctrinas and 6 townships, inhabited by 5,146 souls: 21 clergy, 18 religious, 560 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 3,803 Indians, 731 mestizoes, and 13 slaves.

Angaraes.—This district comprehends 5 doctrinas and 25 townships, inhabited by 3,245 souls: 23 clergy, 219 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 2,691 Indians, 309 mestizoes, and 3 slaves: produces sugar, grain, and cattle; annual value, \$85,000.

Tayacaxa comprehends 5 doctrinas and 22 townships, inhabited by 13,161 souls: 21 clergy, 1,394 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 9,020 Indians, and 2,726 mestizoes.

Castroverreyna comprehends 8 doctrinas and 35 townships, inhabited by 9,365 souls: 16 clergy, 168 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 8,385 Indians, 771 mestizoes, and 25 slaves: produces grain and cattle; annual value, \$76,000.

Intendancy of Tarma.—The town of Tarma is situated in 12 degrees 33 minutes 49 seconds south latitude, and 69 degrees 29 minutes longitude; population 5,538 souls: 2 clergy, 361 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 1,878 Indians, 3,244 mestizoes, the rest mulattoes and slaves.

The intendancy of Tarma comprehends 79 doctrinas, 1 city, 2 towns, and 203 townships, inhabited by 201,259 souls: 229 clergy, 127 religious, 15 beatas, 15,939 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 105,187 Indians, 78,682 mestizoes, 844 free mulattoes, and 236 slaves.

Cercado de Tarma comprehends 13 doctrinas, 1 town, and 45 townships, and is inhabited by 34,491 souls: 32 clergy, 1,681 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 18,821 Indians, 14,300 mestizoes, and 77 free mulattoes: produces grain and bark; annual value, \$8,315. The mine of Yauricocha yielded, in 1793, \$2,016,703. Rent of the crown for Diezmos and Cobos, \$231,283.

Xauja comprehends 14 doctrinas, 1 town, and 16 townships, inhabited by 52,286 souls: 32 clergy, 84 religious, 1,713 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 28,477 Indians, 21,922 mestizoes, and 58 slaves.

Caxatambo comprehends 13 doctrinas and 56 townships, and is inhabited by 16,872 souls: 31 clergy, 504 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 10,500 Indians,

4,808 mestizoes, 629 free mulattoes: produces grain and cattle; annual value, \$30,000.

Conchucos comprehends 15 doctrinas and 19 townships, and is inhabited by 25,308 souls: 40 clergy, 2 religious, 1,384 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 9,899 Indians, and 13,983 mestizoes: produces grain, and possesses mines, but which are not very productive; annual value, \$73,476.

Huamalies comprehends 8 doctrinas and 30 townships, inhabited by 14,234 souls: 18 clergy, 593 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 8,957 Indians, 4,625 mestizoes, and 43 slaves: produces bark, cocoa, and cattle; annual value, \$53,420.

Huaylas comprehends 12 doctrinas and 20 townships, inhabited by 40,822 souls: 67 clergy, 11 religious, 3,604 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 20,935 Indians, 15,971 mestizoes, 138 free mulattoes, and 96 slaves.

Huanuco comprehends 4 doctrinas, 1 city, and 7 townships, inhabited by 16,826 souls: 9 clergy, 30 religious, 15 beatas, 6,160 Spaniards and Spanish creoles, 7,598 Indians, 3,075 mestizoes, and 39 slaves: produces bark and cocoa, and exports a small quantity of silver; annual value, \$45,094.

Panatahuas.—Military government of Callao and of the archipelago of Chiloe.

NUMBER OF INDIANS FOR THE COLLECTION OF TRIBUTES LEVIED ON MALES
FROM 15 TO 50 YEARS OF AGE

Males	314,863	Amount of tributes	\$885,586 0
Females	304,327	Of the common hospital fund	25,852 7
	619,190		911,438 7
Exempt from age, sex, and rank	473,615	Pensions, expenses, &c. . . .	374,052 4
	145,575	Nett rent	\$537,386 3
Contributing			

DUTIES

Imposts into Callao 6 per cent. alcavala, and 3 per cent. customs; woolen exports 3 per cent.

The interior commerce pays 6 per cent. alcavala.

Alcavala were first levied in Peru, in the year 1596, at 2 per cent. until the year 1771, when they were increased to 4 per cent. In the year 1777 they were increased to 6 per cent. The expenses of collecting the customs at Lima exceeds \$50,000.

TABLE OF THE COMMERCE BETWEEN THE PORTS OF SPAIN AND CALLAO

IMPORTATION				EXPORTATION		
Years	Spanish effects	Foreign effects	Total value	Gold and silver	Produce	Total
1781	\$114,952 7½	\$309,230 3	\$424,183 3			
1782	566,128 1	633,435 3	1,199,653 4			
1783	695,295 7	1,049,348 4	1,744,644 3	\$443,306 0	\$177,766 7	\$561,067 5
1784	1,020,434 1	2,073,530 4	3,093,964 5	16,152,916 4½	968,290 2½	17,121,206 6
1785	2,318,448 1	3,727,267 4	6,045,715 5	7,144,325 2	732,587 4	7,877,912 6
1786	6,136,067 4	7,630,681 7	13,766,749 3	8,283,659 7½	882,807 1	9,168,467 0
1787	3,870,200 7	2,911,898 1	6,782,099 1	4,518,246 3	906,022 0	5,424,268 3
1788	1,557,904 0	1,194,066 7	2,751,967 1	5,463,973 1	579,160 2	6,043,133 3
1789	1,209,196 5	1,460,226 3	2,669,423 0	2,449,945 6	523,080 0	2,972,575 6
1790	2,297,964 4	2,465,499 2	4,763,461 6	5,220,387 2½	448,095 1	5,668,482 3
	\$19,786,677 5½	\$23,455,186 4	\$43,241,862 7	\$49,678,305 1	\$5,158,809 1½	\$54,837,114 3

In the moneys exported is included \$3,562,000, sent by the Royal Philippine Company.

Importation	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	\$43,241,862 7
Exportation	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	54,837,114 3
Balance in favor of exports	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	\$11,595,251 4

The excess of exports was occasioned by the war. Four ships arrived in 1779 and sailed in 1784, occasioning the great export of that year, \$17,121,206 6.

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, January 15, 1819.

SIR: I have the honor to announce my arrival at this place and enclose the result of the tour to the North West Coast written at Monte Rey. I have added a copy of the sentence of restoration in the Case of the *Canton* and hope to have time to subjoin that of the *Beaver*. These vessels are now in the possession of their respective captains and prepared for Sea. The Government is not in a situation to refund the value of the cargoes and I have directed their claims to be liquidated in order that I may forward them to your department.

The Patriots are daily expected under San Martin who will be accompanied by Lord Cockran [Cochrane] as admiral of the Fleet. I really do not perceive preparations to resist the force anticipated. The consternation is great and the depression beyond description.

I regret that I cannot enter into details as the vessel by which this is to be conveyed is already under way.

Captain Shireff has in every instance assisted our countrymen during my absence and I take great pleasure in forwarding the copy of an address which he received.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ M.S. Consular Letters, Lima (J. W. Prevost).

*Act of the Independence of Peru*¹

[TRANSLATION]

IN THE ROYAL CITY OF PERU, *July 15, 1821.*

The señors who compose it having yesterday assembled in the most excellent Senate, with the most excellent and most illustrious señor the Archbishop of this holy Metropolitan Church, the prelates of the religious convents, titulars of Castile, and various neighbors of this capital, for the purpose of fulfilling what had been provided in the official letter of the most excellent señor and general-in-chief of the liberating army of Peru, Don José de San Martín, the contents of which were read; and persuaded thereof, reduced to what persons of known probity, learning, and patriotism, who inhabit this capital, would express if the general opinion for independence had been resolved on, which vote would serve as a guide to the said general for proceeding to take the oath: all the señors agreeing for themselves, and satisfied of the opinion of the inhabitants of the capital, said that the general will was decided for the independence of Peru of the Spanish dominion, and of any other foreign dominion whatever, and that they would proceed to its sanction by means of the corresponding oath; it was compared with a certified copy of this act to the same most excellent señor, and the señors signed it.

THE COUNT OF SAN ISIDRO,	MANUEL DE ARIAS,
BARTOLOME, <i>Archbishop of Lima,</i>	THE COUNT DE LA VIGA DEL REN,
FRANCISCO DE ZARATE,	FR. GERONIMO CAVERO,
SIMON RAVAGO,	JOSÉ IGNACIO PALACIOS,
FRANCISCO XAVIER DE ECHANGE,	ANTONIO PADILLA, <i>Syndic, Proc. Gen.</i>

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

LIMA, *December 7, 1821.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a Duplicate of my last of the 16th of October together with the several Documents therein referred to. No conveyance has since offered until this moment by which to renew the communication and in saying so, I hope I shall be exempted from censure for my silence during the time which has intervened.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 827.² MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

It appears that his L^dShip¹ upon leaving Callao sent one of his Frigates to Valparaiso and proceeded with the other three to Guayaquil where he still remains. Some attribute his stay there to Policy, others to necessity, but whether to be ascribed to the one or to the other, it will equally afford to the Government of Chile the means of directing his Destination from thence. Many believe that he will pay no respect to the orders which have lately been despatched to him from Chile in as much as he did not return when so enjoined by San Martin. I think differently not from any confidence in the rectitude of his L^dShip, but from an impression that he will make any Sacrifice to obtain the favor of Chile in opposition to the Protector whom he now reviles. He is implacable in his resentments and circumstances are propitious to their indulgence from the discontent prevailing there as to the course pursued by the General since his Entrance into this Capital. Whether this disapprobation be confined merely to his inaction or extend to other objects connected with his rule I cannot yet ascertain, but from the silence maintained by that Government to the Communications sent from hence some months since, there is reason to suspect the latter. The General's career has been too splendid to allow me to impute his conduct to other cause than disease, he has been at the point of Death and is not yet sufficiently restored to direct operations either civil or military. It is indeed a subject of regret that any thing should have occurred to suspend an event which I deem inevitable. The Impulse given cannot be resisted and delay only adds to the misery of those who are still subject to the vexations of an army without other resources for its support than such as are obtained by exaction.

I do not venture to touch upon the subject of Government because until the Communication shall be opened with Upper Peru no Judgment ought to be formed. There certainly prevails a great contrariety of opinion here, many avow their preference to monarchy, but they are principally among those who have imbibed the erroneous impressions of the Dominion of the Capital. This unfortunate Idea if cherished and extended will produce the same results as at Bs. Ayres and necessarily separate the two Perus.

Some weeks since the Master of the *Tea Plant* came hither from Guayaquil to obtain my aid in the release of his vessel under detention at that place. I had no conveyance upon which I could rely for safety and of course was compelled to confine my exertions to the obtaining a letter from this Government in his behalf addressed to the Junta there. What may have been the effect of this communication I have not heard and fearing that it may not have availed from the jealousies existing there as to the exclusive views of the Capital, I wrote a line to Capt. Ridgley immediately upon his arrival at Callao (a Copy of which is enclosed). He concurs with me in the propriety of proceeding thither forthwith and tomorrow I shall embark for the purpose of accompanying him. Two motives determine me the one a confidence that

¹Lord Cochrane.

my presence may be useful to Capt. Robinson if the ship be still in Jeopardy: The other that I may as connected with the revolution here be enabled to report to the Department the prospect of liberating Quito together with the views of Bolivar, who according to the last advices must ere this have reached Guayaquil with a considerable Force.

I have thought it prudent to leave a commission with Mr. Lynch so as to enable him to act as Consul should any thing hereafter occur requiring his interference. It is of course temporary and taken by him merely to assist our Countrymen in any moment of difficulty without intention to exact Fees or to ask its continuance from the President. Mr. Lynch is personally my Friend and I felt some delicacy in giving him the appointment although without emolument, but the fact is, that there is not an American Resident in the City.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, February 6, 1822.

SIR: Upon my arrival at Guayaquil I learned that the *Tea Plant* had been liberated and had sailed for Gibraltar. The Intelligence was the more grateful because the case involved principles that I do not recollect to have seen discussed. The object of the Seizure was to compel security from the Master to respond to a suit to be instituted for the recovery of a Poenalty incurred by him under the former Government for some violation of its revenue Laws. Several collateral questions of importance were also involved, but from the view which I took of the subject all appeared to me to resolve itself into the simple question of the right of the present Junta to pursue a Delinquent for an offence anterior to the revolution. In my application to the Supreme Authority here for its friendly interference, I maintained that both the right of enquiry and of punishment were extinguished by the Dissolution of the Sovereignty against which the offence was committed. Fortunately the position obtained the concurrence of the Minister and thus procured me the aid indicated in my last of December² written on the eve of my Departure. In that letter after referring to the application of the Master I advised you of the course I had adopted, together with the motives which notwithstanding afterwards determined my visit to Guayaquil and I shall particularly regret its miscarriage, because I am now without the means of offering to the Department a Duplicate. If my recollection serve me, I also intimated discontent both here and in Chile as to the Inaction preserved by the Protector after the fall of Callao. The Impressions were certainly then

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 945.

as mentioned but the motives ascribed to him have been fully contradicted by the energy which he has since displayed. The fact is two months of Disease has so enfeebled him that at the time of my sailing, he was unfit for any Effort, but upon regaining his health shortly after, measures were adopted corresponding with his Character and in Unison with his professions. He commenced by issuing a proclamation for the meeting of a Congress in May and then surrendered the Palace and Government to the Marquis of Torre Tagle a Peruvian celebrated here for his attachment to the cause. He has since confined himself exclusively to the command of the Army, has been actively occupied in gathering recruits, organizing new corps and distributing them so as to bear upon that section of the Country still in possession of the Spanish Forces. Fifteen hundred men are on their way to Arica, as many more in the neighborhood of Truxillo have been ordered to advance into the Interior and he himself embarked yesterday in an armed Schooner for some Point on the Coast undoubtedly most favorable to his Cooperation. The destination avowed in his proclamation is Guayaquil, but I have no Idea that such are his Intentions. Time only developes his secrets and until he land no one can pretend to designate the route. Some Days since I mentioned to him my intention to return to Chile and asked whether I might anticipate an early period to the impending struggle. He answered that all would be settled by the first of August and surely Guayaquil is not the Direction in which to obtain so early a result.

The call for the Congress appears to me, from the crude shape in which it is enveloped, intended more to appease the Public feeling than to give effect to a meeting at that Day. Indeed were such the case I should think it not only premature but dangerous, until those of Upper Peru can be united, in as much as the Politics of the City are at variance with those of that Portion of the Empire. Among the higher orders of this Place there certainly prevails a strong disposition to a Monarchical government not as connected with Europe or the Intrigues of Bs. Ayres but rather from an ignorance of the practicability of any other form to the present State of Society. In the Interior I am assured that a different Sentiment prevails throughout.

My Intention to remain in Guayaquil until I could proceed to Quito in order to meet Bolivar was defeated by one of those accidents to which change of Place always renders the Traveller more or less liable. The Boat accompanying us up the River with the Baggage was upset, so that upon landing at the Town I had not a change of Linen. I have invariably during my journeys kept my papers within Sight and on this occasion had been particular in placing the Trunk containing them in the Boat, in which I was with Capt. Ridgley, but by some fatality while refreshing ourselves on the Shore within a few leagues of the City, it was removed into the other by one of the Sailors whom it probably incommoded. In every view it has been a source of Chagrin, but in none so much as in the loss of a number of original docu-

ments which I had taken pains to collect, some at a considerable expence for the Information of the President upon many Subjects of Importance. As to my Agency with these Governments I apprehend no inconvenience, because all I have hitherto done has been without assuming a public Character. As an Individual I have had access every where and as such have been enabled invariably to obtain their attention to any subject of complaint. The jealousies incident to an avowed Agency first determined me to this course and I am Satisfied that had I adopted any other, I should ever have been a Stranger to the feelings, principles and views of those ruling.

The Brig of War containing the Despatches from the Director of Chile to his Lordship did not reach Guayaquil anterior to the Departure of the latter from thence. Instructions were however left by him for the officer bearing them to follow him to Panama, upon which Place it appears he intends an attack and although so deficient in foreign Seamen, that the whole number does not exceed forty, yet there is little doubt of his success.

Some Days since the General informed me that during my absence he had sent an Agent to England and that he wished also to send one to the U States if I thought it might favor an acknowledgment, I answered that to me the measure appeared premature without the entire possession of the Perus: that upon the happening of that event I should immediately communicate it to the President who I was persuaded would then not only recognize its Independence but renew his efforts to obtain an acknowledgment by the Powers of Europe. I felt myself authorized to say thus much from the communications heretofore made to the Government of Bs. Ayres and I was the more induced so to do in order to impair Impressions which he has received in common with many others from foreign Agents, that is, that the U States are and must ever be unfriendly to the Independence of South America from commercial Jealousies.

There exists but one opinion in Guayaquil as to the revolution, they are all Patriots, yet they are divided in Sentiment as to the government of which they ought to become an integrant Part. The wealthy class of the Community incline to Peru, the Body of the People to Quito. Locality certainly designates the latter and I think the presence of Bolivar will soon decide the question. The river is beautiful, navigable by vessels of any Tonnage, the Soil fruitful and the elevation of part of the Country such as to furnish all the productions of Europe in addition to those of Africa. Indeed it unites advantages that must render it one of the most important Towns on the Coast.

Upon my return to this Place having no documents to justify the acts of Mr. Lynch should they be questioned, I have requested him to suspend the exercise of any further Consular functions. While on this Subject Sir, allow me to suggest for the Consideration of the President the propriety of enquiring into the pursuits of those of our Countrymen here who are seeking appointments on this Coast. Many are exceptionable in point of Character

and others while engaged in an illicit commerce from one Port to the other have incurred the notice and enmity of the Patriot governments by services rendered to the Enemy at times at variance with the neutrality of the Flag.

Sir Thomas Hardy sails tomorrow for Valparaiso on his way Home. I sincerely regret his departure, his views were enlarged and liberal and peculiarly fitted him for the Station; with great mildness he was always firm and by adhering to principles without indulging in asperities at times courted, he has maintained his Dignity and inspired confidence. To our Countrymen he has uniformly extended his protection and on a late occasion exhibited the most lively interest to prevent the intemperate measures which were in contemplation on my arrival.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

947

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, March 4, 1822.

His Lordship² has not been heard of since his Departure and it is supposed that upon leaving the *Independence of Panama* at the mouth of the Esmeraldas where he intended to touch, he afterwards directed his course to some Port of Mexico. There he will equally be disappointed as they also from the Changes on this Coast are no longer regarded as Enemies.

The two Frigates the *Venganza* and the *Prueba* have eluded his Grasp, and were lately, if not at this moment, off the mouth of the River of Guayaquil. They are in a Deplorable State, afflicted with all the Diseases incident to Filth and wholly destitute. It is said that upon the change of Government at Panama the officer commanding the Squadron proposed the Surrender of the one, provided those in authority there would equip the other, so as to enable him to double the cape. If such be the fact and I have every reason to believe it, their approach may be for the sole purpose of entering into a like negotiation with those in Power at Guayaquil where they possess greater facilities to give effect to such an arrangement.

Private letters from the Interior state that Potosi and the Province adjoining have declared their Independence—an event the more important as tending to hasten and consolidate the Confederation on the other side. It was from thence that the remittances were formerly obtained by Bs. Ays. and Interest dictates the policy of reviving the ancient connexion, so as to prevent an Union with this Government which might then cause a diversion of its

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² Lord Cochrane.

Commerce to the Port of Arica, the contiguity of which offers many advantages.

The fall of Lima has decided the Politics of the whole Coast and I may add of South America, in opposition to every thing European; all is now American, even the degraded Brazilian feels its Influence and Bs. Ays. so long distracted by the corruptions of the Portuguese and the visionary projects of France, is rapidly returning to the principles to which she gave birth and will I think be among the first to establish a government upon the true footing of equality and general representation.

The General whose Departure I stated in my last proceeded as far north as Truxillo and after putting the Troops on that Station in motion returned hither, where he has since remained unremittingly employed in preparations for the March of the great Body of the Army, in two Divisions, the one to cross the mountains so as to occupy the Valley of Xauja [Jauja], the other to proceed Southerly in order to join the Force in that Direction destined against Arequipa.

I have neither received my letters by the *Franklin* nor heard from Commodore Stewart since his arrival. No doubt he anticipated my return to Valparaiso in the *Constellation* and Such was my intention until I learned Capt. Ridgley's determination to touch at the intermediate Ports then and now under close Blockade. It is one of those subjects upon which I have had the honor to address the Department heretofore and although my view as to the right may have been incorrect, yet I am not so as to the effect, which is always that of producing unfriendly feelings.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

948

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, April 1, 1822.

SIR: Although in my last² I adverted to the probable inducement to the Entrance of the Spanish Frigates in the river Guayaquil, yet I did not, could not, anticipate their Surrender in the manner indicated by the enclosed arrangement. The *Venganza* and *Alexander* Sloop of War were immediately placed under the control of the agent of this Government at that place, where they now ride at anchor. A mutiny took place among the crew of the *Prueba* and she was taken out to sea, but so badly provisioned, that expectations

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 947, under date, March 4, 1822.

were confidently indulged of her return to order: These were yesterday realized by her entrance into this Port when the Surrender was immediately compleated. Thus the Spanish Flag has ceased to wave on the Pacific, and without incurring much responsibility, I think I may venture to predict, that ere long, it will be displayed throughout S. America, only, on Days commemorative of the Triumphs of Bolivar and of San Martin.

The want of mechanics has delayed the March of the Troops. There was a deficiency in the number of Saddles and other equipments for an augmented Cavalry, which it was necessary to supply and which could not be purchased: These however are now in such a State of forwardness, that the moment of departure may be determined with some precision, and it is understood that they will move about the 20th of the present month.

The professions of Spain as to a recognition are here considered as made only to paralyze and to delude, and I confess I incline to the same opinion. The revolution there does not appear to have engendered one liberal feeling, on the contrary the enmities strengthen with the disgrace of their arms, and there is no motive of interest to quiet them: Commercial Intercourse ceased with the change of Sovereignty, not to be revived; all the productions of Spain are equally the growth of these Colonies; the dependence was artificial; it was that of restrictions solely and always accompanied with odium. . . .

Not a single conveyance has offered from hence for the U States since my first arrival and I have been compelled to send my letters to Bs. Ays. by the way of Chile. This will explain the length of time necessarily consumed before they reach their destination. I am now endeavoring to establish a correspondence with some one at Panama and hope through the medium of an acquaintance going thither, to be enabled to avail myself of that route hereafter.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, April 16, 1822.

SIR: As there is a Vessel sailing directly for Bs. Ays. I have sent under cover to Mr. Forbes the Gazettes for the last two months to be transmitted by him to the Department.

L^d. Cochrane returned about a month since to Guayaquil where he still is, claiming possession of the *Venganza* and *Alexander* Sloop of War or some equivalent therefor as Admiral of the liberating Squadron. He even went so

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

far at one moment as to place Marines on board of the one or both, but finding that those ruling there were resolved to sustain the rights of this Government, he consented to withdraw them and entered into some treaty on their subject, of which money was of course the object. I cannot learn that the Protector has ratified the compact and unless compelled by circumstances I am inclined to believe he will not. Blanco however has gone thither with part of the Peruvian Squadron in order to convoy them to this Port and most probably is authorized to exercise a discretion as to the necessity of acquiescence.

Such is the hostility of his L^d.Ship towards the General that I should not be surprized if he were to send or take Blanco to Chile under arrest. He may do so with sufficient color of right to protect him from censure, as the latter was sent hither by that Government to join their Squadron and consequently placed under his orders. It would be without result as to Blanco, yet the occurrence would necessarily retard a campaign now opening and in which, expedition is all important, to resist the mischief growing out of the reverse which I am about to unfold.

You will recollect Sir, in mine of the 6th of Feby.¹ I mentioned that a Force composed of about 1500 men had been sent to the Southward. The design of the General at that time in so doing was simply to present a power sufficient for the protection of Deserters, and orders were accordingly given not only to act on the defensive, but always to remain within reach of the Transports so as to embark upon the approach of an Enemy. The command was confided to a Peruvian, native of that District, of powerful connections, but wholly without experience and although policy may have justified the choice, a surprize and total defeat or rather dispersion has been the consequence.

This success has so animated the other side, that I am now persuaded they will make efforts to a resistance which before were not contemplated by them and although my conviction is the same as to the ultimate issue, yet the contest will necessarily be protracted.

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

LIMA, March 13, 1823.

SIR: The Expedition to the intermediate Ports has entirely failed and altogether from the Incompetency and Inefficiency of the Executive Junta. Instead of giving effect to the Plan of the Protector by marching the division

¹ See above, pt. xi, doc. 946.

² MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

contemplated for the valley of Xauja [Jauja?], they arrested its progress at Lurin a Town at the Foot of the mountains about six leagues from hence and thus enabled the Spaniard to direct his whole Force toward the liberating Army. Albarado who had been successful throughout until the junction of the two armies under Canterac and Valdez, was then compleatly overpowered and compelled to retreat with a precipitation that cost him the greater part of his Officers and men. The news of the Disaster reached this a few Days anterior to my arrival and produced an excitement which terminated in the Dissolution of the Junta and in the concentration of the executive Powers in one Individual. The Person pressed upon the Congress by the Public and invested with that authority under the name of President, is an ardent Patriot and a Sound republican distinguished for his constancy, his sufferings and his efforts throughout the revolution. His Presidency now only of ten Days has totally changed the aspect of affairs; from a state of Dismay and dejection he has animated all into confidence and by reviving those feelings which had been paralysed by a wicked policy, he is assuring an early conclusion of the revolution. Envoys have been sent to Bolivar and to O'Higgins and I have no doubt but that they will occupy the different Ports of Peru best adapted for offensive operations by the end of the ensuing month. I speak thus confidently because the latter prior to my departure from Chile had solicited and obtained from those in rule there, leave to proceed to the Intermediate Ports with a division of 1500 of the best Troops and upon my departure was only waiting at Valparaiso the concurrence of this Government. Bolivar has always been in habits of confidential correspondence with the present Chief upon the subject of the revolution and latterly upon the politics of this City, and as soon as he learned that San Martin had surrendered his authority, determined to remain in the neighborhood of Guayaquil where he still is, with a large portion of his army in order as I am assured to be in readiness to repair the mischiefs he was anticipating.

Believe me Sir, there is but one feeling throughout the Country as it respects Spanish Dominion, and long since would it have been annihilated had any one system been pursued or had the late Rulers chosen to confide in the Agency of the People. They sought to obtain the object without augmenting an Influence that might endanger their privileges and their Sway, while they neglected to cooperate with the Troops of Chile and of Bs. Ayres and thus have not only prostrated their authority but have subjected the Capital to an attack, were the Enemy so disposed. I lament the unnecessary loss of a number of gallant and useful men, yet I rejoice in the change produced by this reverse. A change that will secure the establishment of a popular Government in consonance with the feelings of the Interior.

Another French Sloop of War lately made its appearance on the Coast and it is said a Ship of the line is on its way from Rio. There must be an

object in sending such a Squadron into this ocean and I am not without my fears as to Chiloe and Valdivia. Some ascribe their presence to a renewal of the Intrigue with Spain on the subject of the Prince of Lucca, if so, I should heed his presence much less, than the possession of those Ports by France, the one would only be a temporary evil, while the other would be permanent.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LIMA, March 29, 1823.

SIR: An officer arrived two Days since from Guayaquil with despatches from Genl. Bolivar, stating that in anticipation of the approach of the Spaniards towards this Capital, he had taken up vessels for the transportation of 2000 Troops and that he had 5000 more in readiness for embarkation. A sufficient number of Transports to carry 2500 men well provisioned, accompanied the Envoy to whom I referred in my last, so that a total of 4500, may be calculated upon with great certainty by the 20th of the ensuing month.

The first advices that shall now be received from thence will be still more interesting, as I believe they will communicate the coming of the Libertador in Person—an event not exactly in consonance with the feelings of the Aristocracy lately in rule, but one I am persuaded that will have the most happy results 1st. in producing an early termination of a struggle so afflicting to the American 2d. in assuring to the Friends of a popular Government a permanent ascendancy. . . .

The Spaniards appear to be satisfied with the advantage they obtained and discover no Indication of approach.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, April 24, 1823.

SIR: The order exacting bonds from Neutrals prior to their Sailing, has been rescinded as you will perceive by the Note of the Minister in answer

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

to the one addressed to him by me on that subject. No. 1 is a Copy and as it alluded to a Blockade of some degrees of Coast may require an explanation.

Sometime during the last Month this Government thought it expedient to publish a Blockade comprising the extent indicated in the letter, but referring its operation to the regulation of the 15th of October 1821, heretofore transmitted to the Department. As that Decree gives effect to the Blockade only upon the arrival of vessels of War at the Station destined to render it efficient, it appeared to me imprudent to cavil at the loose manner in which it is announced and unnecessary to ask explanations as to the Force employed, when its competency must be a Subject of enquiry should any case occur claiming my Interference.

The first Division of Troops from Colombia in number 2000 have arrived, the Second composed of 2500 has been at Sea 20 Days and in all probability will reach this before the close of the Month. Bolivar was to follow with a third Division of 1500 men as soon as the additional Transports sent from hence should arrive at Guayaquil. I do not recollect the time of their departure, but by the computation of the President he must have been afloat at least 12 Days.

The Enemy at the last Dates were concentrating their Forces at Huan-Cayo about 70 leagues distant, for the purpose as is said of advancing upon the Capital. Should they have moved on the 20th, the day assigned for that purpose, it will require 15 more to compleat this rugged March and thus allow full time for the arrival of the Second, if not of the last Division with its celebrated Chief.

I confess I doubt whether the Spaniard will be so impolitic even with a prospect of entering the City, because the Patriots upon the accession of the whole of the Colombian Force, will unite a power competent to their entire destruction. You will Judge Sir how far I am correct, when I say that I have seen official returns of Troops in this City and its vicinity, exceeding 9000 in number, of whom 5000 are Veterans including the division from Guayaquil.

No. 2 is a copy of the decree of the 15th of October 1821, and No. 3 of the answer of Bolivar to the application of this Government for relief.

The Aid from Chile will be directed to the Intermediate Ports in conformity with the mode of attack contemplated and directed by San Martin.

I have understood Sir, that representations have been made against me and sent home to the Department. I have not enquired into their contents, nor should I now notice them, but that you Sir may be ignorant of the unworthy Source from whence they spring and thus give them a consequence the Signatures cannot merit. They proceed wholly from the Efforts of four Individuals to whose favor I certainly have no claims, they are T. Eldridge heretofore engaged in privateering, H. D. Tracy best known by the fraud committed upon one of the Banks in New York, J. Robinson whose prac-

tices in Chile have disgraced the American name and Capt. Smith whose transactions I have unfolded. I am not Sir Jealous of office but I am of reputation and shall ever be so of the good opinion of my Government.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, May 15, 1823.

SIR: The activity displayed by the President surpasses any thing I have witnessed in South America. 5000 Troops well equipped have already Sailed for Arica, and upwards of 7000 more including those from Colombia, are here in readiness to march for the Valley of Xauja [Jauja?] upon the return of the Deputies sent to Guayaquil, in order to accompany the Libertador. They sailed on the 14th of the last month from Callao so that should he decide to come and assume the Command, he may be expected in the course of the ensuing week. Many however doubt his coming, because Congress did not sanction the Invitation or rather were silent; but to me it appears unimportant as I cannot believe he will be deterred from embracing a Career so brilliant, by the Inattention of a Body composed of Artful Prelates and Philosophical Dotards and to the Politics of which all the late disasters are to be ascribed.

Canterac has not advanced from his Position at Huancayo and now cannot without abandoning the Interior to those referred to as on their way by Sea, he having concentrated at that Place nearly the whole effective Force they possess.

Advices were yesterday received from Chile, by which we learn that upwards of 3000 auxiliary Troops are preparing to embark at Valparaiso so as to sail from thence on the 25th and if so, they will reach Arica about the same time with those from this Place and thus form a total of nearly 9000 in that quarter.

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, May 27, 1823.

SIR: Although a direct conveyance Home is promised about 10 Days hence, I have thought it proper at so interesting a moment to avail myself of a Vessel sailing this Day to Valparaiso for the Communication of such Incidents as have occurred since my last.

The third division of Colombians composed of 1500 Troops have been afloat for some time and may be hourly expected; the Libertador also is on his way but by Land and will reach this in about five Days. The Spaniards continue in their encampment at Xauja or rather were so at the last date, perhaps waiting to learn the decision of Bolivar before they change their plans. . . .

P. S. Lima, June 1st. 1823. The Enemy has at length retired and the greatest activity prevails in the preparations for offensive operations. A Vessel leaves this for New York in about ten Days when I shall be enabled to offer a view of the Forces to be employed and of the direction to be given them. Bolivar has been on his way about 12 Days and must be here in the ensuing week.

With great respect [etc.].

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

CALLAO, June 29, 1823.

SIR: I have delayed writing in order to avail myself of the last hour and now am unable to fulfil my Intentions on account of a Slight attack of Pleurisy. The Spaniards approached Lima on the 17 and on the 18th a small Division was allowed to enter without resistance. The main Body is concentrated between this and the City distant about 5 miles. The Patriot Forces under Sucre a Favorite of Bolivar retired to this Fortress. The numbers are nearly equal, about 6000 effective men on each Side, the one however with every resource, the other with few, indeed so much so that they

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

cannot long maintain the position they have taken. The Expedition sent from hence landed on the Coast somewhere near Quilca and news is daily anticipated of its entrance into Arequipa.

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

CALLAO, July 10, 1823.

SIR: The Spanish Forces have in part retired and the residue under their Leader Canterac follow as it is said in the course of a few Days. Whether he delay or hasten his departure, his visit has been unavailing except on the score of plunder and I must believe will prove more destructive to himself than his last to this Fortress in 1821. The ship *Ea* leaves this for Baltimore sometime in the next week when I think I shall be enabled to confirm their departure and probably to add the loss of their Baggage by the Montonera, who in large numbers are hovering about them.

Upon the application of my countrymen having merchandize in Lima I addressed a Note to Genl. Canterac of which No. 1 is copy. No answer has been received, although he assures the agent that he has sent one. I doubt it and have written a short note to those interested advising them to ask the interference of Capt. Stewart. Fortunately there is scarcely any American property in deposite in the public stores and that without, can certainly be liberated upon the payment of the additional duties imposed upon the English Merchant.

I should have gone thither had I possessed any document in support of the Character assumed in my note, not having this, I did not feel inclined to stress it, because of the time that has elapsed since mine of the 6th Feby. 1822² communicating the loss of my papers.

The President and Congress shortly after their coming to this Place removed to Truxillo together with the Heads of the several Departments of the Government, first augmenting the powers of Sucre to a general control in those Provinces in which the War is maintained. He has accordingly since exercised the authority of Civil and Military Commander and hitherto with great discretion and Judgment. He has fitted out and sent to Sea another expedition to the South under the Command of an excellent officer, composed of 3000 choice Troops. It is said that he follows them but until we have something specific as to Bolivar I doubt his change of Place.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² See above, pt. xi, doc. 946.

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, July 21, 1823.

SIR: The rear Guard under Canterac left their encampment on the night of the 16th and on the succeeding morning the greater part of the patriot Force in Garrison marched out towards the South in order to cover the Cavalry in case of need. The Montonera, the mounted Militia of the Country proceeded in close pursuit, are hourly making reprizals of the plunder taken from hence and by the protection offered augmenting the number of Deserters.

Except in the destruction of a few private Houses in this neighborhood the property of Individuals distinguished by their adherence to the revolution, the Spaniards have deviated from their usual mode of Warfare, and what renders it the more strange is, that they had nothing to gratify them upon their entrance, as most of the White Population had abandoned the Capital and those who remained did not attempt to sooth by the customary exhibition of Flags &c. 300,000 dollars were levied in the first contribution and about 200,000 in value carried away in Merchandize. The whole scarcely an equivalent for the expences incurred in the preparations for a visit of which all are at a loss to derive the motives. It is confidently said by those who had intercourse with them, that greater mischiefs were contemplated by the Commanders and would have been carried into effect, had they not been deterred by the News from the South which determined them to a precipitate retreat. Some circumstances induce a belief that such was the case, first an order issued early upon their arrival, compelling the Spanish Inhabitants of the City to join the camp with all their property; 2dly, the temper discovered in the Circular addressed to the several Commanders of Neutral Ships of War on this Station; and 3dly, their not entering the Capital during their whole stay except on the first Day.

The losses sustained by the foreign Merchant have fallen lightly upon my Countrymen, not exceeding in the whole three thousand dollars, as you will perceive by a note of the agent, to a copy of which herewith transmitted I pray leave to refer. Indeed such was their Hurry, that they did not collect several private impositions nor the additional Duty of 15 per cent which they claimed upon Goods in deposite in private Warehouses.

The War is certainly approaching its conclusion and should Bolivar arrive, I think the present Campaign will be the last. His presence they are entitled now to anticipate hourly, as the obstacle hitherto alledged is removed

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

by the permission granted him to leave Colombia. Unfortunately Peru has furnished no leader capable of Succeeding San Martin and without some one to direct their Military operations, all efforts must prove unavailing. The present President is a sound Patriot, deserves much from his Country for his zeal and activity, yet he is not a Soldier.

I had hoped to have given news from the intermediate Ports, but none has arrived since that communicated in my last.

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LIMA, January 10, 1824.

SIR: Whatever may have been the motives of Riva Aguerro to procrastinate the conclusion of a Treaty, the terms of which had been assented to, loss of consideration and loss of employment of the highest grade, have been the fruits of his Duplicity. As soon as Suspicion was attached to him, the destination of the army was changed, the march toward the Enemy suspended, and 5000 men were embarked for Santa under the immediate command of the Libertador. The Celerity of the movement, combined with the reputation of the Chief, dissipated all opposition. Upon his approach Riva Aguerro was surrendered by his officers, abandoned by the Soldiery, pardoned and sent to Guayaquil and the Troops he had so industriously levied, were marched together with the Veterans of Colombia, to a Valley in the Mountains abounding with the necessaries of life. The whole effective Force since concentrated in this Valley is estimated at 11,000 of which 6000 are Colombians and it is from thence that they will proceed to Pasco not more than Twenty leagues distant. Upon this Body all reliance is placed and it is in the Valley of Xauja adjoining, that we may anticipate a contest in the approaching march, the result of which, if favorable to the Patriots will conclude further resistance. All has been adverse to Bolivar since his arrival; he has had to surmount difficulties that would have appalled a man less firm and less ardent in the cause; he has had to contend with Civil dissensions; he has had to watch over domestic treason among those to whom he was compelled to lend a portion of his confidence; and he has had to encounter the dereliction of a powerful Body of Troops, upon which he had a right to rely. Pinto the general to whom was confided the Command of the Succors sent from Chile, after remaining some Days at Arica,

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

where it was contemplated he should remain, suddenly reembarked his Troops and returned to Coquimbo. What could have been the motive to induce so precipitate a measure I cannot imagine, nothing had occurred either here or there to suggest a change of Place, he was well supplied with provisions, well sustained by a considerable Peruvian Force and his Transports protected by two Frigates under his immediate Control. He has incurred an unpardonable responsibility, he has disgraced his cause and although he may escape punishment from the false lenity of his Government, he never can extricate his reputation from the foul stain of Cowardice. . . .

The Director of Chile learning my intention not to return thither, thought proper, upon the usual application for a passport to order an audience of leave and to instruct his Minister to announce it to me as a personal compliment, having never disclosed a public character. My first impression was to decline an honor which could avail nothing, while it might bring down upon me censure at Home; but upon reflexion I determined to meet the feelings of the Government and accordingly prepared an address for the occasion, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. It is confined to the expression of individual feelings simply and if they are not in accord with those of the President I shall regret it.

[His address, referred to in the last paragraph follows:]

SIR: Born in a Country, the Cradle of Liberty and this the best Inheritance of its Laws, I should feel myself unworthy of my birthright, could I have witnessed with Indifference the struggle of Chile to emancipate herself from European oppression. No Sir! I have followed with unceasing interest the Footsteps of the noble dramarians [*sic*], and I have with pride contributed to extend the fame of their Sacrifices, their patriotism and their prowess. They have given to Humanity another Triumph, and History will record in its fairest page their deeds of Glory. Chile, Sir, disenthralled and free may now place herself alongside of her Sister Republic of the North and claim from the World that consideration as a nation, to which she is so preeminently entitled by the virtues of her Sons and the Beneficence of Nature.

The benign and liberal policy you have adopted Sir, by producing an oblivion of wounds inseparable from a revolution, add to your claims of Gratitude from the good people whose happiness you thus assure. That such result may be permanent and that your Excellency may enjoy the Grateful Satisfaction of an uninterrupted confidence is the ardent wish of my Heart.

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

TRUXILLO, March 13, 1824.

SIR: On the 4th of the last Month, the black Troops of Bs. Ays., to whom had been confided the Castle of Callao, in number about 1100, mutinied and hauling down the Flag of Peru, refused to acknowledge the further authority of the President and Congress, until their arrears were paid. Torre Taglee [Tagle] took no measures to avert the dangers threatened by this revolt, and at the expiration of a week, the Negroes liberated the Prisoners confined in that Fortress, hoisted the Spanish Flag and Sent an Agent to Canterac, in order to advise him of the Event, together with their determination to surrender its possession and to join his standard, upon receiving the amount claimed to be due for their Services. Answers were soon received acceding to the terms proposed and a Body of 1000 Spaniards followed, as well to sustain the Conspirators, as to secure a possession deemed so important.

I stated in the last which I had the honor to address to the Department that the whole Force of Peru including that of Colombia was concentrated in and near the Valley of Ihahuco to be in readiness for opening the Campaign as soon as the rains shall subside. The distance however from Lima was not such as to have prevented the approach of a Sufficient Force in season to repel the Spaniards, had Bolivar so inclined, but he having reason to suspect this Treachery to have had its origin elsewhere, and not considering Lima of sufficient importance in a Military view to justify a Division of his Troops, did not chuse to change his position. The enclosed proclamation No. 1² gives his Impressions and as an Observer intimately acquainted with the Sentiments of every Class, I have no hesitation in saying, that I am persuaded the whole is the work of those of the higher order surrounding Torre Taglee [Tagle]. I have heretofore adverted to his Incapacity, and I trembled when Bolivar thought it Incumbent upon him to recognize an authority emanating from the impure Source indicated in mine of the 31st of August last.² My apprehensions have been realized, the absence of Bolivar from the Capital gave them full Scope and every measure that foul Treason could engender was adopted to arrest his progress, and Torree Taglee [Torre Tagle] the President of the Republic borne away with the ignoble feelings of the wretch who burnt the Temple at Ephesus in order to occupy a page in history, upon the approach of the Spaniards, fled to those very Negroes that his name might be recorded with their Infamy. Fortunately for the Country after the explosion of the Conspiracy had taken place at Callao, the fear of detention among those of the Congress, who had had an agency in bringing about this event, induced them to yield to the views of the patriotic

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² Not printed in this collection.

portion of that Body and to unite in investing Bolivar with dictatorial Powers. These he now possesses and with them an authority, which, notwithstanding the untoward Circumstances that have Combined to retard his Efforts, will yet enable him to extricate Peru from Gothic Despotism.

It is difficult to predict the Course the Spaniards may pursue at Callao, my Impressions are that they will destroy the Fortress and retire. I am induced to this Conclusion 1st. because the Force requisite to maintain its possession must necessarily weaken Canterac at a moment when his Fate is to be decided by a Battle, 2d. because it is almost impossible to obtain wherewith to Subsist any number of Troops without the Dominion of the Ocean. Admiral Guise lies there with his Frigate in order to sustain the Blockade herewith Transmitted No. 2 and scarcely a Day passes without the exhibition of some act of Gallantry much to the annoyance of the Garrison.

This dereliction of the principles of the revolution by the Aristocracy does not proceed from an Idea of return to the ancient System. It is an Union with a proud and corrupt Clergy to preserve their privileges, by the Establishment of a Monarchical government under the auspices of France, to which two of the Spanish Chiefs La Serna and Canterac are equally inclined. The visit of Baron McKau was undoubtedly directed to that object, and Secret Agents are employed in every part of the Continent to give it effect. Two were destined for Peru, one of whom high in rank died on his way, the other has been in Lima for the last six months. This latter fact among others has just been developed in an official communication from the Government of Mexico to the Libertador, and from Confidential disclosures made to me while last in Chile, others in the like capacity are there actively employed. A Copy of the Instructions I have seen, the principal heads are 1st. to defeat the project of Union of the different States as contemplated by Colombia, 2d, to resist republican Ideas and above all Treaties with the U States until France should unfold her views, 3d, to impress them with the warm Interest which that Power takes in their happiness, together with her desire to give them one of her Sons who may preserve inviolate the holy Catholic religion. It is in fact the old Intrigue of Puerreydon which those in rule at Bs. Ays. are still cherishing, and which is now extending itself over the Continent. I cannot answer for the Politics of those governing Mexico, but happily I can for those of the Chief of Colombia, whose abhorrence of those implicated, is equal to his hatred of the Spaniard.

Shortly after the revolt I took a small boat at Chorillos and went to Callao with a view, if possible, to extricate such of our vessels as were detained in the walls of the Castle. My mission however was unavailing, as I was denied access both to the Port and to our Vessels, upon which not considering my presence of consequence, I removed to Chancay about 12 leagues to the North.

The Subsequent arrival of the Spaniards decided me to embark for this Place, with which there are daily communications from Headquarters.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

TRUXILLO, April 4, 1824.

SIR: The Count of Landos, Brother in law of the Duke of Montmorency, was the Agent referred to in my last, who died on his route from Portobello to Panama and Requier de Sauvignac the Secretary is the one now in Lima.

The defection of Torre Taglee [Tagle] has produced no other result, than that heretofore indicated; he is holden in general execration throughout this wealthy and populous District, he is equally spurned at by the Spaniard, and so abhorred in the Capital, that he is obliged to have a Guard for his protection. A reinforcement of 1500 men followed Rodil for the purpose of accompanying the Blacks into the Interior; with these they have marched leaving this Commander with his Division of 1000 Troops for the protection of the Fortress, as well as of the Capital. A Force so incompetent only adds to the distress of that unfortunate City, in as much as the Montonera are daily at its walls, intercepting all supplies.—

The rains are subsiding and the probability is that the Rivers may be forded by the beginning of the next month, when the campaign will be opened. Bolivar has now under his control 8000 Colombians inured to fatigue and accustomed to victory, to these he expects to join 1500 Veterans on their way to this Place from Panama, in which case he will be enabled to lead upwards of 9000 Colombians to the encounter with Canterac. The Peruvian Troops in number about 4000 will be kept in reserve for exigencies.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

CALLAO, May 3, 1824.

SIR: I have already had the honor to address you a letter No. 3 by this same opportunity in relation to a particular object and have now only to

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

describe the general state of things here. This task if confined to authentic statements would soon be executed, for little of that character appears; and such is the interruption of correspondence from the suspension of interior commerce & the unsafe situation of the roads, that all the reports which are circulated are mere rumors as idle as they are contradictory.

It appears however certain and it may be relied upon, that the disparity of force between Generals Bolivar & Canterac is too great to admit of a battle with any hope of success to the former. An intelligent Englishman who arrived here a few days since from Truxillo, and who appears to be an admirer of Gen'l. Bolivar, and frequently saw him, states his force at 6800 Colombians, and that a reinforcement of 1500 were expected in a few weeks being then on their way. He had besides 2 or 3000 Peruvians on whom he placed no reliance as they were known to be very discontented, and only anxious to seize the first opportunity of getting back to their friends. The army under Canterac is admitted by all to be from 10 to 12000. One person who seemed well informed, asserted with confidence that it amounted to 11000 infantry & 2000 cavalry.

Both sides it is said were preparing for a battle which was only delayed on the part of the Colombian general to obtain his reinforcements and by the Spanish commander from the obstacles of the season and the impracticability of passing the rivers which are extremely swollen in the autumnal season, but as the winter approaches the waters subside, and it was universally believed that the month of May would not expire without a battle that would be decisive, if against General Bolivar; and if otherwise extremely injurious but not ruinous to the Spaniards as they would still hold the whole of Upper Peru, the strongest & most valuable part of this country.

The event in either case seems to promise only a prolongation of evils to this unfortunate country. If the Spanish armies are to succeed only to conquer the country for a despotic monarch & the Inquisition, it will be only to reduce it once more to the withering bigotry & monopoly of their ancient system; and if the Colombian army succeeds, the consequences will be a further exhaustion of the inhabitants by a protracted civil war; the almost useless expenditure of the resources of Colombia,—which she may need for her own defence, and which will here be wasted, as the Colombians are excessively disliked by the Peruvians, and their chief is especially an object of dread & hatred to them.

The people of this country are of a mild character, without instruction & effeminate. Though secluded by their geographical situation as well as by the peculiar jealousy of the Spanish Court from all intercourse with the rest of the world, of which they were almost entirely ignorant they still felt the oppression of the monopoly they were subjected to; the progress other nations were making could not be wholly concealed from them, and they were prepared to accept of any change. When therefore the invasion of

the "patriot" chiefs was made they caught with eagerness at the ideas of liberty and independence, without knowing at what sacrifices these must be obtained, and that those who commence even a successful revolution seldom live to enjoy its results.

Unfortunately for Peru the invaders who came to proclaim liberty & independence, were cruel, rapacious, unprincipled & incapable. Their mismanagement, their profligacy, & their thirst of plunder soon alienated the affections of the inhabitants, and prepared them to hail the return of the royal armies who were left unmolested to recruit their forces in the fine regions of Upper Peru. The character of the royal chiefs formed too a striking contrast to their opponents. La Serna the Viceroy a man advanced in life is distinguished for his moderation, humanity and uprightness. The Generals under him, Canterac, Valdez, Monnet, Loriga, Rodil, are men in the prime of life with an energy intrepidity & enterprise that recall the character of their countrymen in the 16th century. They are all of the Constitutional party, & possess the virtues of those ill fated but real patriots.

I have in another letter submitted some reasons for the necessity of increasing our naval force on this ocean where our commerce is so considerable, & so capable of being enlarged. A recent occurrence since that letter was written has shewn still further the necessity of a reinforcement to watch such an extensive coast so liable to depredations from various parties. General Bolivar in the name of the Peruvian government has declared the coast of Peru in a state of blockade. Admiral Guise with a frigate & three smaller vessels is to enforce it & is to be stationed off this port. One of his cruisers arrived here a week since and detained a very valuable American ship which was fortunately rescued by our squadron. The officer stated, that they intended to be very liberal, they should allow vessels to enter on paying 25 pr. Ct. of the value of their cargoes in this market. Here then is a blockade established on the new system, not to distress an enemy but to pillage neutrals.

Though this plan is not original with them yet when it was practised by some others, we might bear with its injustice for a time, because there were governments we could look to for reparation. But in this case who is to be responsible? Not the Colombian government but the Peruvian government and this latter has really no existence, it is extinct. Here there are a number of foreign adventurers, they are almost all Englishmen, who undertake to lay neutral commerce under contribution, and when they have collected a certain sum, will like their predecessors disperse themselves, and leave us without a hope of future compensation. I do not know how the American & English naval commanders will act, but it will be difficult for them with a superior force to see their countrymen thus plundered in their very sight, and at such an immense distance from their governments that

the whole mischief will be effected & the depredators gone before they can receive instructions from home.

I am in daily expectation of receiving an answer from the Vice Roy, who is still at Cuzco as General Rodil informed me today; he continues to say that he has no doubt of my being recognized, and has urged me to act from the beginning in my official capacity. I have declined so doing except in a few cases, where my efforts might be of some use to my countrymen. One of these the Brig *Frederic* of Stonington which has been under detention for two months, on account of her Captain retaking this vessel from a prize crew of the privateer *Quintarilla*. He has promised to restore her to me tomorrow.

There are now eight American vessels in this port, part of them with assorted cargoes not yet landed. Among other articles those who are now discharging had about 7000 barrels of flour. Their voyages generally will give them a fair profit. I send a packet of newspapers published here.

I am [etc.].

P. S. May 4th. Last night a party of Montoneros entered a part of Lima, & created of course great dismay. They carried off several of the sentinels. This may give you an idea of the distracted state of this unfortunate country.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LIMA, June 7, 1824.

SIR: My last letter of the 3d ulto.² was by the *Franklin* which sailed from Callao the 5th inst. Since then I have received a short note from the Viceroy in answer to my letter on arrival, & a letter of explanation on the subject of my consulship to Commodore Stewart, to which he refers me; the viceroy appearing to fear that writing to me would be a kind of acknowledgement. I have written an answer which was despatched by the general who commands here about a week since; copies of these papers I inclose, as also translations of three other documents relating to the privateer *Quintarilla*, addressed to Com. Stewart, which came to hand at the same time. Presuming for various reasons that it would be the wish of the President, that I should exercise the functions of my office here, I wrote this second letter. I feel some doubts about the result, though I had none as to the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 961.

refusal of the first application. I hope I have not mistaken the views of the government in the course I have pursued, but such have been the changes here, that we are all of us placed in a peculiar & difficult situation. I wrote to the Viceroy in Spanish, as there is no one about him who understands English.

In the mean time I have received the most courteous treatment from General Rodil, who has the entire military & political command here; he has shewn me both before & since the answer of the Viceroy the most friendly disposition, & has refused me nothing that I have asked of him in behalf of my countrymen; and in one case by releasing some duties that had been already levied, although pressed with urgent wants of the service & obliged rigorously to exact every specie of revenue, he gave a very striking proof of the sincerity of his professions. It will therefore I think appear, that I have only done him justice, in an article in one of the newspapers inclosed.

In a former letter soon after my arrival I anticipated from the changes that had taken place, those mischiefs to our commerce in this idea which are now rapidly accumulating. The loss of this district by the patriots has occasioned a double injury, by enabling the royalists to fit out cruisers & the patriots to establish a vexatious blockade. Two Corsairs under the Spanish flag sailed from Callao two months ago; one went to leeward, the other to windward; they have sent in two prizes under patriot flags, & last week one Swedish & one American brig, the former laden with timber, & bound from one port in Chile to another. I hear that one of the reasons assigned for her capture was her having carried troops for the patriots in some expedition. The Captain applied to Come. Hull & myself for protection under the treaty with Sweden, but I shewed him that the last treaty had repealed the separate article of the treaty of 1783, by which the mutual protection was stipulated: He will apply to the English commander, there having been none here at the time of his arrival as I understand an agreement subsists between England & Sweden, similar to the one which formerly did between the U. S. & Sweden. . . .

The accounts of a battle are daily expected, both sides speak with equal confidence of their expected success. It is almost impossible to form an opinion on the subject. The forces may be presumed to be nearly equal. One of the reports of the day is, that General Bolivar has detached a body of troops to take possession of this city. At other times it has been said, that he would not come here at all, untill the question was fully decided; that if he was successful in the first battle, he would follow the Spanish army in their retreat to Upper Peru, & there decide the fate of the country, for if victorious there, Lima must fall of course.

In the meantime this City at present containing between 40 & 50 000 inhabitants & once so full of wealth & luxury is now one of the most wretched places in the world. Their resources have all been cut off, and with means

almost exhausted, every article of food is extravagantly high. Almost every family has suffered one of the great misfortunes of the civil war, that of having its members enrolled in opposite, embittered parties. Which ever side is victorious there are a great number who have to fear the vengeance of the conqueror. And with this eventual prospect at no distant period they are daily threatened by the bands of the *Montoneros*, who hovering round them like vultures are growing more bold as they find the garrison to be weakened, and have been three times within the bounds of the city the last week, so that a skirmish occurs every night, and it may be feared from one day to another they may come in sufficient force to take the City & plunder and assassinate at will for three or four days.

The English force on this coast consists of the *Cambridge* 84. Capt. Maling who is the senior officer, arrived this day at Callao, the *Tartar* & *Aurora* frigates, the latter bound home, & the *Fly* & *Measey* Sloops of war [sic]. The French have one corvette at Valparaiso, & it is reported that a fleet of several sail are on their way. There are now in the harbour of Callao ten sail of American vessels (merchantmen) & about the same number of English; none of other European nations except one Genoese. Our last dates from the U. S. are by the Frigate & from Europe to the middle of January.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

TRUXILLO, June 10, 1824.

SIR: Yesterday the *Dolphin* arrived at this Port with despatches from Capt. Hull and I pray leave to assure you that I shall take a pleasure in reciprocating the friendly feelings he has been pleased to express, as well as in Uniting with him most cordially to promote the views of the President. It is the more gratifying because the course adopted by Mr. Tudor is so foreign to my Ideas of the Intentions of the President, that I cannot think of lending my support to his measures.

The Army of Bolivar consisting of 10,600 Troops is advancing upon Xauja in four Divisions and we are in hourly expectation of an Encounter the result of which will form the subject of an early communication. 3000 additional Troops have been at Sea upwards of a month and are daily expected to arrive at this Port, indeed it is said that some of the Transports were yesterday in Sight to the Northward. This accession of Force will enable the Libertador if so inclined, to direct a small division for the occupa-

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

tion of Lima, now wholly defenceless and groaning under the most awful and brutal oppression.

Admiral Guise has been committing outrages upon both the English and American merchantmen in direct hostility with the orders of the Libertador and I regret that Capt. Stewart did not furnish me with some one case upon which to ground a representation. I have had frequent interviews with the Secretary General residing in this City and his marked disapprobation of the conduct of that officer satisfies me that Capt. Hull will obtain prompt orders for the correction of these abuses.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

FRIGATE *United States*,
CALLAO ROADS, July 11, 1824.

SIR: By the English Frigate *Aurora* which takes this letter round the Cape, I have sent a duplicate of my last dispatch. The official returns of our commerce for the first six months of this year, & some other documents I had ready for this opportunity, which I thought would have been delayed a few days longer. These papers are in Lima & the vessel sails in the morning.

To explain the reason of my writing from this place, will serve to give some idea of the state of things here. The General who commands this district, sent me an express today, to say that the Commodore wished to see me, & if I would come down to Callao, might go on board: this is a particular favour as all communication with the ships is now wholly interrupted. Admiral Guise is in the roads blockading the port with his squadron. One or two nights he has sent in boats to make attacks in the inner harbour, & the night before last burnt one & took out three Spanish vessels. All the foreign merchantmen are at anchor with their ships of war out of reach of the balls of the contending parties. This state of active war produces much irritation, & for the few last days there has been a total interruption to all intercourse with the shore.

I informed you in my last of the arrival here of the Brig *Nancy* of New York, as a prize to a privateer fitted out from Callao; & today the privateer herself with a valuable American ship, the *General Carrington* of Providence, taken in the port of Quilca, also came in safely, passing the blockading squadron. The American ship had Spanish Colours hoisted, & Come. Hull immediately wrote to the Governor to inquire the reason of this outrage.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

I inquired of General Rodil the reason for the capture of this ship; he told me he had not examined all the papers, but that she had landed powder & firearms in Coquimbo an enemy's port, & she had also smuggled some goods in the port of Quilca. The Captain & Supercargo were not allowed to land today, so that I could obtain no other particulars. If this ship which is said to be worth 100,000 \$, should not be burnt or cut out in some of these night attacks, I can have little hope for her acquittal after such charges against her, when the case of the *Nancy* is considered. This vessel has all her papers in perfect order, the whole value of her cargo is not more than \$1800, & it is obvious from the documents that she was only taken in order to send down some plunder, which the privateer took on shore in the port of Huasco, where she was lying.

The General requested me last week to look at the papers of this case the Fiscal having given an unfavorable opinion, and send him my observations upon it. This was done, & fortunately a variety of circumstances & official acts combined to prove in the most perfect manner, that the testimony of an English sailor, one of the privateer's crew, who swore that he had worked on board of her a few months before, under patriot colours, was an open perjury. The General in his letter replied to me, that my remarks appeared just, & he should be glad to have her acquitted; but today he informed me that one of the officers had declared the case looks badly. If she is condemned, I cannot imagine that any vessel can be cleared.

If a change does not speedily happen to terminate the dissensions of these countries, our commerce will be subjected to great risk, & if the government determine to protect it, more force will be necessary & more explicit instructions to the commanders. Five vessels at least will be wanted between Chiloe & Mexico: At the same time it would be extremely desirable to combine if possible some mode of proceeding between the forces of neutral nations. The *Quintanilla* whose captain acted so like a pirate was captured by a French Sloop of war which she fired upon. Yet the property of all Frenchmen in Upper Peru, to the amount of 400,000 \$, was taken possession of by the government to await the decision of the case, & they themselves held as prisoners on parole.

We are in daily expectation of the news of a battle between Generals Bolivar & Canterac. The forces of the parties are nearly equal & both speak with equal confidence of the expected result. But all the events of the war will reach the U. S. much sooner from other quarters, & I therefore forbear to dwell upon the subject.

The *Dolphin* returned two days ago bringing answer to Come. Hull from General Bolivar, saying that he would be answerable for the money taken from the American ships as a fine or ransom by Admiral Guise, whenever the affair could be investigated, if it should appear that his conduct was improper. It inclosed also a copy of the last orders to him, prohibiting the

levy of any duty on vessels bound in or out, & directing that he should consider no port in a state of blockade before which he had not a vessel stationed. Callao & Pisco are I believe the only ports now blockaded.

An American seaman by the name of Henry Hudson of Rappahannoc Co., Virginia, called upon me in distress & died of consumption in Lima about a month ago; he had served in the squadron under Come. Decatur in the Mediterranean & came out to Chile boatswain of a Brig from Baltimore. I have been told that a brother of his, died a short time since at Guayaquil. They may possibly have friends to whom this notice may be interesting.

The following ships of war are now lying here besides the Frigate *A. 1.* & the *Dolphin*: the British ships *Cambridge 84*, *Tartar* Frigate, & *Fly* Sloop of war; the latter sails tomorrow for Valparaiso. The Peruvian squadron consists of the *Prueba* Frigate, *Adl. Guise* & three smaller vessels. They have detained several English vessels but none belonging to the U. S.

I hear that a few newspapers have been received from home into March, & it is said that the bill against transporting money in ships of war has passed. This induces me to repeat here an opinion, that was developed at large in former letters; that our policy, instead of prohibiting the transportation of money, should be, to encourage it to the utmost under proper regulations. If it be an object with the government to extend our commerce with these countries & to increase the consumption of our manufactures, or even to preserve the share we now have, two objects must be immediately attended to: first, to give every facility to the transportation of specie in our ships of war, & secondly by a new arrangement of our naval force, to keep a ship constantly going and coming between the U. S. & South America. For the receipt & transmission of intelligence, as well as for the deposit & remittance of specie, we are now almost wholly dependent on the English ships of war, & the commerce between our country & this, will rather diminish than increase, if a different system be not speedily adopted. I earnestly hope that this subject will be considered on a large scale; our present policy is excessively injurious to our interests.

On our glorious *Fourth*, the few Americans in Lima dined by invitation on board this ship, as did all the English commanders, & some of their lieutenants, the awning under which we dined, was composed of the American & English flags, the first time I presume that they were ever blended on that day. Being Sunday, the festivity according to the customs of both nations was moderate in its tone. The experiment was a delicate one, but succeeded most harmoniously and seemed to give mutual satisfaction.

I have the honor [etc.].

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, August 24, 1824.

SIR: I take the advantage of a vessel bound to Guayaquil to write this letter with the hope there may be some opportunity of forwarding it by the way of Panama.

The present moment is a very critical one, & the anxiety of all parties at its height. On the 6th inst. a combat took place between the patriots & Spaniards which ended in the triumph of the former. It appears that General Canterac who for the last year has had his headquarters at Huan-cayo near Jauja, moved forward to meet the patriot army which had descended the Cerro de Pasco, & had traversed the Pampas of Reyes. Two leagues in advance of that place the advanced divisions of both armies encountered each other, & after an obstinate combat the Spanish force was worsted with a considerable loss, 300 they admit themselves—the patriots say much more. It was not a general action, but principally between the cavalry; & as it was on this arm that the Spaniards chiefly relied for their superiority, it augurs badly for them that they should have been defeated. They retreated 20 leagues with precipitation night & day, closely followed by the patriot army, to take up a position previously chosen at the bridge of Ircuchagua on the Apurimac. Here the Viceroy who left Cuzco on the 5th inst. & Valdez are to join them with reinforcements. The official dispatch of the Patriots was dated the 7th inst. the Spanish General here has dates to the 13th, but nothing more is known; it is fair however to presume that the Spaniards have met with no subsequent success or it would have been gladly proclaimed here.

In the contradictory & confident assertions of both sides, it is difficult to get at the truth, but the aspect of affairs has essentially changed in favour of the patriots within the last three months. The great exertions that have been made by the patriot government of Colombia & the energy & ability of General Bolivar have brought forward an army filled with enthusiasm & probably numerically stronger than the Spaniards can collect. General Bolivar is said to have with him between 12 & 13000 men besides having reinforcements coming up. The Spanish force after the junction of La Serna & Canterac will not exceed the patriot army in numbers, & are inferior to it in character, & much more liable to revolt & dispersion. For although the Spanish officers have done wonders in collecting & disciplining their force they cannot infuse any enthusiasm into their followers for the dominion of Spain. With the exception of a very few Spaniards, their ranks are composed entirely of Indians & negroes. The former are prone to disperse after every action & carry off their arms with them.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

In the meantime the Spanish General commanding in this district has removed all the public property from the Mint & elsewhere to the Castles of Callao; & the small garrison that remains in the City is ready to evacuate it at a moment's warning. The *Montonera*, have made incursions in its immediate vicinity the two last days for the purpose of pillage and the approach of some patriot force is now daily expected.

This City has been exposed to dreadful disorders from its populace & the savage *Montonera* on former occasions of a similar nature. The civil governor evacuates with the garrison & an entire suspension of authority follows, for the Alcaldes & watchmen having no point of support, abandon their posts & shut themselves up in their houses like the rest of the inhabitants. No vestige of public spirit which might combine the citizens for mutual support in such an emergency is to be found here. Each house prepares for a separate defence as well as it can; but the foreigners are better able to protect themselves, as they are provided with arms of which the other inhabitants are destitute. Under these circumstances the commanding General last week spontaneously proposed to the American & English commanders, as he could no longer be responsible for the safety of their countrymen after his troops evacuated the City, that they should send up a force of marines for their protection. Captain of the *Cambridge 84* the Senior English officer in this sea immediately sent up three officers & 110 men who were put into fine quarters here, & have since received rations from the Spanish General.

Commodore Hull declined taking the same course for several reasons, but he offered to send up a few sailors under the charge of an officer to be distributed in the houses of his countrymen; on consulting with them I found they were afraid they could not manage the sailors, and have therefore only requested the loan of some arms and ammunition. It may be hoped that the disorders will not be so serious as on a former occasion. It was at first understood that the English marines would remain concentrated, & in that case the Alcaldes & watchmen would have kept their posts; having a military force to rely upon, & this small corps might have protected the whole city. There seems however to be some objections to this course, & I understand from Capt. Maling this morning that they are to be dispersed in the houses of the English residents.

A reflection obtrudes itself here irresistibly. The last news we have here from Europe contains the correspondence of Mr. Canning on the subject of South American Independence, & the debate in the House of Lords on the Marquess of Lansdown's motion. Lord Liverpool in his answer leaves less hope of a speedy recognition on their part, than was caused by the able letter of Mr. Canning in answer to the Conde Ofalia. It appears however that the Cabinet has definitively resolved to acknowledge the Independence, & only defer "the mere form" out of delicacy to the Spanish Court. Yet

for want of this form chiefly, these countries are kept in a distracted state, this large city & many others are plunged in wretchedness & thousands of brave men are to waste their blood on the sands of Peru. Is not deference on such a subject, at such a moment, for such a Sovereign as Ferdinand, & such a cabinet as the present one at Madrid, thinking too much of Court etiquette, & too little of human misery?

The blockade of the port of Callao, which had been properly maintained for two months was given up about ten days since, & has not been renewed. It is however said it is to be resumed, though with a force, that Captain Maling writes me today, he thinks insufficient for the purpose. In the interval six American vessels have entered the port.

Of the two American vessels which I informed you in previous letters, had been sent into Callao by a Spanish cruiser, the Brig *Nancy* has been condemned, & the ship *General Carrington* of Providence undoubtedly will be. The value of the *Nancy* & her cargo was not more than 8 or 9000 \$ both together; her papers were perfectly in order, & the case is one of flagrant injustice. The Ship with her cargo is worth about 100,000 \$ & as she had landed powder & arms in Chili, her condemnation under the treaty of 1795, will be more difficult to be set aside. The Spaniards have now no cruisers at sea; the last that was sent received so much injury from the straining while chased by the Frigate *U. S.* that the Captain afterwards burnt her in the port of Chilca.

The Supercargo & officers of the *Carrington* were imprisoned & not allowed to communicate with any one. When I took down to the General a copy of the seventh article of the treaty of which I had previously given him an entire copy, he said he had nothing to do with it. I asked him how a Spanish officer in his situation, or their courts could be exempt from the obligations of that treaty? He replied, that they knew nothing of treaties, that they were only bound to follow the instructions which the Viceroy received from his Court. This was in other words to say, that they cared nothing for the present state of these countries, or of the commerce on these coasts, that the laws of the Indies were their only rule, & the instructions to the Viceroy dated several years since their only guide. Such are the proceedings & policy of the Spanish administrators.

August 26th. I was yesterday at Callao, & saw General Rodil; he told me Come. Hull had written to him respecting the *Carrington*; but that she must be condemned as the *Nancy* had been, & that if we were injured we must look to Spain for redress. A vessel arrived yesterday from Quilca & at length we have certain accounts of the *Asia* which, with the Brig *Achilles* are at Chiloe, where they arrived in May & were waiting to be joined by two French frigates manned with Spaniards. The *Asia* has 1050 men on board. Two officers from her had reached Quilca ten days since. They were refitting the miserable vessel they came down in to return with the Viceroy's

orders, which cannot reach Chiloe before October. It is therefore probable that the *Asia* may arrive here just in season to take back to Spain the chiefs of the Spanish army, if the campaign should be decided against them.

The Spaniards have three armed vessels at Callao, two brigs of 14 & 18 guns, & the Ship *Esther*, formerly belonging to Mr. Dorr of Boston, which they have absurdly armed as a two decker to carry 32 guns. These vessels it is the intention to keep in port till the *Asia* comes down. If the patriots do not conquer Peru this campaign, & the Spanish squadron be actually reinforced by the Frigates, expected, they will then have a force of seven vessels of war, & men enough to fit out two or three more. In such an event nothing but the positive resistance of the American & English squadrons, could prevent our whole commerce from being swept away from these coasts.

I am writing by Captain Carter of the *Peacock* who I understand returns home, & proceeds in the *Dolphin* in a few days to Valparaiso on his way. I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. August 29th. Admiral Guise in his own ship with the schooner *Macedonian* has resumed the blockade of Callao today. Further news from the officers of the *Asia* say that she is ordered to remain at Chiloe till joined by the *Guerrero* an 80 gunship. No further news from the armies.

966

*José Ramón Rodil, Military and Political Governor of the Province of Lima, to William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima*¹

[TRANSLATION]

CALLAO, *September 4, 1824.*

Considering you Sir, as a person of the first influence among the citizens of your nation residing in this Province, I find myself obliged to communicate to you the request which has been made to me under date of the 3d inst., by the Political Governor of Lima, the Count de Villar de Fuente, on the sacred subject which is explained in it; that by taking it into your consideration, you may endeavour to remedy as far as possible, the scandal of which the Count complains:

Neither in my public nor my private character, can I see with indifference, the scandalous profanation which the holy sanctuary of our Churches is suffering from foreigners. Your Exy. knows better than I, the civil & polite deportment, which should be observed among the diver-

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I, enclosed in Tudor to the Secretary of State, September 18, 1824, which see below, pt. XI, doc. 968. Similar letters were sent to the British Consul and to the Commanders of the American and English squadrons.

sities of worship which blinded nations adopt: and which Catholics though well persuaded of their fanaticism observe; and if they also, preserve a corresponding composure & exterior circumspection when led by curiosity or any other motive, they enter those Temples where the true God is not worshipped; why should not protestants or heretics observe the same politeness when they enter into ours? Every day this Christian people perceives the contempt with which our sacred mysteries are treated; and while offering the proper adoration of their faith, to the August Sacrament in the most solemn festivals,—even then, these strangers making a contrast of their different opinions, manifest the highest contempt with impudence & impunity, going so far as to cover themselves before the Divine Majesty itself, and insulting the faithful, in the holy celebration of their most sacred dogmas. It is necessary to make known to these uncivil strangers that the irreligious flags of the patriots (*le Patria*) no longer wave in our territory, but the virtuous ones of the Catholic King, that they may adjust their conduct to those duties, which order & the highest policy of nations require; and as we now happily find your Exy. placed at the head of the Military & Political government of this Province, your Exy. is more immediately called upon to justify the sacred confidence of the Sovereign, in a matter that has always deserved his royal vigilant attention & watchfulness, as well as, those of our most excellent Viceroy and General in Chief. If your Exy. thinks proper to communicate officially to those representatives of foreign powers, existing here, with that energy, decorum, & efficiency, (*energia, decoro, y acierto*) which are characteristic of you, these abuses of such transcendent mischief (*peinas transcendencias*) will without doubt be reformed; your Exy. will thereby give a testimony worthy of a distinguished Spanish Chief, & the most decided protection to all the inhabitants, who now recognize in the provident and moral government of your Exy. the safeguard of the laws.

I have the honor to repeat to your Exy. the assurance of my respect.
God guard your Exy. many years. Real Felipe del Callao Sept 4 1824.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to José Ramón Rodil, Military and Political Governor of the Province of Lima*¹

LIMA, September 6, 1824.

GENERAL: I had the honor of receiving yesterday your Exy's. letter of the 4th inst.² containing a communication from the Political Governor of Lima, the Count de Villar de Fuente, which I have read with the greatest surprise & regret. I have vainly endeavored to ascertain & am unable to

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I, enclosed in Tudor to Secretary of State, September 18, 1824, which see below, pt. XI, doc. 968.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 966.

imagine, what conduct on the part of foreigners in this City, can have given rise to such a harsh and indiscriminate denunciation of them, in such phrases as the following: "*scandalous profanation of Churches, blinded nations, contempt of sacred mysteries, impudence and impunity, insults to the faithful, uncivil strangers, abuses of such transcendant mischief.*"

In regard to the citizens of the United States, it is my duty solemnly to protest against this language as applicable to them. The vast & splendid Churches and convents of Lima, are very naturally objects of admiration to them; and it may happen through inadvertence that they may enter these at an inopportune moment & from the same motive fail of complying with some of those ceremonies which are expected & rendered by all. But in such a case, I am sure that a suggestion from any of the attendants, would be immediately followed with thankfulness; and I declare that I do not know any of my countrymen in Lima, who are capable of wantonly insulting the feelings of the inhabitants, by treating with intentional disrespect, any object which they may hold sacred.

In the United States the most perfect & absolute religious toleration exists; in all the towns churches of different communions are to be found together. The civil government in matters of faith, considers men responsible only to their Creator; and while it protects equally the rights of all, declines, and in fact is prohibited by our Constitutions, from according any exclusive preference. No sect therefore being either favoured, or persecuted, there being neither oppressor nor oppressed; but all the citizens worshipping the same Omnipotent God & Divine Saviour of the world, though with different forms, are exactly equal in the eye of the law. I mention these facts only to shew, that my countrymen being accustomed to see all sects enjoying equal privileges, and treating each other with mutual respect, and judging of men not by their particular belief but by their general conduct, cannot be supposed likely to treat the Catholic religion here with disrespect, among whose professors in their own country, they have left neighbours, friends, relations, and fellow Christians.

It remains for me only to say, that feeling as I do, the most sincere respect for the Count de Villar de Fuente, whom I have always heard described as remarkable for his moderation, virtue & wisdom, I am more surprised at such a general denunciation of foreigners. I am confident there must have been some mistake in the representations made to him on this subject. But if a man of his character, who in his situation, has all strangers placed under his protection, thus covers them with such reproaches without distinction; what might not be expected from the pious but mistaken zeal of ignorant people, if once stimulated to consider foreigners as guilty of sacrilegious insults? The cruelty and injustice of such general proscriptions might then be shewn very strikingly in the case of my countrymen. There are among the officers of the squadron, some Catholics, and as that bounteous Provi-

dence who provideth for all his creatures, has fixed no distinctive mark on the Catholic & the Protestant, these individuals who by their dress & language, would be marked as foreigners, might fall victims, Catholics killed by Catholics, in a moment of popular phrensy.

I intreat you to represent these considerations, with the utmost respect on my part, to the Count de Villar de Fuente. I will do every thing that depends on me, to caution my countrymen against giving any offence to the amiable people among whom they reside; and I in my turn, must appeal to the same "*energia, decoro, y acierto*," which the Count so justly describes as distinguishing your administration, to afford them the same security & protection, which the subjects of Spain every where receive in the United States.

I have been reluctant of late for many reasons, to trouble you with applications; but I must take this occasion to represent, that there are on board the ship *General Carrington*, a few cases of silks belonging to a very respectable merchant, a particular friend of mine, in Boston, which were recommended to my attention, when I left the U. S. These goods were shipped in Chile for this market, and being entirely independent of the property of the vessel & her cargo, ought not to be subject to the decision in her case, if unfavorable. I therefore hope you will order them to be delivered to me.

I regret to learn that in the attack made by the gunboats yesterday, a ball from one of them, killed a sailor on board the American ship *Governor Clinton* & carried off the arm of another of my unfortunate countrymen. As the man is disabled for life through this unlucky accident, I hope he may be considered an object of your Excellency's benevolence.

I have the honor [etc.].

968

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States.*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LIMA, September 18, 1824.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copies of two letters which recently passed between General Rodil & myself.² His letter was a circular addressed to the English Commanders & Consuls. This letter seemed to me extraordinary, especially when the mild character of the Governor is considered, who has only been allowed to hold the mere semblance of power,

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, docs. 966 and 967, under dates of September 4 and 6, 1824.

and as such an unqualified & bitter denunciation of all foreigners, might well serve to prepare the way for a general proscription, I thought it my duty to protest against it immediately. I have received no answer to my reply, or to the other topics of my letter.

The Brig *Nancy* of New York has been finally condemned; the case of the ship *General Carrington* of Providence was not concluded yesterday, but I have no doubt will share the same fate. Come. Hull sent up protests & a demand for restitution in both cases to the Viceroy by the *Peacock*, which sailed for Quilca about ten days since. The Spanish government however is so pressed for funds, and the country is so exhausted that there can be little hope of recovering any property from their hands.

The Spanish Ship *Asia* & brig *Achilles* reached Callao on the 12th inst. in exactly eight months from Cadiz. The former mounts 70 guns, with upwards of 700 men. The Brig is a very fine French corvette of 20 guns. There were in the harbour two brigs carrying 14 & 18 guns & one ship of 28; these sailed out to meet them. Admiral Guise who was lying at anchor in the outer roads, when they were first discovered slipped his cable & sailed out to meet them with three vessels, his own frigate carrying 50 guns, a ship filled up with lumber, her guns stowed in her hold, & a brig with 6 guns. He fell to leeward & could not reach the Spanish squadron, but hove to for them to go down to him, which they declined doing though with such an immense superiority of force. They are all quietly anchored under the guns of the forts & make no effort to attack Guise though he is in sight of them every day. They have attempted to shelter their conduct under the absurd pretence, that on the day they entered, they took the United States for an enemy's frigate, & treated the Commodore merely in an official visit of ceremony. He however repulsed this treatment very properly, and if they do not retract their assertions, is resolved to make their conduct very widely known by publishing a little chart of the harbour, with the positions of all the vessels laid down.

The arrival of these Ships produced the most extravagant joy at Callao where the adherents of the Spaniards are now all collected under the protection of the Castles. The most unmanly boasting followed, in language unequalled for its scurrility & obscenity, as you will see by the inclosed gazettes, written by a Spaniard named Ricco, who is a particular favorite of the Spanish government & holds several employments under them. An allusion is made in one of the papers to the accusation against the Frigate *United States*. I have been assured that in the drunken orgies which took place, it was openly proposed to use the knife at once against all English & Americans, though it dwindled to a petition to General Rodil to banish them from the country, which he would probably treat with the same contempt he has previous propositions of the same nature.

We have no news from the army of General Bolivar since the 22d ulto.,

when the advance was at Huamanga & the headquarters at Huancayo near Jauja. This delay inspires a good deal of uneasiness, & there is no immediate prospect of the occupation of this city by the Patriot forces. Persons who have come from the headquarters of the patriot army say, that they have no expectations of terminating the war this campaign, & that the rise of the rivers prevents any decisive movements till the next campaign. If so the Spaniards will again be able to assemble a respectable force, & the war may be prolonged indefinitely. The whole country, & this part of it more especially is daily exhausting & verging towards the extreme of misery. . . .

I saw two days since for the first time the Truxillo gazette of the 11th of June last, containing a miserable libel against me, which doubtless will be published throughout the United States. The charge intended to be insinuated, that I received a certain vessel as a reward for my *servility* to the Spaniards, alludes to the Brig *Frederic*, which I purchased in conjunction with Nixon & McCall, an American house here, of her owner Captain Burrowes who returned home in the *Franklin*. Come. Stewart was acquainted with the whole transaction & he I trust will have obtained and printed Capt. B's deposition. I consider my duty to the government as well as to myself requires this explanation.

The Frigate *United States*, the British Ship *Cambridge* are in the roads of Callao. The Spanish squadron of five sail are anchored in the inner harbour. Admiral Guise is outside the island of St. Lorenzo with a frigate & two smaller vessels, and eight sail of American & nearly the same number of English, merchant vessels are in the outer roads.

I have the honor [etc.].

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, September 27, 1824.

SIR: Since my last letter of the 18th inst.² we have had very important news from the armies. A bulletin of the 27th ulto. contains an account of various minor successes, in the capture of small parties of the Spanish troops, arms, ammunition &c. It states the spirit of the Spanish army to be entirely broken & its ranks reduced by desertion to 2500 or at most 3000 men. Their retreat is made with such rapidity in the direction of Cuzco, that they think the campaign will be terminated without another battle. General Bolivar was the 26th of August at Huamanga, & the whole army moving forward with as much expedition as possible. This paper speaks with the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 968.

utmost confidence of "the fate of Peru being fixed" and that the "war will irrevocably be terminated this year."

Other accounts confirm this important intelligence. An intercepted letter of General Canterac to General Rodil, after the battle of the 6th August speaks in such terms of the consequences of that affair & the state of his army, as fully corroborates all the assertions of the bulletin. An American ship arrived yesterday from Quilca, & letters by her from Arequipa say that the Viceroy had abandoned Cuzco, which has no doubt been entered by the Patriot army before this date, to retire to a mountainous position about 30 leagues distant; that a considerable part of the army under Valdez had passed over to Gen. Olañeta, and that at Arequipa they were preparing to embark their property & persons.

From these accounts it would seem that the War must be finished without further bloodshed, a most fortunate & unexpected result. The Viceroy will probably be induced in this desperate state of affairs, when a further contest must be unavailing, to enter into a capitulation, in which case, the Castles of Callao would be included in the condition and the Spanish authority would be wholly extinguished, which would save a great deal of useless devastation & suffering to this district.

We have reports that troops have arrived from Panama at Huacho, & that they will enter this city in a week. The movements of the Spanish garrison seem to render this probable. They retired from the City entirely yesterday, & previously disbanded the military guard—a small party of cavalry re-entered it today, & their troops are making various movements on the roads to the South & West. Today a quantity of flour coming up from Callao, was ordered back by General Ramirez, who said that no more should be allowed to enter Lima.

The squadron in the port with the two American prize vessels fitted to carry troops, are preparing for some expedition. Two objects are supposed, one to take down a body of men to make an attack on Guayaquil, the other, that they are going up to the Intermedios to bring away the troops that may escape to the coast. As the garrison does not consist of more than 1500 men, hardly sufficient for the defence of the castles, it would seem that they could not spare force enough for any expedition, & especially as it asserted that 700 men marched up towards Chilca yesterday. It seems more probable therefore that the expedition is bound to the Intermedios. The English marines are to remain in the City another week.

I have the honor [etc.].

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LIMA, October 17, 1824.

SIR: Since my last despatch² we have had no authentic intelligence from the armies, & as more than six weeks have elapsed from the date of the last official statement, this long interval produces anxiety. According to accounts that are put in circulation from Spanish sources, the forces still remaining with Canterac, Valdez & Carrotela, would if united be about equal in number to the army of General Bolivar, though with a character very much depressed by recent reverses, & the troops being chiefly composed of Indians & negroes can not be relied upon. The season for active operations will be terminated in about a month by the annual floods of the rivers. An apprehension therefore is entertained that the war may be prolonged another year.

A report has been circulated that the Viceroy had requested an armistice of Bolivar; if we may rely on the decisive tone of the last despatches from him, it may be presumed that he will not consent to an armistice except as preliminary to a capitulation. In the mean time the hopes of a speedy occupation of this City by the patriots have vanished. The report of the troops from Panama having arrived at Huanchaco [Huacho?] was unfounded; the transports to take them were not to sail from Guayaquil till the end of September, & their arrival here cannot be expected in less than three months, during which time this district must remain as it is, except the gradual increase of misery which every day produces. The whole number of troops at Huacho, Truxillo &c. does not exceed 1500 men, composed of recruits, invalids, & various little detachments left behind by the main army. This force is not sufficient to dispute the possession of Lima with the Spaniards, & if they advance with a less force than 3000 men, which will be necessary for the investment of Callao, it would only increase the misfortunes of the capital without any benefit to the patriot cause. The patriots now hold the valley back & the coast on both sides to within 5 or 6 leagues of the city, & their Montonera traverse all the roads except that to Callao, & prevent provisions from being brought to market. The Montonera have entered the City several times of late in the middle of the day, and without committing so many acts of violence as formerly. One night last week they carried off between 3 & 400 horses, mules & oxen, belonging to the garrison of Callao, from some fields not more than a league distant from the Castles. The Spanish garrison of Lima which evacuated it about three weeks [ago?], & has since been stationed at the Church of the Legera half way to Callao

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 969, under date September 27, 1824.

retains that position, and from time to time sends a detachment into the City for a few hours. The English marines belonging to the *Cambridge 84*, which have been quartered here nearly two months, returned to the ship this week, as she is about sailing. It is said a party from the *Tartar* frigate are to replace them. Their presence has greatly contributed to the quiet of the City.

Admiral Guise after an absence of some time reappeared before the port, on the 6th inst. having with him five small vessels, besides his own frigate the *Prueba*. On the 8th the Spanish squadron consisting of the *Asia* mounting 74, the brig *Achilles* 20, The Ship *Ica* (formerly *Esther* of Boston) 28 & the Brigs *Pezuela* & *Constante* of 16 each went out to meet him. The British & American ships also got under way to witness the combat. The fog however prevented the operations from being distinctly seen. Guise himself behaved with great courage & skill, his small vessels as badly as possible. The Spanish squadron maneuvered with regularity, & the escape of Guise, having the *Asia*, *Achilles* & *Ica* all upon him at once, was considered wonderful. Nothing could have saved his whole squadron from capture by such an overwhelming superiority of force but that "fulness of precaution" on the part of the Commander of the *Asia*, which was satirically ascribed to him in the Spanish official account of his arrival. I inclose his report of the action with a few other papers. It is correct except in the assertion of the serious injuries received by the *Prueba*, which however was the impression of the officers on board the neutral ships of war.

The Spanish squadron with three transports in addition are daily expected to sail to make another attack on the Peruvian squadron which returned to the entrance of the port a week ago without having received any serious injury in the engagement; if they can get clear from the squadron of Guise, they will it is presumed go to some port of the Intermedios though their destination is not known. Captain Maling in the *Cambridge* the senior English officer on this station, means to follow them; he believes them to be bound for Quilca, and wrote me the day before yesterday that he felt more convinced of this, as an embargo had been laid on all the vessels at Quilca.

There are two Colombian Corvettes at Guayaquil, & the Chilians have two frigates & a sloop of war at Valparaiso; the latter are expected here, but their movements are so dilatory & feeble that no dependence can be placed upon them. The *Asia* has been now five months in this sea, & they are not yet equipped; & when they arrive the jealousies about rank & command between the respective commanders, will perhaps render them inactive. From these circumstances it will appear that supposing only the ordinary vicissitudes of war to happen, the result by sea as well as on land seems extremely uncertain; and though there can be no doubt what will be the termination of this struggle, still that the war may be prolonged for a considerable period.

The revolt in the Castles of Callao, which gave the Spaniards possession of Lima in February last, may be supposed to have been known in Spain in the month of June. It will doubtless inspire extravagant expectations in the infatuated, obstinate Court of Madrid, & they may make great efforts to send out succours to Peru. Should they succeed in getting out only three Frigates to this sea they will have a decided preponderance, & unless the U. S. & the English governments authorize their commanders to make a positive interference, they will sweep all the merchant vessels from the coast, to supply those public and private wants for which this impoverished country can no longer provide; and while the Spanish commanders fill their pockets, they will tell neutrals to look to Spain for redress. If Admiral Guise does not cripple the Spanish squadron, which is hardly to be expected with the great inferiority of his force they will be able to injure us extensively even if no reinforcements should come from Spain. If General Bolivar should succeed in conquering Peru this campaign & get possession of Callao, they will retire to Chiloe & from thence cruise against neutral commerce.

It is to be regretted that we have not a Ship of the line and another sloop of war on this station in addition to our present force. The three vessels we have here are inadequate to the service that is required of them. An instance of it has occurred within the last two days. Admiral Guise has turned away from American vessels & ordered them to Huacho. Come. Hull has no vessel to send after them as the *Dolphin* is at Valparaiso & the *Peacock* at the Intermedios, (while another sloop of war is wanted to watch Chiloe and one to protect our commerce at Guayaquil & its vicinity). This conduct of Admiral Guise is unreasonable, because it is absurd to say that he blockades the port, when he is leaving it half the time, and while there is a superior force within side. Besides the entry of these vessels would do his cause no injury; they would land nothing but provisions, with these the castles are stocked for a year, & they are only wanted by the patriot population of Lima where scarcity & suffering increase every day.

Since my last letter the Ship *Carrington* has been finally condemned, & that vessel & the Brig *Nancy* whose case I have previously stated, are fitted out as transports to accompany the Spanish squadron. The fate of these vessels has excited feelings, which joined to the natural inclination of our officers to the Patriot cause, and the open declarations by the Spaniards of hatred towards all foreigners & a hardly concealed desire of vengeance against them have tended to aggravate. Come. Hull & General Rodil are on the worst terms; the former has certainly some reason on his side, & the latter accuses the Come. of insulting him with perpetual threats and other irritations. My own intercourse with the government is almost at an end. I have seen the General but twice these three months, & then we met by accident on the mole. The last time we had a long conversation, I touched upon some of the subjects of disagreement that existed as to the vessels.

I observed to him that I had more than once expressed my opinion very frankly in regard to them, but as I was not recognized, I was spared the task of disagreeable discussion. I alluded to the singular communication I had received from him some time before on the subject of religion, a copy of which with my reply in duplicate has been forwarded.¹ He laughed, & said, that he had nothing to do with those matters, that he had communicated the Count de Villar de Fuente's letter to those who represented foreign nations here, as being the only step he could take in regard to it. I spoke to him on the subject of giving a passport to Captain Sumner of the *Nancy*, who was threatened with detention owing to the existing irritation, & it was given to him a day or two after. . . .

October 19th. Yesterday the Montonera had the boldness to take possession of the Callao gate of this city for some time & carry off several market people from the road. This induced the General himself, with his principal officers to go after them with about 300 men. We could see them from the houses engaged in the pursuit. The consequence was their killing between 50 & 100 of the Montonera & taking upwards of 90 horses & mules saddled. Their own loss they say was confined to 4 or 5 wounded. The troops afterwards passed thro' the city & returned to Callao.

I have the honor [etc.].

971

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

CHANCAI, November 9, 1824.

SIR: After remaining a few Days in the Bay of Callao, I retired to this Place in order to wait the Entrance of the Patriots into the Capital. This Event has been retarded by the Non-arrival of Munitions of War, that ought to have been here some weeks since and which only reached this two Days ago. In the next week possession will be taken under the immediate auspices of Bolivar.

After one of the most extraordinary Campaigns recorded in History it became necessary to give the Army some repose and the General availing himself of the moment came past two hundred leagues in order to quicken the operations against the Castles of Callao. The main body of the Patriot Force is encamped upon the Banks of the Apurimac 170 leagues S. E. of Lima and that of the Spaniards on the Heights of Callao [?] about 30 leagues South of Cuzco. Canterac has been superseded and La Serna commands in Person aided by Valdez who has been compelled to retire from the neighborhood of

¹ See above, pt. xi, docs. 966 and 967.

² MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

Potosi. Sucre who commands in the absence of Bolivar is invested with authority to proceed to Cuzco from which he is distant 20 leagues, whenever he shall judge proper to cross the Apurimac.

There is no doubt of the adhesion of Olañeta to the cause of Independence and of his Intention to cooperate as soon as a communication can be established between them, unfortunately his Despatches hitherto have been intercepted by Canterac and their contents concealed.

The *Asia* sailed from Callao fifteen Days since with about 250 Troops on board, her destination unknown, but from the course pursued for several Days, it is supposed she has gone to one of the Intermediate Ports.

Bolivar has lately received a most flattering Invitation from the Government of Mexico to go thither and assume the Command with any powers he may ask. He necessarily has been obliged to decline, but promises his services as soon as he shall have emancipated Peru and given to her a fair and general representation.

In Confirmation of what I have so often written without notice I can now add a late communication from the Abbé Dupradi, in which he advises the Liberator of the Intrigues existing throughout America. He also adds that France will not risk a War at this moment.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

972

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, November 11, 1824.

We have had ill luck in our affairs here with the Spaniards, this has been in the case of the captures partly owing to accident. The animosity of the Spanish Chiefs which however it may be veiled in some cases with courtesies no doubt exists & with sufficient reason by our recognition of the independence of the Colonies, & the inevitable consequences which have followed that great leading step. The irritation on their part has been increased by the decided part our young officers take with the patriots, & their undisguised ill will to the Spaniards. And lastly it has been owing to the inadequate force we have for the protection of our commerce in these very critical times, & particularly since the arrival of the *Asia* has so enlarged their maritime power.

I have in former letters described the situation of this unfortunate city. On the 3d inst. a patriot force entered it, & announced that a body of their

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

troops had crossed below, for the purpose of investing Callao, & that they had come to take permanent possession. This long expected event produced the most extravagant demonstrations of joy, & the people gave themselves up to a delight which seemed to be universal. This pleasure lasted but three hours, for at the end of that time, it was announced that the patriots were totally defeated, as was fully shewn by their most disorderly flight through the city. They were attacked by the Spaniards on the road to Callao, & almost instantly routed. In fact less than 200 Spanish troops by their superior discipline & conduct, in a very few minutes put to flight a body of 800 men. This sudden, unexpected disaster threw the inhabitants of Lima into the greatest consternation, many fled, & the rest have been since filled with terror.

A few days after this unfortunate affair, we heard that General Bolivar, finding that the rainy season & the rise of the rivers would suspend his operations in Upper Peru, placed his army in quarters on the Apurimac at Andahucilas, & came down to superintend the occupation of the capital. He brought a few cavalry with him, & has received other reinforcements, and is now expected to lead in the Patriot forces himself within a week, consisting of about 2500 men.

It is quite uncertain where the Spanish squadron has gone. The English commanders think, to windward, it seems to me, however, that the most important object to them is to intercept the reinforcements on their way from Panama. Two more Spanish Frigates are said to have arrived at Chiloe. Admiral Guise is at Simanco repairing. The Chile squadron was destined to sail this month, but their movements are extremely dilatory.

It now appears that the war must last at least another campaign. The prospect is unquestionably favorable to the patriots, but those who are in the habit of scrutinizing most severely those opinions that accord with their wishes, may see that the fate of this country is yet dependent on the events of war & its vicissitudes may yet render it dubious for a considerable period. Under present circumstances I must repeat my belief with additional conviction that our interests on this ocean require an increase of naval force.

I have the honor [etc.].

LIMA, December 7, 1824.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that General Bolivar entered this city today accompanied with no other troops than a corps of cavalry, the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

infantry & artillery still being without the capital. He went on to the Callao road for the purpose of reconnoitering. It is not yet decided if he will remain in Lima, or wait for the troops from Panama, before he invests the Castles, which cannot get here for several days [*sic*]. No official account has yet been received of the action between General Sucre & Valdez; but no doubts are entertained of the defeat of the latter with the loss of two entire battalions, and great desertion of his force. The Chilian & Peruvian squadrons are supposed to have formed a junction to leeward, and are expected soon to blockade Callao. All the circumstances of the day lead to the expectation that this desolating war must soon be terminated in the complete triumph of the Patriots.

The English Consul Mr. Rowcroft died today of wounds received last evening from an advanced guard of the patriot Montonera, about two miles from the city. He was returning in his carriage with his daughter, wearing a military uniform, as he has been accustomed to do lately from having formerly commanded a regiment of volunteer cavalry in London. His servant on horseback, hearing the challenge of the sentinels, it being after dark, they could not be seen, informed his master, who got out of his carriage mounted the horse of the servant & rode on, the carriage following. Several shots were fired, he still continued his course, when several balls reached him at once—one going thro' the neck of the horse, one passing thro' his hand, and another entering his side. He then turned about, he was put into the carriage—and they proceeded back to Callao, where he died of the latter wound this morning. However much this unfortunate event is to be regretted for himself and others it is only justice to state, that no one attaches any blame, to the sentinels, who thought it was a party of the Spanish troops advancing & the noise made by the carriage they took for that of artillery moving.

Judge Prevost is expected here tomorrow.

I have the honor [etc.].

974

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, December 22, 1824.

SIR: I have the honor to offer my cordial congratulations on the great & most important victory of Guamangilla, of which the details will be carried by Lt. Campbell who is despatched via Panama for this purpose. This memorable battle secured in one day the independence of Peru, & terminated

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

the Spanish empire in America; and as this country was the last on this continent in which Spain maintained a struggle, the world may now hope that the South American republics will be recognized by every civilized state, peace restored to the world, and the cause of freedom & national improvement obtain a lasting triumph.

As soon as the Liberator entered this city, I addressed myself to the Minister of Foreign Relations, and have received the exequatur of General Bolivar, to my Commission as Consul of the U. S. for Peru; and I shall now be able to enter more regularly into the business of my office. Our commerce has been almost wholly interrupted by circumstances of the war, & the difficulties that arose with the Spanish General, for several weeks past, but as we may presume that the Castles will be surrendered the next week according to the terms of the capitulation, the vessels will return from Chorillos to Callao, & trade assume its usual course.

Hitherto in the absence of other agents I have endeavoured to communicate from time to time to the department such intelligence as I could obtain of passing events. The arrival of Judge Prevost in this city to be near the government will render such correspondence on my part superfluous; and I have only to offer my congratulations that information from this capital in future will be communicated with so much more ability.

I have the honor [etc.].

975

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, December 22, 1824.

SIR: On the 9th inst the Spanish Army under the immediate command of the Vice King made its last effort in an attack upon Genl. Sucre at Guamanguilla. The result has been fatal to them, they were unable to resist Colombian Valor and all, all are now Prisoners of War. Stipulations have since been entered into for their embarkation upon the Surrender of the Castles. Thus Sir has the Genius of this wonderful man triumphed and Peru disenthralled may claim her recognition in common with her Sister States.

The precipitancy of Capt. Maling prevents my sending the official documents, but I have seen all as well as the two officers sent by Canterac to communicate the Intelligence to Rodil. They are now on their way thither and the result will be known in the Course of the Day.

With great respect [etc.].

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, January 8, 1825.

The results of the battle of Ayacucho will soon be complete. The *Asia* & the squadron with part of the Spanish officers have sailed from Quilca for Manilla. Others are taking passage in merchant vessels for Europe. General Rodil yet obstinately resists surrendering the castles of Callao. But his situation grows more arduous & dangerous every moment. There can be no doubt that those fortresses will speedily be obtained, either by being taken by assault as soon as the Panama troops arrive from Guayaquil, which cannot be delayed more than a fortnight, by a mutiny of the garrison, or by the secret embarkation & flights of the General & his adherents. One of the two last may be daily expected. Today the second Captain of the port with four gunboats & 72 men, arrived at Chorillos, having deserted last night. Nothing but the most extreme vigilance & severity, prevents the garrison from taking the same course; and from one moment to another, a revolution in the castles may be expected. This will be the finishing stroke to the liberation of Peru.

I have the honor [etc.].

*John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Peru, Buenos Aires and Chile, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

LIMA, January 10, 1825.

SIR: The Brig *Nereus* went to the Island of San Lorenzo in order to take in Ballast and Sailed from thence without affording me an opportunity to communicate such events as have occurred since the Splendid victory of Ayacucho.

La Serna and Valdez with many others immediately upon their Surrender were permitted to proceed to Quilca, where they embarked ten Days ago; the two former in a French vessel bound to Bordeaux, the others in the *Asia* and *Achilles* bound to Manilla. The Genls. Canterac, Garcia, Camba, and Villalobos accompanied Sucre to Cuzco, and Monet came hither in search of his wife and Children. Vessels are preparing and they will all be embarked for Spain, notwithstanding the refusal of Rodil to abandon the Castles, and this the only motive with Sucre for entering into Stipulations of any kind with them.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

The main body of the Army under the comand of its distinguished Leader entered Cuzco on the 30th Ultó. and the Division which left Guamanga on the same Day for the Coast under Genl Lara must have reached Arequipa on the Second instant.

The Libertador as soon as he shall have divested himself of his dictatorial powers, proposes to visit the South in order to secure an entire acquiescence on the part of Olañeta in the System of Government adopted by the Constitution of the last Year. A demand of the Kind has been made by Sucre, but a sufficient time has not elapsed to furnish a result. My Impressions are that it will be favorable, he is however a Spaniard, a Bigot of the Inquisition and little reliance ought to be placed in his professions until he shall have disbanded his Followers and retired to private life. His position at the time of the surrender of the Empire, was in the neighborhood of Potosi and his Force estimated at 3000 men including a considerable body of Patriots under Lanza a celebrated Montonera Chief, who had united with him against Valdez the then common Enemy.

The Blockade was commenced some Days since by Blanco the Admiral of the Chile[an] Squadron and will be continued by him, until he shall be relieved by Guise who is now on his way from Guayaquil. Two or three Regiments of Colombian Veterans accompany Guise and when they shall arrive Genl. Salom will be enabled to compleat the Investment of the Castles by Land. Rodil has been active in gathering provisions in order to prolong the defence, but I am inclined to believe without avail, in as much as his Troops are not sufficient in number to man the works throughout, and certainly are not addicted to the Spanish Cause.

The general Congress of Deputies from the several Provinces of Spanish America including Mexico, referred to in mine of the 15th of November 1822,¹ will take place at the Isthmus under the immediate auspices of Bolivar sometime in the ensuing Summer—a meeting from which the most important results must proceed: Results in which the U. States are most deeply interested and I regret that the silence maintained by the Department on this head does not allow me to express the concurrence of the President, so as to give effect to the Invitation at one time contemplated.

The General has lately received an extraordinary letter from one of the Ministers of France of a late date, proposing an immediate recognition on the part of that Power, should he consent to the Establishment of a Monarchical System throughout America. He has transmitted the original to Genl. Santander without other notice; spurning alike the proposal and its authors.

I have asked of Capt. Hull a passage in the *Dolphin* as far as Quilca in order to proceed from thence to Arequipa and Cuzco. It appeared to me that it might be interesting to our Government to have some view of the Interior and of its commerce and this I shall hope to offer in my next to bear

¹See above, pt. v, doc. 495.

date from the decayed Capital of the Incas. The Fall of the Castles, should it take place as I anticipate during my absence, will be communicated by my Son at my request.

I have not yet received an answer from Bs. Ays. and cannot as I had hoped accompany my draft of this Day with the account requested of me by the Department. I have waited until my means are absolutely exhausted and must now subject myself to the painful hazard of a protest.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

978

Stanhope Prevost to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States ¹

LIMA, January 29, 1825.

SIR: My Father on his departure from this Place for Cuzco requested me to Communicate to the Department any important occurrence that Might take place during his absence.

The Liberator has received despatches of the 31st ulto. from Sucre announcing the unqualified Submission of Genl. Olañeta to his orders. Thus with the Exception of the Castle of Callao the whole of Peru is now rid of its oppressors.

Should the obstinacy of Genl. Rodil induce him to hold out as long as he has provisions the siege may be protracted two or three Months, but they are closely invested by land and Sea and we hourly anticipate that Some happy revolution will put them in possession of the Patriots.

The Spanish Squadron immediately upon receiving the news of the battle of Ayacucho sailed for Manilla.

I have the honor [etc.].

979

William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States ²

LIMA, February 25, 1825.

SIR: Since my last letter of the 8th ulto.,³ I have been absent from this city for several weeks in an excursion over the Cordillera. Previous to my departure I appointed Stanhope Prevost, son of Judge Prevost Vice Consul for Lima, and Alfred Cobb Vice Consul for Arica; and both of them have received the exequatur of the Libertador. Mr. Cobb has recently sailed for his destination. Both these young men have resided some time in the

¹ MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

² MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

³ See above, pt. XI, doc. 976.

country & speak the language of it fluently, and I trust will give satisfaction in their office.

There are no recent events of any magnitude to communicate. The assassination of Montegudo seems to have been an insulated crime unconnected with any conspiracy, and owing undoubtedly to the hatred which was felt for him by the people of Lima.

The Congress have wisely continued the political power in the hands of General Bolivar for another year; which appears indispensable for the safety of Peru. He is to leave Lima early next month for Cuzco, to pass several months in Upper Peru. The administration in his absence is confided to General La Mar, Mr. Carrion, & Mr. Unanue. La Mar is extremely popular, & I hear most justly so, & this choice of the Libertador is an excellent one.

General Olañeta, has at length openly declared himself, and issued a proclamation in favour of the King of Spain. No anxiety is entertained from this measure, but his overthrow is considered easy & certain. General Rodil still holds out and he has declared that he never would surrender. There is a cannonading with the castles every night. The only vessel in the harbour is the ship *China* condemned by the Spanish authorities, & which is now said to be fitting for sea, probably to carry off some of the emigrants, who fled to Callao. The Port is blockaded by the Chilian Frigate *O'Higgins* & three sloops of war. Some provisions are introduced by night in the canoes of the fishermen, but it is presumed the castles cannot hold out more than three months longer, without the blockade is raised by a maritime force. The last sortie made by the garrison was repulsed with a heavy loss to the Spaniards, an official account of which will be found in the inclosed paper. The General leaves 3500 men, most of them very fine troops, for the protection of Lima, & the siege of Callao.

There were a few days since seventy sail of vessels at Chorillos, and there is now tho' the number is diminished to between 50 & 60, a larger amount of tonnage than was ever before collected in any port on this side the Continent. Several of our vessels must unfortunately make very bad voyages, as the late cargoes arrived of flour cannot be sold for more than 2 or 3 dollars on board. On the 22d inst the Libertador partook of a collation on board the U. S. Frigate; he selected the day himself as being Washington's birthday. The Americans present took the opportunity to echo the voice of their country, in the reception given to General La Fayette. General Bolivar afterwards rose gave La Fayette as a toast, & made a very complimentary speech. The Frigate *United States* & *Peacock* are at Chorillos. Judge Prevost left this city for Cuzco about a month since.

I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. Your letter of Augt. 10th, covering my commission, as ratified by the Senate was received by me a few days since.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, March 21, 1825.

SIR: Since my last letter which goes by this same opportunity, the French Admiral Rosamel has arrived at Chorillos and is now there with his own frigate & three smaller vessels. He has visited the Libertador, to make some demands for the restitution of property, and for the return of some individuals of his nation who had been ordered out of the country; and from what I have heard I presume without success. The Peruvian frigate *Prueba* arrived yesterday afternoon to join the blockade of Callao. The British frigate *Blonde* has sailed for the Sandwich Islands, and does not return here till November. She brought with her two tenders which have been loaded with horses, mules and asses in Chile & sent to the islands, these will be useful presents to them. The frigate has some scientific men on board & a fine collection of instruments, & visits several of the islands in this ocean before her return here.

The army besieging Callao, will open one battery of four 24 pounders two days hence. Four other pieces of this calibre, are still at Chorillos. They have also two 13 inch mortars, one of them is already at the lines, the other still at Chorillos. The firing between the parties is kept up at intervals day & night. The *Cambridge* went into Callao Bay last week, the government having given a passport to bring away three young children, the eldest of eight years old, whose mother is in this city. Capt. Maling from motives of humanity consented to receive them. Gen. Rodil's adjutant who came on board the ship brought letters from the children (doubtless dictated to them) saying that they were very happy and did not wish to leave. This officer spoke with great confidence of their being relieved by a larger ship in a few days. Every effort is made by the General to keep up the spirits of his troops, and to hold out hopes to them, which he must feel have a very slight foundation. The French Admiral requested leave to communicate with Gen. Rodil, which was refused.

I have in other letters alluded to the subject of a most infamous libel that was written against me by a person of the name of Alsop belonging to Connecticut, & now a merchant in this city, but who has recently returned on a visit to the United States. I waited with anxiety on this account, as well as for public motives the arrival of the Patriot government, to ask from them the name of the authour, as the libel was published by their consent, and purported to be at the government press. I addressed myself to the Minister on this subject, the day after his arrival; but an answer was delayed under various pretences. Untill at last finding the libeller was on his way

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

home, I had a very earnest conversation with General Bolivar on this subject, & he told me if I would write to the Minister, the name should be given me; the facts of the case and who was the authour, I mentioned to him, to shew I was not ignorant of them—but I wanted his name to be given me in a *regular* manner, as it was my intention to give him an opportunity before a court of law in his own country to prove his assertions or abide by the consequences. After three weeks' further effort in this business, it resulted in a negative answer by Col. Peres, the former Perfect of Truxillo. The case of a government *thus* protecting a libeller, is singular. I have stated the whole business to my friend Mr. Webster, and have spared no exertion, to bring Alsop to justice, because the circumstances of this case are very peculiar, & display a union of treachery, malignity, falsehood, & meanness rarely to be found.

There are no recent authentic accounts from Upper Peru. The private accounts are extremely contradictory. Some of them represent Olañeta as having a considerable force, others that he himself has fled, & his followers dispersed.

I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. Admiral Guise is ordered back to Guayaquil to take his trial there—he is said to be in very bad health.

981

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, May 26, 1825.

The last news of General Bolivar was his arrival at Quilca & dining on board the British ship *Cambridge*. He had journeyed by the coast & from that port goes to Arequipa. The night of his arrival a French Ship with a valuable cargo from Bordeaux having brought out General Espartero a Spanish officer was seized, & this officer sent under a guard of soldiers to Arequipa. He sailed from this country a year since, with those dispatches from the Viceroy, which painted their prospects, (not without some reason) to have such a flourishing aspect, that Peru was wholly theirs, Chile would drop into their hands at the first touch, & that they should drive back Bolivar to Colombia, & be able to act in Concert with the Spanish forces on the shores of the Atlantic. On receipt of these accounts La Serna was made

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

Count of the Andes & all his officers promoted *two days* before the day of Ayacucho. In less than a year the same officer returning with the favours of the Court for himself & others, finds the Spanish dominion irrevocably driven from this Continent, & the Libertador in the very port of his arrival. One of the singular coincidences of the memorable events that have occurred in the last year.

The siege of Callao continues with no recent occurrence of interest. General Rodil has not 900 effective men, & the misery & dissatisfaction are daily increasing in Callao, & the mortality is very considerable. How long he may hold out is uncertain. His vigilance is incessant, & he exerts all the talents of an able commander to animate those about him, & keep up the confidence of the troops. Most persons think he will hold out three or four months longer, I am disposed to believe that he will capitulate next month; as notwithstanding his pertinacity, & the especial personal hatred he has shewn towards the Patriots, he must know by the entire defeat & death of Olañeta, by the state of Chiloe shewn in Gen. Quintarilla's letter, & by the certainty that no succours are coming from Spain, that his perseverance is without a ray of hope, & if continued must involve him & all around him in certain destruction.

982

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

LIMA, June 4, 1825.

SIR: Since my last letter in which I inclosed copies of my recent correspondence with this government, no event of much importance has occurred. Gen. Rodil still holds out in the castles of Callao, but his situation becomes every day more critical, as the officers are growing more openly disaffected; & he has lately shot one & has now three or four in close arrest: this danger is more imminent than even famine or the balls of the besiegers. I am still inclined to believe that he will surrender (or be surrendered) in the course of this month; but most persons calculating on his energy, vigilance and pertinacity think he will hold out till August in the expectation of receiving orders or succour from Spain.

There are some troubles at Pisco & Ica arising from some of the disbanded soldiers of the late Spanish army having formed a corps of banditti headed by one or two officers, & threatening to plunder those towns. Report makes their number amount to 2 or 300. It is said that the government

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

here have employed Col. Roulet, an officer retired from the service who cultivates an estate near Ica, to command a small corps of cavalry & go against them. . . .

The Libertador was at the last accounts at Arequipa, from whence it is now said he will go to Cuzco. The Provinces of Upper Peru, were to have a Congress the 25th of last month in Potosi, and it is said they determine on forming a state equally independent of Peru & Buenos Ayres. General Santa Cruz is supposed to be instrumental in these transactions with the intention of being made President. The presence of Gen. Bolivar is necessary to the quiet of Peru, there are too many symptoms to shew that it will be torn by factions the moment he leaves it.

I have the honor [etc.].

983

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, January 24, 1826.

SIR: I arrived in this City yesterday after an absence of several months & found it in the midst of rejoicings for the surrender of Callao after 14 months siege & the death of great numbers of wretched fugitives who have perished of misery & despair within its limits; the useless consequence of Spanish obstinacy. By this event the last hold of foreign tyranny on this continent is recovered for the safety of this republic.

I pray you to receive [etc.].

984

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, February 23, 1826.

SIR: My last letter was forwarded via Panama to communicate the intelligence of the surrender of Callao.² I have now the honor to inclose the reports of the Vice Consuls for this place & Arica for the six months ending with 1825. These do not give so many particulars as I could wish, but as the office affords no emolument, I cannot expect of them to employ the time & expence that would be necessary to make it more exact. During the time

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 983, under date January 24, 1826.

that the vessels have laid at Chorillos which has been since Novr. 1824, I have allowed the Masters of vessels to retain their papers on board owing to their exposed situation; and because those peculiar inducements to an improper use of them against which the law was particularly directed did not exist here. The commerce being now restored to the Bay of Callao I have required that they should be again deposited with me.

As it is generally believed, that an arrangement will be made between Peru & Bolivia to cede the port of Arica to the latter; and in this case it will no longer form part of the Peruvian Consulate, I take the liberty should this event be realized to recommend that my Vice Consul Mr. Alfred Cobb should receive the commission of Consul for that port. Mr. Cobb is established in business at that place, & having resided a few years in this country he speaks the language well: he is a young man of firmness & prudence, & has preserved the moral habits & principles in which he was brought up, & I fully believe the appointment would be well bestowed, & its duties discharged to your satisfaction. I have no other motive in making this suggestion than the esteem I feel for Mr. Cobb's character.

I also inclose copies of some correspondence with the Peruvian government & with Gen. Rodil relative to the debts & credits of the latter. Fortunately the subject affects our citizens but little. The only one who has any claim against Gen. Rodil, and in the last resort against his government is Mr T. R. Elredge [Eldridge?] whose statement accompanies the documents. The house of Nixon, Macall & Co owed a small balance on Custom House account, which the patriot government claim. As by the terms, '*active & passive debts*': they mean, by the former all sums owing *to* Rodil, which they claim as theirs, & *passive debts* are those owing *by* him, which the creditor must recover as he can.

Troops continue to be sent to leeward, some to Guayaquil, & others to Panama. A part of these are Peruvian troops in exchange for Colombians remaining here; a measure of policy not unlike that taken some years since of exchanging the English & Irish militia. It is one of the rumours circulated here, that a force will be sent from Colombia & Mexico to dislodge the Spaniards from Cuba, who instead of acknowledging these countries & securing their friendship make use of that position to annoy them—a policy that will inevitably deprive Spain of the last of her colonies.

The Libertador returned here a few days after the surrender of Callao, & resides at La Magdalena a country house a league from the city; into which he made a triumphal entrance some days since. Acting as a mediator between Peru & the new Republic, & preparing measures for the resignation of his authority furnish him with much occupation. The Congress will assemble as soon as a constitutional number have arrived, which is not yet the case none of them from Cuzco having come down; and unfortunately a majority of the whole are clergymen.

The hopes of Peru as well as the wishes of the Libertador were fixed on Marshall La Mar to take the Presidency of the Republic. He is the only individual who unites public opinion, and as far as my experience extends not a dissentient would be found in the country. He is extremely beloved & respected; but his constitution is not strong, & he is really in very ill health. I had recently a long & frank conversation with him, in which being exempt from all suspicion of flattery, I spoke to him of the state of public opinion & the feeling of all parties towards him: and tho' perhaps not obliged to play the part of Curtius, yet his acceptance of the place, would prevent the opening of that gulph which it might be feared faction would create if he retired. I think there is a little of nervous melancholy mixed with real illness & that he apprehends more dangers than I trust will happen. He told me he only came here (from Guayaquil where he left his family) to prove to the Libertador & to the government that his illness was not feigned, & that he was utterly incapable of taking the command. He has asked for leave of absence, & a hope is given of his return but I believe if he goes, he will not come back. His repugnance to taking the command seems invincible, a subject of great regret to Gen. Bolivar, & to all Peru.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, February 28, 1826.

The French government have no acknowledged agent here; but Admiral Rosamel previous to his departure from this ocean, made known to the governments of Chile & Peru an offer of the King of France to receive a certain number of youths, who should be taken to France, receive the best education there, & be afterwards sent home entirely at the expence of the King; a measure of policy very characteristic of that Court. The French officers have also circulated the report, that these countries would speedily be recognized by France; a language they have no doubt been instructed to hold.

Since my last letter we have received the agreeable intelligence of the surrender of Chiloe, & its dependencies, an event that must have a salutary effect in Chile, & will probably expedite the assembling of a Congress, and a more regular organization of the affairs of that country.

The surrender of Callao is a great relief to the affairs of Peru: not only in terminating the last scene of the war, & bringing back the commerce to Cal-

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

lao, where the vessels lie secure, & the expence of landing & transporting goods is much diminished, but it also restores a number of fine estates to their owners & to cultivation, & produces an immediate diminution of expence. A part of the Colombian force their ranks completed by Peruvian recruits, are returning to the Isthmus. The *Protector* frigate, & one or two other vessels of war are laid up in ordinary, & other measures taken of the same description which will lessen their expences.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, April 9, 1826.

SIR: The Congress assembled on the 28th of March, for the purpose of organizing themselves. A spirit of opposition to the administration was manifested in the first movements. The principal topic of discussion was the verification of their elections, the time & mode of taking the oath &c. The returns of the elections had been given by the existing administration, to whom was confided the whole power of the State, to the Supreme Court to examine. Several persons who had been returned, were declared not entitled to their seats for various deficiencies of constitutional qualification. The Congress I understand contended that they had the sole right to judge on all these points. Mr. Larrea one of the "Council of governments", is one of the members, & he with his friends were left on all questions in a minority of 18 or 20 in a house of 66 members. This opposition was directed ostensibly against the "Council of government."

General Bolivar disgusted with these proceedings which he considered as aimed at him thro' his Ministers, on the 31st, publicly declared his intention of immediately withdrawing from the country, & ordering all the Colombian troops to return home; & a small vessel of war was ordered to hold herself in readiness to take him & his suite on board. This menace produced a considerable effect on the public mind, as every one can see that in the present state of the country, such a measure would plunge it at once into a conflict of factions. Deputations from the capital & other public bodies of the capital, & a committee of seven from the Congress containing a member from each department, waited upon him, to assure him of their unlimited gratitude & entire confidence & intreating him to remain. He yielded to their wishes.

It is very difficult to get an accurate account of these proceedings; part of

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

the sessions were private, there are no newspapers to discuss political topics, & those persons who are best informed, are reserved in their communications. The opposition party say, that they are disgusted with the *Consejo de gobierno*, that most of its acts have been foolish & tyrannical, & many of them so impolitic, that the Libertador was obliged publicly to reverse them: that Mr. Unanue is incapacitated by age from holding his situation & for which at no time he was properly qualified; that he is avariciously filling his own coffers while all the officers in the civil department receive only half pay on which they are unable to live. They say that they will gladly make the Libertador the constitutional President of the republic, but that the war being now over, they ought no longer to consent to granting unlimited powers, &c.

The friends of the Administration say, that the Congress were discussing points prematurely & before they were organized; that they were attempting to pass acts which would have violated the constitution; that the opposition wish to get the power into their own hands by a modification of the executive in an illegal manner; that their views are factious & narrow minded; that they are entirely led by the Canon, Luna Pizarro, whose motives are selfish, & his opposition is to revenge himself against the Libertador for having preferred another as Dean & ecclesiastical governour of the Diocese of Arequipa. That they neither possess the enlarged views nor the intelligence necessary to initiate measures for the prosperity of the republic; that they should in the present state of the country receive a direction from the great talents of the Libertador, & move gradually towards the management of affairs of which hitherto they have never taken cognizance, & whose combinations they are inadequate to form. That the majority of them, are clergymen governed by an *esprit de corps*; & that for some years to come the advantage of the country will be promoted by allowing the executive to have a leading influence in all measures, &c.

Such is the summary of what is said by the respective parties. On the side of the opposition, the principal person is Mr. Luna Pizarro: on that of the administration Mr. Larrea (one of the Consejo), the Canon Pedemonte Dean of Truxillo, Mr. Villaran Curate of Tacna. On the 5th inst. after several meetings they adjourned rather abruptly on discovering that they did not possess a constitutional quorum, & that they must wait till some more members come in.

The presence of General Bolivar is unquestionably of vital importance to the quiet & advancement of the two republics of Peru. So long as he remains they will be safe from any dangerous conflicts of faction; & under the influence of his name the interior & exterior policy of these republics may be established gradually on a liberal scale, & individuals be formed with those requisites necessary for an enlarged view of political affairs, which are now almost wholly wanting.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

Confidential.

LIMA, April 25, 1826.

SIR: My last letter of the 11th inst. goes by this present opportunity direct to Phila., a change having been made in the voyage of the vessel by which it was to have been sent. I ask your reference to that letter for some account of the first meetings of the Congress, & have now the honor to relate what has subsequently occurred.

That body having adjourned *sine die* to await the arrival of a few members to form a quorum, four or five only being wanting; & a part of these had arrived, when a decree of the government was published, declaring that the powers of the delegates from several provinces named, being irregular, the meeting of Congress must be deferred, untill new & regular powers could be obtained; and as many of them are very distant, the slow progress of the mail, & the reassembling of the electoral colleges would require 3 or 4 months to effect the object.

The objection to these powers is, that they are *ample*, (*amplios*). In this state of things, the party attached to the administration, have got up a petition to the Libertador to continue in the exercise of the dictatorial power two years longer, & it is said that 22 signatures out of a body of whom 70 are present, have already been obtained. While this is doing, General Bolivar has on all public occasions, spoken against this exercise of power which he considered odious & dangerous, & on various occasions has expressed himself anxious for the meeting of Congress that he might not only resign it, but also all further direction of their affairs.

Wishing to understand what were the views & sentiments of the opposition, I had a long conversation with Mr. Luna Pizarro, who is its leader & soul. He is a Canon of the Cathedral of Arequipa, was bred up by the Bishop of Chavesla Rosa, & was a member of the Spanish Cortes, where he was considered an ultra liberal. He was so decided a patriot in Peru, that while the Spaniards held Arequipa he was obliged to absent himself & reside in Chile. He is a man of talents, of agreeable manners, very republican in his principles, & seems to have little more of the priest than the dress.

I asked him what were the views of the opposition. He told me that they were most anxious that the Libertador should continue in the direction of affairs, that his talents, his experience & the influence of his name, were most important to them but that he should be the constitutional President of the Republic. That the members of the *Consejo* has shewn themselves by most of their acts, which Bolivar had been obliged to annul by reason of their im-

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

propriety, incapable of administering the affairs of the government: that they were well known to be monarchists: that in their hands the public affairs would soon be involved in total ruin: That the war was now over & they ought no longer to be governed by bayonets: that under the guidance & influence of Bolivar, they might begin to organize a constitutional administration of their affairs, & seek to form men capable of public trusts. That hardly any such existed; that he would select a number of young men, the most intelligent & promising who could be found, & send them to the U. S. & to Europe, to observe & study the proceedings of legislative bodies & the modes of administration, & that among some of them they should probably get a few, who in the course of 4 or 8 years might obtain knowledge that would qualify them to enter into branches of the public service. That the plan of the last Congress which had ordered a dozen to be sent to England for education, was well enough as far as it went, but that these had been boys of 12 or 14 who were selected more from favoritism than regard to their merits, & it would be many years even if they turned out well before they would be useful. But that they should lose no time in beginning to do the best they could; & look into the situation of the country whose finances were in such a ruinous state; & that a bankruptcy & all its evils of paper money & depreciation &c. must succeed, unless the affairs of the Treasury were examined, & a system established that should make known & ameliorate the financial state of the country, an account of its expences & income. That they could not always be governed by bayonets, that General Bolivar might die, or be called home, & the longer a liberal constitutional administration was deferred, the greater would be the danger & difficulty of introducing it.

In reply to what changes they wanted in the Constitution, he said: principally in the Senate, to change it from its present form (in which however it has never been organized) of a kind of Council, into a regular legislative body, so that there may be two houses for legislation. They wished also the Courts to be formed according to the principles & regulations of the Constitution; that the arbitrary power now exercised by the Perfects as delegates of the supreme authority should begin to exist under a legal & constitutional government.

The objection which had been made at this late hour by the government against the deputies whose powers were *amplios*, he said must be judged by history. That these powers were given according to a regulation attached to the Constitution, & subjecting it to a revision, whenever the country could be fully represented. That it having been formed by a body all whose members were inhabitants of Lima & the coast to leeward, by far the greater part of the country, being then occupied by the enemy was not represented. That now on the first meeting of a Congress whose delegates came from all the Provinces, their assent was by a regulation of the Constitution expected to be given to this instrument, & to adopt such amendments as might be deemed

expedient, or at least to propose them. That there was no previous combination for this purpose, but that as among the deputies who had this *ample* power, were those from the Cities of Bolivar, Lima, Arequipa & Cuzco, places where the most intelligence was concentrated, it might be presumed that they were not given without reason & propriety.

There is some obscurity in these transactions. General Bolivar has [on] numerous occasions energetically disclaimed the exercise of this absolute power; but the efforts to induce the Congress to continue it in his hands all come from his friends. Military habits have perhaps too much influence with him. He is quick, positive & unyielding. When the Committee from the Congress waited on him after his threat of leaving the country, he told them that he should sustain the Consejo. Mr. Luna Pizarro called at La Magdalena to see him after the first difficulties arose: he sent him word that he was engaged, & that he need not call again for he would not see him. He is too much affected by any opposition, to which he is unaccustomed, & which none of his officers dare make to him. General O'Higgins told me after the first difficulty occurred, that he had told the Libertador he should not mind this opposition, that for his part he was glad to see it, that if there was no opposition there was no liberty, no public spirit.

The Libertador is a very ardent, impetuous character; he has achieved such great things, has had such a sole direction of affairs, that the jarring movements of civil government are regarded by him too much in the light of military insubordination, & to be resisted in the same summary way. The officers about him are young men, & three of them Englishmen, devotedly attached to him, & unconditionally submissive. He has no characters of weight & dignity near him, who can sustain a contrary opinion; & there is a tone of excessive adulation & absolute deference in those of this country who approach him, that has nothing of a republican complexion. Dr. Unanue who is at the head of the Consejo, is enfeebled by age; he was a physician & is a man of considerable literary acquirement, but never prepared for the extensive range of a statesman's duties: he lived to old age under a system, whose habits of thinking & acting he had too strongly imbibed; & perhaps the best idea I can give you of him, excusing its familiarity, would be to suppose Dr. M. of N. Y. superannuated. Col. Alvarez late Minister from Buenos Ayres told me that at the time of his reception, when they were conversing on the U. S. he said to him. "O! that system is impracticable, it will not last long."

This state of things gives occasion to the enemies of Bolivar to look wise & exult in the truth of their prophecies & that he would discover his ambition & designs of usurpation &c. A Frenchman of liberal & intelligent character said to me, "He will lose himself just as Napoleon did—" & this may perhaps serve to convey the best idea of the danger he is exposed to. I think the situation of things to be regretted, & that it would have been better to attempt with his great influence, to conciliate the most able of the members of the

Congress, & have endeavoured to concert measures to enable this feeble country to stand & go alone: & if General Bolivar wishes to get away, as I believe he does, that no time should be lost, in trying to form representatives & officers of various descriptions for administering its concerns: He appears to be a man of too much talent to follow the career of false ambition which his enemies attribute to him, which would cause his ruin, & would degrade him inevitably from the lofty station in the list of pure & virtuous patriots, which he hitherto has held & which in my opinion is his object to maintain and advance. . . .

We yesterday had the satisfaction to receive the President's message; a masterly exposition of our magnificent prosperity & most gratifying to all Americans. The recommendations it contains seem as powerfully stated as their necessity is obvious.

The Frigate *U. S.* arrived yesterday from Chili & the Intermedios. We have no further accounts relative to the *Dolphin*.

I trust you will excuse some of the details of this *confidential* letter, which are given with the desire to inform you of the present state of affairs here, at an interesting period. And I pray you Sir to accept [etc.].

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, May 6, 1826.

Since my last, by the aid of a very free use of threats & promises, upwards of fifty signatures have been obtained from the members of Congress, praying the Libertador to retain absolute power for another year, which he has agreed to do, & there will be no meeting of Congress, the present year. I have received some very interesting details from an authentic source, of the views & intentions of those in power, relative to holding that power, & the future organization of the country including *both Perus*, which I will forward to you by some future, safe opportunity.

I pray you to receive [etc.].

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

LIMA, May 17, 1826.

SIR: I have now the honor to write you on subjects of the deepest interest, & regret that the intelligence must give pain if not surprise. Thro' great confidence that has been reposed in me, I have obtained from authentic sources, a very full exposition of the views that are at present entertained here, & the principal points of which will be found in the "Observations" annexed,² written with great force & elegance, but whose style necessarily suffers in the hasty translation I have been obliged to make. I have added a few notes only to give the passages from the constitution & the gazette referred to. I add the gazette containing the documents relative to the dissolution of the Congress, which of course have gone out to the world, & need no comment from me. The "Observations" bear intrinsic marks of their authenticity, & the intimate acquaintance of the writer with all the circumstances he relates; & will shew the fatal intoxication that must produce incalculable mischief to all South America.

It is in the highest degree painful to change a favourable opinion we have formed of any individual, & how much more so when that individual is so eminent, & his own great reputation is at stake & the hopes & credit of these new republics are involved with it. The deep hypocrisy of General Bolivar has hitherto deceived the world, tho' many of his former friends have for more than a year past discovered his views & abandoned him. With the violent dissolution of the Congress, the mask must fall entirely, & the world will see with indignation, or with malicious delight, that he who was occupying the attention of politicians in all countries, & for whom fate by a fortunate combination of circumstances, had prepared the means for leaving one of the noblest reputations that history could record, may be handed down as one of the most grovelling of military usurpers, loaded with the execration of his cotemporaries for the calamities his conduct must bring upon them.

In no instance has his hypocrisy been more profound or more interested, than in the case of La Mar, tho' it did not deceive him. I have seen letters from him to a late period, professing the utmost admiration & friendship for La Mar, & holding him up as he constantly did in public, as the only man to take the Presidency of the Republic; while he has taken every means to sever his connection with Peru, & force him either to become the mean abetter of his designs, or to leave the country. And so successful has he been in this policy, that in the opinion of many, La Mar to use Bolivar's expression is "politically a coward," & with a kind of hypocondriac effeminacy shrunk from all direction of affairs.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² Not printed in this collection.

The gallant, generous, high minded La Mar, had a leading influence in all the progress of the last successful campaign, & a much more decided part in the victory of Ayacucho, than was allowed him in the dispatches. He was adored by the Peruvian Army, is beyond comparison the most popular man with all parties & all classes, and may emphatically be called the hope of Peru. It was early found, that his views were too liberal, too honest, & too republican, to become an agent in any usurpation, and therefore he was timely distrusted. Still it would not do to break with him openly. Disdaining to be made a puppet, & moved by wires with fellow puppets in the Council of government, where he could do nothing to alleviate the situation of the country, he absented himself untill a short time before the meeting of Congress. He then came here invited with the same flattering language & hollow deception, that had been practiced upon others, not so credulous as to be deceived by it, but willing at least to be ready to enter into the government, if there was any sincerity in the professions that were made. He soon saw there was none, & after the arrival of Bolivar, their first interviews produced the conviction that the one could not make a dupe & sycophant, & that the other was resolved to prosecute the purposes of his sinister ambition. La Mar therefore determined to decline, while he was obliged to see the same hypocrisy displayed of holding him up to the public, as the only man to be their chief, which had the double purpose of seeming magnanimous, & lessening the esteem in which La Mar was held. Still the latter had determined to remain till the meeting of Congress, to which his presence would have been a strong support. But this was a danger to be prevented at all hazards; a leave of absence for some months was therefore forced upon him, to drive him away. It is a singular fatality under present circumstances, that La Mar who has always been intimately connected with the affairs of Peru, (he was under the ancient government Inspector General of the army, which was the next post to that of Viceroy) where he is personally known & universally beloved, should have his home in Guayaquil, which province was forcibly aggregated to Colombia, & in that country he has never exercised any employ, & is known only from the part he has taken in the war in this country; thus being virtually a Peruvian in exile, & a stranger in Colombia.

One of the odious transactions connected with recent events, which must be generally known hereafter, was the execution of Berindoaga & Teron. I confess I was always surprised that so favorable an opportunity for the exercise of clemency was lost, & I remarked rather jestingly at the time, always thinking that the execution would not take place, that if it did, the purpose must be to intimidate the Congress. The fact is, that it had been determined long since to commute the punishment. Bolivar in conversation with Unanue, & another person said, "they will be condemned to death, but the Congress must pardon them changing the sentence into a couple of years confinement in the castles." Unanue replied, "O no! they must be pardoned

by your Excellency. You have full powers for the purpose." Bolivar rejoined, "No it must be given by the Congress, as the effect will be more striking." This was made known by one present at the conversation to those wretched victims, who believed to the very moment that they were finally led out to execution, that they should be pardoned. But the quarrel with the Congress had intervened, & these unfortunate men were the victims of it. A young aid de camp had even the imprudence to say, that it was for this purpose, & that a particular person naming him, must take care of himself or he would share the same fate. One circumstance will give this transaction a darker hue hereafter, as it will be attributed to personal vengeance. It is well known, that Berindoaga entered warmly into the patriot cause, & that his defection from it was owing to a terroure & abhorrence of the Colombians that had been generally inspired in Peru, on account of the sanguinary war waged in Colombia; & that when it came to the question whether they should receive La Serna or Bolivar, he & others said they preferred the Spaniards to "the Mulattoes of Colombia," applying this term to Bolivar himself, tho' improperly, but many of the Colombian officers such as Sucre, Paez, Carvajal &c have a tinge of African blood, & some of the subalterns are entirely of that origin.

This unfortunate state of things has partly been brought on by the base & excessive adulation that he has admitted, untill it has become necessary to him. There is no individual among those about him, who dares tell an unpleasant truth, & at the slightest opposition he gives way to an unrestrained violence. At the present moment when they are in such distress for money, the only public work that is going on, is an equestrian statue of himself, the execution of which now is a project of Larrea's to pay his court. This cannot cost less than 70 or 80,000 \$, & after all from the deficiency of good artists must be miserably executed. A great number of gold medals have been distributed with the arms of Peru on one side, & his bust on the other; & these medals are given to both men & women, with a diploma of being *benimerito de la patria*: & no one of either sex approaches him, who possesses one, without having it dangling from the neck; and those who neglect this, are at once proscribed from all further audience. On his arrival at any of the towns, expensive fetes are to be got up for him, which bear excessively hard on an impoverished country; but his generals who are in command, will take care to vex those who are reluctant. Arequipa has within a short period been obliged to furnish three of these fetes that have cost 60,000 \$. With these demonstrations he deceives himself, or is deceived by the crawling, despicable flattery of those about him, that they are the spontaneous effects of attachment.

In the meantime abuses doubtless unknown to him, are practised by his dependents of which I have recently heard some instances, in which the insolence on the one part, & the baseness of the magistrates who were appealed to,

could only be paralleled in Turkey. There is the most jealous watchfulness of the press, so that not a word can be printed, freely, & the popular feeling finds a vent in the most miserable pasquinades, which appear on the walls in this city every morning. Thus one was found lately, predicting his fate would be like that of Berindoaga; & a person told me he had seen a printed one from Arequipa, menacing him if he should ever come to that place again with the fate of Monte Agudo.

The state of the Finances threatens speedy ruin, & if the talents of the Minister are to be estimated by some of the projects resorted to, they are truly of the most despicable kind. To inspire still greater distrust, stories are circulated of accounts settled by some of the chief persons in power, that if true, would be sufficient to account for their dread of a Congress, that would make any investigation. Many of these things are doubtless kept from his knowledge, but some may be permitted to reward submission. Timid & broken down as these people are, still public opinion cannot be stifled, so long as people breathe: & tho' they utter their whispers & mutters as if the walls of their houses might hear them, they communicate the general feeling, & it is easy to see that the popularity which Bolivar had acquired in the Capital, was sensibly shaken by the execution of Berindoaga, & has been annihilated by the destruction of the Congress.

The project of an expedition to Chile which you will find alluded to in the accompanying "Observations", is undoubtedly meditated. Gen. O'Higgins was sometime since called from his plantation at Cañete to be consulted, tho' I suspect he is but partially informed of the designs. He is an honest man whose administration would have been useful in Chile, if his family & some of his Ministers by their venal maneuvers to fill their pockets, had not disgusted the public & thrown affairs into confusion. Some recent attempts of his friends to procure his return, ended in their being banished, & they are now here. I have been informed by an intelligent American well acquainted with Chile & who has recently arrived here, that O'Higgins has now hardly any friends left in that country; & tho' there was a time when his administration might have been very useful, yet now any attempt to restore him, must be unsuccessful, & attended with bad consequences.

The plan with regard to Upper Peru is also full of hazard. The deputy who is nowhere referred to in the "Observations", has I am told said, that the principal persons of the country, are in favour of Bolivar's plans, but that the lower classes are almost universally desirous of joining with Buenos Ayres: & this last country which is not deficient in activity, will doubtless use her efforts to preserve this disposition: those extensive provinces will therefore be subjected with difficulty, if at all to the power of a usurper.

While such obstacles are to be anticipated on this side, how much greater will arise from that of Colombia? The press is there free & public opinion considerably enlightened. The people have been clamorous for his return, &

the only excuse that could be offered for delay, was, that the Spaniards held Callao, Chiloe &c. Now that this reason no longer exists, if he refuses to return, he quarrels openly with his own country, & will expose it to the evils of factions & convulsions. Denounced at home, what will be his support here? even the 4000 Colombian bayonets that he calculates upon will hardly all be willing to desert their country, & will be a slender force to hold both Peru's in subjection. Besides, Gen. Bolivar's great force consists in opinion: the world have received an exalted notion of him: the respect that now gives him such a predominant influence is founded on the belief that his views are pure and elevated; this once destroyed he will dwindle to nothing. If the ideas entertained (I speak thus conditionally, clinging to a hope that I fear does not exist) are just, he will place himself between Napoleon & Iturbide, whom he brought together in the weakest speech he ever made, but much nearer to the latter than to the former.

It is impossible to calculate the mischief that this conduct may produce. He will soon be openly denounced in Chile & Buenos Ayres, where he is both feared & hated; & if his own country joins in the cry, it will produce the most dangerous confusion; the influence of his name at present of such vast moment to all South America, will be dissolved & succeeded by derision; the Holy Alliance will make use of their entrance of the Brazils to attack perhaps both Buenos Ayres, Upper Peru & Chile; & Spain herself may be animated & assisted to direct her forces from the Havana to invade Colombia if not Mexico.

Some persons now think that he has made overtures to the Brazilian Court, but this is probably unfounded: the way however may be prepared by his denial of all assistance to the republic of La Plata; & if he engages in the meditated usurpation of this country, his only ally must be the Emperour of the Brazils. To excuse a little the insulting, tho' artful refusal of assistance to the Buenos Ayreans, the language held was (repeated by an aid de camp at table where there was a number of Americans): "Our situation is now changed, we have been acknowledged by England; we have received a British Minister in Colombia, we are now a nation, and must be cautious what steps we take, & cannot enter into a quarrel with the Brazils"—which also involves another opinion, that *our* prompt acknowledgements, *our* Minister & *our* treaty were estimated very lightly, a profusion of phrases to the contrary notwithstanding.

The plan of establishing a monarchy here, I believe more visionary than that of a republic. Doubtless there is a great deficiency of administrative talent, because the Spaniards filled all offices almost exclusively with their own subjects, who are all dead or absent. But the people are naturally intelligent, & tho' there is a sad want both of morality & education in Peru, both may be produced. It has been remarked by all who have had occasion to observe them, that the improvement of these countries under a few years

of self government, tho' impeded by factions, is great & visible; & they have acquired notions of liberty that will not be easily eradicated. Had there been honest views with regard to Peru by having La Mar for a President, & the men of talents that the Congress contained, properly directed, Peru might have gone on successfully, till new men capable of entering into the various branches of administration were formed & developed. But it is the fashion of tyrants & their panders to calumniate a people, as an excuse for enslaving them, as the Boa covers an animal with his slime that he may be able to swallow it.

I was conversing within a day or two with some Colombians, who have been the enthusiastic admirers of Bolivar. They spoke with the deepest feeling of regret at the course he is pursuing, & seemed to cherish a hope, that he might recede in time from the dangers before him. There is now a kind of crisis in his affairs. He is said to be printing the Constitution he has prepared for Bolivia, & is also meditating a proclamation to palliate to the world the recent proceedings in regard to the Congress. He is about dispatching two of his aid de camps, one to Colombia, & the other to Chuquisaca, & the dispatches they take must be decisive in their tenour. He has given out that he wishes for a few days retirement, & is going to pass them at the plantation of Bille four leagues from the Capital, where he wishes to be uninterrupted by visits, & takes none of his suite with him. He has evidently passed the Rubicon, but is still within sight of its banks, & might secure his retreat: the desperate hope that he will do so is hardly worth entertaining.

It is not without the most painful feelings, that I have come to the conclusions explained in this letter. I have believed Gen. Bolivar, animated by the most pure & lofty ambition, & that notwithstanding some defects of private character, & personal traits & habits wholly dissimilar, that he had taken a model in view, of which we are so proud, & the world so admiring. Nor am I ashamed of my credulity; the fame within his reach was so glorious, that I could never believe any man would descend from that lofty eminence where posterity would have recognized him, to confound himself with the ignoble herd of ambitious, usurping, military chieftains.

I have pledged my honor that the most strict reserve should be maintained with respect to the inclosed observations; which if known might be fatal to their authour, who I hope may be preserved for the service of his country. I have thought it my duty to communicate these things to my government, that they may be prepared for the consequences which may result.

I have only to add, that I pray you Sir to receive [etc.].

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, June 11, 1826.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose two pamphlets, the one containing the new Constitution & address of Gen. Bolivar, & the other a pamphlet by Mr. Laso, a deputy to the late Congress of Peru. This latter is meant to influence opinion in regard to the plans of the former: & I am assured from good authority, that it was published under the special revision & Correction of Gen. Bolivar, every sheet being sent to his residence at the Magdalena; a fact, which makes many of its passages more remarkable. The assertion that the Foreign Agents interfered to prevent his pretended departure, is I know unfounded in regard to a part, & is so I fully believe as respects the whole of them. It will be unnecessary for me to make any comments on the pamphlets, especially as my letter No. 40,² will serve as a kind of explanatory preface to them. I regret not having been able to send this project of the constitution sooner, for it has been printed some time, but was kept strictly in reserve, that no knowledge of its provisions might transpire prematurely, so that they could be sent to the deputies at Chuquisaca to be on their guard. It was transmitted by an aid de camp, just in time to meet them at their assembling on the 25th of this month, & as they assemble under the bayonets of Gen. Sucre there will be no useless discussion. As soon as it is adopted the other measures for the reunion of the two republics & subsequently for the provinces of Guayaquil and Quito will go rapidly forward: it is intended that the dominion of Gen. Bolivar shall be coextensive with that of the ancient empire of the Incas. And in Mr. Laso's pamphlet it is boldly suggested to continue him also at the head of Colombia, a proposition whose reception in that country we have yet to learn.

Mr Ortis Cevallos has been appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Upper Peru to negotiate for the reunion of the two republics. Mr. Ferreira is to go as Minister to Colombia; & Mr. Rios at present a clerk in the department of Foreign Affairs, goes as Charge d'Affaires to Rio Janeiro. No agent is sent to Buenos Ayres, altho' they had a Minister here for several months, but who went to Chile when he found that no minister would be sent to his country in return. This mission exclusively to the Brazilian Court, while none is sent to a sister republic with whom the former is at war, is sufficiently indicative of the policy intended to be pursued, & which has been mentioned in former letters.

I pray you Sir, to receive [etc.].

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 989, under date, May 17, 1826.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

LIMA, July 5, 1826.

SIR: On Saturday last Marshal Sta. Cruz was installed as President of the Council of Government & on Sunday a dinner was given at the Palace to the Ministers & some military officers in honor of this event. I assisted at both by invitation, and at the latter Gen. Bolivar was present. After dinner a number of toasts were given, all of course filled with the most extravagant adulations of him but there were two that had much meaning. The first of these was from him to say that the three republics of Colombia, Peru & Bolivia, united under the wise administration of the three great men who governed them, Gen. Santander, Marshal Sta. Cruz, & Marshal Sucre would be able to resist all the efforts of anarchy & despotism. That they must be prepared for changes in affairs, & to rally round these men; & a very pregnant allusion was made to the state of the neighbouring countries. All this was without the slightest allusion to himself, or to his having any connection with their affairs. This toast or speech was answered by one from Mr. Pando which completed what was wanting—that it was very true these governments were in the hands of three great men (Santa Cruz has only been brought here to keep him in a state of *surveillance*) but that the head of the whole system was the Libertador, he alone gave security to these republics: He must remain at their head forever, & after his death his sword hung up in their hall, would be like that of Damocles against all anarchists (republicans) & despots. It is said to be certain that Gen. Bolivar goes on a visit in a few days with his personal suite to Colombia.

Gen. O'Higgins goes shortly to Chiloe, he does not take any troops with him, only a few officers, & a quantity of arms & accoutrements. He is said to be very confident of getting possession of the country & government—but if the accounts we hear from there are true, he will be disappointed in these expectations.

Gen. Bolivar's model is now Napoleon & his ambition is equally unbounded: his views extend not only to being at the head of Colombia & the two Peru's, but to including Chile & Buenos Ayres in his domain; & I believe that a just calculation regarding his plans cannot be made, if it does not suppose the design of an empire from Panama to Magellan under the title of Libertador.

Marshal La Mar I have heard is going to the U. S. for the recovery of his health; & I suspect also to avoid being compromised against his will here. He is the most popular man in Peru, & the most deservedly so. A most gallant soldier & distinguished officer, a pure patriot, with a character public &

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

private unsullied. He is extremely partial to our country & our institutions, & deserves on every ground, the most cordial reception both as a public & private individual.

I pray you to receive [etc.].

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, July 26, 1826.

The force at the disposal of Gen. Bolivar to hold a country thus circumstanced, & prosecute his ulterior views is not very large. Sucre has under his command rather less than 5000 men, of whom about one third are Peruvians, & all disaffected. The province of Salta is commanded by Gen. Arenales a Spaniard by birth, who was with St. Martin in the first invasion of Peru. He has always been warmly attached to the patriot cause, & bears an excellent character. Report has made him already leading an army against Sucre, but this at least is premature. Buenos Ayres has too much on hand with the Brazilian war to engage in another; but as they must now be fully impressed with the views entertained here, they will only dissemble untill they can get rid of their present enemy—and as the people of the provinces of Bolivia are said to be generally in favour of a union with Buenos Ayres, if Gen. Arenales should be ordered to act against the Colombians, Sucre even with a superior force may be placed in a dangerous situation.

Besides this force under Sucre, there are about 7000 men under the more immediate direction of Bolivar, who has reserved the Ministry of War in his own hands, & that department is at present separated from the Council of Government. More than one third of this number are Peruvians, of whom a few, as already mentioned are in open revolt. In Callao & the Capital there may be about 2500 men, of whom three fourths are Colombians. Upwards of 7000 Peruvian troops have been sent to Colombia since the conclusion of the war. The whole army may now be estimated at 12000, of which one third may be Peruvians, who are all discontented, & only want leaders to act against the Colombians. With a force then nominally of 7 or 8000 Colombian troops, (many of the regiments containing Peruvian recruits) Gen. Bolivar has to hold both Perus with discontented population, & at the same [time] carry on his scheme of empire, which avowedly embraces Colombia, & secretly involves the whole of South America at least that was formerly Spanish.

The finances which are to provide the means for all these objects are in the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

greatest confusion, and the talents for bringing into order the chaos of the Treasury department, seem almost wholly wanting. The military now receive two thirds of their pay, & the civil officers one half, but both, especially the latter, are in arrears. As no accurate reports are given, it would be mere conjecture to state the actual receipts: it is thought however that the income from the customs the present year, will be considerably below the last. Loans are out of the question, & both the bills of Peru & Colombia are coming back protested. The commercial distress & monied panic in Europe have had their reaction here, which has embarrassed all the principal English houses, who have been making the greatest sacrifices of the goods consigned to them, to sustain the suspended credit of their houses at home that are under advances to the manufacturers, which last will in many cases sustain a total loss of the property shipped. Every effort is making to transmit funds, & the market is therefore drained of specie, thus increasing the embarrassment here.

Notwithstanding this unfavorable combination of circumstances, if the country escapes internal convulsions, & no military expeditions are undertaken, an able financier might retrieve its credit, even supposing the debt to amount to \$40,000,000. at which it is estimated. The large amount of Church property formerly sequestered, & the still greater amount which they may easily take into their hands, is in itself an immense resource. The rich estates on the coast, & the extensive *Estancias*, in the interior that have been almost entirely devastated by the war, are again coming into cultivation & renewing their stocks, and lastly the mines afford an inexhaustible resource, & one which if the country continues tranquil, may by the aid of foreign enterprise and capital exceed all former productions.

The recent election of Admiral Blanco to the Presidency of Chile is a fortunate measure. His character is not suited to remain long in power in times like these, but it is thought by persons intimately acquainted with the parties in Chile, the best choice that could be made at present, it satisfied the enemies of Freire, it does not alarm the *pelucones* or adherents of the clergy; & it is adhered to by the friends of the unfortunate Carreras & Rodriguez, who for the sake of these victims, are the inveterate enemies of O'Higgins, & who comprize most of the young men of the country. It has changed the plan here also. Gen. Bolivar on hearing of it said, that O'Higgins could not now think of going; that all parties were united. In a conversation I had with the latter yesterday, I understood from him, that he had relinquished the expedition; & I am told that a proclamation from him to that effect will appear in the *Chilote*, a newspaper printed by his partisans here for circulation in Chile. It will now be attempted to effect by intrigue, what was intended to be done by force, & which was rendered almost desperate by the strong feeling that was excited in Chile, when they obtained information of the designs against them. It is unnecessary to repeat that O'Higgins is merely an instrument of

Bolivar, to prepare the way for the introduction of the Bolivian Constitution, & to make Chile a viceroyalty or prefecture of the Bolivian empire.

The great plan is gradually developing: the two Perus, Colombia as one, but more probably divided into two, Chile & Buenos Ayres are to form this empire; & will probably be consolidated, tho' an idea of a kind of federation of these great divisions is held out. Doubtless the principal officers & adherents will also receive hereditary titles. Gen. Cerdeña after his promotion for his services in the intrigues for the dissolution of the late Congress was named commander of the Peruvian Guard; the first hint of the *grand guard* hereafter to be created. Napoleon is now the model in every thing the subject of praise & admiration; & Dr. Unanue in his exposé prepared originally for the Congress, & recently published, has openly introduced the name, comparing Bolivar to Scipio Cesar and Napoleon. A year ago he appeared pleased with the comparison to Washington, & affected to resent that with Napoleon. In the mean time he continues disclaiming all wish to command, says, that he is most anxious to retire from public life, to pass a few years in traveling in Europe. One of his ministers recently cited as a proof of his sincerity in this, that he had indignantly refused the offer of the crown lately made by Paez, & told the officer who arrived here a few days since with this commission from Venezuela, that he would have nothing to do with them, & that they might turn robbers if they liked &c.

It appears to be decidedly his intentions at present to return to Colombia, from which he has received favorable information from Santander, & which the open measures of Paez may render more urgent. The forces available for this vast scheme of ambition seem wholly inadequate; & it is to be feared that besides losing the opportunity of leaving a noble reputation in history, it will only tend to entail a long series of troubles upon countries, that require peace, the protection of industry & encouragement of emigration, to develop their resources, & occupy a territory which is less peopled than that of any civilized region on the globe.

The *United States* is the only vessel of war we have here. The *Peacock* left Guayaquil the 25th ulto. on her way to the Sandwich Islands, nothing further is known about the *Dolphin* since the report of her being at those islands in April. The English have a ship of the line, a frigate & three corvettes here, the French two small corvettes one of which has just arrived to relieve the other that sails for France this week taking three youths of Lima to be educated there at the expence of the government.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

LIMA, August 1, 1826.

SIR: Since my last,² intelligence has arrived from the interior, that the partial revolt mentioned in it, had been entirely suppressed. A few were killed, a part made prisoners & the rest had dispersed. No details have yet been given to the public.

In the meantime the last week has been one of great excitement. All the officers of the Peruvian corps stationed in the capital were arrested, Gen. Bolivar shifted his residence from the Magdalena & has since resided in the palace. The arrests of these officers was soon followed by more important ones. Gen. Necochea who is at the head of the Mint, Gen. Correa a retired Buenos Ayrean officer, Messrs. Forcada & Telleria Judges of the Supreme Court, & Mariategui Attorney General, & several others have been arrested. It is said that from 60 to 80 persons are in confinement in the Convents of St. Domingo & Francisco. Some others made their escape: Mr. Requeña a Canon of this Cathedral, Carrasco a Captain in the Navy & scientific man, with his Lieutenant Salmon, & Vidal.—Carrasco was a member of the late Congress, & one of those who refused to sign the destruction of that body. Requeña was probably sought for only to take his declaration, as an acquaintance of Vidal, but in the manner of these people has hid himself thro' fear. In the last *Peruano*, a violent article attributing this movement to that "classic land of anarchy", Buenos Ayres, filled with passionate declamation & calling for blood, bears intrinsic marks of Gen. Bolivar's style. He was thrown into the most violent agitation by this event, & if the prudence of the Ministers is not able to calm his feelings, it is feared executions will begin.

The whole of this plot is very imperfectly known: every one who knows Necochea, his general character, & the retired life he has led, is convinced that he could have had nothing to do with it: and it seems highly improbable that the other principal persons arrested should have had any share in a scheme of which the agents are so obscure. It is supposed that Vidal & Ninivilca (the latter an Indian educated at the University of Lima) the two most famous chiefs of the bands of Montonera formed by St. Martin, had combined with some subaltern officers, to attempt the overthrow of the Colombians. Their plan is said to have been to surprize the barracks in this city with the aid of the Peruvian corps, make the Colombian officers prisoners & at the same time take possession of the Magdalena & surprizing Gen. Bolivar there embark him & his officers for Colombia. Vidal escaped, but Ninivilca was taken, & his declarations are said to have compromised Neco-

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 992, under date, July 26, 1826.

chea & the others. Altho' the persons who are best informed on this subject, believe that the conspirators had only mentioned his name & others as being discontented, & would join in such a conspiracy of which no other proofs but suspicion against them can be found. This week the anniversary of the battle of Junin was to be celebrated. That battle was gained chiefly by the valour of Necochea, in which he was desperately wounded & mutilated for life; to see him in prison on its celebration, & La Mar who gained the battle of Ayacucho in banishment, occasions very obvious emotions in every generous breast.

One or two vessels are fitting out in all haste, the object variously stated: some say to take the Peruvian troops here to Guayaquil, & others to go to the Intermedios & bring down a battalion of Colombians.

Events in other quarters are unfolding other parts of the main design. The last *Peruano* contains a memorial of the Cabildo of Guayaquil, beseeching Bolivar to continue at the head of the government; & change the constitution which experience has shewn to be insufficient, & which the movements of Gen. Paez have overthrown. The two chief agents of this meeting were the Intendente Castillo & Admiral Illingrot. The former is represented as being an ignorant, brutal tyrant, against whom all the inhabitants supported by the English Consul, have petitioned the government; the latter declaring if he was not displaced he would leave the city. Illingrot is an Englishman married to a Guayaquil lady; is a very solid, brave, sensible man, much esteemed for his good conduct, & entirely devoted to Gen. Bolivar. He was sent from here in June on this mission, to take these steps as soon as he should hear of the movements of Paez. These measures are calculated to distract the Congress of Colombia, which will see the republic in revolt at its two extremities. As to Guayaquil & Quito, as they were forcibly aggregated to Colombia, by Gen. Bolivar, they will gladly reunite with Peru, whatever may be their feelings with regard to the system of government.

It is unnecessary for me Sir, to comment on these transactions, many of which will be known to you from the other side of the Continent before they are from here. Much depends for the immediate success of Gen. Bolivar's plan on the news that may come from Colombia. If the liberal party are strong enough to maintain their opinion, he must confine himself at present to the ancient empire of the Incas. The designs against Chile & Buenos Ayres appear wholly thwarted; & those countries being now on their guard, cannot be subdued except by force, which will furnish future occupation, when the usurpation here is fully organized & established.

That he is a very extraordinary man there can be no doubt: but the degree of success that he has obtained & the base, oriental flattery that he has received from his dependents here, have inflamed his ardent character almost to madness. Were I to repeat to you some authentic anecdotes they would seem incredible. An idea may be formed from the single fact that on his

birthday last week, when he completed his 43d year, taking fire at a toast that was given at his own table, he declared himself a greater man than any which history has recorded, that not only the heroes of antiquity were inferior to him in "liberal ideas", but Washington & Napoleon he had left much in the rear. His deep deception & huge scheme of usurpation have hitherto advanced with prodigious success; his eminent talents & fortunate position might have been of the utmost importance to the advancement & prosperity of South America: his immeasurable pride & ambition will I fear involve them in great confusion & calamity.

Admiral Guise who has been for a long period under arrest, tho' not in confinement, is about having his cause decided. Some of the charges against him are his violent acts against some of our vessels. He is a brave man who has rendered considerable services to the patriot cause, & finds himself with ruined fortune & health. Some of the charges against him will doubtless be proved, but he probably will not be condemned.

We are yet without any recent intelligence from home, & are looking for some arrivals with anxiety. Since December we have no regular intelligence & know but little of our national affairs which are more interesting to us than any others. For nearly eight months we have only had a straggling newspaper or letter. To all the officers of our nation here, this want of communication is painful, & extremely injurious to our mercantile interests. I allude to this subject to reiterate in the most earnest manner the expediency of establishing a regular communication thro' the Isthmus, on which I have so frequently written.

I pray you to receive [etc.].

P. S. Augt. 2d. I understand that the declarations of Espinosa, a Peruvian Captain who revealed the conspiracy, strongly commit some of the persons arrested & the avowals of Ninivilca confirm them. But it is said nothing appears against Necochea. Arrests are still making.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, August 24, 1826.

About a fortnight since the departure of Gen. Bolivar for Colombia was announced as inevitable, & various preparations were made as if it were cer-

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

tain. The several corporations of the City, were then directed to come forward, & petition him to remain. Among the addresses on this occasion that of the Dean & Chapter of the Cathedral are the most to the point: they speak of his "empire", & of being his most "devoted subjects". One of the manouvers on this occasion & which gave him most pleasure, is highly characteristic of Lima. The ladies according to private notifications sent round were invited to meet at the palace at seven in the evening of a day in the last week, to intreat the Libertador not to abandon Peru. Three young girls delivered him short addresses on this occasion, one of them a daughter of Dr. Unanue. To these he answered that he regretted he could not remain, that he was sensibly affected by their kindness, but that his duty called him to Colombia. On this answer, two or three ladies whose husbands are in place, exclaimed "he has said nothing, he has not promised, he must not go", & a general cry was raised, "he must not go": those nearest to him then caught him in their arms, insisted that he should promise to stay, & with the exception of a very few, about seventy ladies being present, the whole went forward to embrace him. He said it was impossible to resist so much beauty & attraction, & that he would stay. This like all similar scenes, was prepared as regularly as any on a theatre. Every mode of adulation has been so exhausted here, that it is difficult to practice any that does not appear to him insipid: this however was sufficiently high seasoned to be relished, & it put him in the most extraordinary spirits. He went round in the most courteous manner & addressed all the ladies, contrary to his usual practice, but to one he said, these words were all in jest, leaving her to suppose he still meant to go.

Another scene of more seeming moment, but quite as easily managed, has been produced on this occasion. The electoral college of Lima, was convoked last week, accepted his plan of a constitution, & elected him President for life, which was a condition of the acceptance. In the preamble to this act, as published in the *Peruano*, it is stated as a decisive reason in favour of this constitution, the vast progress made under it by Bolivia (where it was adopted about three months ago). The electoral college of Lima consists of about 300 members of whom, 70 were present on this occasion, many of them Indians of the neighbouring villages. Two days beforehand the persons assembled, were verbally notified to meet to *approve* the constitution. At the meeting several officers were present, who *managed* the business. One individual rose to say, that he thought the article, disfranchising a citizen who did not know how to write, was at present harsh & premature. It was immediately intimated to him, if he said more he would get into difficulty: Another said, he thought it improper to sanction a constitution without any deliberation &c. he was also silenced by menaces from the officers present. The constitution was actually read over by one of the Secretaries; & while this was doing a strip of paper, containing these words "*Bolivar Presidente vitalicio y Autocrat*" was distributed, which words were to be shouted as soon

as the reading was over. Many of those present would not know the meaning of this last word. The constitution was adopted by acclamation. The business was completed by 2 o'clock p. m. but the electors were detained, none being allowed to go out, till seven o'clock, to give the appearance of time for deliberation. In consequence of these proceedings, rejoicings were ordered for three days. Bolivar said to O'Higgins after the result was known, "now I am Emperour." These scenes recall to me, those I witnessed in Paris, when Napoleon overturned the Directory, & made himself First Consul for life, Emperour &c. &c. He is the model, & Bolivar imitates him as nearly as circumstances permit.

I called at the Palace two or three days since to visit Mr. Pando & the Libertador. The former said to me, that by the act of the electoral college & [in?] adopting the Constitution of Bolivar & electing him President for life, they had taken the best step for the country, that elections of President here, were impracticable, &c. I told him that the general objection to that Constitution in my opinion was, that it resembled a play written for a single actor of peculiar talents; I knew not how they could replace Gen. Bolivar. That the idea of an empire from Panama to Cape Horn was splendid, but it seemed to me too vast a scheme, & would perpetuate war & interior struggles. He replied, that it was no longer a question of Chile & Buenos Ayres, that the union of Colombia & the two Peru's was all that could be effected, & that this would employ him twenty years to accomplish. I then called on Bolivar, expressed my regrets that a slight indisposition had prevented my being present, when he received the ladies the other evening, & offered him my compliments on having secured their affections, to avoid any insincerity in congratulating him on the doings of the College. He was in fine spirits & humour, & after a few minutes conversation, it being announced that the Cabildo had come to make him a congratulatory address, I rose to go. As he accompanied me out to give them a reception, he said, "I shall go to Colombia." And I presume his intention after having secured this matter here, which will give the lead to the other colleges: & having seen the arrested persons sent out of the country, that he will go towards Colombia, where the state of affairs urgently requires his presence.

A predilection for republican governments & a sympathy towards all those in favour of them, is I suppose natural to all Americans: It is however necessary to admit, that Peru is singularly destitute of the requisite character for sustaining an elective republic. The Spaniards & their adherents held all the offices in the country; & these being all dead or banished, few men capable of any branch of administration remain. Most of the leading men are monarchists, & persons who had so long lived under the double oppression of Spanish colonial government & the Inquisition, could hardly be expected to have any republican ideas or habits. The most that could have been done in the outset, would have been to have administered a republican system in a

monarchical spirit, preparing the people gradually for the unbiassed exercise of the elective franchise & other civil duties. Had Gen. Bolivar been governed by that virtuous ambition, which the world in conformity to his protestations of disinterestedness had given him credit for, such a system might have been safely commenced in Peru. There were several individuals of fine talents & pure character, & popular in the country, who would have been adequate to its administration. Marshal La Mar, the Canon Luna Pizarro, Count de Vista Florida, Generals Necocha, Alvarado & others were of this class. These individuals are all of irreproachable character, & their probity is proved by their poverty: it is indeed a grateful reflection, that the purest & most enlightened men in Peru are all republicans.

There can be little doubt that the ardent character of Bolivar, which produced such heroic constancy in the extraordinary vicissitudes of his early career made him early conceive the vast scheme of ambition which is now developing. His superiority of talent & energy of will reduced all his confederates to subalterns, ready to follow & obey all his directions. Several of them long since wished him to assume the title of monarch, for which Gen. Paez has always been most strenuous, which he frowned upon with simulated anger, because it was premature. His solemn, reiterated, & vehement protestations of disinterestedness, deceived the world, while he was taking every measure to secure that result which is now manifest. From the first moment of his coming to Peru, his object was to humiliate the Peruvian Army; & as soon as the war was terminated in Ayacucho, send it out of the country, or distribute it in such small detachments, that its chiefs had no support & the troops no head. His affected horror of the dictatorship, his contemptuous refusal of the millions offered him, his declaration that he would not take a grain of sand from Peru, all contributed to deceive the world, while he was preparing to make himself master of the country, & form South America into one empire.

There is a glare about such lofty projects that dazzles the world; and the admiration that is excited as in the case of Napoleon, prevents a calm & just estimation of such unprincipled usurpation. The egotism of Bolivar like that of his model, inflamed by success makes him consider mankind as mere chequers to be moved at will in the game of his aggrandizement. If the end is to justify the means; it will rarely have a harder task. In most of the measures taken to secure his power in Peru, & especially in the recent arrest of so many distinguished individuals, who are to be ruined & banished merely for precaution, all the rights & feelings of men have been trampled upon, with a violence never surpassed.

In the selection of the victims of these measures, Buenos Ayres & Chile will see a most offensive step against themselves; since being a native of either of those States is a sufficient reason for proscription. Besides the intrigues openly carried on against both, to distract their councils, & divide

their provinces, as in the case of Chiloe & Salta, would be a just motive for a declaration of war. It is impossible too that those countries should not see that his views extend to including them under his dominion; & whenever that is tolerably established here; that he will direct his arms against them; & that course is prepared by continual insults against their system of government. His ambition will lead to endless wars, & the prosperity of these unpeopled countries will be arrested by its ravages on their population: & their resources exhausted by the enormous expences that will be required. His hatred of a federal system, the existence of which in adjoining states will disprove the alledged impracticability of a republic in these countries, may afterwards lead him to hostilities against Guatemala & Mexico; so that with all his restless, military ambition, he need fear no want of occupation for the rest of his life.

Hostile operations much more justifiable, & which the fatal ignorance & obstinacy of Spain render inevitable, will previously be directed against Cuba & Puerto Rico. General Perez was complaining to me a few days since, that the government of the U. S. had delayed their movements against Cuba more than eight months, but that they had 8000 men in readiness in Colombia, & the first step after their arrival would be to invade Cuba. Gen. Bolivar in private conversation lately declared, that when he had driven the Spaniards from that island, that he would lead an army to Spain, & make peace in Madrid; one of those quixotic extravagances that he occasionally discovers. This is not a solitary instance; some months since at a supper in Arequipa, at which were present upwards of twenty persons, after the champagne had circulated pretty freely, talking of the character of Napoleon, he said, if he had been in his situation, he would have conquered all Europe without difficulty. Some one remarked that he would have found an obstacle in England, perhaps it might have been so, he said, & then jumping on the table & kicking about the bottles & glasses, he exclaimed in this manner I would have marched over France & Spain. You will excuse the mention of such private anecdotes as this, but they are illustrative of his character; & history will record of him some acts of madness like those of Alexander in Persepolis or Napoleon in Russia.

This ill regulated ambition which may involve South America in long scenes of confusion, is to be so much more deeply regretted, as his talents and enlightened views, would have contributed to their rapid advancement: and if he had realized the disinterested character to which he pretended, the weight & influence of his name would have made him an invaluable umpire in all cases of difficulty. He is a friend to emigration of which these unpeopled countries are so much in want; he is the protector of foreigners (with the recent exception before mentioned); & is anxious to proceed as fast as possible, in getting rid of the idle & dissolute monks, who formerly overran these countries, & still hold immense possessions; & he is the declared friend of religious

toleration. If with these sound & liberal views he had directed his energy to developing the resources of these countries, to establishing great public works such as that of steam navigation on the coast of the Pacific, & a canal across the Isthmus, he would have obtained the most extensive & permanent reputation as the great benefactor of his country. But military glory is his predominant passion, conquest & extensive empire his aim; & even if he escapes all the casualties which are incident to such a career, he will at last be only a brilliant, military usurper, to be cursed by the present generation, & add another to the list of military madmen.

Of the results of the first session of the Congress of Panama, I need say little, as the details will reach you much sooner from that quarter. The demand for the reunion of Guayaquil & Quito was made by the Peruvian deputies by orders from hence. Both those provinces which are extremely jealous of each other, are it is said in favour of a federal system; & would prefer being united to Peru, as their junction with Colombia was an arbitrary act of Bolivar, & extremely inconvenient to their interests. Some of the measures of the Congress have caused great vexation & disappointment here: it was the intention to have transferred its sessions to this city. The removal to Mexico shews the jealousy entertained by that republic & Guatemala of Bolivar's plans: Chile & Buenos Ayres will now send their deputies to it, & all these states will join in opposing the influence of the Dictator. His ambition may therefore tend to defeat the utility of a Congress, of which he was the authour, the idea of which justly increased his reputation, & whose measures might have been most salutary if not made subservient to his personal ambition.

A new system of taxation has just been promulgated, which will yield a large revenue if it can be enforced. It is a tax upon industry applied to all classes of dealers & carriers. The first class of merchants pay 500 \$ annually, & others in gradation, it is by no means excessive on the principal merchants & shopkeepers, but falls heavy on the others. In Lima it will meet with no resistance, where every measure of government however oppressive is always received with apparent subservience, & secret murmurs. In the interior it may cause some trouble to enforce it. But the state of the finances requires taxes; credit is extinct, & the expences are daily increasing, while the revenue is diminishing.

Marshal Santa Cruz has returned from the interior, after having repressed the mutiny that had taken place. He is President of the Council of Government, & commander in Chief of the army and navy: titles given him to secure his acquiescence for the present: to be thrown aside when measures are matured. As soon as the Constitution is adopted in Peru, Bolivia will be united with it, & probably the whole assume this name, Sucre remaining at the head as Vice President under Bolivar. It is however pretty well understood that these titles like those of Napoleon's Consulate may be only temporary, & will

be succeeded by that of Emperour, & the creation of nobility to support the new dynasty.

This political apostacy has naturally made the adherents of the Libertador, a little ashamed of meeting Americans, after so many professions of public virtue, & the pretended imitation of Washington. Gen. Bolivar in an allusion to some of my countrymen & myself, asked lately, "how they in the Merced [*sic*] liked these steps," & added "let them kick against them; 'twill be in vain." Personally in my intercourse with him, he is always polite & affable; tho' at the last dinner at the palace he talked a little *at* me. I was sitting with him in an inner room. Gen. O'Higgins & one or two of the Ministers being present, & he addressed himself to me, in declaring the impossibility of an elective government in Peru; that such a system might do in the United States, or even in England, but was utterly impracticable here: that no man in possession of power would resign it, that none but a hero was capable of such disinterestedness, that eternal struggles & factions would ensue. This was at a time of great excitement during the late panic, & where there were more guards than guests. Of course I avoided any dispute on general principles, & turned the conversation by some anecdotes of American & English elections.

The shocks he will receive from the opinions in the U. S. relative to the course he has taken, & the criticisms that will be pronounced on his scheme of a constitution of which he is vain to a degree of infatuation, will if my anticipations are well founded, serve to irritate him deeply: & like Napoleon he will naturally feel a secret hatred for those, whose consistent patriotism is a silent but perpetual reproach to him. How this enmity may be shewn I know not; but as his chief reliance for conciliating the liberal party throughout the world, is founded on his enfranchisement of his own slaves & his unsparing denunciation of slavery, it is on this point that he may secretly assail us. How far he may cherish a feeling of hostility & to what extent he may carry it, I do not undertake to judge: & this is too delicate a matter to do more than make this suggestion of its bearing on a tremendous topic, which is daily assuming a more dangerous aspect, & I am persuaded will require the most serious attention.

*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, November 25, 1826.

The acceptance of Gen. Bolivar's constitution, and choosing him President, has been effected in all the provinces under the immediate inspection of a military officer. This farce seems to have been performed every where with the same forms & the same indifference; & next month the oath is to be taken to this Constitution: if he succeeds in bringing Colombia to the same result, "the Consulate for life" will then be fully established, & the Empire will follow of course, & measures prosecuted to extend its advantages to Chile & Buenos Ayres, with respect to which latter country especially Gen. Sucre is incessantly intriguing to dismember its provinces & gain them to his side. The intentions towards the Brazils will be manifested afterwards; in the mean time preparations are in progress already; the Prefect of Junin has been occupied this season, in opening a military road from Tarma to the territory occupied by the independent Indians; the motive is said to be for the transportation of timber & salt for the use of the mines; but the real object to establish posts on the Marañon, with the justifiable end of recovering territory, which the Portugese thro' the carelessness of the Court of Spain formerly invaded & retained to the inconvenience of Peru. Once established on the navigable waters of the Marañon an inspection of the map will guide conjectures as to future consequences.

Marshal Santa Cruz told me that their army now consisted of 11,000 men, & tho' they were taking recruits in some places, they were discharging soldiers every day. About 4000 of these troops are in Lima, & in no capital in Europe have I ever seen troops with a more soldierlike appearance, well & even elegantly dressed; & the parade of military bands, the attendance of guards &c. give an imposing aspect. Santa Cruz has made himself popular, & this is the only instance, with the exception of La Mar, that I have known of any individual in the government, since my residence here.

In spite of the military expences & the embarrassment of their finances, the country is recovering from the state of ruin that was caused by the profligate, atrocious manner in which the war was waged. The vast amount of Church property that will be at the disposal of the government, & the immense wealth contained in their mines will relieve them whenever they organize a wise, financial administration. The aspect of the capital improves every month, & the valuable estates, on the coast that have suffered so severely are again becoming productive. The produce of the mines may be estimated at 2,000,000 \$ the present year, & will probably be doubled the next.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

The President Santa Cruz has conversed with me on the subject of sending three of his nephews who are under his protection to the U. S. for education which he says he prefers to sending them to Europe, as he wishes they may have an American & not European sympathy. He wished to have them go by the Frigate *U. S.* & I advised Com. Hull to take them. The point is not entirely settled & I have promised him some further information relative to schools &c. His wish is that they should receive the best education to fit them for any career. I told him that one of the best schools existing in any country was our National Academy at West Point. That I had no doubt the President would be disposed, if it was in his power to place them in that establishment; but that the reputation of the school made the applications so numerous that many parents were disappointed in the wish of having their sons there. I could not say how far the President's discretionary power might extend, but I had no doubt if it was sufficient he would give an order for their admission. I hope I have not been indiscreet in speaking in this measured manner, but it seems to me good policy to encourage the sending of a few of their young men to our country, to maintain hereafter our share of influence with the rising generation of Peru. Several have been sent to England, & the French are constantly making efforts to have boys sent to France for education. The last French vessel of war that returned to Europe took seven; & a sloop of war about returning has made the offer to take any more free of expence. These will all be formed by the Jesuits of that country, & as far as possible will be imbued with antiliberal opinions religious & political. It is our duty on loftier grounds even than those of national policy to counteract these efforts, & assist in producing examples of more liberal instruction.

Santa Cruz is not a married man & these youths who appear intelligent will probably have his patronage to advance them in the service of Peru.

A French Agent is daily expected here, under the name of Inspector General, with a large salary but with mysterious credentials. He will not be received if he does not bring documents in the accustomed form. The English Consul is engaged in making a commercial treaty which proceeds slowly. I was told last week by the English commander on this station, that he thought all their ships except two sloops of war would be recalled, as it was reported orders had been given to that effect. The French have only two corvettes here. There is now no appearance of occupation for any squadron in protecting commerce, except privateers should be fitted out from Manilla, which has been talked of as probable: all vessels would be exposed to their violence, if there were no foreign ships of war to protect them; should the Governor of that island act on the principles, that General told me governed him, in his command here, which was (without any reference to events) to consider the laws of the Indies as still in force.

Since the departure of Gen. Bolivar the government consists of Marshal

Santa Cruz President, Mr. Pando Minister of Exterior & Interior Relations, Gen. Heres Minister of War & Marine, & Mr. Larrea Minister of Finance & ecclesiastical affairs, & all power is in their hands.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, January 8, 1827.

SIR: Referring to the inclosed letters & copies for information on the topics to which they relate, I have now the honor to add a few confidential remarks on the political state of things here.

All eyes are turned towards the North, to see the result of Bolivar's return to Bogota. Gen. Santander wrote by the last post to Gen. Lara saying, that the meeting with Bolivar would be the most trying day of his life. If the administration in Colombia be not overwhelmed by the first vehemence of the usurper, if they can maintain their principles with firmness for only a few days, his attempts against the constitution of his own country must be abandoned, & they will then be ended here of course. The rumours & appearances of some change are becoming every day more prevalent; the discontent among the Colombian troops both here & in Upper Peru is constantly increasing; & it is said that Gen. Sucre has written here to say, that he can no longer contain [*sic*] the troops, & that a part of them must be sent home.

I have reason to believe from what I have heard confidentially that Gen. Santa Cruz is taking steps to secure the Presidency of the Republic for himself; & that as soon as he can prepare a sufficient number of partisans to prevent opposition, he will order a Congress to take the affairs of the country into consideration. Several of the Colombian officers recently made a proposition to a friend of Gen. La Mar, to make a declaration in his favour; but this was discouraged, as it was well known that La Mar would never give a moment's countenance to any intrigue or faction; altho' he would come forward to take the Presidency of the Republic, if deliberately called upon by the unbiassed voice of the country. I have heard from him lately, & am rejoiced to find that his health & spirits are improved. It is a characteristic anecdote, that when he called on Gen. Bolivar on his passage thro' Guayaquil, the latter asked him, what he should do with Paez. March against

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

him & shoot him—was the answer significant enough to the person who was the author of all his movements.

I hazard it as a mere conjecture, that within a short period, especially if the news from Colombia continue in the same tone, that Santa Cruz will order the assembling of a Congress, and may perhaps obtain the election of President, tho' I think & hope for the prosperity of Peru, that La Mar will at no distant period be called upon to preside over it.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

LIMA, February 3, 1827.

SIR: If my letters written during the last two months should have reached you, the events which I have now the honor to communicate will not be unexpected.

On the 26th ult^o the people of Lima were surprized to find that the Colombian troops now here, had occupied the great square at daylight, & sentries at all corners prevented every one from entering it. There was the most perfect tranquillity & order, which has indeed been uninterrupted, & on that day only, the shops were shut & business suspended. It was soon known, that a majority of the officers, the senior of whom, & present commander of the troops, is Lt. Colonel Bustamante, had arrested their two Generals Lara & Sands [Lando?] & five Colonels; & so completely was the business executed, that they were all arrested in their beds without opposition: & hitherto this revolution has not cost a drop of blood. As a part of the Castles of Callao had been occupied the evening before, to receive the prisoners, at 10 o'clock, these officers & a few others of subaltern rank, were sent prisoners to the Castles; & the troops were then marched to their respective quarters.

General Santa Cruz with the Ministers Larrea & Heres had been for a fortnight preceding at Chorrillos for the purpose of sea bathing and amusement. Mr. Pando Minister of Foreign Affairs alone remained in the city; & early in the morning having been refused by the sentries leave to pass to the Palace, immediately went to Chorrillos: the archbishop elect, a servile adherent of Gen. Bolivar in great alarm took the same direction.

Early in the morning the Colombian commander Bustamante, sent a message to Gen. Santa Cruz, to request him to return to Lima, & take care of the public security: that the steps they had taken concerned only themselves

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

& their country: that they had been obliged by their officers to swear to the Bolivian Constitution which they abjured; & that they had been compelled by their duty to their country, & fidelity to its constitution to arrest their chiefs, who would be immediately sent home, & that they should wait the orders of their government: that they would not be made the instruments of enslaving Peru, that they declined absolutely all interference with its government, but they would lend their aid at all times, to preserve the public tranquillity.

Santa Cruz & his ministers were confounded by this event, & excessively alarmed at the consequences which might follow. They tried various plans to extricate themselves from their desperate situation, but all in vain; & Santa Cruz who had been quite ill, by his hesitating, timid conduct & wavering between the Councils of his Ministers & the voice of the public, has shewn himself inadequate for such a crisis. The first day he advanced half way to the city, and tho' his guard of honor, about 40 hussars, were sent him, was prevented by his Ministers from coming to the city.

You will immediately suppose that this movement was made in concert with some of the principal Peruvian patriots, who took their measures in consequence, tho' with an apathy characteristic of this timid people. But on Saturday the 27th an open *Cabildo* was held to which the entry was free to all the citizens. It was one of the monstrous acts of arbitrary power, that all the municipalities were silently extinguished by the Constitution of Bolivar. The *Cabildo* being reassembled, considered themselves the representatives of the people, & passed certain resolutions inviting Santa Cruz to come to Lima & act as President *interino* of the Republic, till a constituent Congress with full powers could be called: that the intrusive constitution should be abolished: the former Constitution in force: that a proclamation calling a Congress should be immediately made; & that he should appoint his own Ministers, dismissing however the present ones. He tacitly accepted these conditions, came to Lima about 2 o'clock, & the next day Vidaurre was appointed Minister in place of Pando, & Salazar in place of Heres, who fled in a canoe from Chorrillos, to the French brig of war in Callao Bay. Larrea continues Minister of finance, but for a few days only.

On the 30th the arrested Colombian officers sailed with a guard of three officers & 40 men for St. Buena Ventura, on their way to Bogota. Till the 31st Santa Cruz was still under the influence of his former advisers, & still secretly conceiving plans of escape. But when he discovered confidentially to one of the Generals, that he thought of going to put himself at the head of the Peruvian troops under Cerdeña at Jauja, they told him frankly that he knew nothing of his situation: that those troops were in fact acting in favour of their country: & that he must follow the public voice & not stir from Lima or he would be ruined. He then determined to act in harmony with the public feelings & to appoint new chiefs for the troops which are on the

march for the capital. Their arrival is looked for with some anxiety, as the discipline of the Colombian troops already relaxed by their long & idle residence in this city, has been inevitably very considerably impaired by the recent transactions. They have been marched to various villages, around the City, & their officers are incessantly engaged in restoring subordination. Indeed the conduct of these Colombian officers whatever may be the result to them of the momentous responsibility they have incurred, has been induced by the noblest principles of patriotism & fidelity to their country, & the address & vigour with which they have acted is admirable.

Among the papers of Lara, they found many most interesting letters from Bolivar, Sucre & other Generals, & which throw very considerable light on the designs of the former, & will be a powerful aid to Santander in his efforts to preserve the Constitution of Colombia, against the deep & treacherous designs of the Usurper.

By the letters of Sucre, it appears that his situation was nearly desperate, & that he could with the greatest difficulty restrain the troops; & in the opinion of the best informed persons, the moment he hears of these events he must at once march his army to the Intermedios & embark for Colombia: those who are acquainted with his army say, he will be forced to do this, not only by the discontent of his troops, but by the superior officers, who in his army are all liberals.

There is another set of documents of the most interesting description, respecting which there is much anxiety, & every precaution has been taken to get possession of them; & the knowledge of whose existence hastened a little these movements. Lara the late commander in chief of the Colombian troops is a brave soldier, but an ignorant, stupid man, with few ideas above those of a sergeant, & fitted to obey blindly all Bolivar's orders, & at the same time disgusted with the arduous situation in which he found himself. By the last mail from Bogota, which arrived on the 20th ulto. he received a letter from Gen. Salom, who wrote him by order of Bolivar that in a few days an officer would be sent with despatches: that the directions from the government he must disregard, but comply immediately & exactly with the orders he would receive from Bolivar himself; who would write confidentially by the same opportunity to Santa Cruz & to Sucre. Lara had the indiscretion to mention this information to a General of patriot principles. These alarming & mysterious hints made it necessary to lose no time in executing the recent measures. If these despatches can be obtained, they must unmask Bolivar beyond the possibility of further deception, master as he is [of] that art.

At present he appears to be attempting to deceive the government at Bogota; where in answer to our Chargé d'Affaires, he has held the same language, which he used to me & other Americans two years ago; but which has been for some time abandoned, as for many months past, Napoleon has

been openly & exclusively admired & taken as a model for imitation. He wrote to Lara, that he should after pacifying Venezuela, retire to his hacienda from which "nobody nobody nobody should withdraw him." Some persons think he will remain at home, till his agents can so far distract the provinces as to oblige them in desperation, to give him the Dictatorship: others say that he will return here from the Isthmus, to enter upon his empire, which with the two Peru's, Guayaquil & Quito completes Dr. Unanue's plan of giving him the ancient limits of the Incas; & that he will leave his agents to drive Colombia into joining him. With respect to the precise form & extent of his meditated empire, it is of course difficult to get exact information; but it is said, that confidential revelations partly from him, & partly from his Secretary, Gen. Perez to one of the Ministers in Panama, gave the following general outline. North America to be occupied by two great republics, the U. S. & Mexico: & South America by two great empires, for which Guatemala, Colombia, the two Peru's, Chile & Buenos Ayres would constitute one for Bolivar, the other formed by the Brazils.

The events that have taken place here the past week, will shatter this extravagant project to pieces. The army here is lost to him; Sucre to preserve his division must evacuate; & when the provinces of Upper Peru are left to themselves the name & constitution will be annulled. Buenos Ayres will be relieved from her most dangerous enemy, whose intrigues were distracting her provinces & councils; & making preparations to carry on open war, for which purpose 3000 muskets & 500 qtls. of powder were sent from hence a few weeks since. The Emperour of the Brazils having lost his secret ally, will now be more willing to make peace; in short all the States of South America, have escaped from the projects of a wild unprincipled ambition, whose professed plan was that of a military despotism, which at the utmost would have only lasted during the life of its projector, & have involved them in a long series of disasters.

A proclamation has been issued for assembling a Congress the first of May. Dr. Luna Pizarro has been recalled, & I forwarded to him today the decrees & letters for his return. I have urged his immediate coming: he is the most enlightened, the most liberal, the purest of the Peruvian patriots, & the most versed in all constitutional matters. All look up to him as a directing mind. La Mar also, with whom he is in the strictest friendship, will without doubt be elected to the presidency, & under the direction of these two men Peru may hope for prosperity & happiness, & the adjoining States for honest neighbours.

The hope that Bolivar's schemes are now effectually destroyed is a most consoling one. Nor is it alone a matter of felicitation, as regards South America, rescued from a military despotism, & projects of insatiable ambition, that would have consumed all their resources; but the U. S. too are relieved from a future dangerous enemy. I have taken considerable pains

to study the character & views of Bolivar, & have had some advantages for this purpose, & had he succeeded, I am persuaded we should have felt his animosity, if asked, in what manner?—I should answer with a few brief allusions.

His character is ardent, vehement, arrogant; his passions uncontrollable & restrained by no principle public or private: & with frequent sallies of frankness or rather indiscretion, he is capable of the most profound, solemn hypocrisy. He considers words as conveying no obligation, but wholly subordinate in whatever shape or profession, to promoting his designs. The decree against Spanish merchandize, of which you & the English government so justly complained is an instance of his despotic arrogance; that was dictated from Cuzco, as one of more celebrity from Milan, & tho' the bearing of the former was not quite so extensive, as that of the latter, the spirit of both was the same. This was issued without any regard to the laws or rights of nations, & was sent to the Abbé de Pradt to discourse upon in the same pamphlet with the Congress of Panama. For a time it was his object to flatter us, & hold up our institutions & patriots as models; but his sinister abandonment of both, engenders a natural hatred to objects which are a perpetual reproach to him, & his irascible disposition is one to seek to revenge itself for the double humiliation which his own hollow professions & the sarcasms of the world will entail upon him. Consider then, that his chief reliance to redeem himself with the liberal party in the world, is his hatred—his proscription of slavery. Read his inflammatory tirade against it in the preface to his nondescript constitution: take into mind, that the losses & ruin consequent on emancipation have taken place, & that the system is irretrievable, in these countries: bear in mind that his soldiers & many of his officers are of African mixture, & that they & all others of that class will hereafter have a natural feeling against all who make this a plea for degradation: look at Hayti now, & at Cuba (inevitably) a short [time] hence, & at the infallible success of the English abolitionists: calculate the census of our slaves in 1830: observe the confines of black, triumphant liberty, & of black, sullen slavery, & how many days or hours sail they are from each other: reflect that every age has its spirit as strongly marked as the current of a river, & that moral gravitation in our times is as irresistible as physical, & that if in one period it was the crusades & in another discovery, that in ours it is the assertion of personal rights & the abrogation of slavery & further, that from various motives, very opposite parties in Europe will gladly see "this question tried in our country:" and then without adducing further motives, judge whether the "Madman" of Colombia could & would have annoyed us. Alas! Sir, this is a subject whose dangers are not limited to fears of him, but which it is not my business to dwell upon.

I have been agreeably interrupted in this last paragraph by a long visit from Gen. Otero; he has told me that the Peruvian troops will reach here on the

5th, & that he is named to command one division & Aparicio the other. Many things are in the press, & public opinion will be heard when they feel safe with the protection of these troops. In conversing on the character of Pando, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was particularly valuable from his knowledge of official routine, but has drawn upon himself a very general hatred, I found him fully impressed with the general opinion, that he was not only the willing agent, but the authour of many of the violent persecutions that have taken place; & cited in confirmation, a speech of Bolivar's at Guayaquil, who, when he was asked if he did not fear some alteration of affairs in his absence, replied: "O no! I have left Pando in office who is a savage, a tiger, who will sooner drown his country in blood, than see the slightest change; his character is so violent that he almost made *me* afraid of him." This is one of innumerable specimens of the practice of Bolivar, which seems systematic, to degrade all those who serve him, in the opinion of the public, so that they may have no support but himself & be therefore wholly dependent.

One fortunate circumstance arises from these events, a greater dislike of a standing army, as even those who made use of it, see themselves at the mercy of its caprice. I had the pleasure to hear Gen. Aparicio say, we have no need of any army, & the first thing we have to do is to burn all our uniforms. The army is now 11000 men, probably the Congress will reduce these to 2000. They will then be able to pay the interest of their foreign debt, & gradually recover their credit, & relieve their finances.

A circumstance which has occurred after writing thus far, has induced me to increase this already long letter. In having written so much at different times, on the operations of Gen. Bolivar, my object has been to put the government in possession of all the knowledge I could obtain of his views, as the part he fills is of such great moment in the affairs of South America. At the same time my opinions may appear the result of prejudice or exaggeration; & to prevent any possibility of their misleading, I am bound to state, that they are very different from those of many persons, who ought to be well informed.

Having seen Gen. Santa Cruz but once since the late events, I called on him today, & he invited me to dine without ceremony. I had a long conversation with him alone, chiefly on two points. Wishing to have him act fully with the patriot party, I observed to him, that I thought in the peculiar situation in which the government found itself that he was very fortunate in not being committed to any party; that having been called here suddenly from the interior to administer the government, he could not be responsible for a system that had been devised & put in train before he was consulted; that by his position he was only obliged to maintain the public tranquillity, & therefore when it was proved by recent events, that this could only be preserved by following the wishes of the nation, he was compelled to pursue it; & that

this opinion was shewn the very moment, that force was removed; & when the manner was considered in which the Bolivian Constitution was adopted, & which was notorious to the whole country, it was only surprizing how any persons of reflection could suppose, in the present state of the world, that such a system could be lasting. He seemed pleased at the idea, that he could not be considered, as committed to the administration of General Bolivar, & said, that when the public voice called for a revision of the affairs relating to the constitution, he could not act otherwise than summon a Congress to decide.

I afterwards with proper reserve touched on the plans of Gen. Bolivar. I observed that however magnificent & liberal his views might be, that their extension rendered them impracticable; & however attended with partial success, it was impossible such a vast empire could be made permanent, & therefore that it would prolong the troubles & unsettled state of these countries: but I feared his character was so ardent, & his plans had been so long in preparation, that he would be unwilling to abandon them. He replied that I was entirely in error, that he knew Gen. Bolivar thoroughly, that he was only anxious to get rid of all command, & retire to private life; & that he was now employing himself in Colombia, in trying to settle its troubles, & in preparing a defence of himself, against the attacks that were made upon him; & that he would either live wholly secluded on his estate or go to travel in Europe. Similar opinions also are expressed by Pando: six months ago he told Luna Pizarro with all the warmth of the most honest zeal & conviction, that Bolivar was the most extraordinary man that ever lived, that he had no ambition to command, & that he was only anxious to retire to private life &c. &c. After the last mail came in from Bogota, he said Bolivar would not come back to Peru & he offered his resignation. It must here be remarked that this shew of resigning is practised occasionally by Bolivar, & imitated by all his adherents. Mr. Pando knew that his resignation neither could nor would be accepted—but when within a week it was unexpectedly insisted upon by the public voice, he made every effort against it. Still this doctrine respecting Bolivar which he always inculcates, is, that he is wholly disinterested & without any ambition to command—*Credat Judaeus Apella—Non ego.*

Not only Santa Cruz & Pando but many liberal Colombians, who are the personal friends of Bolivar, but opposed to his projects, think, that on his arrival at Bogota, he entirely renounced all further idea of introducing his constitution: & that all the steps he has taken in Peru, were only to have the pleasure of refusing the crown: a supposition that it seems to me would make his conduct more odious than even sincerity & perseverance in his ambition.

But without referring to any thing that has taken place in either of the Peru's, how can this moderation be reconciled with the creation of the dictatorship in Guayaquil, which was produced shortly after the arrival of Admiral Illingrot & two or three officers who were sent from here & as it was

said at the time, to produce this very effect. How happened it that the same result was produced in Quito, tho' with much greater difficulty & that his confidential Secretary, Gen. Perez was left behind in his late journey, as Governor, to secure the doubtful state of that Province. Paez too in Venezuela, tho' apparently acting with those who were in favour of a Federal system, yet secretly sent an officer here, to insist on Bolivar's accepting the crown, which he refused with affected anger, as he did the same offer, (as I was assured by Gen. Perez) a long while before, because in both cases he would not have his plans anticipated or defeated by premature disclosure.

Again the "Act" of Carthagena in favour of the Dictatorship took place soon after the arrival of Col. Gusman who is said by the papers of Bogota to have been the cause of it, & this officer was sent from hence by Gen. Bolivar. In connection with this individual it may be remarked, that two pamphlets were published here last year, in favour of the Bolivian constitution, & filled with praise of its authour: one of these bore the name of Mr. Laso a member of the Congress, who espoused Bolivar's views, & the other under the name of Col. Gusman. But as a very sensible Colombian, who was a joint agent with Bolivar in London at the commencement of the revolution, remarked, it was a very singular coincidence, that not only the ideas, but entire phrases were employed, such as Bolivar was in the habit of uttering at that time. It was in Paris under the Consulate of Napoleon, that he formed his first political views, & they stimulated the heroic constancy he has shewn in the revolution; & his plans are neither the progeny of recent success, nor the suggestions of Monte Agudo, Pando, or any other persons to whom they are at random attributed; they are all his own, conceived years ago, concealed as long as possible, while they were secretly pursued with eager enthusiasm.

The pamphlet above mentioned which bore the initials of Gusman, was dedicated to the Abbé de Pradt in which dedication, Bolivar was compared to the Sun & the Abbé to the Moon; & while the former was animating every thing on this Continent, the latter with his reflected light must illuminate the other, & he was called upon to expound the Bolivian constitution. Nothing has yet appeared on the subject; which may perhaps be owing to the unwillingness of the Abbé to act as a mercenary, or at least to be known to do so. Gen. Bolivar revealed the circumstance that he had sent de Pradt 3000 \$, which was to be remitted annually. A very respectable French gentleman, belonging to the liberal party, intimate in the circle with which the Abbé associates, & who brought a letter of introduction from him to Bolivar, expressed his surprize on this subject & wrote to his friends in Paris what was said. He has yet received no answer, but it may be conjectured the Abbé de Pradt who is in easy circumstances will decline all further agency.

One more anecdote on these subjects, I may offer, which I had from a very respectable individual who received it from the hearer. In 1822 in Guayaquil, Gen. Bolivar declared to one individual in the presence of Colonel—"that

in 1810 & 11 he was acting from pure patriotism, but seeing how fickle & ungrateful mankind were, he had made up his mind thenceforward to act for himself." The speech is characteristic, but may be received with the hesitation natural to all similar relations, tho' verified by the event.

I make no apology for this long letter, as it will be only a repetition of what I have before had the honor to remark. I hear nothing of Mr. Cooley, but I trust his early arrival will enable you to receive more able & satisfactory communications, & relieve me from volunteer services, which however willingly rendered, have been performed under the most discouraging circumstances.

I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. This letter goes under cover to Mr. Poinsett, to whom I have sent some late gazettes, begging him to forward them after perusal.

The *Dolphin* is daily expected here from Valparaiso, via Coquimbo, & the *Brandywine* from the same port via the Intermedios. The *Peacock* has not yet returned from her cruise. The English Frigate *Blanche* & a French Brig are in the bay of Callao.

Feby. 6th. I have broke the cover to say that I am just informed by Admiral Guise that letters have arrived from Upper Peru & that a similar revolution to the one here had occurred among the Colombian troops there. To-day the Peruvian troops entered the city about 1200. The city to be illuminated &c.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, *February 21, 1827.*

SIR: My last letter under date of 3d inst.² having been forwarded by a safe conveyance to Mr. Poinsett I do not send a copy of it, more especially as information of the late changes here, which it contained will reach you before this letter can arrive. I have now only to relate the few subsequent events that have happened.

Accounts are successively coming in from the Provinces, & hitherto the news of the late events have been received every where with rejoicing. Such was the case at Truxillo, Ica, Guamanga &c. The returns from Arequipa & Cuzco have not been received; but the result will no doubt be the same in all the Departments, & in Arequipa particularly, it is anticipated the revolution will be seconded with enthusiasm.

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

² See above, pt. XI, doc. 997.

In Guamanga, capital of the department of Ayacucho, the Prefect Pardo de Zela (a Spaniard) attempted to conceal the news on the arrival of the Courier, but the officers of a Peruvian battalion having also received advices, put themselves at the head of the troops, & arrested the Prefect, whose life they thereby saved, & sent him prisoner to Lima. An open Cabildo of the citizens was held, & all joined in declaring the Bolivian Constitution void, & proclaimed the constitution of Peru. It is said that there were no opposers to these measures except the Prefect & two others.

In Lima several small pamphlets & one or two newspapers have made their appearance. There seems as yet to be a kind of reserve in attacking Gen. Bolivar directly, arising partly from respect, partly from fear, & partly from the presence of the Colombian troops, whose officers taking the tone of Bogota & speaking of him in high terms while denouncing his measures; & while all his plans are reprobated & abjured, the opposition is directed against his agents; & especially against Mr. Pando, who discovered the most boldness & talent in justifying himself for the part he has taken. The electoral college has been chosen, & this will soon proceed to the choice of deputies to the Congress. Orders have been issued to all the Prefects to expedite the elections as much as possible, leaving them however entirely free. But it is doubted owing to the great distances & difficult communication, whether the Congress will be assembled so early as the period fixed, the first of May, & it may be June before their session is opened.

It is calculated that it will yet be three weeks before advices can be received from Bolivia, of the steps that will be taken there; but it is commonly believed, the Colombian troops will be eager to follow the steps of their companions here; & will be prepared by previous concert to adopt the same measures. The main body of that force is at La Paz, & it is thought that Gen. Sucre, who is at Chuquisaca, will receive by the same courier that takes the news from here, the accounts that his troops have already joined in the measure. In this case he will probably make immediate preparations to march with his army to the ports of the Intermedios; & he has long been prepared for such an alternative, as appeared by his letters found among the papers of General Lara.

In the meantime the pertinacity in the system of deception, which Gen. Bolivar & his ministers have maintained becomes almost ludicrous. From the beginning the professions were to be the direct opposite of actions; the utmost disinterestedness, a horror of holding arbitrary power, & a desire of retirement, were accompanied by a disposal of the revenue at discretion, every measure of intrigue & violence to secure absolute, irresponsible domination; & the acquisition of no less an empire, than all Spanish South America. Mr. Pando in a manifesto recently published to justify his own conduct, exhibits an equal degree of boldness & disregard of truth clothed in a very elegant style. In this pamphlet he maintains, that Gen. Bolivar was

only desirous of retiring from command, & never would have returned to Peru. But this language is more remarkable in another document, which was never intended for the public. The Agents of Buenos Ayres have obtained copies of several private ministerial despatches, & among others the instructions given by Mr. Pando to the Peruvian plenipotentiary to Bolivia. This document will probably get into our newspapers, & in the last paragraph it will be observed, that the Minister is to make it a strong argument with Gen. Sucre to aid in making the two republics one & indivisible, as he was to be their future President for life, since it was well known Gen. Bolivar would never return to Peru. That it was expected of Gen. Sucre, who of all the Colombian chiefs possesses the most of Gen. Bolivar's confidence, & has been the most able promoter of his plans, was to listen gravely to this argument, & to be moved by it, tho' he well knew that he was to [be] the Vice President & hereditary successor. An excessive estimate of the intelligence & virtue of mankind may lead a statesman into very great errors; but there is also a danger in the opposite extreme, & Gen. Bolivar & Mr. Pando have committed a fatal mistake in supposing them to be entirely destitute of both.

Altho' every thing in this revolution is proceeding favourably, & the present administration which in fact hardly possesses materials sufficient for an ephemeral existence, is avowedly *interino* yet the possibility of a reverse is not wholly ideal. The mail from Colombia due yesterday has not yet arrived; it comes only once a month & as all the letters & papers from Bogota in the preceding one, were taken from it by the Chief of banditti who robbed it, & who was formerly a Colombian officer, there are therefore no late accounts from that country. A Colombian officer of distinction, now here on temporary leave of absence, told me yesterday, that he had received information by a person from Guayaquil, that the government of Colombia despairing of resisting the plan of usurpation except by a civil war, had agreed to the adjournment of Congress till the year 1828, then to take up the subject of amendments.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

Confidential.

LIMA, March 23, 1827.

A very important movement has recently taken place, & which will relieve this Government from a state of continual apprehension. The Colombian troops, about 2000 men, sailed from Callao early in the morning of the 19th

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

inst. Having called on General Santa Cruz to congratulate him on this event, he told me that he had never expected to get rid of them without a battle. Ever since the Peruvian troops arrived in this city, they have been kept on the alert, with ammunition fixed & ready to be called out at any moment: nor was this precaution entirely unnecessary. All the late agents of Gen. Bolivar, some of whom have good reasons to fear the investigations which the Congress will doubtless make, & all of them have seen their hopes of fortune & title destroyed, have remained unmolested in this city; except Gen. Heres the late Minister of War who fled for security on board a French vessel of war, & was subsequently sent to Guayaquil, where he has arrived. Some of these have unquestionably been engaged in secret intrigues, of which Mr. Armero a merchant & Colombian chargé d'affaires,—a man like almost all the agents of Bolivar of unprincipled, private character, & in his public one knowing no other course but the most slavish servility to him acting as his agent & not the agent of the Colombian government,—was the ostensible mover. . . .

Quito & Guayaquil will return to the support of the constitution of Colombia, when these troops arrive, if they should not have done so before, which in fact is highly probable. The whole of these events shew the very fragile nature of arbitrary power, especially when it is a usurpation, unless sustained by a greater force than Bolivar had at his disposal. Still his system consummated with so much fraud & violence, seemed to many persons firmly fixed in the two Perus: & acting from this basis would inevitably destroy the liberty of Colombia, having previously distracted most of its departments by intrigue, & offering no escape from civil war, by the sad alternative of the Bolivian Autocracy. The whole of this vast scheme at the moment of its completion, falls into irretrievable ruin, by the hazardous combination of these enthusiastic & honorable young men; & who have now gone onward almost without organization or system to constitute their work. These events abound with striking incidents, in what would have seemed *a priori* the most rash & unequal of all struggles. It is a remarkable instance in human affairs of how power may be subverted by instruments apparently the most inadequate; & in some countries it would have been illustrated by sermons to prove that an overruling Providence sometimes uses the feeblest means to baffle the arrogance of men, & when a giant enemy is to be overthrown; a shepherd boy & five smooth pebbles from the brook may be made the efficient means.

Much anxiety is naturally felt to know what course will be followed by the government of Bogota, when this revolution becomes known to it. The constitutional chiefs of that government, have evidently yielded to a kind of desperate necessity, in allowing Bolivar to pursue his schemes in Colombia. But when they are put in possession of documents that will enable them to denounce his projects, & find that he has thus suddenly lost the support &

resources of Peru, & that the dictature is also abolished in Quito, Guayaquil & Azuay, it will give them such an accession of strength that they may renew their hope of being able to sustain the constitution.

By the recent events several confidential letters have fallen into hands for which they were not intended: Among these were some from General Perez, subdictator of Quito & Guayaquil to a confident of his, in which he speaks of "having unlimited power over three immense departments"; but that he only held it *ad interim*, because nothing would tempt him to resign "his Secretary Generalship & give up returning to this happy country with the Libertador." There was also a letter from Gen. Bolivar to Gen. Heres, stating that every thing was proceeding favourably, that Santander was acting in concert with him, & that the Bolivian Confederation would be soon completely organized, & would consist of six States. 1. Venezuela. 2. Cundinamarca. 3. Quito & Guayaquil. 4. Lima. 5. Cuzco. 6. Bolivia. This letter would do for a parallel column with his proclamation at Bogota, his abhorrence of command, his destiny more sublime than that of the throne &c. I was promised a copy of this letter which was communicated to several persons here, but in the hurry of the embarkation it was forgot, I wished to have transmitted it to you. Gen. Bolivar has indeed acted with extraordinary constancy & success on a favourite maxim with him, that language was given to man to conceal his intentions: but having come in contact with a few honest men at different times, & recently with so many untoward events, his conduct & character must be eventually unmasked.

With respect to any attempt at returning here, it seems to me impracticable. Should any serious apprehensions of it arise, they will then fit out the *Presidente* Frigate & corvette *Limeña*, which with two smaller vessels now in commission will form a squadron for Admiral Guise to intercept the approach by sea, & by land he cannot come without an army, which is for the present impossible. He has no ancient legions here to welcome him, & his position has much more of St. Helena than Elba in it; & like his model he may exclaim "from the sublime to the ridiculous there is but one step." Guise would have been already in commission but the expence of refitting these dismantled ships has deferred it till the necessity arises. The departure of these Colombian troops relieves Peru from a heavy expence. But orders have been given to raise five battalions of Peruvian troops to increase their army.

The feeling in favour of the late change appears universal throughout the country. The elections are prosecuting with expedition, & some of the principal are already concluded. In Cuzco, & several of its provinces, those of the former Congress who signed the destruction of that body, have been replaced by new members. In Arequipa, Luna Pizarro, Cuadros & Lopes Sanchez, who refused to lend themselves to Bolivar's views, & have undergone various persecutions in consequence, have been reelected with a high degree of enthusiasm: some of the votes were found written in letters of gold, silver,

& some *with blood*. Every kind of spontaneous rejoicing followed for three days. In Lima the choice shews strong marks of judgment, as well as patriotism. Among the persons chosen Gen. La Mar stood highest on the list, & next Luna Pizarro. This latter I am hoping to see every day, his presence is of the utmost importance here.

My last letter from Gen. La Mar was dated in the early part of the last month, & before he became acquainted with the revolution here. I think he will be elected President of Peru by an unanimous vote, & in that event I have no doubt will accept it. Tho' in a recent conversation I had with the ex-minister Pando, he thought he would not come here, but as he, Pando, believed a revolution would have taken place in Guayaquil, that he would be called to preside over that country. I doubt however the soundness of this opinion: La Mar is characterized by the most delicate sense of honor & will never accept any situation that involves a question of right. I know he has sympathized with Santander who was suffering under the evils, which he himself would not consent to compromise with in Peru, & which have nearly overwhelmed the administration of the latter in Colombia. Besides Guayaquil at present pertains to the Republic of Colombia, & untill it is fairly and honorably separated, La Mar would never listen to taking the command of them. The forced union of Guayaquil to Colombia, was the first of that series of violent & perfidious measures, by which Bolivar has forever tarnished on the shores of the Pacific those splendid laurels with which he was covered in his heroic career on those of the Atlantic. Should Colombia be dissevered in consequence of his sinister schemes, Guayaquil would probably join itself to Peru, to which for many reasons it would be a most important acquisition.

I cannot help hoping that La Mar will come here, to take his place in the Congress, as soon as he receives notice of his election. I ventured to lose no time in urging him to take this step, which the confidence with which he honors me, permitted me to do without impropriety. I will here make a suggestion, which I beg you to make known to the President. Gen. La Mar in his last letter tells me, that he had sent two of his nephews (he has no children) to the U. S. to be educated in St. Mark's College, Baltimore. If the President has the power to place these youths at the Military Academy, I think if he should direct the offer to be made to Gen. La Mar it would be highly appreciated; & that he merits such an attention on our part I have no doubt, whether he be in or out of power. As an officer he is skillful & the bravest of the brave, & he unites to the purest patriotism in public life, the most amiable & stainless private character: and for our history & country he feels a degree of enthusiastic admiration, heightened by the sad contrast he has witnessed in his own.

From Upper Peru we are still without intelligence as to the course that may be finally pursued by Gen. Sucre. On the first news of the revolution here, which however unpleasant could have occasioned him no surprize, but of the

extent of which he was in doubt, he appears to have promptly taken the wise step of moving the troops from Chuquisaca to concentrate them in La Paz. By this movement he gave them no leisure to form plots, & as the movement was in the direction towards the coast, it would excite their hopes that he meant to return to Colombia. His object besides was doubtless to gain time to decide on ulterior measures. He wrote here to say that he should not interfere with the government of Peru, but that he feared this assembling of the Congress would draw great misfortunes upon it. The people of Arequipa are fearful of a hostile visit from him, & have no confidence in their Prefect Gen. La Fuente, whose character & servile devotion to Gen. Bolivar, are calculated to inspire, & the more so, as on the first receipt of the orders of Heres (late Minister of War) he complied with them immediately, which all the other Prefects declined doing. He has since resigned on account of this unpopularity, & requested that he might be replaced, & receive some other destination. Gen. Sucre with a force not amounting to 4000 men, in want of muskets & ammunition, (of which a large stock that was destined for him was fortunately detained in Arequipa) with this force deeply discontented, & the Provinces he rules dissatisfied with the Bolivian constitution, can hardly hope to maintain himself. If in good faith he resolves to proceed to the coast to embark, he will take a fortunate measure; if he resolves to station himself in Arequipa till he can hear from Bolivar, he will keep Peru in an uneasy situation: & eventually a very dangerous one, if the latter were to enter its northern provinces with a small army.

There are some persons who think Sucre may pursue a different course, & seeing Bolivar's system ruined, determine to act for himself. Sucre is described as being polite and affable in his manners without the impetuous, domineering violence of Bolivar, & if of a less lofty, daring genius, with much more skill & judgment. The constitution is disliked, & the Foreign troops are disliked in Bolivia. But Sucre himself is extremely popular; he has no guards about him, & receives every body at all hours frankly. His administration is wise, active & liberal. He is founding schools & making great public improvements; eradicating the convents & other ecclesiastical abuses, and is the person most able to make an advantageous treaty with Peru, on the two points that are most important to the people he governs: the first of these is acquisition of the port of Arica, & the other arranging the proportion of the expenses of the war to be paid by Bolivia. Should he resolve to send home all the Colombian troops, except the few who might volunteer to remain, reform the vices of the Bolivian constitution, & raise it to a republican standard, he would probably have the unanimous vote of the country & be a most useful person to preside over it. He is the only one of Bolivar's lieutenants except Santander, who has talents above those of a mere officer. In some points he may be said to be to Bolivar what Bernadotte was to

Buonaparte. However these are only speculation; he is an able man placed in a singular situation, in which great sagacity & decision are necessary to extricate him.

It is said that Gen. Santa Cruz intends going shortly to Arequipa, on a journey which seems to have no useful object, & which I should presume the friends of the revolution would endeavour to prevent. He was born in Bolivia, & has some mixture of Pocahontas blood, which mixtures are here called Choalos; he is not a bad man, is amiable & affable in his manners, but his conduct was wavering & uncertain in the progress of recent events: he is cursed with an unfortunate mixture of qualities, is timid, indecisive & ambitious: if he foresees that he has little chance of being President of the Republic, he may have it in view to gain partisans in the Southern departments; but the danger would be little from such intrigues, were it not for the vicinity of Sucre. Gen. Sucre whose talent & skill in revolutionary maneuvers, are of a superior class, & which Gen. Bolivar said were far superior to his own, would get a dangerous influence over Santa Cruz tho' they are personal enemies. Vidaurre the present minister of Foreign Affairs would then be the most ostensible person in the government. He is a zealous patriot, recently President of the Supreme Court of Justice, about fifty four years old, of a retentive memory, extensive reading, quick, ardent, restless disposition, & so inflated with vanity that the slightest breeze rolls him out of his course & makes him wholly unfit to be a leader. Ever since he has come into place he has been filling the papers with his writings, & publishing a plan of a constitution, in which the first paragraph sanctifies tyrannicide, & the chapter on religion is precisely such an one, as the least orthodox & most innovating of our sects would have given. A single fact will shew the discretion of this project in Peru, where Luna Pizarro in one constitution, & Bolivar in another, wishing to leave it possible to open the door to toleration hereafter, made the simple provision, that the religion of the State should be the Roman Catholic, Apostolick; to which the Congress in the case of the former & two thirds of the Provinces in that of the latter added—"exclusive of all others". . . .

P. S. March 25th. Since writing the above I have received a very interesting letter from General La Mar of the 5th inst. He appears equally delighted & surprized at the fortunate revolution that had occurred here, by which he says they have escaped from a yoke more infamous & oppressive than that from which they had been finally liberated by the battle of Ayacucho: all whose anticipated glorious results, by the most atrocious perfidy had been defeated; & that the 26th of Jan'y. is the great day from which Peruvian freedom is to be dated. He tells me that the terms of the arrangement with Paez had created general disgust. That the government at Bogota was maintaining the principles & honor in spite of the Bolivian

league. From some expressions in his letter I am confirmed in my opinion, that he will come here, as soon as he hears of his being chosen a deputy for Lima: & his arrival will be a fortunate event for the country.

March 26th. The journey of Gen. Santa Cruz to the Southern departments is given up. Letters have been received by him from Gen. Sucre, in which he offers his assistance to maintain order in Peru: & at the same time advises separating the Colombian battalions, sending one of them home, & distributing the rest in Jauja, Guamanga, Arequipa &c. This advice shews that he was still ignorant of the state of feeling in Peru, or in those troops. At the same time another step is highly characteristic of his intriguing policy. He wrote to the Prefects of Cuzco, Puno, & Arequipa, advising them to procure elections of deputies to assemble & take care of the interest of those departments during the present disturbances, & he should be always ready to sustain them. This would have been anticipating a little, Bolivar's intended organization of the 5th State in his Bolivian federation: but it proves also that Sucre is ignorant of the state of Peru, as those departments are among the most decided in their hatred of the late usurpation that oppressed the country.

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

LIMA, May 23, 1827.

SIR: Tho' Mr Cooley will write by this opportunity, I will venture to give you a few brief details of political occurrences, & will continue to do so for a short period, untill that gentleman shall have time to get acquainted with the new field he has come upon, & the characters who occupy it, after which, if not before, my letters will be superfluous.

I had a letter yesterday from Colonel Elisalde commanding the division that entered Guayaquil (as mentioned in previous letters) dated 30th ulto. He informs me that every thing proceeds most favorably, that on the 27th he despatched a column in the direction of Quito, to join the division under Bustamante, which last entered Cuenca on the 25th of the same month, & are all doubtless now in Quito. Bravo the officer who was sent from here with the arrested chiefs, & with the documents to the government, had also reached Cuenca on his return from Bogota. Gen. Santander had received the notice of the movement here with satisfaction; & had written to Bustamante approving his conduct, & that he should send Col. Ovando to take the command of the division. These steps were of course taken before he knew

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

of the ulterior movements of this division: & the officer named to the command will probably meet them in Quito; & the government of Bogota will find three departments restored to the constitutional government, & a force of 3000 troops to support it.

Sucre is extremely active & attempting to distract the departments of Cuzco, Puno & Arequipa by his intrigues, but he stands on a quicksand that is washing from under him every moment. The press is under the most rigid controul, & observes with a strictness one piece of quackery that is cautiously adhered to wherever Bolivar commands. His own name that of *Bolivar & Libertador* are always printed in large capitals. He some time since removed all the Prefects who were natives of the country & replaced them with Colombian officers, & at the last accounts was occupied in taking the sense of the people who under the protection of his bayonets, were to declare freely, whether they wished him to continue in a command which "*he abhorred*". This is the Bolivian phrase so often used in speaking of *command*, that it may be considered technical in that school. He must however every day receive intelligence to make his situation more desperate. The unanimous feeling in Peru against the usurpation: the quiet progress of the nation to the opening of Congress, & restoring the Peruvian Constitution: the departure of the Colombian troops & their success in destroying the Dictatorship in Colombia: the mutiny of the division that he had embarked for Panama: all these circumstances united will probably induce him to evacuate a country, which it is evident he can no longer retain in submission. The whole of this melancholy Bolivar farce must therefore soon be every where at an end.

Congress has had four or five *preparatory* sessions as they are called: about 70 members are present, the whole number 105. The committee for examining returns, qualifications &c. found that 15 or 16 were irregular. Santa Cruz & Vidaurre have been using every effort to hasten the opening of the session, in the hope that the election of President might be made before the arrival of La Mar, & some other principal members who are known to be on the way. In the session of yesterday, after much preparation & very confident annunciations of the influence he possessed, made an effort that was to decide the question. His object was to cut short the labours of the examining Com^{ee}., to admit all the members who had presented themselves, open the session formally, & rectify any mistakes hereafter. His speech was written beforehand, & was the most timid effort of mock heroics, I ever heard; it would really have appeared rather high charged as caricature in a farce. He was sustained by Mr. Tudela, late Minister of Bolivar to the Congress of Panama, & proscribed by a former Congress as a partizan of Riva Aguerro. The proposition was opposed in a calm & argumentative manner by Messrs. Llosa, Talleria, & Luna Pizarro, & the vote was 48 in favour of the Com^{ee}. continuing their labours to 4 against it. This vote was very satisfactory, I attended the session for the first time, & I think it would have been creditable

to the majority in countries more accustomed to parliamentary proceedings. The session will now probably be opened about the first of next month.

I had the pleasure of hearing from Guayaquil, that Gen. La Mar was to embark on the 4th inst. for this place, & he may therefore be daily expected. His presence here will be equivalent to an addition of 5000 men to the army of Peru, will give confidence & strength to the enlightened portion of Congress, & undoubtedly be followed by his election to the Presidency of the Republic.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

LIMA, June 15, 1827.

The last news we have from Gen. Bolivar is his renunciation of the Presidency of Colombia, in the beginning of Feby. the document is in his usual style of vehemence & feigned candor to cover his views more effectually. To judge of his intentions it will be however necessary to consider the state of affairs as he supposed them to be at the time. The two Perus he presumed were irrevocably & irretrievably in his power: his delegates of the Dictatorship held possession of Guayaquil, Quito, Panama, Cartagena &c. He himself retained the supreme power in Venezuela, where as usual he had destroyed the liberty of the press. Referring then to his intercepted letter to Perez, in which he stated that the scheme of the grand Bolivian confederation (or empire) was in rapid progress, it will appear, that he thus thought five out of the six states, of which it was to be composed were securely his, & the dissidents of Bogota, would not be able to prevent Cundinamarca from falling into the vortex. His confidential envoy Colonel Palacios had arrived at Rio Janeiro, where he was received with extraordinary distinction, & would form his secret alliance with the Emperor of the Brazils— When he finds all this great project dissolved without a wreck behind except of his own fame, by the mutiny of a small body of his own troops, how will he be affected? I think it probable that he will pass the Styx or the Atlantic before the end of the year.

The whole career of this remarkable man must ere long be fully disclosed, & a sad disclosure it will be, forever some of his military feathers will be plucked away; & a long series of maneuvers to accomplish the most insane plan of ambition, & wither an illustrious reputation, will be made manifest. It was the practice of his satellites to gratify his vanity, & increase his power,

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Lima, I.

to attribute every thing to him: Thus the battle of Junin, that was principally owing to the brilliant valour of Necochea, & the steadiness of the Peruvian cavalry after the Colombians had faltered, was entirely owing to him & the Colombians. But still more the battle of Ayacucho, he being in Lima was attributed to him, tho' at the time he gave almost the exclusive credit of it to Sucre, while it was chiefly due to La Mar.

It was always mysterious why Bolivar left the army, previous to that memorable battle & came down to Lima accompanied by O'Higgins & a few attendants. The Spaniards at the time in Callao, confiding in the great superiority of their force, at first denied the report of his being on the coast, but when the fact could no longer be disputed, they asserted with the utmost confidence in their gazette, that he was either "mad or routed." I have always believed, that he despaired of success under the great disparity of force, & came to the coast ready to make his escape if the event were unfortunate, when he would have had it circulated, that it was owing to his being absent; & if his army were successful, he knew the glory would be appropriated to him by his servile admirers.

I had recently a full confirmation of his having despaired of success. Gen. Orbegoso Prefect of Truxillo, received a letter from him, which letter he told me he had now in his possession, ordering him to pack up the public archives, & all the treasure ready to be sent off under escort of all the troops he had, about 400 men, in the direction of Quito, & that in consequence of these orders he had all the packages & everything ready to execute them. The most fortunate & unexpected result of that battle rendered these precautions unnecessary.

I received today letters from Mr. Poinsett & Mr. Sargeant dated 4th of April, & they inquire what probability there is of Ministers being sent from here to the Congress of Tacubaya. I have spoken since with Dr. Luna Pizarro & he thinks nothing will be done at present. He says that the government in the midst of all their poverty & misery have expended 100,000 \$ this year in diplomatic missions (to serve the caprice & private views of Bolivar) all of which have been utterly useless. I am inclined to think that Congress will fall thro' for the present at least, suspicion of Bolivar prevented Chile & Buenos Ayres from joining it. Peru will be very lukewarm; & the distracted condition of Colombia & its removal to the Mexican territory, may disincline that country to continue their delegation.

The arrival of Gen. La Mar is looked for with anxiety. The administration cannot be organized till he comes, & the conduct of La Fuente Prefect of Arequipa & Gen. Cerdeña commanding the division of the army in the upper departments, who are nightly in a club with an agent of Sucre, & some other persons whose principles are doubtful, inspires some suspicion. After a short residence here a visit of La Mar in that quarter will be necessary to quiet the public mind, & overawe factious designs if any such are entertained. Sucre's

talents & disposition for intrigue, & the ruin of all his hopes & those of his patron, unless some extraordinary intrigue can save them, makes his vicinity always dangerous.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*James Cooley, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, September 19, 1827.

During the conversation above alluded to, Mr Pizarro asked me what would be the sentiments of my Government upon the subject of the New Republics late Spanish Colonies giving to each other a preference in their ports over the vessels of other nations. I was a little surprised at this question & the rather abrupt manner in which it was put, but glad of an opportunity of expressing what I believed to be the sense of the Government in relation to it. I replied that I was not particularly instructed by my Government, but that I had no hesitation in giving it as my opinion, that the Government of the United States would not treat but upon the basis of the most favored nation. I made use of such arguments as suggested themselves at the moment, why such preference ought not to be given, & why Peru should not thus entangle herself, & referred him to the correspondence with Mr. Poinsett for a full expression of the sense entertained by the Government of the U. States upon the subject. The subject has no doubt been pressed by the Minister from Chile. I sincerely hope that the intelligence & liberality of Mr. Pizarro (& he certainly has much of both,) may prevent the adoption of such a principle.

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*James Cooley, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, November 7, 1827.

. . . On the 5th Instant a schooner arrived in this neighborhood, having on board among other passengers, a Colombian officer, charged, as the government here were informed with despatches for Sucre. This schooner the

¹ MS. Dispatches from Peru, I.

government caused to be seized & the officer conducted to Lima. It is supposed that he threw overboard his most important despatches; but among the other letters seized, was one from Bolivar to Sucre (as the Secretary of State informed me last evening) directing him to remain in Bolivia. If this be so, & I have no reason to question its correctness, it would seem there would be little doubt as to the views of Bolivar upon this Country. I am free to confess, I have been slow in forming opinions adverse to the principles of one who has done so much for the cause of Independence in this quarter of the world. But proofs multiply upon proofs in such a manner as to be irresistible.

Whatever may be the intentions of Sucre as to the evacuation of Bolivia, if he be disposed to second the views of Bolivar, which is here very much apprehended, it is almost equally dangerous whether he remain in Bolivia or embark for Guayaquil. If he remain, he is ready to make an attack from that quarter, to second any movement that may be made from Guayaquil. If he goes to Guayaquil with his forces, he by so much strengthens the forces with which the Libertador may march upon Peru. In consequence of the just apprehensions of the government, & the peculiar posture of affairs, great exertions are making to place the Country in the best possible state of defence. Their small Navy is getting in readiness, a National Militia is endeavoring to be organized & impressments are going on for the army. The Executive seems firm & determined. In the language of Gen. La Mar, used, as reported to me by a Friend, upon occasion of the reception of some of the late news from Colombia, they seem resolved that "*If Bolivar attempt to invade the Country he shall be met with fire & sword, & will enter it only over the dead bodies of Peruvians*". If this determination of the government be but seconded by the spirit of the people all will yet be well for Peru. I had an interview with Gen. La Mar last evening. Among other subjects of conversation was that of the Congress at Tacabaya. Nothing it seems has yet been done on that subject. No report has been made in the Congress by the Committee, & indeed it would seem to be almost lost sight of in the other matters that press upon the attention of the government. Gen. La Mar observed among other things in relation to it, "Sir," said he, "the truth is that tho, exceedingly desirous of having Agents abroad in all those Countries with which we have friendly relations, our situation will not permit it. Those that we now have abroad are almost in a state of starvation. We cannot dispatch a Minister without advancing him \$15, or 20,000. & *we cannot command the money*." It would seem therefore that the prospect of Peru being represented either at Tucabaya or Washington at present, is exceedingly problematical.

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*F. I. Mariategui, Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru, to Henry Clay,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

LIMA, November 16, 1827.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The Undersigned, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Peruvian Republic, has received orders from his Government to give to His Excellency, the Minister of the corresponding Department in the United States of North America, a slight idea of the events which prepared the recent political innovations by which Peru was placed in a situation to govern itself, and in the danger which threatens it, of a new war.

After the victory of Ayacucho had secured the triumph of Independence, the Republic had hoped that General Bolivar, faithful to his repeated promises, would resign the Dictatorship, and establish a national government. But far from fulfilling these promises, he contrived to invest himself with extraordinary powers alleging that the public safety required it to prevent anarchy. The Congress alarmed by the fear of impending evils, and seduced by the apparent disinterestedness of General Bolivar, clothed him with this high authority on condition that he should exercise it only in cases of civil commotions or foreign wars. But no sooner had this law been sanctioned than he arrogated to himself powers that did not belong to him, and began a capricious administration of the nation by instituting a Council of Government wholly subservient to his will.

The Undersigned will not enter into a long detail of the vexations to which the People were subjected under that administration nor of the changes it underwent, while it continued to be the instrument selected to sink the State into degradation and ruin. They looked forward to the meeting of the first General Congress with hopes of relief from oppression, not thinking that it had been convened for the purpose of sanctioning their servitude, and of being compelled to accept the Constitution which General Bolivar was then imposing on Bolivia. The Deputies, firm in the determination not to betray the confidence of their constituents, expressed, in preparatory meetings, their resolution to constitute the State themselves, without subjecting themselves to the views of General Bolivar, nor to the suggestions of his agents; who, unable to divert them from their purpose, resorted to the expedient of delaying the installation of the Congress, in the mean time, urging the Majority to sign a representation, framed by General Bolivar, requesting him to continue in command with the same powers, and postponing the meeting of Congress until the following year.

Two months had scarce elapsed, when abusing these powers, he ordered the Council of Government to submit the above mentioned Code to the

¹ MS. Other States, II.

examination, and for the sanction of the Electoral Colleges which had just appointed Deputies, in the exercise of the sole privilege granted them by law; and, by means of intrigue and persecution, in every quarter, its approval was secured, and the constitution which had been proposed by the first Congress, was superseded.

While these scenes were acting in Peru other expedients were resorted to, for introducing the same order of things in Colombia, through the agency of the tumultuary movements in Venezuela, and of the acts forced by the Intendents of Departments, from the municipalities and citizens, to proclaim the Dictatorship and the Bolivian Code, in order to unite the southern States, from Panama to Cape Horn, under a nominal confederacy, with a military government, having General Bolivar for its chief for life. Alarmed by these events, the troops, left by him in Peru, for the purpose of carrying his plans into execution, fearful that these should overturn the institutions of their country, made a movement, on the 26th of January last, whose sole object was to renew their oath to protect them. This Capital availing herself of so favorable a circumstance, expressed a wish that the nation should constitute itself, and the Council of Government, seconding these wishes, convened the Congress, without altering the existing order of things, and the whole people of the Republic hailed the change with joy and enthusiasm. Meanwhile, symptoms of reaction soon began to show themselves among the auxiliary troops; and as there did not, then, exist a Peruvian Division capable of preventing their consequences, the Government availed itself of the request of their officers to be supplied with the means of returning to their country. This step which prudence dictated, and which necessity called for, in those circumstances, has drawn upon it the censure of General Bolivar to such a degree that he now threatens us with war, alleging wrongs and aspirations, on our part, towards Colombia, which are not even known to the Vice President, General Santander, charged with the Executive Power of that Republic, but whose real and sole object is to involve us in dissensions, in order to set himself up as mediator, and, on pretence that our present condition endangers the tranquillity and safety of Colombia, to interfere in our domestic affairs, and restore the charter which our present Constituent Congress has declared null and of no value, on account of the violations committed upon the Sovereignty of the People in order to establish it.

The Government of the Undersigned is convinced of the justice with which Peru acted in this political change, and that its only wish is to respect the rights of others, in order to secure its own. Heretofore it has refrained from uttering a single complaint of the humiliation and incalculable injuries inflicted upon it. It is notorious that the fleet of Peru was destroyed after the termination of the blockade of Callao; that seven thousand Peruvians have been transported to Colombia, to swell the ranks of her armies, that the remains of ours, reduced to a mere skeleton, was scattered over the boundless

extent of the country; that its generals and officers in highest repute, were either removed from the bosom of their country, or compelled to retire in voluntary exile; that the extinguishment of the public debt, at home and abroad, was abandoned, in consequence of the extravagant expenditures for the support and equipment of the auxiliary forces; that the disorder and dilapidation of the public treasury were scandalous and that the citizens opposed to the Bolivian Constitution were persecuted and banished. On all this Peru has remained silent, in order to save herself from the imputation of ingratitude which might have been cast upon her by those not fully acquainted with the facts, and to preserve union and peace with our Ally, the Republic of Colombia. But not even this generous oblivion appears sufficient to deter General Bolivar from their interruption. The last intelligence from Bogota confirms it and the concentration of troops now making in the southern Departments of Colombia, implies threats of approaching hostilities which are confirmed by the very papers published under his sanction.

It naturally follows that General Sucre acting in the interest of Gen. Bolivar, will, at the same time attack us in the south; which is likewise indicated by his preparations, and confirmed by the necessity, in which he believes himself to be, of overturning us to avoid the explosion which threatens Bolivia, upon the same grounds.

The combined forces of Colombia and Bolivia shall not conquer Peru, sustained as she is by justice, and a public opinion strongly in favor of her institutions. But her government deplores the bitter compromise which she will be compelled to make, if the principles of international law are trodden under foot, and the fatal results which await American Liberty, if the event should not answer our hopes. Resolved to leave nothing undone, on her part which may remove all motives of war, bathe the nation in American blood, and prolong her misfortunes, Peru will exhaust all reasonable and conciliatory expedients afforded by her situation and ability, to avoid this extreme; and hopes that the Government of the United States, impelled by a congeniality of principles, and by the love of humanity, will interpose its powerful mediation in defence of the peace and freedom of Peru.

With this view, the Undersigned has been authorized to write this communication to the Minister, to whom he tenders the profound respect [etc.].

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*William Tudor, United States Consul at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

LIMA, November 20, 1827.

SIR: In my last letter of the 7^h inst. which was forwarded by a vessel bound home direct, I said something on the subject of an intention by the U. S. & England, to prevent the war with which Peru is threatened by Bolivar, & avert by their mediation jointly or separately, a long train of misfortunes to Colombia & Peru, as this letter which I forward under cover to Mr. Poinsett may reach you earlier, I will recapitulate what has occurred on the subject.

It being evident by the accounts received from Colombia, that Bolivar so far from being warned by the events that had taken place here, of the impracticability of his plans, was on the contrary, excited to a pitch of fury on learning the shock they had received; & that he immediately collected an army to march on Bogota; & after trampling down the patriots in the capital & the adjoining provinces, which were the only parts of the republic exempt from his dictatorial sway, that he would then proceed inflamed with a spirit of vengeance to resubjugate Peru. By the appearances in Colombia, the patriots seemed unable to oppose him, & circumstances would no longer admit of the disguise, he has endeavoured to maintain (with too much success indeed) but that he would be compelled to finish the ruin of the republic, by openly assuming the same military dictature [dictatorship?] in the center, which he already exercised in the Eastern & Southern department.

Authentic information was received here of the orders he had given to collect a force in Guayaquil, for the invasion of Peru, & the preparatory intrigues that were to be carried on, while the newspapers under his controul, were filled with the most bitter reproaches & absurd accusations against this country. All these facts left no doubt of his intentions, & those who now administer the affairs of Peru, are too intimately acquainted with his character, to have been for a moment off their guard. For two months past, Gen. La Mar has been collecting an army in the North, ready to meet the invasions & most of the corps have already arrived or are on the way to their destination. Perhaps the whole army of Peru may be estimated at 9000 men of whom 6000 will be assembled in the north, the remainder must be retained to watch the movements of Sucre, & at various points in the interior great efforts have been made to call the whole militia into active service for the purpose of local duty. Admiral Guise was to leeward to watch any movement that might be

¹ MS. Dispatches from Brazil, VI. This probably should have been filed with Tudor's Consular Letters from Peru. His commission as chargé d'affaires to Brazil was dated June 26, 1827; but evidently he had not left Lima when this dispatch was written; and presumably he carried it with him to Rio de Janeiro, dispatching it from there.

attempted by sea. The frigate he is in, mounts 50 guns & is in fine order, & he has two or three smaller vessels.

The force of Peru will probably be equal in number to any the Usurper can bring against it; in one arm, that of cavalry, it will be decidedly superior both in number & quality; & the army generally, will be animated by a feeling of the justice of their cause, the deplorable fate that will attend them if conquered, & a vivid recollection of the long series of injuries and bitter insults they received from the Colombians. As a General, Bolivar has little to recommend him, besides his ardour, vehemence & activity; these did wonders when they were exerted in the cause of patriotism & independence; it will be seen whether they can have the same effect in a campaign, where he can only stimulate his followers with the hope of plunder. La Mar is undoubtedly the first general in South America; to a regular military education, brilliant valour & experience in every variety of warfare against the finest troops of Napoleon, he adds thirty years of service, & Bolivar, who was originally only a captain of militia, is as inferior to him as a general, as he is in public & private virtue. If they ever meet, unless the superiority of force be very great on the side of Bolivar, I have entire confidence that he will be beaten.

If Gen. Bolivar had been an honest man, if he had returned home with his troops after the fall of Callao, how different would be now the state of South America! Colombia & Peru after two years of repose & diminished expences, would have had their prosperity confirmed, their political & financial credit established, & the mad hopes of Spain have been wholly discountenanced. Instead of this posture of affairs, Colombia has been thrown into anarchy, divided into factions, impoverished to an excessive degree, & subjected to a military despotism. The two Perus have been degraded & oppressed beyond description, Chile kept in a state of suspense & uneasiness; & Buenos Ayres reduced to a state of total dissolution of the republic, & that heroic city left to contend alone against the Brasils, & all this ruin & disgrace have been the result of the intrigues & sinister ambition of a single man. Spain, decrepid as she is, will exult & say, that these countries must again return to their allegiance to escape from the miseries of independence. For all this mass of evil, even the success of his schemes would hold out no hope of alleviation; every one who examines them must perceive, that they do not possess the slightest guarantee, & contain the swelling seeds of perpetual reaction and insurrection.

Reflecting on these subjects, & on the unprincipled character of the war he now menaces, it occurred to me, that the mediation of the U. S. & of England either together or separately might be obtained, [and] would of course be effective, & alike beneficial to Colombia & Peru, for in this case while both countries are to be the victims, it is individual ambition alone, which is to be gratified. Each of the powers above named has its *peculiar* motives for wishing to see these countries enjoying peace & prosperity, besides the power-

ful reasons of state, *common* to both, against the inordinate aggrandizement, and pernicious accumulation of power in the hands of an arrogant individual. Bolivar has agents personally devoted to him in various places, & Peru is almost wholly unrepresented abroad. Under all these circumstances, from the great confidence & frankness with which Gen. La Mar & his most confidential adviser Dr. Luna Pizarro both honor me, & both of whom I am in the habit of seeing daily, I sought a private interview with them together, & laid before them the reasons, which I thought rendered it politic for Peru to appeal to both these friendly nations, by sending a succinct account of Gen. Bolivar's conduct in this country, with a sketch of the present state of affairs & the war with which they are menaced by him; accompanied with a letter from Gen. La Mar to the President & the King, & without directly claiming their interventions preparing the way for both nations to offer their friendly mediation. Peru could have nothing to fear from it, as she was only acting from the sternest necessity of self defence, & asks for nothing but peace & tranquillity, & to enjoy a government which is the nearly unanimous choice of the nation. They both assented to the propriety of my suggestions, & in a second interview it was agreed that the documents should be immediately prepared. I have since urged the conclusion of this affair, as the sooner it was adopted the better—and today one set of these despatches were forwarded by a vessel sailing direct for London, & it may be calculated, that they will reach their address by the first of March. I also wrote confidential letters to two persons of my acquaintance in that country, giving them a sketch of the part, Gen. Bolivar is now, & has been for a long time past, playing in these countries; & explaining the very strong interest that England has in seeing peace restored; the individuals to whom they are addressed, by their stations & connections can have some influence on the question. Similar documents addressed to you & to the President will be forwarded by the first *safe* opportunity. In the meantime, should it be deemed expedient to take any steps in this matter in conjunction with England, our Minister in that country might be instructed accordingly. Should it be decided by either or both nations to offer their mediation, it is of great importance that no time should be lost. The difficulty with respect to finances, as well as that arising from the season, as the winter now begins in the mountains, & lasts four or five months, will probably prevent his getting a sufficient force to Guayaquil to attempt an invasion before the months of April or May. Sucre can hardly do more than form a negative diversion, he is not strong enough to attempt an invasion of Peru, but a considerable force must be kept on the frontier to watch him. The probability of his returning to Colombia, of which I spoke in my last, is altogether at an end. All the official letters & orders on this subject which filled a whole gazette, were only a repetition of one of the usual tricks of the shameless Bolivian school; as at the same time Col. Fernandez was sent to all the cities to exact signatures from the inhabitants, intreating him not to leave,

while the whole country is on the eve of insurrection to get rid of him, & which an entire want of arms only prevents from bursting into action.

I am aware that I have here taken steps of considerable delicacy, but they must be considered as the acts of a private individual. I hope the President may not be dissatisfied with my conduct; certain I am, that if the situation of these countries, the character & views of Bolivar, & the consequences that would follow their success were fully understood, both the U. S. & England would not only offer their mediation, but if necessary accompany it with an alternative that would compel its acceptance.

I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. I forward with this under cover to Mr. Poinsett a confidential letter from Gen. La Mar to Gen. Victoria, respecting the situation of Peru & the attack with which she is threatened; presuming on the just & honorable feelings of the government of Mexico in a cause, which has a common interest to a certain degree for all the new republics of this Continent.

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*James Cooley, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Lima, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

LIMA, December 12, 1827.

It seems that Gen. Sucre notwithstanding his pretended determination to evacuate Bolivia & his pompous published proclamation & orders to that effect of which I have heretofore informed you, has, if he ever seriously entertained the idea, now abandoned it, at least for the present. His Minister here Mr. Serano, has been recalled by him & left this City yesterday. The reasons for this recall are not known, & we are only left to conjecture that it is owing to this gov. having declined to send a Minister to Bolivia, & having aroused its determination to recognize the Independence of Bolivia, only in the event of the absence of a foreign force.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Peru, I.

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*William Tudor, United States ex-Consul at Lima, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

RIO DE JANEIRO, August 1, 1829.

The news from Peru is of the most disastrous description, as relates to the independence of that country; and the success of the usurper appears certain. A rumour is in circulation, that a revolution had occurred in Lima, a massacre had taken place &c. I have nothing later that is authentic than the official accounts of the engagement, which resulted in the defeat of the vanguard of the Peruvian army at the Portete de Tarqui. Gamarra the second in command, appears to have caused the defeat by his cowardice, & afterwards to have sealed the disgrace of his country by his treachery, which conduct is perfectly harmonious with his whole career. La Mar seems to have escaped unhurt, after exposing himself to the hottest of the fight, & I have no doubt from the character and opinions of the man, in the hope of getting killed. He is one of the bravest & purest I ever knew; but acting with reluctance in a political situation, extenuated by ill health, & surrounded by many in whom he has no confidence. His letter to Sucre after the action, is a remarkable document, which probably will have been published in the U. S. He never would have made those charges of assassination, if he had not known them to be well-founded, & the individuals mentioned, as committing them, had already established their reputation in Lima by former acts in that way. An opinion may be formed from these events, if Peru will have to suffer, from this new & vindictive invasion. Bolivar appears to have selected appropriate agents to penetrate in the vanguard; & many of the individuals in it, have already made themselves notorious, by the most remorseless plunder & assassinations.

In the capitulation, Sucre professes, that they do not wish, "a single grain of the sand of Peru"—this is a favorite, established expression. At the same time the whole resources of both Peru's have been disposed of at discretion, and without any account rendered, by himself & Bolivar, so long as they held possession. It is meant also, that it should be inferred, they have no plans against Peru; but will make peace under the mediation of the United States, or some other power. While at the same time they have been incessantly striving by every species of intrigue & corruption, to re-establish themselves in that country. Independently of it its being the center of the contemplated empire, the mines of that country still contain great riches, and Colombia is reduced to the last stage of poverty & exhaustion.

The interest I was obliged to take during my residence in that country, in

¹ MS. Dispatches from Brazil, VII. Although this was dated at Rio de Janeiro, it has to do wholly with Peru and has consequently been printed as if it had originated in Peru.

their affairs, which were so deeply involved in the extensive & sinister designs of Bolivar, still makes me regard them with a solicitude which a thorough acquaintance with the character & principles of some of the principal actors only tends to aggravate. But, it is not my intention to dwell on events, of whose occurrence my information is too tardy, to be of any use, in conveying them to you: I only purposed to offer a few remarks on the subject of our mediation, mentioned in the capitulation.

After General La Mar had been most reluctantly established in the Presidency of Peru; he saw himself immediately threatened with the hostility of Bolivar, whose agents were busy in following his simple & efficacious prescription, "to anarchize the country", and in this they were so successful, that the Constitutional Congress, which began under good auspices, & contained among its members some of the most enlightened & excellent men in South America, soon presented nothing but scenes of intrigue, faction, folly & mischief; against which all the efforts of the patriotic portions were wholly unavailing. I felt, as every one else did, the danger of the struggle that was to ensue with Bolivar. La Mar honored me with his most intimate confidence. I urged him to make an appeal to some foreign State, to mediate, & prevent the ravages of civil war, between countries already impoverished & exhausted by their revolutionary struggles. His views were honest, disinterested, & pacific, (too much so if the expression be not absurd, for the prosperity of the cause he had to maintain) & he was enthusiastically republican in his principles. He objected to making such a proposal, on the ground that Peru had fallen so low, had been the victim of such strange disasters, that until a constitution was organized, & their finances were in a state to meet their engagements any overture on his part would be slighted; and that he did not wish to send an agent abroad, till their reputation was better established at home. I persisted however in the advice, and that while he was putting his shoulders to the [*sic*] & every effort to maintain their independence; that he should submit the dispute to the arbitration of foreign powers, in a manner, that without immediately asking their interference, would justify them in offering it, if they thought it expedient. To prevent all suspicion of selfish views on my part, I proposed, that a similar application should be made to the United States, to England, & to Mexico. At length this was consented to; and a memorial was drawn up, not by the person I had suggested, but by an inferior hand, tho' the regular organ for the purpose. It was shewn to me, & I thought not worth while, tho' not so able a paper as I could have wished, to object to inferior details—but it was made out & delivered to me, & I forwarded the three packets to England, Mexico & the United States. I have never heard whether either of these despatches reached its destination. This I presume to be the origin of the mediation before referred to.

Any mediation, & of all others, that of the U. S., Bolivar would carefully avoid, with the usual, solemn, hypocrisy, of pretending to seek it. Should

however our mediation by any accident be called for, it will only be to sport with our credulity, unless the most ample precaution is taken, as he did, with that of several nations in the farce of Panama; & it will require great penetration and firmness in the mediator, not to be the dupe of his designs. There is little doubt, that the subject will be entirely obviated, by his again obtaining absolute controul of the two Peru's, and once established in Lima, with Sucre at his old outpost, (tho' perhaps the latter may be fixed for a time in Lima, till Colombia is finally organized) the former intrigues will be resumed, against Chile, & Buenos Ayres, & probably with success; while the same efforts will be carried on in Central America, amidst the distractions which he has assiduously fomented in that country.

The ambition of Bolivar is extravagant, unprincipled & reckless. He unites in a singular degree of perfection, two qualities that are not often allied in the same individual, duplicity & vehemence. His plan of forming Spanish South America (to say nothing of some change of boundaries with Brazil) into one empire, will be pursued implacably, to the last moment of his life. His schemes are ill-digested, impracticable, offering no guarantee, no hope of stability; yet they may succeed to a considerable extent, & during his life all the resources of those countries, will be wasted in the attempt to form an empire, that even should it be realized to the utmost of his wishes; will only entail a long course of intestine commotions, and at his death, leave the palpitating fragments, to the endless rivalry & contention of his lieutenants. His arrogance is unbounded, & his ardour indefatigable; obstacles & opposition excite vengeance but not reflection. The heroic constancy of his early efforts for the independence of his country, would have covered his name with laurels; but the same quality directed against the liberty of his own & other countries, will hereafter blend it with execrations.

I ask pardon for wandering so far from my immediate post; but the truth is, that the ambition here denounced, bears upon the concerns of the whole Southern part of our Continent.

1008

*Samuel Larned, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Lima, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

LIMA, December 15, 1829.

SIR: Grand Marshal Gamarra, the provisional President of this Republic, arrived here on the 25th ultimo. On the 26th., I addressed a note to the Minister of Foreign Relations, of which a copy (marked A.) will be found

¹ MS. Dispatches from Peru, I.

annexed, transmitting to him a copy of my credentials, and requesting an audience. The Minister replied on the 27th., as will be seen in the subjoined translation of his letter (marked B.) fixing Monday, the 30th ultimo, as the day for my reception. Accordingly, on that day, at the hour appointed, I waited on the Minister of Foreign Relations, at his Office, presented him my letter of credence, and the Note transmitted to me from the Department, for him, in reply to the communication of his predecessor to the Secretary of State. The Minister, in succession, presented me, in my Publick character, to the President.

On this occasion, I stated to the government of Peru—agreeably to my instructions, and in reference to the subject of the letter of Mr. Mariategui, its former Minister of Foreign Relations, above alluded to—that the government of the United States had ever taken and continued to feel, the deepest interest in the success and prosperity of the Southern Republicks of the Continent of America. It was sensible, that peace is required by their condition to enable them to repair the ravages of war; to establish and consolidate their free institutions, and to take that respectable stand among the Nations of the Earth, which it is sincerely hoped they will occupy.

Notwithstanding that, by the recently made peace, the subject had lost much of its importance; still, as a proof of the interest which the United States took in the welfare of this country; and of the attention which the communication of its Minister of Foreign Relations had met with, I was induced to observe, further, that the Minister of the United States at Bogota had been charged, amongst the first duties which he should perform upon his arrival there, to communicate to the government of Colombia, the President's "anxious wish, that the war might be averted, if it had not broken out—or might be honourably terminated, if it had commenced." And that he had been directed to embrace some suitable occasion to communicate this sentiment to the Colombian Government, and to express the gratification which the President would derive from the reestablishment of peace and a good understanding between the two countries; in whose prosperity and happiness the United States must ever feel a lively interest.

That the government of Peru could not estimate too highly, the solicitude which that of the United States felt in its welfare; and that it would be ever ready to manifest this solicitude in any manner in its power, not inconsistent with the paramount duties which it owes to the People of the United States. That the policy of the United States is that of peace and friendship with all nations: always regretting, but carefully avoiding taking any part in, their wars; and abstaining, with the utmost caution and delicacy, from all interference in their internal concerns.

The President of this Republick, expressed his high gratification at this friendly proof of interest, on the part of the United States, in their behalf:

and requested me to convey to the President his grateful acknowledgements, therefor, in the name of the People of Peru.

On the same day, the Minister of Foreign Relations addressed me a note, purporting that the government had formally recognized me as Chargé d'Affaires of the United States to this Republic.

I have the honour [etc.].

PART XII
COMMUNICATIONS FROM RUSSIA

COMMUNICATIONS FROM RUSSIA

1009

*William Pinkney, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *September 13/25, 1817.*

I have endeavoured to ascertain the views of this Gov^t. relative to the struggle in Spanish America. You know the difficulty of obtaining any *sure* information here upon such subjects; and I am free to admit that I have none such to give you upon this. Nothing is to be extracted (for I have tried repeatedly) from the Spanish Minister-Resident, through whom perhaps, the Emperor might not choose to communicate with the Gov^t. of Spain on this business. The other members of the *Corps diplomatique* appear to know nothing of the matter; but some of them ridicule the idea of Russian interposition in this transatlantic contest. As to the Russians about the Court &c. they know little, and they tell that little with exemplary reserve. The subject has been mentioned to me once by a person of consideration, whether casually or by design I do not know. In the course of a pretty long conversation with the Prince Galitzin at Peterhoff he took occasion to allude to S. Am^a. and to ask my opinion of the probable success of the resistance of the Colonies. I told him frankly that I had no doubt at all of its final success, whatever obstacles might retard it for a season. I said, however, that I had no knowledge of the subject but what I collected from newspapers and no opinion upon it but my own. We conversed upon this topic for some time, but I did not perceive that he took any particular interest with the Gov^t. of Spain as to the colonies, although I thought it plain enough that he was no partizan of the latter.

My notion is that nobody here cares half so much about this quarrel as they seem to do in France and England; yet I have suspicions that the Emperor will in some way or other meddle in it: very friendly relations (displayed occasionally with some parade) exist between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and, although it might naturally be expected that out of Europe the Emperor would leave him to manage his own affairs as he could, this case, of resistance by subjects to kingly rule and of an effort to multiply Republics, may be thought to call for a general combination in Europe to discourage and repress it. The Emperor must however, calculate worse than he is in the habit of doing if he puts himself *seriously* against the revolution in

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, VI. William Pinkney, of Maryland: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia, March 7, 1816; left post, February 14, 1818.

S. America. If it be true that a new Congress (or rather an *Intercourse* of Sovereigns) is to take place next summer at *Aix la Chapelle* (as is confidently said, and as I believe) the affairs of S. America will I presume be talked of on that occasion.—

1010

*William Pinkney, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *September 29/October 11, 1817.*

SIR: It is only since the date of my last that I have understood (in such a way as to be sure of the fact) that the B. Government sometime since directed L. Cathcart to press the Emperor's Ministers for explanations relative to his supposed intention to offer his mediation between Spain & its colonies. You know that the English opposition newspapers have said that this offer may or w^d. be made, and have even gone so far as to state that Russia was about to assist Spain to subdue the colonies without the ceremony of a previous tender of mediation. Hence the above orders to L^d. Cathcart. The answer of C^{te}. Nesselrode was that there was no truth in these speculations; and he has repeated his assurances so frequently & earnestly that no doubt can be reasonably entertained, or at any rate decently expressed, on the subject.

The sale of the fleet mentioned in my last (which I take to be certain) can scarcely be considered a perfectly neutral proceeding with respect to the Colonies, but, if it be a *sale*, it seems to show that the Emperor does not mean to embark as a party in the contest. I say "*if it be a sale*" because there are not wanting those who believe that it is a sale *in form only*. I am not of that opinion.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, VI.

*Russian Memorial on the Negotiation relative to the Question of Rio de la Plata, and, in general, on the Pacification of the Colonies; for communication to the interested Courts and to the Cabinets of the Mediating Powers*¹

MOSCOW, November 17, 1817.

The official Note delivered on the 18. of October by the Ambassador of His Most Faithful Majesty to the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the Mediating Courts presents an additional evidence to that already existing in favour of the ascendant exercised by the European Alliance on the regular and lawful course of political affairs of the greatest interest.

It was in the expectation of this infallible result that the respective Courts explained themselves, as well on the occasion of the commotions at Fernambouc [Pernambuco?], as on that when His Catholic Majesty thought fit in his wisdom to call the attention of His Allies to the general situation of the vast and fertile regions of the other Hemisphere which Europe is so deeply interested in preserving for ever from the horrors of Revolution.

Referring therefore to the accession of His Most Faithful Majesty [to] the communications which have heretofore taken place between the Cabinets, relative to the question of Rio de la Plata, and to that of the Colonies, the Court of Russia will reply to all the overtures which were made to it on these subjects, by assuming as a primary point, as the sole motive of its opinion, the vital importance of conducting the negotiation in question to a prompt and happy issue.

In fact, from the moment that *the lawful interests of Spain shall be identified with those of Brazil and Portugal*, under the safeguard of the impartial and collective intervention of all the Powers of Europe, it will perhaps be easy to produce such a concert of measures, by means of a general agreement, as shall be calculated to restore the inhabitants of the Colonies to that peaceful and honorable existence, to which they are destined by the paternal wisdom of their respective Sovereigns.

Such are the wishes of His Majesty the Emperor. And it is with the hope of seeing them participated [in] by his August Allies, that His Imperial Majesty has commanded his Minister to state on the present occasion the motives which sanction them, as well as the considerations which seem to offer the presage of their happy accomplishment.

It is not now proposed to examine in detail the proposals offered on *both sides*, and on the basis of which the arrangement relative to the restitution of the River of La Plata *may and ought to be effected*. We consider them as

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XV, enclosed with Erving to Adams, February 26, 1818, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1079. See also, in pt. XIII, doc. 1080, his dispatch of March 1, 1818. See reference to the memoir in Campbell to Adams, December 31, 1819/January 12, 1820, below, pt. XII, doc. 1017, with which a copy of the memorial in French was enclosed.

respectively susceptible of improvement. But this is a task which can only be usefully undertaken by the Negotiators Plenipotentiary of the interested and Mediating Powers.

Our position is founded on a more general principle. It embraces more comprehensive views.

We consider the Act which will result from the present Negotiation as a new corner stone, adding strength to the unshaken solidity of the European System.

In the enlightened and conciliatory spirit by which the conclusion of this Act will be promoted, we discover the only source of seeking the means of pacifying the colonies, by respecting all the rights, all the attentions due to dignity, and by establishing between the benefits contemplated to be produced in the other Hemisphere, a direct relation with the benefits produced in Europe under the auspices of the *General Alliance*.

FIRST

When the political relations between States were consecrated by the stipulations of Vienna and of Paris in the year 1815, the European Alliance, which was their most valuable result, forcibly impressed all minds.

By some the system of amicable and fraternal Union then formed by the respective States, was considered as an abstract Hypothesis and void of any practical utility.

By others a hope was entertained that means would be afforded by it of restraining, or confining within certain absolute bounds, the power of States of great territorial possessions and especially those which were completely and absolutely independent.

Finally this general Alliance was held up by others as a new combination of Despotism established for the subjugation of the People, and even of the States of the second rank to the exclusive will of the Cabinets of England, Austria, Prussia and Russia.

Judging of this system as of a premeditated work, its origin was attributed to the principles which have the closest affinity with ordinary human conceptions. In consequent its motive was pronounced to be the blind passion of universal domination, employing distrust and hypocrisy as its instruments.

To have combatted these errors by arguments, would perhaps only have tended to sanction them. But by opposing to them the evidence of incontestable facts, they are solidly refuted and forever eradicated.

The transactions however which have hitherto terminated affairs of importance by the intervention of the conservative powers of the Grand Alliance, being a necessary continuation of anterior transactions, they cannot yet have produced this conviction, or given a practical idea, to say so, of the essential object of this system.

On the other hand the transaction now under consideration, presents the

first case of a pure and simple application of the principles characterizing the force of the Union of Cabinets, animated by a uniformity of intention, for the maintenance of general tranquillity and the support of just rights on all occasions and with respect to every State whatsoever, according to the eternal maxims of Justice.

It is then on the success of the present Negotiation that the realizing this system in a great measure depends. And although this issue is a fact highly consolatory to the enlightened conscience of the Cabinets, yet it still remains an abstract theory, and therefore susceptible of every sort of interpretation by those who pretend to represent in the world the tribunal of public opinion.

Nothing in fact would more embolden the genius of evil to persevere in its rash enterprizes than the failure of this Negotiation.

If either Portugal or Spain should perceive the impracticability of a settlement of their existing differences thro' the medium of the deliberations of the Allied Powers, they would probably seek in partial alliances, a measure constantly objected to by Russia, the means of effecting their object, or those of asserting their rights by resorting to force. This tendency alone would have the effect of holding up the Allied Powers, both in Europe and America, as in a state of war, if not real, at least *intentional*.

It is from the imputation of the latter that it is important carefully to screen the Grand Alliance.

Its real and intrinsick force rests solely in the *purity of intentions* and in the reciprocity of good faith which animate and actuate the Allied Powers. They cannot however dissemble the fact that the Nations which have been engaged in the Storms of Revolution, are but little prepared for this Policy. Now, the important point is to inculcate it on them; and this is the interesting task which it is the object of the cabinets to fulfill.

We have said enough to place in a strong light the motives of a general interest, which plead in favour of the prompt and favourable issue of the present negotiation. Let us now see what are the more particular motives, those which are more immediately connected with the direct relations of the two Monarchies, Spanish and Portuguese, with South America.

SECOND

These relations have been complicated by undecided questions of right and of territorial limits, the character of which assumed appearances more alarming to Spain and more injurious to the tranquillity of the people of the other Hemisphere from the moment that the Portuguese colonies were raised by the irresistible force of events to the effective dignity of *Mother-Country*, and those of Spain, with the same prospects, or at least, that of their emancipation, had in fact retrograded towards their former situation.

The two Cabinets were thenceforward involuntarily placed in a divergent attitude, which left a free scope to the conjectures as well as to the hopes of

the insurgent party, and induced the belief of the possibility of a war between Spain and Portugal.

The occupation of the Provinces of La Plata and the irritation naturally produced by this unexpected event in Spain, were of a nature to encourage hope and inflame the passions.

Finally the attentions which H. M. Faithful Majesty is perhaps under the necessity of observing towards the People in a state of insurrection bordering on his possessions, keep alive the jealousy of the Cabinet of Madrid as much as they add to the great difficulties which in other respects obstruct the speedy pacification of the Colonies.

Or considering these facts at present in their most natural connexion, and with reference to the influence which they have on the dispositions of the Cabinets of Madrid and Rio de Janeiro, as well as on the minds of the Inhabitants of the Colonies, it will readily be perceived that the most essential object of the present Negotiation is reduced to simplifying, under the European Mediation, the relations between these two Courts, so as that they may be presented to South America, as being closely, necessarily and irrevocably connected both in fact and intention, as regards the system which they propose to pursue in relation to that Country.

If their Catholic and Most Faithful Majesties should honour this fundamental idea with their approbation, it would in that case be easy to discuss by common consent all the questions which of right belong to this negotiation, and to agree, at the same time, on the forms, by which they may most promptly and successfully be decided.

As to the *territorials Questions*, they chiefly existed before the disastrous events which afflicted Spain in both Hemispheres, and which procured Brazil the happiness of receiving her Sovereign.

Now, to insist on deciding these Questions, as if these events had never happened, or as if they did not exercise a powerful and necessary influence on the state of things, would perhaps be mistaking the principle of the evil and the nature of the remedy. It appears then that all the points of territorial discussions, instead of presenting difficulties, offer great resources in negotiation, for the purpose of identifying solidly the interests and the policy of the Courts of Madrid and Rio de Janeiro.

The transaction proposed to be stipulated for this purpose comprehends two very distinct parts, *the one of right, the other of fact*. The former as doctrine may be viewed as independent of the other, but the latter cannot be effective until the Contracting Parties shall have agreed on the mode of carrying into execution the classes of the arrangement to which they may have given their Sanction.

Now this essential part of the work brings back the discussion to the System which the two Courts propose jointly to follow with respect to the Revolted Party.

The intervention of the Mediating Powers strictly speaking, only relates to the first part of the Negotiation.

The question of right once resolved, the restoration of the Provinces of La Plata, as well as any territorial difference adjusted between the two Courts, no other question can strictly come under the consideration of the Mediation, unless the Parties interested express a desire to that effect.

But, if the urgent and imperious necessity be admitted of making the misguided inhabitants of the other Hemisphere sensible of the real attitude and the identity of the intentions and views of the Powers in relation to them, it will be readily admitted that the distinctions which we have just established, present the means of attaining the object in view without hazarding any which is essential. In fact, every territorial dispute between Spain and Portugal would, by a preliminary act, be completely removed.— This act suggested by the Interest alone of the maintenance of Peace and of the principles on which it reposes, would, when clothed with essential formalities, secure to their Catholic and M. Faithful Majesties the most unanimous co-operation of all the Powers, for the purposes of imparting to the vast countries of the New World the benefits enjoyed by Europe under the auspices of the Treaties of 1815, at Vienna and Paris.

OF THE PACIFICATION

The overtures made in relation thereto by the Cabinet of Madrid, the opinion of that [of] St. James, confidentially intimated, and corresponding observations, offer ideas which viewed altogether, announce the most desirable agreement in the intentions of the respective Cabinets.

If the ideas of the one and the other considered singly,¹ appear to be at variance, we are not however to allow ourselves to be deceived. In truth, Spain wishes to effect the reconciliation of her colonies, thro' the moral and effective agency of the system of the Grand European Alliance. Consequently she wishes to assimilate the Act which would result from this fortunate combination, to those which form the code of the Public Law of Nations, such as the *Recessus* of Vienna, and the numerous transactions which have originated there.

Now if we compare these enlightened and benevolent dispositions of the Court of Madrid with the spirit of the proceedings at Vienna, it seems as if the terms intimated by the British Ministry were in fact completely fulfilled.

The Powers, assembled at the Congress exercised no other rights over the conquered Countries, than by solemnly stipulating certain civil and political rights, which in their justice and wisdom they thought fit to grant them.

The application of the same principle to the Colonies, by the spontaneous determination of *their* Sovereigns, at once enables the vast countries of

¹ In the manuscript the word "distinctly" has been superscribed over the word "singly".

the New World to participate [in] the advantages enjoyed by Europe under the auspices of the *Recessus* of Vienna.

Admitting that this project of a constitutional charter destined either separately or collectively for the insurgent Provinces should be unanimously acknowledged by the Mediating Powers, as the most just and effectual means of reuniting them to the Mother Country, could ¹ it be supposed that the accessory questions of *Neutrality*, of *Armistice*, of *Co-operation*, of *Guarantee*, are of such a nature as to arrest the progress and the success of this great Enterprize?

Without undertaking at present to define the Nature of this co-operation, it may however be correctly estimated by referring to precedents of the highest authenticity. The declaration issued by the Congress of Vienna on the abolition of the Slave Trade, and the acts connected with it, undoubtedly offer an evidence sufficiently convincing of the legitimacy, and efficacy of those means of coercion which are not to be considered as belonging to the employment of military force. These means are tested by experiment.

Finally the question relative to the Armistice appertains fundamentally to those which would be referred to measures of execution. It cannot however be denied, notwithstanding the different opinion entertained by the Court of Madrid, that whatever may be [the] idea of conciliation held out under the name of *armistice*, the word cannot be pronounced without danger in reference to the revolted Colonies.

If the remarks presented in this Memorial receive the approbation of the Allied Courts, as well as that of the Cabinets of Madrid and of Portugal, it would follow:

1. That by the present Negotiation, every territorial difference between Spain and Portugal would be settled on principle by the intervention of the Mediating Powers.

2. That this preliminary transaction would convey, in the name of the Mediating Powers the offer of their co-operation, with a view to obtain for the vast countries of the other hemisphere the benefits derived by Europe from the *Recessus* of Vienna.

3. That this preliminary act would be so framed and published as to produce a salutary effect on the minds of the insurgent party in South America.

4. That Spain and Portugal, by their respective acceptance of the offer of the Privy, would jointly concert their plan of a definitive act for the pacification of the Colonies, and communicate the same to them.

5. The Powers having once admitted and sanctioned this Act as forming part of the *Recessus* of Vienna, would co-operate with Spain and Portugal in carrying it into execution.

6. The character of this co-operation would be defined agreeably to the

¹ In the manuscript the word "can" has been superscribed over the word "could".

principles sanctioned in the Acts and Protocols concerning the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

The Ministers of the Emperor near the Courts of Spain and Brazil, as well as those accredited near the Mediating Powers receive instructions analogous to the present Memorial, and are authorized to promote in the name of His Majesty the Negotiation in question, conformably to the principles here developed, or to those which shall be admitted and sanctioned by the Unanimous Vote of the August Allies of the Emperor.

1012

*George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *December 10/22, 1818.*

There is also reason to believe a *projet* for settling the difference between Portugal and Spain was submitted to the Congress at Aix la Chapelle & met the approbation of that body; under the imposing sanction of which, when presented to the court of Spain for acceptance, there can be little doubt of the course, in the present state of affairs, it will consistently be bound to pursue; especially as it is UNDERSTOOD THE ADJUSTMENT OF THIS DIFFERENCE WAS VIEWED BY THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER, AT PRESENT WITHOUT DOUBT THE GREAT ARBITER OF THE POLITICS OF EUROPE, as indispensable, previously to taking into consideration THE SUBJECT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THAT POWER AND HER COLONIES.

To complete this adjustment between the two courts a negotiation, it is said, is to be opened at Paris, while another is to be carried on, if not at the same time, immediately thereafter, at London to bring about a reconciliation, between the Spanish colonies & the mother country, under the mediation of the court of St. James, it is believed; though this mediation, was not, as is alleged, sanctioned, nor indeed very well relished by the other powers at Aix la Chapelle. That, however, an attempt will be made on the part of the allied powers, in some form or other, to induce the colonies to acknowledge the authority, of old Spain, there can, I presume, be little doubt; but with what success, may depend on circumstances with which we are here unacquainted.

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THIS VIEW OF THE SUBJECT IT IS MY PRESENT OPINION THAT THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA WILL USE HIS INFLUENCE TO RECONCILE

¹MS. Dispatches from Russia, VII. Portions of this document printed in small capital letters were received in cipher.

THE SPANISH COLONIES TO THE PARENT STATE, AND THAT HE WOULD VIEW IN AN UNFAVORABLE LIGHT AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THOSE COLONIES BY OUR GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD IN SUCH EVENT BE INCLINED TO INDUCE THE ALLIED POWERS TO INTERPOSE IF THERE WAS A PROSPECT OF SUCCESS, TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH EXTENSIVE INDEPENDENT STATES AND THE CONSEQUENT SPREAD OF REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES; BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT SEPARATELY UNITE WITH SPAIN IN A WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. FOR THOUGH HIS MILITARY IS ENORMOUS, ESTIMATED AT MORE THAN A MILLION OF THE BEST DISCIPLINED TROOPS IN EUROPE, YET THE BETTER OPINION SEEMS TO BE, THAT HIS TRUE CHARACTER IS THAT OF A CALCULATING POLITICIAN, THAT HE DOES NOT POSSESS IN A DISTINGUISHED DEGREE MILITARY TALENTS, AND IS NOT INCLINED TO ENGAGE IN WAR. IT IS THEREFORE MOST PROBABLE HE WILL USE HIS GREAT PERSONAL INFLUENCE (FOR HIS MANNER IS SAID TO BE VERY PREPOSSESSING) AS WELL AS THAT DERIVED FROM THE IMMENSE PHYSICAL FORCE HE COULD COMMAND TO ACCOMPLISH HIS VIEWS BY OVER-AWING THE COUNCILS OF EUROPE, WITHOUT HAZARDING HIS PRESENT HIGH STANDING, BY ENGAGING SINGLE HANDED IN ANY GREAT CONTEST.

THAT THE VIEWS OF THIS GREAT AND CERTAINLY POWERFUL COALITION OF CROWNED HEADS IN RELATION TO THE PENDING CONTEST BETWEEN SPAIN AND HER COLONIES WILL SOON DEVELOPE THEMSELVES, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR BEING KNOWN TO OUR GOVERNMENT PREVIOUSLY TO ITS BECOMING A PART TO THAT CONTEST, WOULD SEEM ENTITLED TO SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

IN THE MEAN TIME I SHALL NOT FAIL STILL TO PURSUE THE ENQUIRIES ON THIS SUBJECT, AIDED BY SUCH NEW LIGHTS AS THE RETURN OF THE COURT AND MY PRESENTATION TO THE EMPEROR MAY PUT IT IN MY POWER TO OBTAIN, AND ADVISE YOU THE RESULT THEREOF BY THE MOST SPEEDY AND SAFE CONVEYANCES THAT CAN BE PROCURED.

1013

*George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *February 6/18, 1819.*

As to Spain² he [the Emperor] could not say how she might act in regard to the contest with her colonies, or how that might terminate. They (the

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, VII.

² It may be proper to remark that Spain was not represented at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle; the Emperor therefore did not speak of her as one of the powers which had *there* united to preserve the peace of Europe.

powers assembled at Aix la Chapelle) had given her the best advice they could; and if she would do what was considered right, & offer such terms to her colonies as were deemed reasonable, & ought to be accepted by them, he did not despair of the dispute being finally adjusted. They, (i. e. the allied powers) had however, (he said, speaking apparently from the impulse given by the course the conversation had taken) proposed to the King of Spain the appointment of Lord Wellington who had so highly distinguished himself in the world, & established such a character for every thing noble, generous & disinterested, as mediator between her & her colonies, from which step much might be expected; but no answer to that proposal, had yet been received.

The Emperor after some other remarks of a general nature closed the audience which lasted nearly half an hour, by expressing his hope I should find myself agreeably situated in St. Petersburg, & his expectation to see me often.

Aware how uninteresting detailed accounts of this kind in general are, I have, notwithstanding, thought it my duty to be thus particular on the present occasion, as what passed at the audience with the Emperor appeared to me entitled to more attention than any thing that occurred since my arrival; more especially when it is considered that in the direction of public affairs here, the Emperor, himself, from his personal character, as well as from the nature of the government, is in fact, *every thing*, and his Ministers *nothing*.

From what he said, as above related, there can be no doubt that the dispute between Spain & her colonies was made the subject of formal deliberation at Aix la Chapelle, & that the powers represented there evinced a serious disposition to bring about its adjustment. I have however reason to believe from information derived from a respectable source that Spain is not inclined to offer such terms for adjusting the dispute as will be likely to induce the allied powers to embark in the contest for the purpose of enforcing their acceptance on the part of the colonies. It is however still my opinion that this government would view in an unfavorable light the acknowledgment of the Independence of those colonies, at this time, by the U. States; and though it probably would not, in such event, engage alone on the side of Spain, its influence would be exerted conjointly with that of the other powers to maintain the cause of *legitimacy*, & prevent the establishment of such powerful Independent States, as might by giving a wider spread to free principles, tend to endanger its stability.

The impression produced here of the aggrandizing views of our government at the expense of a neighbouring state, by the occupation of the ports in Florida, particularly Pensacola, by Genl. Jackson, which was pretty strong as well as general, appears to be entirely removed by the prompt orders of the Executive for their restoration; and the language held in the message at the opening of the session of Congress, (which has reached me only through the English newspapers) on this subject, as well as respecting our relations with Spain in general, indicating, as it is understood here, a disposition to main-

tain our neutral position in regard to the contest with her colonies, seems to meet general approbation, as well on the part of this government as on that of the public functionaries accredited here from the other states of Europe, all of whom manifest the most friendly sentiments towards the U. States.

1014

*George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *April 21/May 3, 1819.*

The struggle in South America for Independence, will, there is now reason to believe, be allowed to progress without interruption from this quarter. The conduct of old Spain, has not, it is presumed, been such as to induce, on the part of the Emperor, a disposition to interpose in her favor. The events there appear to be viewed with a less lively interest than formerly.

There is reason to believe that about the close of the Congress at Aix la Chapelle instructions were given on the part of this government to put in a state of preparation for active service at the opening of the Spring twelve ships of the line, besides other vessels.

This step, it is understood, was taken, with the view of being prepared to co-operate with Spain, should it become necessary, in enforcing such measures relating to her revolted colonies as might be adopted in accordance with the recommendation of the allied sovereigns; and under an impression that she would acquiesce in the course proposed by them, of mediation, as stated in my last. Not long after the return of the Emperor, however, to the capital, the foregoing instructions were, it is said, countermanded, and the usual number only of vessels of war directed to be prepared for service; in consequence, it is believed, of information received by this court, that Spain was not disposed to pursue the course suggested to her by the crowned heads at Aix la Chapelle; and since that time, it would seem, a less lively interest is manifested here in relation to the affairs of South America.

With sentiments [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, VII.

George W. Campbell, *United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *September 24/October 6, 1819.*

A few days ago, being in company with Lord Cathcart, the English ambassador at this court, who is about returning home, & is to be succeeded by Mr. Bagot, late minister to the United States, whose designation for that purpose by the Prince Regent has been announced to the Emperor, he expressed a desire to communicate some things to me in rather a confidential manner; & with a degree of seeming interest proceeded to state, after some preliminary remarks: that the . . . negotiations carried on at Paris under the mediation or supervision of the five allied powers; (meaning, it is presumed, Austria, Russia, England, Prussia & France) for adjusting the differences between Spain and Portugal, were likely to be soon brought to a favorable issue, as terms were now proposed, which ought, & there was reason to believe, would be agreed to by both parties; adding that the settlement of this dispute was deemed an indispensable *preliminary to any attempt at an amiable adjustment of the differences between Spain & her colonies*. I took occasion here to observe, that it was then, I presumed, understood, that upon the differences between Spain & Portugal being finally settled, there would be an *attempt* under the mediation or auspices of the allied powers to adjust the dispute between the former & her colonies. He said, what Spain would do in regard to the business appeared uncertain; her pride, which was equaled only by her poverty, might prevent her from consenting to offer such terms to her revolted colonies as it would be their interest, or as they *should be required*, to accept; that it would certainly be better for her, if indeed she was capable of estimating her true interest, to conciliate their affections by such proposals as would induce them to continue at least closely united with her by the most friendly relations, than, by driving them to extremities, make them her worst enemies. Whether she would hereafter agree to any mediation in this affair, having hitherto declined every measure of the kind proposed, could not now be known, nor indeed what course she might finally pursue.

His Lordship did not appear disposed to be very explicit on this subject of mediation; but from what he said I was inclined to conclude, that in case the dispute between Spain & Portugal were finally settled, an adjustment of that between the former & her colonies would, in his opinion, be attempted, in some shape or other under the auspices of the allied powers.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, VII.

1016

*Count Nesselrode, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia, to Pierre de Poletica, Russian Minister to the United States*¹

[EXTRACT; TRANSLATION]

November 27/December 9, 1819.

You have doubtless been able to obtain information how far the President's last instructions to Mr. Forsyth were positive. The Emperor will not now take it upon him to justify Spain; but he charges you to plead with the Government at Washington the cause of peace and concord. That Government is too enlightened to take hasty steps, and its rights appear to be too solid not to be weakened by a violent course of proceeding; and, on the other hand, such is the character of the considerations which command the ratification by Spain of the arrangement relative to the Floridas, that it is to be hoped she will at length yield to the force of evidence. The United States will then have added to the reputation of an able that of a moderate policy, and will gather with security the fruits of their wisdom.

His Imperial Majesty therefore wishes that, if there be yet time, you would engage the Government at Washington to give to the Spanish ministry a proof of patience which its circumstances might, indeed, seem to suggest. Nevertheless, the Emperor does not interpose in this discussion. He makes, above all, no pretension to exercise an influence in the councils of a foreign Power. He merely expresses a wish dictated by his concern for the general welfare, and worthy of the generous good faith which characterizes the Government of the United States.

1017

*George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACTS]

ST. PETERSBURG, December 31, 1819/January 12, 1820.

SIR: Enclosed herewith is the copy of a memoir, (no. 1)³ obtained from an authentic source; which if not hitherto seen by the President, may, it is believed, merit his perusal.

It relates to the subject of adjusting the long existing difference between Portugal and Spain, and also the more important dispute between the latter

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 676.

² MS. Dispatches from Russia, VII.

³ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1011, under date of November 17, 1817.

and her colonies, through the mediation of the allied powers. It was drawn up by the Count Capadistria, the efficient & confidential *clossit* Secretary of State of the Emperor, (who was also the penman of that relating to the *projet* for suppressing, in future the piratical practices of the Barbary States, already forwarded,) and contains, no doubt, the views entertained by this court in regard to those important subjects at the time of its date. It will shew the deep interest His I. Majesty, &, without doubt, the other allied powers then took in bringing about a pacification between the colonies and the mother country; and there is every reason to believe the conduct of Spain alone prevented the actual & powerful interposition of those powers to effect that object.

There is little doubt their views in regard to this subject, so far as they were connected with the great objects of the original co-alition of crowned heads, remain substantially the same; and may yet be carried into effect, should the adjustment of the dispute between Spain & Portugal, hitherto deemed an essential preliminary, not be postponed so long, that the progress made by the colonies towards establishing their independence would render the attempt to bring them again under subjection to the mother country too hazardous if not altogether hopeless.

On the 12/24, Dec^r. the Emperor's birthday, there was a court, which I attended, & in the evening a grand ball. The attentions shewn by the Emperor, as well as the Empresses to the foreign ministers, though said to manifest, in a greater degree than usual their disposition to please, were of such a nature as to avoid any marked distinction; and nothing occurred of a political character entitled to particular notice.

The Spanish Minister and myself stood next each other, so that had the Emperor been disposed to make any remarks of a political nature to either, the occasion was not a favorable one. . . .

A short time ago, Mr. Teca the Spanish Minister procured an audience of the emperor; the occasion whereof not being known, and being somewhat unusual with Ministers of his grade, except to present letters from their sovereigns, not believed to be the case in this instance, it led to some enquiry. At first it was suggested by some the object of it might be to announce the marriage of the king, which had lately taken place; as this event, however, has not appeared here in any official form, it is now presumed not to have been the case. But notwithstanding the secrecy that seems to be observed both in regard to the occasion of, as well as to what passed at the audience, it has reached me from a reputable source that certain explanations were made by the Minister in relation to the late proceedings of his court, particularly as regarded its dispute with Portugal, with a view to remove unfavorable impressions, presumed to have been entertained by the emperor in regard to that subject,—that these explanations appeared to produce a favorable effect, & that it was known the emperor had expressed his satisfaction at the

lenient measures adopted by the king after the arrival of the young queen at Madrid; but what passed, if any thing, on the subject of the Florida Treaty, or respecting the dispute with the colonies, has not transpired. It is known that immediately after the audience a note was addressed by the Minister to Count Nesselrode, to which a reply was given, and very soon thereafter the Spanish Secretary set out as a courier for Madrid.

With sentiments [etc.].

P. S., 4/16 Jany. It has been intimated to me since writing the foregoing, and is believed by some well informed persons here that one object of the audience above referred to, was to invite on the part of Spain the mediation of the allied powers, heretofore declined by her in a manner not very agreeable to them, in adjusting the dispute with her colonies.

1018

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private & confidential.

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 8/20, 1822.*

SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your No. 12, brought to England by the Chevr. Politica & thence forwarded by post. The instructions therein communicated shall be duly attended to, & the matters given me in charge be brought before the Imperial Ministry in such form as shall appear to me most likely to effect the desired purposes, & with all due observance of the most conciliatory & friendly tone.

To recur to a subject sometime since gone by, I have now the honor to acquaint you, that upon seeing in the public prints the Message of the President to Congress proposing the recognition of the new Governments in So. America, & connecting its purport with the recollection of the communication made upon the same subject to our Government by order of the Emperor some three years since, I felt anxious about the impression which might be made upon His Majesty's mind. I therefore took occasion to open the subject informally to one of His Majesty's Ministers, & declaring that I was wholly without instructions upon the point, I yet expressed my wish & hope that this step might be correctly understood by the Emperor: That I felt an entire conviction that it could only have been taken by our Government upon a full & most mature consideration of the whole subject in all its bearings; & that it was doubtless justified by the urgency of the occasion. That it was

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, IX.

to have been expected from the *Geographical & Commercial position* (keeping out of view the *political bias*) of the United States, that they should be the first among the nations to incline to this measure, which the European Powers generally, not even excepting Spain herself, would probably ere long acquiesce in. The reply of the Minister was made in a tone which impressed me with the belief that he in some degree assented to the justness of my observations. His manner & language taken together encouraged me to think that the policy we had pursued in relation to the So. American question had as yet in no degree impaired our good standing with the Emperor. A few days after this conversation the Spanish Manifesto or circular addressed to the other European Governments, protesting against our act in relation to the Hispano-American provinces, was presented to this Government by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, & the answer made to him, was shortly after by permission of the Emperor, made known to me, & I now forward you that paper ¹ in the original copy sent me from the Department of Foreign Affairs. (No. 1) I have reason then to conclude from this I think, that the language I have held upon this occasion has been taken in good part; & I may further hope, Sir, to have the President's approbation upon my endeavour to preserve & improve the harmony so happily subsisting between the two Governments.

¹ A translation of the reply of June 13, 1822, from the Russian Foreign Office to the Spanish Minister, Chevalier d'Argaiz, follows:

MR. CHEVALIER: I laid before the Emperor, my master, the communications you sent to His Majesty's cabinet concerning the measures taken by the United States of America towards recognizing the independence of the Spanish colonies in the south of that vast continent.

His Catholic Majesty cannot entertain any doubt of the Emperor's desire to see that handsome and rich part of the Spanish possessions prosper under the laws of the monarch whose fatherly care had long been engaged in finding the means of securing for it a peaceful and happy future. It will be enough for the cabinet of Madrid to look into its archives to know how glad his Imperial Majesty would be to learn that the hope still indulged by the King according to your letter of May 29/June 10, to maintain the relations of Spain with her provinces beyond the seas could be brought into effect and that the knowledge of his benevolent intentions revived there the sentiment of faithfulness and love which must bind the peoples to their rulers and governments.

The King must already have satisfied himself from the indifferent reception given to the negotiations of the agents of his American provinces and from the communications received by his cabinet from several courts of Europe that the decisions of the allied powers will not contribute to deciding prematurely or against the trade interests of Spain the question to which he attaches well warranted importance. In this matter as in all others the Emperor will not depart in the least from the principles of uprightness, justice and moderation which guide the European policy and which he has had occasion more than once to develop in his friendly relations with your August Sovereign.

I have the honor [etc.].

*Baron de Tuyll, Russian Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *October 4/16, 1823.*

SIR: The Emperor, my August Master, having been advised that the republican regency of Colombia had appointed diplomatic agents near the several European courts and that Major General D'Evreux [Devereux] had received a similar appointment to St. Petersburg, His Imperial Majesty has ordered its Ministry to warn me that true to the political principles that he is following in concert with his Allies, he may not in any case receive any agent whatsoever either from the regency of Colombia or from any of the other *de facto* governments which owe their existence to the events of which the New World has for some years been the stage.

As I am directed not to let the slightest doubt stand as to the intentions of His Imperial Majesty on this point, I deem it proper, Sir, to bring this decision to your knowledge and I grasp this opportunity to reiterate to you the assurance [etc.].

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

ST. PETERSBURG, *February 5/17, 1824.*

I enclose an extract³ (marked C) just obtained of a paper from Madrid dated 26th. December last. It is said to be part of a circular intended to be communicated to the Allies of His Catholic Majesty, calling upon them for aid in reestablishing the dominion of Spain over her Colonies. I was not able to procure a Copy of the *entire* circular, which contains, as it would seem, some passages which it is desired to keep secret:—possibly the views it develops may be of a nature not to be divulged:—neither have I been able to learn the terms of the answer given by this Court. This answer is probably of an evasive kind, until it shall be known definitively what course England shall have determined to pursue. The decided tone of the President's Message at the meeting of Congress (which was received here with unprecedented rapidity, having reached St. Petersburg (in the English Gazettes of

¹ MS. Notes from Russian Legation, I.

² MS. Dispatches from Russia, X.

³ Not printed in this collection.

the 26th December) on the first of January O. S.) is considered generally as having gone far towards deciding the question against interference.

I have the honor [etc.].

1021

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Strictly Private & Confidential. ST. PETERSBURG, February 7/19, 1825.

SIR: I have just had a private and confidential communication, made to me by a friend, of a despatch dated 27 Jany. (O. S.) & addressed to Count Lieven, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James. It begins by stating that the illness of the British Chargé d'Affaires, (who it seems had notified this Government of the acknowledgment of the South American Governments by Great Britain) makes it necessary that the answer to the notification lately received, should be transmitted through Count Lieven. The substance of the remainder of the despatch, as far as I have been able to note it from memory after a careful perusal, is almost *verbatim* as follows:²

[TRANSLATION]

His Imperial Majesty could not learn this determination of England without feeling a sentiment of regret and pain. He could not realize the necessity which that power found itself under of proceeding to the recognition of the Governments *in fact* which are formed in the Spanish colonies.

As to Russia, she persists in the principles to which all States owe the repose and security of the state of possession. These principles on which the security of the world depends, cannot cease to be in the eyes of the Emperor the object of inviolable respect. They have been moreover sanctioned by England herself, which agreed to the transactions of the years 1814, 1815, and 1818.

If in France and Spain, the legitimate Sovereigns, too long unfortunate, have been replaced upon the thrones of their ancestors, from whence the revolution had precipitated them, this effect has been particularly due to the efforts and co-operation of England.

Russia cannot dispense with following the example at that time given by Great Britain, by remaining faithful to the generous principles to which she is attached; and from which she will not further deviate in the case which now presents itself. Besides, she sees less reason for not applying them, since the King of Spain, occupied till now by other cares, having to repair other misfortunes, has not had the possibility

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X.

² For the exact wording of this dispatch, see above, pt. VIII, doc. 823.

hitherto of assembling a sufficient force to prosecute his rights in his *ultramar* possessions:—and the only proposition made in this regard by England tended to cause her [to] submit to the total loss of her provinces, and the refusal of Spain has been accompanied with a satisfactory developement of her motives.

Since then, the Emperor has seen nothing which could have changed his opinion. His Imperial Majesty has seen on the part of the Spanish Government important concessions in respect to the commercial system of her colonies: he has seen the victories obtained in Peru by the arms of Spain: he has seen proved in fine, by the resistance of the Fort of San Juan d'Ulloa, the weakness of the resources of the Government *in fact* established in Mexico.

Moreover since the Congress of Vienna the Emperor has seen that in order to determine in any question whatever the resolutions of the powers which have agreed in this grand work of pacification, it would be sufficient to know that the rights of one third were concerned, and that they might be injured.

For these reasons, in the question in hand, the Emperor cannot *participate in the determination* of the British Government.

Finally, Count Lieven has it in command to read this despatch to the English Ministry, *without giving a copy of it* in order to provoke no useless discussions.

Such, Sir, is the substance of this communication, in repeating which I may indeed have omitted from inadvertence some part of the chain of reasoning, but there is sufficient left to enable you to judge of the feeling excited here by the transaction alluded to in it.

1022

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Private & Confidential.

ST. PETERSBURG, April 7/13, 1825.

SIR: As all circumstances connected with the course pursued by this Court, & by other powers, upon occasion of the acknowledgment of the independence of the South American States, are interesting in so much as they serve to characterize the prevailing policy in this relation, I beg leave to add to the details contained in a former despatch (No. 42)² the following particulars.

In a despatch addressed to Pozzo di Borgo in Paris, & bearing date on or about the 27th. of Jany. last (the date of the despatch to Count Lieven in London which was mentioned in my No. 42) Count Nesselrode, after reca-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X.

² See above, pt. XII, doc. 1021, Middleton to Secretary of State, February 7/19, 1825.

pitulating and urging the opinions stated in this last, developes at some length *the advice* to be given to Spain in this juncture of affairs, which I have noted *en résumé* as nearly in the words of the original as I could collect from a careful perusal, as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

1st. That she (Spain) reserves her rights by a protest against the resolution of the Cabinet of London, conceived, however, in moderate terms, analogous to the justice of her cause.

2ly. That she employs all her efforts to prosecute truly her rights to the insurgent Colonies.

3ly. That with this design she listens to the counsels of her real friends; that thus she prepares for better fortune by giving immediately to the Spaniards of Europe a security for the future; that she thinks seriously to establish at home internal order and the finances, by thinking of resources either by loans, upon the bases proposed by France, or by an appeal to the patriotism of her Clergy, in fine by all the measures proper to inspire confidence. On this occasion, it is shewn that the complaints of the great Capitalists, whose interests have been hurt, have been able to contribute, more than is thought, to the part taken by England.

4ly. That Spain carefully avoids giving to England direct causes of rupture: thus she does not interrupt with her their diplomatic relations; that in the Colonies which She is about to subdue, She does not re-establish the ancient restrictive system, a dangerous measure, not only because it must have alienated England, but besides by the moral effect which it would produce in countries which have already enjoyed the advantages of a free commerce.

5ly. In fine that for better avoiding, therefore, all the indirect causes which might determine England to go further than she has yet done, Spain proclaims immediately liberty of commerce with these countries, not as a consequence forced by the declaration of England, but as the fulfilment of a promise solemnly made a year ago!

This is all I have been able to learn with respect to the proceedings at Paris. At Brussels certain communications have passed between the Russian Chargé d'affaires & Count de Reede; in the following manner: the former having addressed himself to the latter to know what would be the answer of his Court to the Communication on So. American affairs made by England of her acknowledgment of the New States (which had been *disapproved by the Powers* (*les puissances*) said Count Gourieff) and further expressing his desire to be informed particularly what would be the determination taken upon this point by the Low Countries: M. de Reede replied at first verbally, that he could not very well account for the circumstance, that *the powers* should desire to know the determination of his Court in this matter, when he recollected that they had decided so many important affairs without asking for any advice:—that in his opinion the conduct of England had been upon this occasion irreproachable, and that at any rate he was convinced that on no consideration would any answer be given of a character disagreeable to her.

Upon the repeated application of Count Gourieff, M. de Reede, after taking the orders of the King, delivered a *Note Verbale* in which it is stated "[translation] that England had only demanded that the Court of Brussels should avoid its former march; that thus its communication had been considered as a simple notification; that hitherto the relations of the Government of the Netherlands with those established in fact in the countries concerned, were confined to strict necessity under the commercial point of view and of neighbourhood with the Dutch Colonies; that these relations, after the example of other nations, had been admitted at the time by Spain; in fine that an explanation was considered as superfluous, the more so because the conduct of the Netherlands towards the said Governments did not differ from that which the other powers appeared to wish to observe."

All this affair is said to have been since satisfactorily explained to the Emperor by the Prince of Orange after his arrival here.

In another quarter a transaction of a less honorable nature to the parties concerned has taken place. It is confidently stated that General Suchtelen, the Russian ambassador at Stockholm, has permitted himself even to let drop a threat "[translation] that if Sweden deviated from the principles agreed on at the Congress of Vienna, Russia might well think herself free from the obligation of recognizing the order of things actually established in Sweden." Such at least appears to have been *the substance of a declaration* of the Russian Cabinet, which however is kept on both parts profoundly secret. The answer given by the Swedish Government to this declaration, is contained in a despatch from Baron Witterstrot to Baron Palmastzierna, Swedish Minister at this Court. It is in substance as follows.

[TRANSLATION]

That His Swedish Majesty had received the above mentioned declaration; that without doubt Spain might be guarantied in the entire possession of her Colonies, if His Catholic Majesty wished to follow the wise and truly paternal counsels of His Imperial Majesty; that in considering the manner of the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London appearing *totally opposed* in this affair, the determination of that of Stockholm could no more be doubtful; . . . that considering the multiplied evidences of affection and friendship which the King Charles XIX [XIV?] John had received from the Emperor Alexander, *Sweden could only decide in favour of the benevolent principles of the Continental powers;*

That if the commercial interests of Sweden demanded hereafter a diplomatic intervention in her relations with South America, the Cabinet would never go so far without the knowledge of Russia, and *without concerting beforehand* in that regard with the Sovereign to whom so many ties of amity and recollections so intimately unite that of Sweden!!!

Any remarks of mine on the character of this last communication would be superfluous if not misplaced. I could never have been induced to believe that such language had been used if I had not the proofs of it before me.

I have the honor [etc.].

1023

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Count Nesselrode,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia*¹

[TRANSLATION]

ST. PETERSBURG, July 2/14, 1825.

The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary from the United States of America, has the honor to suggest to His Excellency, Count Nesselrode, that, to fulfil the intentions of his Government, he conceived it proper to enclose to him the accompanying copy of a dispatch, in form of an instruction,² which he has just received, and to request that it be submitted to his Majesty the Emperor, whose friendly intervention, accorded on more than one occasion, may again promote, both the interests of Europe and America.

The Undersigned is the more disposed to this course, as he believes, that his Imperial Majesty will discover in this dispatch, additional proofs, to many others, of the sentiments of great esteem and confidence, which he has inspired into the Government of the United States, and that He will therefore receive, kindly, the request that has been made.

In the present war between Spain and her *ci-devant* possessions of *Ultra Mar*, the United States have never taken any part, either to encourage or sustain it. They have always observed the strictest neutrality. It cannot, indeed, be said, that they have been indifferent spectators of the events that have occurred under their own eyes. Commercial reasons have induced the desire, that the nations of the same continent, might establish a political independence, whose happy influence they themselves have experienced. But this feeling has never caused the neutrality to be violated, that had been proclaimed. As proof of the fidelity with which they have fulfilled their obligations, during the present war, both belligerent parties have complained, and alike unjustly, of the violation of this neutrality.

But if the United States have regarded with satisfaction, the efforts of the nations of the American continent to throw off the yoke of Spanish domination, they do not thus feel towards the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The character of the population of those islands, renders their capacity for maintaining independence, extremely doubtful. A premature declaration, would probably result in the distressing scenes of St. Domingo.

Against such a catastrophe, there can be no other guaranty than the presence of an armed force, furnished by some protecting power. If the new States, or any one of them, should conquer these islands, their military and naval means could not secure (them) against the occurrence of scenes so

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, XI, enclosed with Middleton to Clay, July 15/27, 1825, which see below, pt. XII, doc. 1024. See also *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 850, where it is printed.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

horrid and sanguinary. Having regard, therefore to circumstances, and in a commercial point of view, the United States are perfectly well satisfied with the political condition of these islands, under the rule of their Metropolis; but they could nor regard, as indifferent to their interests, the armed intervention of any other nation.

All the Powers that have possessions in the American Archipelago, are deeply interested, in preventing the subversion of the existing order in these islands. Although Russia be not thus situated, yet the acknowledged beneficence of His Imperial Majesty and his disposition to maintain all legitimacies, induce the hope, that he will not decline to aid in promoting the *only means* that can be suggested, for avoiding an increase of evils to Spain and the civilized world.

The means are pointed out, in the enclosed Copy.

The government of the United States, better able to judge, from its geographic position, and the information it has collected as to the actual condition of the New States, of the probable chances of the present war, than governments more remote, conceives itself authorized, without temerity, to express its opinion as to the best mode of closing a source, already fruitful of evils to humanity, and which threatens to discharge its stream of larger volume.

In this question, it is not to be decided, what are the true principles of right. As to these, there may, or may not be, difference of opinion. The question is, to establish the facts. When facts have spoken, right has been annulled. It only remains to do the good that may be effected, since all that is desirable cannot be accomplished; and if, at this moment, active measures be not taken, to save to Spain, her remaining colonies, the occasion may be forever lost.

Having invited serious consideration of the urgency of the case presented, the Undersigned has but to pray His Excellency, Count Nesselrode, to accept [etc.].

1024

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

ST. PETERSBURG, July 15/27, 1825.

SIR: I had the honor of receiving your despatch No. 1² on the 28th. of June (o. s.) The Emperor was at that period absent from this residence but expected about the 5th. of the present month. Count Nesselrode had pre-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, XI. This was printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 849.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

ceded him by a few days, & had announced by a circular letter dated 24th June, that he had resumed the direction of the Imperial Ministry of foreign affairs.

I conceived it would be best to lose no time in opening the matter committed to my care by your instruction contained in the despatch above mentioned. After having carefully weighed what would be the best mode of proceeding, I mentioned to the Count the purport of the instruction. He gave me at first no great encouragement, adverting to the essential difference in our way of thinking on the question between Spain & her Colonies. I begged leave however to furnish him with a Copy of the Despatch (as you had permitted) in order that he might lay it before the Emperor. Accordingly, on the second of July, a Copy of your instruction, together with a short introductory note, was sent in (see the accompanying paper.¹)

I conclude from my knowledge of the modes of proceeding in all matters of general concern, that the proposition is in consideration between *the Allies*; it being a fundamental maxim with them not to take any determination in matters affecting the general policy, without the mutual consent of the parties to the Alliance.

I trust that I need not add that every endeavour shall be made on my part to give effect to your proposition.

I have the honor [etc.].

1025

*Count Nesselrode, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia, to Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia*²

[TRANSLATION]

ST. PETERSBURG, *August 20, 1825.*

The Undersigned, Secretary of State directing the Imperial Administration of Foreign Affairs, hastened to submit to the Emperor, the note which Mr. Middleton Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, did the honor to address him, on the 2 of July last,³ accompanying the copy of a dispatch from Mr. Clay, in which that Minister in the name of the Cabinet at Washington, urges the necessity of confirming the general peace, by terminating the contest of the Spanish Colonies against the Government of His Catholic Majesty; of securing to Spain the peaceful possession of the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico; and of effecting these objects, by the impartial intervention of Russia.

¹ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1023.

² MS. Dispatches from Russia, X, enclosed with Middleton to Clay August 27/ September 8, 1825, which see below, pt. XII, doc. 1026. It is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 850.

³ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1023.

The principles of the Emperor were sufficiently known to the Government of the United States, to justify the perfect confidence, that in expressing a wish for the continuance and confirmation of the peace enjoyed by the world, it did but represent the most sincere desire of His Imperial Majesty; that in professing a generous solicitude for the rights of Spain over her islands in the West Indies, it avowed principles that had long since been adopted (by) Russia as the bases of her political system; and that in anticipating perfect impartiality and true disinterestedness from her intervention, it was not deceived as to the sentiments of the Emperor, in relation to all arrangements in which Foreign Powers might be pleased to claim or admit, his good offices.

His Imperial Majesty felicitates himself with having inspired this confidence in the United States of America; and the Undersigned is charged to invite Mr. Middleton, to convey to his Government, the assurance of the high value, at which the Emperor estimates those sentiments, of which, new evidence is furnished by its present propositions.

The opinions of his Imperial Majesty as to the question discussed by Mr. Clay in his dispatch, cannot be concealed from the Cabinet of Washington. His Imperial Majesty has ever thought, that Justice, the law of Nations, and the general interest in having the indisputable titles of Sovereignty respected, could not allow the determinations of the Mother Country in this important case, to be prejudged or anticipated. On the other side, whenever Spain has wished to discuss the future condition of South America, she has addressed overtures to all the Allied Powers of Europe. It will not be possible therefore for His Imperial Majesty to change principles in this negotiation, nor to institute it separately (*isolément*); and until positive information has been received of the ulterior views of Spain in regard to her American possessions, of her decision upon the proposition of the United States, and of the opinions of her Allies in relation to the same subject, Russia cannot give a definitive answer.

She is however, in the mean while, pleased to hope, that the United States becoming every day more convinced of the evils & dangers that would result to Cuba and Puerto Rico from a change of government, being satisfied, as Mr Clay has said in his dispatch, with the present commercial legislation of these two islands, and deriving an additional motive of security from the honorable resolution of Spain not to grant to them, any longer, letters of marque, will use their influence, in defeating as far as may be in their power, every enterprise against these islands, in securing to the rights of His Catholic Majesty constant and proper respect, in maintaining the only state of things that can preserve a just balance of power in the sea of the Antilles, prevent shocking examples, and as the Cabinet of Washington has remarked, secure to the general peace, salutary guaranties.

The undersigned seizes with pleasure, this occasion, to repeat [etc.].

1026

Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States¹

ST. PETERSBURG, August 27/September 8, 1825.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a Copy of the answer of the Russian Secretary of State² to my Note of 2d July last, by which I had communicated to this Government *in extenso* the instructions I had received by your despatch No. 1.³

I think I am warranted in considering this answer to be *in substance*, (when divested of its diplomatic garb,) in every respect as favorable to the views developed in your despatch, as could possibly be expected to be given by this Government standing in the predicament it now does. We are left to infer from it that the proposal that the Emperor shall lend his aid towards the conclusion of the War between Spain & her Colonies by interposing his good offices in the form of pacific counsel to the Mother Country, has been communicated to the Allied Cabinets; and I am fully of opinion, that the majority, if not the whole of them, will agree to it. If such should be the event, the diplomatic Committee, sitting in Paris, will be instructed accordingly. The chief difficulty to be overcome will be in the Cabinet of the King of Spain, where it is understood that *all parties* are opposed to the independence of the Colonies. The necessity of the case, however, begins to be so crying, that a hope may be entertained that even there the counsels of wisdom may 'ere long be listened to. For obvious reasons we must not expect to learn *officially* that such advice as that alluded to above has been given, unless it should be attended to.

I have the honor [etc.].

1027

Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States⁴

Private.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 27/September 8, 1825.

DEAR SIR: You will learn from my despatch of this date all that I can officially tell you. I cannot refrain however from adding, that I beg leave to congratulate you upon the *prospect which appears to me* to open of your succeeding in obtaining the Russian mediation between Spain & the new American States. Matters looked very discouraging when first the proposal was

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X. Printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 849.

² See above, pt. XII, doc. 1025.

³ See above, pt. I, doc. 141.

⁴ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X.

made: but your paper having been admirably translated into French, so as to preserve all its original force, was forwarded to the different Allied Courts, where it has been much admired. I know positively that Prince Metternich approves of your proposal; & as France no doubt wishes something of the kind (which however cannot with propriety come from her) and as Russia assents to every thing which is agreeable to the majority of the Allies, I consider the question as settled. The *advice will be given*, provided Pozzo di Borgo does not get up some Hobgoblin Speech to prevent it. I feel almost assured too that *it will be accepted*: for from some communications I have had with a Person who must be nameless, I know that some of the King of Spain's Friends, who are at the same time friends to their Country, will back the advice by every effort in their power. The answer of the Russian Government has been so long delayed that I fear you will not receive it before the meeting of Congress. I was obliged to be a little importunate to get it even late as it came. But I think a good deal has been gained by the delay, as at first the proposal seemed to be not a little *staggering*.

Excuse the haste of this Scrawl. I ought not to suffer the opportunity which offers to escape.

I am [etc.].

1028

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Confidential.

St. PETERSBURG, *September 18/30, 1825.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward a copy of a correspondence which has lately passed at Stockholm between the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires & the Swedish Government. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the answer to the last communication of Mr. Alvarado, but it seems to be certain that the ships of the line, & the two Frigates it had been agreed to deliver to the supposed agents of Mexico, will not be permitted to sail.

Mr. Alvarado appears to have acted in this business in the strict line of duty. But in the outset, when the sale of these vessels to Spain was proposed to him, he might have gained time by referring to his Government for an answer, which would have prevented Sweden from proceeding in the matter, or at least have deprived her of one of her pretexts for making an immediate sale to others. Subsequently he appears to have been better advised, & he is reported to have [been] egged on by some of his colleagues of the diplomatic corps, who are said even to have draughted the notes for him.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X.

Probably I am supererogating in touching on this matter, as Mr. Somerville will have given you full information upon it, & upon the Agency that Russia & France have had in it. The warmth they have shown upon this occasion, will give some idea of their feelings towards the States of So. America.

Upon the subject of the proposition made to this Government under your instructions of 10th May,¹ I have nothing to add, unless it be, that the little information I can collect tends to confirm my first impressions as stated in my last despatch.² For the rest, until the answer of Spain shall have been received, the question cannot be again taken up in the Cabinet of the Emperor.

1029

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Count Nesselrode, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia*³

[TRANSLATION]

ST. PETERSBURG, *February 27/March 11, 1826.*

The Undersigned hastens to inform the Count de Nesselrode, Secretary of State directing the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs, that he has just received despatches from his Government, with the contents of which he makes it his duty to acquaint His Excellency.

As these despatches are of the 26th December, it is certain that the melancholy news of the death of His Majesty Alexander had not been received at that date. They were there persuaded that his sentiments of humanity and his sound judgment had induced him to interfere by pacific counsels, and that he continued to use his preponderating influence to put an end to the war between Spain and her late possessions on the Continent of America. Full of this idea, the Cabinet of Washington hastened to comply with the wish expressed by His Excellency Count de Nesselrode in his note of 20 August 1825,⁴ to see the United States "use their influence to disconcert every enterprize against the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico," and in consequence Mr. Secretary Clay, by the express order of the President, addressed to the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico residing at Washington, official letters recommending a suspension of every hostile attempt against the islands in question, as a measure calculated to accelerate a general peace and particularly due to the benevolent and friendly procedure of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. Mr. de Nesselrode will find enclosed a copy in the English language

¹ See above, pt. I, doc. 141.

² See above, pt. XII, doc. 1027, Middleton to Clay, August 27/ September 8, 1825.

³ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X, enclosed in Middleton to Clay, February 28/March 12, 1826, which see below, pt. XII, doc. 1030.

⁴ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1025.

of the letter to the Minister of Colombia, that to the Ministers of Mexico being in substance the same.

The Undersigned has received from his Government an express order to explain with entire frankness to the Government of Russia the contents of that letter to the Minister of Colombia. There the remark will be found "that in case of the invasion of these islands by Mexico or Colombia, and of the troublesome contingencies that may result from it, other Governments may perhaps see themselves compelled by their interests and their duty to interfere." In explanation, the Undersigned is authorized to declare to the Count de Nesselrode that the United States, as to themselves, do not desire any change of sovereignty in the island of Cuba: They would be opposed to its cession by Spain to any other European power: nor can they desire that that island should become a dependency of Mexico or of Colombia: But yet, if Spain persists in a war which cannot fail sooner or later to draw all the efforts of the new States upon that island, the only prop which remains to her in the American hemisphere, the President sees no justifiable ground for the forcible interference of the United States to prevent an operation of legitimate war. On the other hand, if the war of the new States against the islands should become a war of devastation; and if, contrary to all expectation, they should be capable of putting arms in the hands of our portion of the inhabitants and of inciting them to the massacre of the other classes; and if, in short, they should encourage excesses and examples the contagion of which might become dangerous to the tranquillity and safety of the neighbouring provinces, then the Government of the United States would not only think itself authorized, but would feel itself called upon to employ force to put an end to such excesses. But, in fact, there is little probability that such a state of things will arise, and it ought rather to be expected, if the war continue, that the United States will remain hereafter, as they have been, heretofore, neutral between the belligerent Powers.

The Undersigned has the honour to represent to His Excellency the Secretary of State, how important it is to obtain from Spain a prompt decision as to her disposition to grant peace to her former possessions on the Continent of America, seeing that the suspension of the expedition against the islands, which will probably take place upon the recommendation of the President of the United States, can in any case have only an extension proportioned to the nature of its object. It is just that this extension should not exceed these limits.

The Undersigned flatters himself that he is right in believing that His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas will deign to continue the work of pacification commenced by the deceased Emperor of glorious memory; and, therefore, he prays His Excellency the Secretary of State to be pleased to take the orders of His Imperial Majesty upon this communication.

The Undersigned has the honour [etc.].

1030

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

ST. PETERSBURG, *February 28/March 12, 1826.*

SIR: I had the honor a few days since to receive your despatch No. 2,² & in conformity to its tenor I yesterday addressed a note to Count Nesselrode of which a Copy is annexed.³

The late occurrences at home, have of course fixed the chief attention of the Russian Government. I am hopeful however that whenever foreign politics shall find room for consideration, the affairs of Spain will come in for a share of the attention of the Emperor, whose *individual & private opinion*, I have been assured, is favorable to the course we wish taken in the question relating to the pacification of the late Spanish Colonies.

I have the honor [etc.].

1031

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*⁴

[EXTRACTS]

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 18/30, 1826.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 3⁵ by Mr. Wyer, who arrived here on the 5th of this month (23d June O. S.). . . .

I reminded his Excellency [Count de Nesselrode] of the object of the Suspension of the meditated attack upon Cuba & Puerto Rico, by the new States of Mexico & Colombia, remarking that we had yet had no *official* information of any attempt on the part of Russia to interpose her good offices in the form of pacific counsel to Spain, conformably to the request of the United States, which the answer under date of the 20th August 1825,⁶ had allowed us to hope would be granted. He replied, that the proposition we had made had been forwarded without loss of time to the Cabinet of Madrid, accompanied by such observations as should have tended to ensure it a favorable reception; that no answer had ever been returned; that they had in their instructions to their Minister at Madrid insisted upon his urging a decision upon the prop-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, X.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 152, Clay to Middleton, December 26, 1825.

³ See above, pt. XI, doc. 1029.

⁴ MS. Dispatches from Russia, XI.

⁵ See above, pt. I, doc. 158, Clay to Middleton, April 21, 1826.

⁶ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1025.

osition of the United States, & stated that courtesy would require an answer to the United States; still no answer has until this time been given, probably from the difficulty of coming to a decision in a matter so grave.

I then stated to the Count the substance of the Letter of the Colombian Minister of 19th March to yourself,¹ & also of your Letter to Mr. Everett of the 13th April,² instructing him to propose on the part of Colombia an armistice for ten years. I observed to the Count that in this form the ground of the contest would be left untouched, and the rights and pretensions of either party uninfringed. I was sorry that I could not put him in possession of the correspondence between the Colombian Minister & yourself, as it had been your intention, or of your Letter to Mr. Everett, it having been unintentionally omitted to forward copies to me. The Count appeared gratified to learn that the proposal of an armistice had been made by Colombia, and it seemed to me, evident that his personal conviction was that it ought to be accepted by Spain. He requested that I would communicate the information I had just given in a *note verbale* or make memorandum thereof in any other form I might think proper, in order that he might submit the same to his Majesty the Emperor, along with the request of his co-operation. The day following I sent him an extract from your despatch containing the proposition of the armistice to be offered at Madrid by Mr. Everett at the instance of the Colombian Government. In a subsequent conversation (on 16/28 July) with the Secretary of State, he repeated his expressions of satisfaction at the proposed armistice, & assured me that want of time alone prevented his giving a written answer to my communication, the Emperor being that day about to leave Petersburg, but that it should be the first in order of all the matters he should take up at Moscow, where I might expect a full communication upon the subject.

. . . Upon the whole, I feel fully confident that although this Government, to be consistent with its own declared principles, would never forestall the determinations of the Parent Country, yet does it by no means countenance a farther persistence on the part of Spain, in her blind and narrow policy, & on occasion of the proposed armistice, I have great expectation that she will be strongly urged to accede to it.

¹ See above, pt. vi, doc. 654.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 157.

1032

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Count Nesselrode,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Russia*¹

[TRANSLATION]

Moscow, August 30, 1826.

SIR: I have the honour to communicate to you herewith the copy of the translation of a note, addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia to the Minister of the United States residing near that Government, dated Santa Fé de Bogota, 17 March last.²

This note relates to the steps taken by the United States to engage the new States of South America to suspend every attack upon the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, a measure which the United States had strongly recommended to the Government of Colombia, and which the latter definitively adopted until the Congress of Panama should pronounce upon the question.

In communicating this paper to your Excellency, I invite your attention to the paragraph in which the Minister of Colombia marks his surprise and expresses his regret "at not seeing realized the hopes of peace which might have been expected from the note addressed to the Envoy of the United States at St. Petersburg." In fact, it would be difficult not to be persuaded that the good offices of Russia have been employed towards Spain in advising her to grant peace to her Colonies:—and certainly no one would think of doubting their efficacy:—but, notwithstanding this, it is still seen with astonishment that until this moment nothing has been able to shake the constancy of Spain in her determination to repel every attempt at reconciliation.

If, to the moment of taking into consideration the question of the attack of the islands, the Congress of Panama should abandon every hope of being able to obtain, peace by other means, it is not at all doubtful that the Representatives of the new States will find it necessary to think of providing for the safety of their constituents by making all effort to chase from their hemisphere the enemy of their tranquillity, and that they will see themselves compelled to conquer peace by a war more active than what has been till now carried on.

Perhaps, Sir, it would be still possible to avert the last blow, which, otherwise, will be immediately aimed at the Spanish dominion in the new world, if His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas is pleased at this moment to join his solicitations to those of other allied and neutral powers, in order to induce Spain to receive the proposition of an armistice lately made at Madrid by the interposition of the United States—an armistice which might naturally pave the way for a definitive accommodation.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, XI, enclosed in Middleton to Clay, September 8/20, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1034.

² See above, pt. VI, doc. 653.

I beg leave to request, Sir, that you will please to lay this note before His Majesty the Emperor, and to take his orders thereon; and I still flatter myself that in the situation of his ally's affairs, he will deign to pardon my importunity, in consideration of the importance of the interests involved in this question.

I am [etc.].

1033

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Moscow, September 5/17, 1826.

. . . I then ventured to suggest my earnest desire to introduce the subject of the war which still continues between Spain & her colonies: That I hoped his policy would lead to some efficient step to put a stop to a contest so hopeless for his ally. He replied with vivacity, that *after what his Brother the late Emperor had done*, & knowing his own opinions upon the subject, I could not doubt of the language he should hold, & he understood that all we wished of him was to give pacific counsel; but, he added modestly, a Sovereign who counts scarce 30 years of age & who has reigned but a few months, cannot expect much deference to be paid to his opinions. He then enquired respecting the *revolution* said to be taking place in the territories of Colombia (alluding to the insurrection of General Paez) & asked my opinion of the capability of those countries to maintain their independence. I replied he himself was a competent judge how little capable Spain is of attacking it: & that with regard to the new States, I felt assured that whatever might be their intestine feuds, there exists but one feeling in relation to Spain, & that resolved itself into an unanimous determination to resist her pretensions.

[The following postscript relates to the same conference:]

Private.

On the same day with myself the Spanish Minister had an audience of the Emperor, for the purpose of presenting to his Majesty the several orders of Spain together with an autograph letter from his Sovereign. I had afterwards at Dinner at the Prussian Minister's on the same day a conversation with him (the Spanish Minister) in which was exchanged some account of what had passed at our audiences. I told him I had urged the Emperor to advise Spain to accept the proffered armistice. He replied that he also had touched on the same topic, & that he had told his Majesty that now he was writing a private Letter to the King, he had an opportunity of doing a deal of good, by advising him to make peace with the colonies. H. G. M.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, XI. The above extract relates to a conference with the Emperor of Russia.

1034

*Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Moscow, September 8/20, 1826.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your despatch No. 4² received just before I left Petersburg for this place. Immediately after the presentation of my credentials, I addressed to Count Nesselrode a note (of which Copy is enclosed)³ together with an extract from the communication of the Minister of Colombia to Mr. Anderson under date of 17th March last.⁴ Having this day had a conference with Count Nesselrode upon the subject of this correspondence, I feel satisfied that everything will be done which depends upon this Government in the way of counsel to induce Spain to accept the overture of Peace made from the New World. The experience of what has happened within the last twelve months is sufficient however to prevent very sanguine expectations being formed of the efficacy of these counsels, for I have every reason to feel assured that during the whole of that period *at least*, the counsels of Russia to Spain have been pacific. It can only have been by some misapprehension that the Russian Minister at Madrid has been supposed *adverse* to peace. It may be that from his care not to seem to anticipate the determinations of the mother country upon the subject of the Independence of her Colonies, his conduct may have appeared doubtful to those who were not in the secret: But it is nevertheless certain that his instructions from the late Emperor Alexander were, to urge the Cabinet of Madrid to consider with its position in relation to the *ci-devant* Colonies—a position becoming every day more critical, & to prepare to make the sacrifices called for by the march of events of too grave a character to be controlled by the slender means at its disposal. I feel satisfied too that Mr. d'Oubril has faithfully performed his duty, but with so much discretion and with so little success, as to be suspected of having taken a different course. Such has been long my persuasion, which now amounts to a conviction, since my audience from the Emperor, & my conference of this day with Count Nesselrode, for a further confirmation of all I advance upon this subject, I beg leave to refer you to the Baron Maltitz, who will receive by the same courier who carries this, a despatch relative to it, of which he will doubtless have the honor to communicate to you the substance.

When I reflect upon the very sensible change wrought upon the dispositions of this Government within the last two years, in relation to the American question, I feel convinced that too much praise cannot be given to the frank and liberal policy of our own, by which this change has been mainly effected.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Russia, XI.

² See above, pt. XII, doc. 1032.

³ Not printed in this collection.

⁴ See above, pt. VI, doc. 653.

*Baron de Maltitz, Chargé d'Affaires of Russia at Washington, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, November 18/30, 1826.

SIR: I made it my duty at the time to render account to the Ministry of the Emperor, my August Master, of the correspondence which I have had the honour to have with you in the course of the month of May last, as well as of the contents of the note which you were pleased to communicate to me at that time, and by which the Government of Colombia declared to the Cabinet of Washington that for the moment it would suspend every expedition against the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico.

That declaration was entirely a mark of respect to the fidelity of the policy adopted by the Government of the United States and to the memory of the Emperor Alexander. In this double relation it afforded to the Emperor my Master a lively satisfaction. His Imperial Majesty saw with real pleasure that agreeably to the principles and to the wishes of his illustrious predecessor, the Cabinet of Washington had used all its influence to maintain to the Antilles the state of possession justified by the incontestable rights of Spain and most agreeable to the interests of all the great maritime powers. The success which has crowned its efforts at Santa Fé de Bogota and that which it expects to obtain at Mexico, have been viewed by his Imperial Majesty as essential services rendered to Spain and to all the Governments which partake of the salutary desire of putting an end to the distractions of South America.

In expressing to you again, in the name of the Imperial Government, the desire of seeing the United States persevere in a system the first consequences of which have been so successful, I experience a lively satisfaction in being able to confirm to you, Sir, all the assurances which I gave you in our former communications relative to the frank and generous co-operation which Russia has not ceased to desire for the work of general pacification. The Emperor, my Master, fully approved of my attention in informing you that incorrect tokens only could have induced the Cabinet of Washington to think that the Minister of the Emperor at Madrid encouraged the Spanish Cabinet to accept no proposition of accommodation with her ancient Colonies.

The instructions, with which the Emperor Alexander had furnished Mr. d'Oubril in that regard, recommended to him, on the contrary, to invite the Government of His Catholic Majesty seriously to consider the position in which circumstances had placed him towards his American provinces, to banish from this examination illusions daily more dangerous, to appreciate the causes of the conduct of the United States, and, as it did not belong to Russia to take the lead of the determinations of Spain, to let her know them

¹ MS. Notes from Russian Legation, II.

as soon as possible in order that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg might communicate them to that of Washington. These instructions have been scrupulously executed by Mr. d'Oubril; they were founded on the just respect with which the rights of Spain inspired Russia, and on the impossibility of giving more positive counsels to an independent State and on a question, if I may be allowed the expression, vital, which he had it in his power to resolve at his will. According to this principle, the correctness of which cannot be called in question, the Imperial Cabinet could only pressingly demand a definitive answer to the propositions of which it had been the organ. This answer, eagerly desired by the Emperor Alexander, came to be requested twice again by His Majesty the Emperor Nicolas. In the month of March he gave orders to Mr. d'Oubril to represent to the Spanish Cabinet that the Imperial Government had expected for six months the result of its deliberations upon the overtures of the United States of America, and that it became necessary for it to come to a decision, after having compared its resources with its desires, and its hopes with the means of realizing them. In the last place again the Minister of His Majesty was charged to remind the Court of Madrid of this imperious necessity, to observe to them that their last note to Mr. Everett, relative to the affairs of America, contained no answer, that nevertheless one was necessary, and that the proposition which had been then made to them, of an armistice to be concluded with the American Insurgents, appeared to His Majesty to offer great advantages.

Such, Sir, is the last state of this negotiation. It will leave no doubt in the Cabinet of Washington of the efforts which the Imperial Government has made to justify the confidence of that of the United States, without however transcending the limits prescribed to it by the rights of Spain, without failing in the respect which her very misfortunes and the difficulty of her position command. Her definitive resolutions will soon be known. The Cabinet of His Imperial Majesty expects it; and it will hasten to communicate them to the Government of the United States. If the Spanish Cabinet kindly receive their opinions and their overtures, the mode of the ulterior negotiations which they shall introduce will remain to be determined on. If it reject them, Russia will have the consciousness of having used all the lawful means in her power to favour a pacific result, and as neither her principles nor her interests would, at least for the present, engage her to interpose in a more active manner in this great question, she would be content to invoke by her prayers the time when Divine Providence shall deign finally to restore to that part of the world internal tranquillity and external peace.

In every case Russia will know how to value the proof of friendship which she has received from the United States of America. This sentiment she will always cause to preside over her relations with them, and I congratulate myself, Sir, in being able to be at this time her interpreter near you.

I have the honour [etc.].

PART XIII
COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN

COMMUNICATIONS FROM SPAIN

1036

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, *September 5, 1815.*

SIR: Under the date of 30th June, I am advised by Lieutenant General Don Pablo Morillo, captain general of Caraccas, and commander of the expedition which His Majesty has destined to re-establish tranquillity at Carthagena, that, with a view to accelerate this important object, he is about to establish the most rigorous blockade of the ports of the viceroyalty of Santa Fé, including Carthagena, and that, in consequence, every neutral vessel which shall be found, not only in those ports, but on those coasts, shall be made prize of, in order to prevent those who have revolted from His Majesty's authority receiving succors of any kind.

I have thought it proper to communicate this to you, for the information of the President, that the injuries may be avoided which would result to the citizens of this republic, if they continue, as heretofore, to trade with the rebels against the authority of my sovereign.

I renew [etc.].

1037

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *December 30, 1815.*

SIR: The diplomatic relations between the King, my master, and the United States being happily restored, and both Governments being disposed mutually to strengthen the ties of the most pure and perfect friendship, it is my duty to inform the President of whatever may contribute to so desirable an object, and remove the obstacles which may prevent it. On the important points on which this note must turn, I have written to you under other circumstances less favorable than the present. I will now confine myself to a plain and simple explanation of them.

The first of these points is, that the direct and official relations between Spain and the United States having been broken off since the year 1808, the

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 156.

² *Ibid.*, 422.

affairs of both nations, as well as their respective frontiers, should now be placed in the same state and situation in which they were at that period; and that, in conformity to this principle, the part of West Florida which the United States took possession of during the glorious insurrection of Spain, and have retained until this day, should be restored to His Catholic Majesty. This just and conciliatory measure, at the same time that it will convince the King, my master, of the purity and sincerity of the sentiments of the American Government, and of their disposition to arrange and terminate amicably the several points of negotiation, will not in the least impair the right which it may believe it has to the whole or a part of the territory occupied, since it will remain subject, exactly as it was before its occupation, to a frank and friendly discussion between the two Governments.

The second point is as simple and obvious as the first, and I will treat of it with that confidence with which I ought to be inspired by the indisputable justice of my importunity, the justification of the American Government, and the importance of the affair.

It is known to you, and is universally public and notorious, that a factious band of insurgents and incendiaries continue with impunity, in the province of Louisiana, and especially in New Orleans and Natchitoches, the uninterrupted system of raising and arming troops to light the flame of revolution in the kingdom of New Spain, and to rob the pacific inhabitants of the dominions of the King, my master. The invasion of the internal provinces, the horrible assassinations committed in San Antonio de Bexar, and the names of the perfidious perpetrators of such unheard-of crimes, have acquired the publicity which great crimes always will acquire. All Louisiana has witnessed these armaments; the public enlistments, (*los enganches públicos*;) the transportation of arms; the junction of the insurgents, and their hostile and warlike march from the territory of this republic against the possessions of a friendly and neighboring Power. Neither threats, nor the laws, nor the indignation of well-disposed citizens, nor even the proclamation of the President of the 1st of September last, intended to restrain these highway robbers, have been sufficient to stop their nefarious plans. On the contrary, they prosecute them with the greatest ardor and rancor, more and more exasperated at seeing the glorious triumphs of the Spanish nation, the adhesion of his subjects to an adored monarch, and the approaching re-establishment of the relations between our respective nations. It is known to me that they are now enlisting in New Orleans men for other expeditions, both by land and water, to invade again the dominions of His Catholic Majesty, under the direction of ringleaders José Alvarez de Toledo and José Manuel de Herrera, who has just arrived in that city with the appointment (as he says) of minister to the United States from the self-styled Mexican Congress, who has delivered to Toledo fifteen hundred commissions in blank from that body of insurgents, that he may confer them on a like number of officers which he is

recruiting in the territory of this Union. I omit mentioning to you other innumerable acts of this kind, which prove the publicity of these armaments, and the impunity with which they continue. I will confine myself to stating to you that the most common practice of nations, and the authority of the best writers on public law, would give a right to the King, my master, to require of this Government to deliver up these traitors as incendiaries, enemies of all social order, and disturbers of the peace of his subjects; but as the object of my sovereign is not to avenge himself of these banditti, but to shield his subjects against their barbarity, I confine myself to asking of you to obtain of the President orders for the prosecution of the principal persons concerned in this sedition, that is to say: José Alvarez de Toledo; Anaya; Ortez; the self-styled minister, Manuel de Herrera; Doctors Robinson and Humbert; Majors Piere and Preire, and their followers; that they may be punished with all the rigor which the laws prescribe in cases of this kind; that the troops which they have raised may be disarmed and dispersed, and that the necessary measures be taken to prevent, in future, these evil spirits from having an opportunity of pursuing their designs, and attempting to compromit the good intelligence which subsists between our respective Governments. The President cannot but have seen with sensibility as well the total want of effect of his proclamation of the lenient measures which he had adopted against these criminals, who boast of recognising no law, subordination, or moral principle, as the protection and support which they have received, and do receive, from the authorities at New Orleans, contrary to his express orders. His excellency, as he is encharged by this republic with watching over its security and the observance of its treaties and laws, cannot but consider himself authorized to restrain the projects and hostile measures of a set of adventurers who make open war against a friendly Power from the territory of this confederation, compromitting its tranquillity and high character, by availing himself of the means which the constitution, the laws, and his prudence offer to him for obliging these persons to abandon their designs, and to manifest to His Catholic Majesty the just indignation with which the United States view the hostile plans and the sedition of that band of incendiaries. I am certain that it cannot be concealed from the distinguished talents of the President and yourself, that the point of which I treat is not one under the civil (or municipal) law—in which case my sovereign must have recourse to the ordinary tribunals—but that it is a manifest and flagrant violation of the most sacred laws which bind together nations mutually, perpetrated by the citizens or residents of the Union, of which the King, my master, gives information, with positive and notorious proofs to the Government under whose jurisdiction it has been executed, that they may give him competent satisfaction, with a knowledge of the act, by causing the delinquents to be punished as guilty of high treason against both Governments.

The third and last point is reduced to this: that the President will be

pleased to give the necessary orders to the collectors of the customs not to admit into the ports of the United States vessels under the insurrectionary flag of Carthagena, of the Mexican Congress, of Buenos Ayres, or of the other places which have revolted against the authority of the King, my master, nor those coming from them; that they should not permit them to land, or to sell in this country, the shameful proceeds of their piracy or atrocities, and much less to equip themselves in these ports, as they do, for the purpose of going to sea, to destroy and to plunder the vessels which they may meet with under the Spanish flag. This tolerance, subversive of the most solemn stipulations in the treaties between Spain and the United States, and diametrically opposed to the general principles of public security and good faith, and to the laws of nations, produces the most melancholy effects on the interest and the prosperity of the subjects of His Catholic Majesty. Certain it is that neither Carthagena, nor any other place in the Spanish dominions in this hemisphere, which has revolted, can be in communication with any Power friendly to Spain, since neither on its part, nor on that of any other Government, has their independence been acknowledged; and it is, consequently, an offence against the dignity of the Spanish monarchy, and against the sovereignty of the King, my master, to admit vessels from such places, manned and commanded by insurgents, and armed in the dominions of this confederation; particularly as they are all pirates, who do not respect any flag, are justly considered the disgrace of the seas, and are execrated by all nations.

The three preceding points are of such established equity and justice, that it would be offensive to the delicacy of this Government to suppose that it could delay, under any pretext, to determine on them in the manner I have proposed, and which I have an express order to request (*solicitar*) in the name of the King, my master. The prompt interposition of the President, that His Majesty may be gratified, would be a new testimony of his friendly disposition towards Spain; an evident proof that he is determined to put an end to the incalculable extortions and injuries which Spain has suffered for the space of seven years, from the gang of adventurers who have assailed her from the bosom of this republic; a means of fixing the frank and sincere system of good neighborhood which so much interests both states; and, finally, a sure preliminary to the removal of all the difficulties which may present themselves in the negotiations which ought to terminate all the pending discussions between the two Governments, and to fix forever between them a perpetual and solid friendship.

If, as I flatter myself, the President gives all the attention which is due to affairs of such transcendent importance, and yields to my solicitations, I can assure his excellency, and yourself, that there will be nothing which the King, my master, will not be disposed to do to satisfy this republic, which may be compatible with his dignity and with the interests of his subjects.

I renew [etc.].

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States, accompanying note of January 2, 1816*¹

[TRANSLATION]

SIR: Since the last note I had the honor to address you, under date of the 30th December, I have received positive information that the expedition which the traitor Toledo was preparing in New Orleans against the dominions of the King, my master, has been suspended until the arrival at that city of two bodies of troops, (one thousand men from Kentucky, and three hundred from Tennessee,) commanded by two American citizens, that were to be united in twenty-four days to the army of the insurgents. I abstain, sir, from offering to you any observations on a subject of such high importance, and so well established. I am well persuaded that his excellency the President will easily perceive that if the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Georgia continue, as they do, allowing their citizens to commit hostilities against a friendly Power, notwithstanding the orders he has issued for dispersing and disarming the gang of *desperadoes* headed by Toledo, Humbert, Anaya, Bernardo Gutierrez, Istri, Doctor Robinson, Majors Piere and Preire, and their followers, the King, my master, will have reason to suspect that, if those meetings are not authorized by the Government, they are at least tolerated. All the assurances I may give to my sovereign of the friendly dispositions of his excellency the President will not suffice, when compared with the evident proofs I had the honor to communicate to you in this and my former note; particularly when His Majesty is well convinced of the resources and authority of the Federal Government, and the promptitude with which their orders are strictly observed in the whole Union. I do not entertain any apprehension of the result of the expedition of these incendiaries. The European wars being terminated, His Majesty will be able to direct all his attention, and his powerful armies, to stifle at once the growth of that insurrection; but the philanthropic heart of my sovereign, the humanity by which he is distinguished, and which constitutes the character of the Spanish nation, induce him to wish to re-establish order among the seduced rather by mildness than by the force of arms, which cannot be effected without the effusion of the blood of his beloved subjects. This object cannot fail to be obtained as soon as the Mexican insurgents and those of the internal provinces cease to be furnished, by the citizens of this republic, with arms, ammunition, and troops.

I shall never have the vain presumption to offer you, or the wise magistrate that is at the head of this administration, any observations on the consequences that might result against the interests of this republic by the independence of Spanish America. My wishes are only directed to equal you in

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 424.*

moderation, and to re-establish, on the most firm and permanent basis, the relations between our Governments. This sincere desire will, I hope, serve as an apology for me, while I take the liberty to present an hypothesis in this note.

I grant, for a moment, that all the Mexican empire erects itself into an independent state; that it adopts the wise constitution of this confederation; establishes a complete system of legislation; and, finally, that it enjoys all the blessings of liberty in the same full extent as this republic. It is beyond question that the climate of Mexico is more temperate than that of the United States; the soil richer and more productive; the productions and fruits more abundant, rich, and of a superior quality; and that provisions, labor, wood, houses, clothing, &c. are, in consequence of the mildness and regularity of the climate, much cheaper than in this country. If this event should take place, do you not think, sir, as I do, that so many alluring prospects, and so many evident advantages, will deprive this republic of the successive emigrations from Europe, and, what is more, of a very considerable part of the most useful and industrious inhabitants of this confederation, who would carry with them to Mexico their flour and saw-mills, machines, manufactures, their enterprising genius—in a word, their general instruction, and all the means that actually promote and vivify the commerce of these States? I flatter myself that this event will not happen; but I am fully convinced that the consequences of this hypothesis can be demonstrated almost with a mathematical certainty; and that if the citizens of Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Georgia should reflect deeply on this subject, far from giving any aid to those vagabonds, greedy of the acquisition of gold, and regardless of the happiness of their country, they would unite themselves with the authorities of the King, my master, to punish that gang of perfidious traitors that hide themselves in these States with the criminal design of devastating their country. I hope, sir, you will have the goodness to overlook this digression, to which I have been carried by my warm desire of strengthening the most perfect friendship between the two nations, and to inform his excellency the President that the orders I claim in His Catholic Majesty's name, directed to the trial and punishment of the ringleaders of those armies, and to the prohibition of exporting arms of any kind from this country to the provinces, against my sovereign's authority, are of the greatest importance, and are supported by the existing treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation between Spain and the United States, especially the sixteenth article.

I expect, sir, your answer to these important points, and I have the honor [etc.].

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

PHILADELPHIA, February 22, 1816.

SIR: The letter with which you honored me on the 19th of last month,² in answer to mine of the 30th December and 2d January, had two objects: the first to make known to me the complaints which this Government considers itself as having against Spain for a long time past; the second, to communicate the resolution of the President on the three points embraced in my notes mentioned above.

You state that the President would have wished that I should not have confined myself to bringing forward the complaints of His Majesty, but should have likewise proposed a reparation for those of the United States against Spain.

The claim for damages and injuries of which you speak would have been definitively arranged and settled if the diplomatic relations between the two Powers had not been interrupted since the memorable epoch of 1808; and this Government cannot but know that this interruption ought not to be imputed to Spain; His Majesty having made, from that time, the greatest efforts to maintain them pure and unaltered.

I have assured you verbally and in writing that His Majesty desired nothing so anxiously as to satisfy the United States for every injury they may have received from Spain, and to proceed to give this satisfaction with that generosity and high sense of honor which have at all times distinguished the Spanish character, and which have always shone conspicuously in the conduct of the Government of the King, my master; but all these points, as being anterior to the epoch I have mentioned in my notes, and since then pending between the two cabinets, ought to be the object of a particular negotiation; and nothing is more natural or more conformable to justice and good faith than that, for facilitating this very negotiation, the state of things between the two nations should be reduced to the same footing on which it was at the epoch referred to, since, from that time, there has neither been any official correspondence between the two Governments, nor have the United States received the least injury from Spain; and if they have received any, it has been contrary to the will of His Majesty, and without his knowledge. Of this class, without doubt, is that which you mention in your note above cited, that is, that British troops and agents had been introduced into Florida, and had communication with the Indian enemies of this republic in its last war

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 426.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 18. For Onís's of December 30 and January 2, see above, pt. XIII, docs. 1037 and 1038.

with Great Britain. The rigorous neutrality which His Majesty has observed in the island of Cuba, East Florida, and his other possessions, ought to convince the President that the Governor of West Florida (who is, I suppose, the person to whom you allude) had like orders with the other chiefs to observe the most strict neutrality; and if he has failed in obeying them, he would have been severely chastised, had you have given to me the least intimation as to his conduct.

I will now pass to the second object of which your letter treats; that is to say, to the resolution which this Government has taken on the three points stated in my letters of the 30th December and 2d January.

The first was confined to a request that, in conformity to the principles I have stated, that is, that the affairs between the two nations should be placed on the same footing they were before the interruption of the diplomatic relations between them, His Majesty should be put in possession of that part of Florida which the troops of this Union had occupied. You were pleased to state, in reply, that this Government, believing that it had a well-founded right not only to the part of West Florida which their troops had occupied, but to a greater extent of territory, comprehended in the limits of the viceroyalty of Mexico, had judged that, with the same propriety that the King, my master, occupied those possessions, the United States might retain that part of West Florida they held, until it was decided by a friendly convention to whom it belonged.

Permit me to observe that there is no parity in the cases. The country to which you allude, extending to the Rio Bravo, or Del Norte, has been under the dominion of Spain, not only before and since France ceded Louisiana to His Majesty by the treaty of 1764, but from the time of the discovery and conquest of Mexico, without ever having passed by treaty to any other nation: whereas the Floridas ceased to be a French or Spanish possession, and passed into the hands of England, under the name of East and West Florida, in the year 1763. They remained under the power of His Britannic Majesty, as such, until the year 1783, when, by conquest, the Spanish arms, and by solemn treaty, they passed under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. From this you will infer that, be the interpretation which may be wished to be given to the treaty of *retrocession* of Louisiana, made between France and Spain in 1800, what it may, the two Floridas can never be directly or indirectly included in it; first, because these provinces being in the legitimate possession of England from the year 1763 to the year 1783, France could not cede them to Spain by the treaty of 1764—nor Spain retrocede them to France, not having received them from her, unless there should have been an article on this point, in which express and direct mention was made of the cession; and, secondly, because the two contracting parties (Spain and France) have declared in the most solemn manner, the first, that she did not cede to France any part of the Floridas—the second, that she had not ac-

quired them by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, or of *retrocession* of 1800; nor had had the least intention to set up a claim to them. You know very well that, according to all the acknowledged principles of justice, no one can be put out of the possession of what he holds until the right of the person who claims it shall be proved and recognised; and that, by a natural consequence of this principle, Spain having been in possession of West Florida when the United States laid claim to it, it is proper she should keep it until this republic shows a better right, which ought to be done in a friendly negotiation between the two Powers; and that it would be anticipating the negotiating to begin by taking possession of the territory, the right to which, so far as it respects the United States, ought to be the object of the negotiation itself. These are the grounds which support the first demand I made on you, in the name of His Majesty, in my letter of the 30th December; and I flatter myself that, reflecting on facts so well known, you cannot do less than consider them just.

I pass now to the second point. This is confined to asking the punishment, according to law, of those turbulent and seditious individuals who have taken up arms within the territory of this confederation, and from thence carrying desolation, destruction, and horror into the frontier provinces of the Crown of Spain; and not content with the atrocities they have heretofore committed, they are now actually engaged in recruiting troops, and preparing armaments in the bosom of this country, again to invade these provinces. I have named the ringleaders of these rebels, who have violated the neutrality and the most sacred laws of the United States, by the well-known fact of their having armed in their territory, and marched from thence, in military and hostile array, to subvert the peace and good order of the dominions of the King, my master. I have named Toledo, Bernardo Gutierrez, Doctor Robinson, and others, who perpetrated the horrible deeds at St. Antonio de Bexar; who recruited their troops in Louisiana, and even in the limits of New Orleans, and proceeded from thence, as an army, to assault the province of New Mexico; who committed there outrages never heard of even among savage tribes; and who, after being defeated, again took refuge in the territory of this Union, where they are now endeavoring to raise new forces to repeat the same excesses. Toledo, Bernardo Gutierrez, Doctor Robinson, and their followers, to this time, move about with impunity in Louisiana, and even in the city of New Orleans itself. The infraction of the laws of the United States, and the violation of the dignity and honor of the American people, of which they are guilty, is public and notorious, not only in this country, but in the whole world. I stated to you, in addition, on this point, that the ringleaders I had named to you were expecting considerable reinforcements from Kentucky and Tennessee, to undertake a hostile expedition against the neighboring possessions of my sovereign; and that I had advised that these reinforcements, composed of American citizens, were raised for the purpose of uniting with them.

You were pleased to state to me, in reply, on this point, that the President had determined not to take any part in the disputes which had arisen between His Catholic Majesty and the revolted provinces on this continent; and that, in conformity to this system, the Governors of different States, as well as the President himself, had issued repeated proclamations, directing that all those who set on foot, or promoted the recruiting of adventurers, with the design of invading the possessions of His Catholic Majesty, should be prosecuted according to law; that the information received at your Department, from very respectable persons, is, that the force collected by Toledo is very inconsiderable, and composed principally of Frenchmen and Spaniards, without the territory of the United States, where their laws do not reach; that my statements on this point are not circumstantial; and that as soon as I pointed out American citizens who promoted the expeditions, collected the troops, or facilitated the supplies to which I referred, and if these collections of troops, &c. were in the territory of this Union, they should be immediately dispersed, and the persons implicated should be prosecuted according to law.

To satisfy you on this point, with that simplicity and candor which belongs to me, I will divide into two classes these seditious persons of whom I have spoken to you in my notes. I will include in the first class Toledo, Bernardo Gutierrez, and Doctor Robinson, as violators of the laws of the neutrality of the United States—an infraction so notorious and so evident that I should do wrong to detain you in referring to the innumerable acts which demonstrate it in an incontestable manner. It is known to you, to your Government, and to the whole country, that, with the troops they individually raised three years ago in Louisiana, they marched in military array to invade the internal provinces of the viceroyalty of Mexico; the horrible assassinations they committed, particularly those by Bernardo Gutierrez at St. Antonio de Bexar, are known. And, finally, it is known that, being defeated by the troops of the King, my master, they took refuge again in this country, and that the Government of Louisiana permitted them to remain undisturbed in the very territory whose neutrality they had violated. This single fact is, in my opinion, a sufficient reason why the law should take hold on them before they leave the jurisdiction of the United States to renew melancholy scenes. But I will give to you even new proofs that these highway robbers have not ceased from that time to concert and to realize new projects against the tranquillity of the inhabitants of the dominions of the King, my master.

The annexed copies, marked Nos. 1, 2, and 3, of intercepted letters from Toledo, which have been officially sent to me, prove beyond doubt that Toledo had armed in New Orleans three vessels, in which he carried arms and munitions of war to give support to the insurrection in Mexico; and that he returned to that city, bringing back with him Herrera, who calls himself minister plenipotentiary from the revolted provinces to this Government. You will see with surprise that Toledo, not content with thus openly violating

the most sacred laws of neutrality of this confederation, had the impudence to prostitute the respectable name of this Government, by asserting, in one of his said letters, that the United States only waited the arrival of the minister of the revolutionists of Mexico to acknowledge its independence. The other ringleaders have done the same thing to deceive adventurers, both in and out of Mexico, and even citizens of the United States, seducing them by false assurances that their Government was decided to support them, and that it would proceed immediately to recognise as an independent Power that band of highway robbers and insurgents. From the extract of a letter from a person of the greatest veracity and the best character, now forwarded to you, marked No. 4, you will observe that Toledo had deferred his expedition against the provinces of the King, my master, as I stated to you in my note of the 2d January, as the thousand men he expected from Kentucky, and the three hundred from Tennessee, could not form a junction with him in less than twenty-four days; and in Nos. 5 and 6 you will see this information confirmed under a posterior date, advising me that a number of Americans came down from the States adjacent to Louisiana to join the expedition which Toledo had concerted; and that he (Toledo) would carry with him the engineer Laford, Savary, and one Soubenet.

You will also learn that provisions and a Carthaginian flag were sent to the American brig, the *Tom Bowline*, from New York, at the moment of her arrival at the Balize, by a gun-boat of the United States, with the object, it would seem, of convoying with her the vessels which should sail from New Orleans with munitions of war for the establishment at the new port of Tampico; that they had purchased in New Orleans itself five other schooners, which they are actually arming to cruise against the Spanish commerce; and that it appears that Mr. John K. West, merchant of that place, is the agent for these vessels; and, finally, that in that city there has been a revolutionary junta, at the head of which is Toledo and Herrera, from which has issued the wicked decree mentioned in these letters—that four honorable Spaniards should be put to death for every revolutionist punished by the established laws of the monarchy of the King, my master.

As respects Doctor Robinson, it is notorious that he has been one of the most infuriated enemies of Spain, and the one who has, with the greatest eagerness, promoted the rebellion of the provinces of His Majesty. It was he who introduced himself into the internal provinces to seduce their inhabitants; it was he who sowed the seed of insurrection; it was he who procured intelligence in St. Antonio de Bexar for Bernardo Gutierrez, that he might possess himself of the place, and afterwards murder fourteen Spanish chiefs; and it was he who published, in these United States, proclamations, signed with his hand, inviting adventurers from all parts to form an army, pointing out the places of enlisting men, and the pay of those enlisted; and, in one word, declaring war himself, in a certain mode, against the Spanish nation,

from the very bosom of this republic, as you will find more in detail in the authenticated copy; (No. 7) which accompanies this, the original of which is in my possession.

I include in the second class those individuals who, seduced by the imposture of the principal authors of these hostile expeditions, have assisted, from the bosom of this republic, the revolutionists of Mexico—some by furnishing them arms and munitions of war, others by enlisting themselves, in this country, in the army of the insurgents, which passed over to subvert all order in the provinces of the King, my master. In this number are those other persons whom I have mentioned to you in this and my former notes. The information which I gave you respecting some persons who were preparing hostile expeditions from Georgia against the possessions of the King, my master, you will find established, officially, by the Governor of East Florida, in his letter (No. 8) which accompanies this; in which he advises me that John McIntosh and William Criach, who supported the last insurrection in that province, in the year 1812, are now recruiting in Georgia a considerable number of vagabonds, again to invade the territory under his command.

I flatter myself that this series of acts, so circumstantial, the information of which has been acquired through channels so respectable, will be sufficient to call the attention of the President to the necessity of cutting up by the roots these melancholy abuses, and to shut the door against the continual, violent movements of these turbulent people, who, from the bosom of this republic, make war on a friendly and neighboring Power. It has never been the intention of the King, my master, to request that the punishment of the laws should be inflicted on these disturbers of social order when their guilt is not fully proven. On the contrary, I have informed you that the object of His Majesty is not to take vengeance on these highway robbers, but to shelter his subjects from their barbarity. His Majesty has only thought proper to solicit from the rectitude and circumspection of this Government what might prevent the crimes which are meditated from taking effect, as otherwise it might be too late to prevent them, as the offenders will be beyond the territory of a friend, and at a distance from the arm of the law. Good order requires not only that the offences already committed should be punished, but that those which are contemplated should be prevented: and this is the case of the individuals I have comprehended in the second class. The personal knowledge I have of the rectitude of the President inspires me with a confidence that he will view the acts I have just stated as I do, and proceeding, in this particular case, with that integrity and humanity which is the most glorious distinction of the American character, he will be pleased to adopt those measures which he may believe most analogous to the system which, you tell me, this Government has adopted, not to mix in these dissensions, and not to permit the citizens of this republic to take part in them,

nor to permit its territory to be a shelter to foreigners who try to make war on a friendly Power.

To the third point in my notes, intended to solicit from your Government that vessels from the insurgent or revolted provinces of Spanish America should not be admitted into the ports of the republic, as well because none of those provinces are recognised by any Power in the world, as because the obligations of friendship and good neighborhood demand that we should not in any way contribute to protect provinces or subjects who have revolted, you have been pleased to make known to me that the President, observing the change of government which had taken place among the revolutionists in Spanish America, had adopted the measure of ordering the collectors of the customs to admit every description of vessel, without regard to her character or flag, provided she paid the duties and observed the laws of the country during the time she was in port.

With due respect for the measures adopted by the chief of this confederation, I cannot do less than state to you that the changes of government which have taken place among the revolutionists of Spanish America do not appear to me to afford a sufficient motive for altering the friendly conduct towards a Power with whom one is in peace and harmony. You cannot but know that this measure places these factionists not only on a footing of equality with the Spanish nation, but gives them advantages over all independent Powers, since, according to the laws of neutrality, the United States would not permit any independent nation to arm its vessels in their ports, nor to sell prizes in them, as is permitted to these revolutionists.

By the two acts of Congress, one of the 28th of February, 1806, and the other of the 24th of the same month in 1807, all commerce with the rebels of St. Domingo was prohibited at the request of France. As the treaties subsisting between Spain and the United States place Spain on the footing of the most favored nations, His Majesty considers himself entitled to expect that this republic will now adopt in his favor a like measure during the disturbances in Spanish America, or for such other period as it may be considered proper to designate. Such is the spirit in which I have made the three requests to your Government, stated in my former notes. I hope that the present observations will merit a favorable reception from the rectitude and wisdom of the President and of yourself. I have given an account to my Government of all these particulars, sending it a copy of my notes, and of the answer I had the honor to receive from you. And, in the mean time, I ought to reiterate to you the most positive assurances of the disposition of the King, my master, to maintain and to strengthen the ties of friendship and good understanding with these States.

At the conclusion of your note which I am now answering, you are pleased to make known to me that this Government is anxious to terminate, by means of a friendly negotiation with the King, my master, all pending differ-

ences, and that it will be very satisfactory to the President to know that I am vested with powers to that effect. I have not lost any time in communicating to my sovereign this desire of the President, and I will have the satisfaction of announcing to you what His Majesty may determine on this point; nevertheless, I ought to state to you that although it would be highly flattering to me to treat with you, as your penetration and rectitude would facilitate the arrangement of these affairs, yet it appears to me that, as Mr. Erving has not yet sailed from the United States, the business would be expedited if the President would give him power and instructions to terminate the negotiations at Madrid. This arrangement cannot present great difficulties. The respective rights of each Power being once settled by common agreement, a friendly understanding being had on each point in discussion, and it being determined what are the reciprocal obligations of Spain and the United States, they would be still further obviated if you would have the goodness to inform me, frankly and plainly, as I requested in a former letter, what are the pretensions of right which the United States have against Spain, and what are those for their own convenience, which they desire to realize for an equivalent which may be advantageous to the two nations, to the end that, with the knowledge I have acquired of the mutual interests of both, I may recommend to the attention of His Majesty these particular points.

I renew [etc.].

1040

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, *March 2, 1816.*

SIR: Don Pablo Morillo, commander-in-chief of the forces destined by the King, my master, for the pacification of the viceroyalty of Santa Fé, says to me, under date of the 19th of December last, that, after having compelled Carthagená to surrender at discretion, he had found it expedient, for the complete re-establishment of the tranquillity of the viceroyalty, to continue the blockade from Santa Marta to the river Atrato, inclusive; and to give orders that if any vessel be met with further south than the mouths of the Magdalena, or further north than the parallel of Cape Tiburon, on the Mosquito shore, and between the meridians of those points, she would be declared a good prize, whatever documents or destination she might have; but that he had left open to the commerce of neutrals the two ports of Santa Marta and Porto Bello.

I have the honor to give you this notice, as it may be interesting to the merchants of the United States, and to renew [etc.].

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 156.*

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, *March 25, 1816.*

SIR: I have received your official letter of the 20th of this month,² in which you state that the proclamation of General Morillo is repugnant to the laws of nations, as well because it declares a coast of several hundred miles in a state of blockade, authorizing the capture of every neutral vessel at an unlimited distance from the coast, as that it is an established maxim among nations that a blockade should be limited to the ports where there may be a stationary and not a cruising force sufficient to make the entrance of the harbor or river where it may be placed dangerous; and, finally, even in this case, a vessel ought not to be captured when she is about to enter a port, save only when, after having received notice of the blockade, she attempts to infringe it. You are pleased to state to me that the President desires that I will communicate these observations to my Government, and that I would use my good offices, confidentially, with General Morillo, so to modify his blockade as to make it conform to the laws of nations.

I will communicate to His Majesty, in compliance with the wishes of the President, what you have stated to me in your note; and I will with pleasure avail myself of the departure of Mr. Hughes to write to General Morillo, inviting him, in the execution of his blockade, to avoid the injurious effects resulting therefrom to the citizens of this republic, so far as may be compatible with the security and tranquillity of His Majesty's dominions under his command.

I must, however, observe to you, sir, that General Morillo has a naval force disposable and competent, as I conceive, to the object in view; that, on the 3d of February, there sailed from Cadiz a squadron of a ship of the line, two frigates, and several smaller vessels, as a reinforcement; that, on the coast intended to be blockaded by the said general, there are no other ports of entry for merchant vessels than those of Carthagena, Santa Marta, and Porto Bello; and, finally, that the measure taken by him, not being directed against an enemy's country, is not, as stated in your esteemed note, contrary to the laws of public rights. The object of the general's proclamation is to notify the traders of foreign nations that he will maintain the laws for the regulation of the Indies in their full force; the observance of which had been relaxed, in latter times, by the effect of circumstances, though modified, however, in favor of neutrals, by leaving two ports open to their commerce. You are aware that, agreeably to those laws, no foreign vessel was allowed to trade with the dominions of His Majesty on that continent, without a special license, and that vessels found near, or evidently shaping a course towards

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 157. ² See above, pt. I, doc. 25.

them, were liable to confiscation as interlopers. Not only that part of the coast lying between Santa Marta and the river Atrato, but the whole coast eastward and southward of those points, from the Oronoco to the territory of this republic, belongs to the Spanish monarchy; and, consequently, any vessel whatever found near it, or standing towards it, can have no other object than to carry on smuggling, or stir up a civil war in the King's dominions: in either case, the laws of nations recommend the seizure of the vessels so employed. Actuated by a constant desire to prevent the misfortunes which such injuries might occasion to the citizens of this republic, I have, on other occasions, suggested a very simple mode of putting an end to them, namely, that the President would be pleased to issue orders that no vessel should be cleared at the custom-houses save for a specified port, according to the general practice of nations. The practice of clearing many vessels for the *West Indies*, generally, carries with it a suspicion of a design to carry on a contraband trade, or to disturb the public tranquillity in the dominions of the King, my master; and, therefore, the owner who clears out his vessel in this way, and without the certificates of the Spanish consuls, cannot complain if it be detained as suspicious. In fact, what difficulty can a merchant, acting fairly, have to specify the port of Havana, Kingston, Santa Marta, Guaira, Porto Bello, Rio Janeiro, or any other of an independent nation? None, unquestionably; since, in case of not finding a good market at one place, he proceeds to another, with a declaration made at the port he touched at of the motives which obliged him to alter his destination. The wisdom and humanity which eminently distinguish the President and the administration cannot fail to perceive the solidity of these observations, nor to approve of the policy of His Majesty in taking the most suitable and effectual measures to secure his subjects from the civil war which a number of adventurers are endeavoring to kindle in his dominions; and I therefore flatter myself that he will be pleased to take into consideration the expediency of adopting the measure I have had the honor to suggest to you, by preventing the collectors of the customs from clearing out vessels, except for specified ports, and notifying merchants trading with the possessions of the King to conform to the established rules and orders, regulating not only neutrals but Spanish vessels also, that they may avoid the consequences of their non-observance, notwithstanding His Majesty's desire to afford them, within his dominions, all the benefits and advantages compatible with the public safety and his royal interests.

I hope that the explanation which I have thus taken the liberty to make, until I have received the answer of the King, my master, will quiet the anxiety of the President as to the proclamation of General Morillo, and that it will be viewed by him as a continuation of my earnest desire to reinstate the commerce of the two nations, reciprocally, on the most liberal and favorable footing.

I renew [etc.].

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to Pedro Cevallos, First Minister of State of Spain*¹

MADRID, September 26, 1816.

SIR: I am ordered by my Government to apply to His Majesty, through your excellency, for the restitution of sundry American vessels and cargoes which have been seized and brought into Carthagena, or other places within that command or viceroyalty, under pretext of a pretended blockade, issued by Don Pablo Morillo, in December, 1815.

When that blockade was communicated to the American Government, Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, in a note of March 20, 1816, addressed to His Majesty's minister at Washington, formally protested against it; and it was hoped that, on proper representations being made by that minister to General Morillo, he would retract his measure, or, if not, that His Majesty, being made acquainted with the remonstrance of the American Government, would immediately send out orders which might produce the same effect, and assure for the future due liberty to the American commerce in those seas.

But it now appears that, as late as the month of June, no alteration had taken place in the measures of Morillo; no attention had been paid to the interference of Don Luis de Onís; and, finally, the commissioner, Mr. Hughes, who was sent by the Government of the United States to Carthagena, for the purpose, amongst others, of reclaiming the property seized, was obliged to return to the United States, on that point altogether unsatisfied. Indeed, the Viceroy of Santa Fé, Don Francisco de Montalvo, gives this commissioner to understand, by a letter of June 9th, whereof the enclosed is a translated copy, that he (the Viceroy) does not pretend to be acquainted with the law of nations; and, at the same time that he goes on executing the arbitrary and illegal decrees of General Morillo, devastating the commerce of the United States, he refers the American Government to His Majesty for redress.

It is therefore that I now find it necessary to write to your excellency upon this disagreeable subject.

It is in vain, sir, to hope that the United States will ever consent to blockades upon the principles of General Morillo; they will acknowledge none to be valid which are not strictly conformable to the well-known principles of public law—principles most clearly defined and quite indisputable, to which the United States have always adhered in their own practice, and to the infringement of which, in any form, in any degree, or under whatever pretext, they have always opposed themselves.

The blockade of General Morillo is repugnant to the law, because it extends over several hundred miles of coast, and to an indefinite distance from the shores; of course it cannot be enforced as a blockade, but remains a bare

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 158.

pretext for spoliation. A blockade by sea, to be acknowledged as valid by the United States, must be confined to particular ports, each having a force *stationed* before it, sufficient to intercept the entry of vessels; and no vessel shall be seized, even in attempting to enter a port so blockaded, till she has been previously warned away from that port.

I may be excused from dilating on rules so perfectly established, so consonant to justice and to reason, in writing to a person of your excellency's knowledge and experience.

His Majesty, who does not fail, through his minister, Mr. Onís, to assure the United States of his constant disposition to cultivate relations of friendship with them, and to that end to satisfy all their just reclamations, will certainly be sensible to the violent proceedings of which my Government now complains, and, I persuade myself, will not hesitate in ordering that the proclamation of embargo issued by General Morillo be declared null, and that all the American property which may have been taken under it be immediately restored to its owners.

In this confidence, I annex hereto a list of the vessels already known to have been captured.

Renewing, [etc.].

Schooner *Adeline*, of Baltimore, at Carthagena; *Friend's Hope*, of Baltimore, at Carthagena; schooner *Count*, of Baltimore, at Carthagena; *Charles Stewart*, of New Orleans, at Santa Martha; *Edward Graham*, at Santa Margarita; *Ghent*, of Norfolk, at Puerto Cavello.

N. B. It is believed that the cargoes of several of these vessels have been confiscated without even the form of trial.

1043

*Pedro Cevallos, First Minister of State of Spain, to George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain*¹

October 17, 1816.

SIR: Having communicated to the King your note of the 26th ultimo² on the subject of the seizure of several American vessels in the port of Carthagena, South America, in consequence of the blockade established on those coasts by General Morillo, and your demand of their restitution, His Majesty has been pleased to determine that information shall be requested (*se pida informe*) of the court of admiralty on this business.

I renew [etc.].

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 158.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1042.

1044

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to Pedro Cevallos, First Minister of State of Spain*¹

MADRID, *October 25, 1816.*

SIR: By your excellency's note of the 17th instant,² in reply to mine of September 26, respecting the proclamation blockade of General Morillo, and the ravages on the American commerce which are committing under it, I am told that His Majesty has ordered that *information shall be taken (se pida informe)* of the tribunal of admiralty.

That General Morillo has issued such a proclamation as I have described in my note of September 26, is a fact of universal notoriety. Your excellency has had before you, long since, the correspondence between the American Secretary of State and Mr. Onís on the subject, and I have transmitted to you a copy of the letter of Don Francisco Montalvo, viceroy of Santa Fé, to the American commissioner, Mr. Hughes, in which the existence of the blockade is admitted, and in which the American Government is referred for redress to His Catholic Majesty. It was therefore that, by the orders of my Government, I wrote to you on the subject. With the fact which I have above stated before you, I am wholly at a loss to imagine what kind of information the tribunal of admiralty can afford which may regulate the decision of His Majesty on the subject.

The tribunal cannot deny the existence of the proclamation; it cannot show that the proclamation is legal; it cannot deny that American vessels have been taken under the proclamation; it cannot contest the right of the American Government to demand the restitution of such vessels.

In fine, sir, it is my duty to assure you that any demur or delay in affording the satisfaction demanded in a case of this principal importance, cannot but be very sensibly felt by the Government of the United States.

I renew [etc.].

1045

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*³

PHILADELPHIA, *October 26, 1816.*

SIR: His excellency the viceroy of the kingdom of New Granada communicates to me, under date of the 2d of September last, that tranquillity being restored throughout the whole kingdom of Santa Fé, and all its provinces

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 158.*

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1043.

³ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 159.*

having submitted to His Majesty's Government, the commander-in-chief, Don Pablo Morillo, has thought fit to raise the blockade which he had established on those coasts, the causes having ceased which obliged him to impose it; and that, in consequence of this determination, the before-mentioned viceroy has been pleased to open the provinces of that kingdom, and particularly the port of Carthagena, to the commerce of the Powers in amity with His Majesty, under the regulations specified in the printed papers which I have the honor to transmit herewith.

I hope, sir, that you will be pleased to bring this to the knowledge of the President, that he may see the disposition of His Majesty to favor the commerce of this republic in every thing that may be compatible with the security of his dominions, and that comports with his interests.

I renew [etc.].

1046

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1817.

SIR: The mischiefs resulting from the toleration of the armament of privateers in the ports of this Union, and of bringing into them, with impunity, the plunder made by these privateers on the Spanish trade, for the purpose of distributing it among those merchants who have no scruple in engaging in these piracies, have risen to such a height, that I should be wanting in my duty if I omitted to call your attention again to this very important subject.

It is notorious that, although the speculative system of fitting out privateers and putting them under a foreign flag, one disavowed by all nations, for the purpose of destroying the Spanish commerce, has been more or less pursued in all the ports of the Union, it is more especially in those of New Orleans and Baltimore where the greatest violations of the respect due to a friendly nation, and, if I may say so, of that due to themselves, have been committed: whole squadrons of pirates having been [fitted] out from thence, in violation of the solemn treaty existing between the two nations, and bringing back to them the fruits of their piracies, without being yet checked in these courses, either by the reclamations I have made, those of His Majesty's consuls, or the decisive and judicious orders issued by the President for that purpose.

The American privateer *Swift*, which, as I mentioned to you in my note of the day before yesterday, had captured, under the name of the *Mongore*, and the flag of Buenos Ayres, the Spanish polacre *Pastora*, just arrived at New

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 184.

Bedford, is now in Baltimore River; and her captain, James Barnes, who has so scandalously violated the laws of nations, the neutrality of this Government, and the existing treaty, has had the effrontery to make a regular entry of his vessel at the custom-house of Baltimore, declaring his cargo to consist of bales and packages containing silks, laces, velvets, and other valuable articles—all, as you may suppose, plundered from the Spaniards.

The three-masted schooner called the *Intrepid*, lately arrived at New York from Montevideo, is, as His Majesty's consul there informs me, the Spanish vessel called the *Leona*, captured off Cadiz by the schooner *Orb*, of Baltimore, whose armament I denounced to you at the time, and communicated the positive information I had received that her object was to cruise against the subjects of the King, my master. This pirate (for that is the name by which both nations have agreed to consider a privateer of this description) was armed at Baltimore, manned by subjects of this republic, and commanded by a Portuguese called Almeyda, an American citizen.

The schooner *Leona*, now at New York, under the name of the *Intrepid*, and ostensibly owned by one Mifflin, at Philadelphia, had on board, when captured, thirty thousand dollars in specie, three hundred boxes of sugar, some grain, with other property belonging to Moreno, De Moro, and others, merchants at Cadiz; and had a cargo of jerked beef and other articles, belonging, as I have heard, to the merchants in Baltimore who furnished the funds for equipping the *Orb*.

The consul at New Orleans informs me that the pirate Mitchell, with the vessels under his command, fitted out by different merchants at that port, of whom a Mr. Dupuy is supposed to be the principal, has lately taken several Spanish prizes to Galvezton, and that, from the proceeds of their sales, he has remitted to the said deputies one hundred and five thousand dollars, which he has deposited in the Bank of Louisiana, after deducting the shares of the captain and crew, amounting as is supposed, altogether, to two hundred thousand dollars. The same consul adds, that two of the prizes, one from Campeachy and the other from Guatemala, were burnt, and their crews landed by that savage monster near Boquilla de Piedras, that they might be, as they actually were, put to death by his great friend Villapinto, a noted rebel ringleader, who, being pursued by the King's troops, had retreated to the seashore to make his escape. Of ninety men, composing these crews, only nine were saved.

The consul at Norfolk informs me of the arrival there of a privateer schooner from Buenos Ayres, one of several fitted out at Baltimore, and wholly owned there; that, from what he has been able to ascertain, among other vessels, she plundered a Spanish ship laden with a cargo of cochineal, indigo, and specie, to the amount of more than two hundred thousand dollars, and proceeded to Baltimore to divide the spoil among the concerned. The said consul, in the discharge of his duty, and the exercise of his rights,

addressed an application to the collector of the customs,¹ (copy of which is annexed, and also of the answer of the collector,) by which you will perceive that he declines this just reclamation. I could cite innumerable other cases, as well attested as those I have just stated, but I omit them, as their detail would fatigue you, without tending to demonstrate more effectually that they proceed from non-observance by the officers of this Government of the President's proclamation, and of the treaty of limits and navigation between the two Governments. Although His Majesty has too much confidence in the rectitude of the President to doubt that due compensation will be made for these injuries to his subjects, on the same principles as have been observed

¹ The letter from the Spanish Consul to the collector of customs and the latter's reply, reprints from *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 185 and 186, are as follows:

Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul at Norfolk, to Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk

NORFOLK, December 16, 1816.

SIR: On seeing an armed vessel in this harbor, in front of the town, displaying a flag unknown to me, and, I will venture to say, unknown to the United States, and, at any rate, not recognised by them; and there being no doubt that this vessel is one of those known to be committing great depredations at sea on the Spanish trade, and frequently also on ships of all other nations, not excepting those under the merchant flag of these States, I have thought it my duty to apply to you, to request you to give me some information respecting said armed vessel, her character and nationality, and under what authority she navigates the seas as a public or private ship of war, who commands her, and how she is manned, and in what light you view her in your official capacity?

In making these inquiries of you, I hope that you will only see a desire on my part to acquire information upon a question of vast importance to the commerce of Spain, as it affects materially the safety of her merchant ships: whether or not those sea plunderers are to find an asylum in the ports of the United States, which would so greatly increase the means of carrying on their spoliations. I am confident that it is not the wish of this Government to afford any sort of protection to a set of men (for the most part foreigners to the country they pretend to serve) who avail themselves of the dissensions which unfortunately prevail between Spain and some of her colonies, to exercise their merciless rapacity upon the inoffensive merchant, not only of Spain, but in many instances of other countries; and I am too well acquainted with your own character to suppose that you would be inclined to favor them. Indeed, the intentions and good disposition of this Government towards Spain are rendered manifest in the President's proclamation of the 1st September, 1815; and it is there forbidden to American citizens to take any part in the contentions between Spain and some of her distant possessions; and it is enjoined on all officers, civil and military, under the Government, to be vigilant in searching out and bringing to punishment all such citizens as shall act contrary to the intent of said proclamation: and there being a report in town that many of those composing the crew of the vessel in question are Americans, I have thought it necessary to call your attention to this point, not doubting that you will consider it as meriting your particular examination. I will conclude by availing myself of this opportunity to assure you of the great respect with which I remain, [etc.].

Reply of Charles K. Mallory

NORFOLK, December 16, 1816.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your note of this morning. In respect to the vessel which is the subject of it, I deem it only necessary to remark, that she is recognised in this office in no other character than that of any other foreign vessel arriving in our waters from a foreign port; that my duty does not require of me to request her flag, so far as to make it a criterion or condition of her admission into this port; and that I shall take care, in this, as in other cases, to see that the laws of the United States and other regulations of the Government, so far as they come within the sphere of my authority, be duly observed.

I reciprocate the sentiments of respect you express for me, and am, [etc.].

by His Majesty, on other occasions, towards the United States, yet I cannot omit requesting, in his royal name, that, in the mean while, the President may be authorized to take the most energetic measures required by the case, to put an end to these practices, and that he would be pleased to cause the vessels I have before mentioned to be confiscated, together with their cargoes, and security to be given by Mr. Dupuy for the amount of his deposit in the Bank of Louisiana, as being the proceeds of the Spanish prizes made by the pirate Mitchell; and that, as a general measure, every privateer coming into these ports under a flag not acknowledged be detained and sequestered, to be made responsible for the depredations committed by it.

I trust that the President will be the more disposed to accede to this request, as, in addition to its justice, it is strictly conformable to his friendly sentiments towards my sovereign, and the humane principles by which he is characterized.

I renew [etc.].

1047

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1817.*

SIR: On the 1st instant I informed you of the arrival, at New Bedford, of the Spanish polacre *Pastora*, captured by the American privateer *Swift*, under the name of the *Mongore*, and the flag of Buenos Ayres, commanded by a Captain Barnes, a citizen of these States. Two days afterwards I addressed to you another note, stating the arrival, in the river and port of Baltimore, of the said privateer, with the booty piratically plundered from the subjects of the King, my master; and requesting that you would be pleased to obtain of the President such orders as would most effectually insure the confiscation both of the vessel and of the privateer, that they might be made answerable for the damages justly claimed by the owners of the property. Although I am persuaded that it is the multiplicity of business that has prevented your answering my notes, yet I cannot doubt that the President will have given the orders I requested in them. Notwithstanding this, and the application made by His Majesty's consul at Baltimore, in the discharge of his duty, to the attorney for that district, (a copy of which is annexed,) I regret to announce to you that the collector and the aforesaid attorney have thought fit to allow the said pirate to depart; and that, after having ascertained that fact, the said attorney wrote a note to His Majesty's consul, (copy of which is enclosed,) inviting him to call at his house to confer with him on the subject of his note.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 186.*

It is not my wish to trespass on your attention with the reflections that are naturally produced by such notorious proceedings, nor pointedly to notice the incivility of the attorney for that State towards a consul of my nation; my only object is to bring to your view what has occurred in the case of the vessel that, by submitting it to the President, he may be convinced that the injuries sustained by the King's subjects in these ports, by the violation of the existing treaty between the two nations, which has the force of a law, are daily augmenting, and that, the more they are diffused, the more difficult will it be hereafter to adjust the indemnities due to His Majesty's subjects.

I trust, sir, that you will only see in the step I now take a continued proof of my desire to restore that good understanding and sincere sense of justice between the two countries which form the basis of real harmony in every society, and that you will therefore be induced to give this subject all the attention due to its importance.

I beg leave to renew [etc.].

1048

*Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1817.

SIR: I have just learned, with the greatest satisfaction, that the marshal of Baltimore has despatched a boat, with a picket of soldiers, in pursuit of the pirate *Mongore*, which has been brought back to that port, in conformity to the orders which I had flattered myself would have been issued by the President. I shall lose no time in giving an account to His Majesty of the friendly dispositions manifested by this Government; and add the hope that this evidence of it will be the forerunner of sentiments calculated to remove every shadow of misunderstanding between the two Governments.

I offer you [etc.].

1049

*Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1817.

SIR: I have just received information, from the King's consul at New Orleans, of the capture, within sight of the Balize of that port, and at little more than musket-shot from the land, of the Spanish schooner *Hipolita*,

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 186.

Captain Don Buenaventura March, by the pirate *Jupiter*, under the *Margarita* flag. To enable you fully to judge of the atrociousness of this capture, manifestly in violation of the territory of the United States, I have the honor to enclose the declaration of the captain of the said schooner, made before His Majesty's consul at the aforesaid port; by which it appears he was at anchor in the Pass of the Mississippi, and with *Pratique*, from the Balize, on board, when he was boarded by the aforesaid pirate, and so inhumanly treated by him as to be left weltering in his blood on the deck.

It would be superfluous to affect your sensibility by a detail of the multiplied injuries and outrages incessantly sustained by His Majesty's subjects in these ports; they have already been admitted by the President in his message to Congress, recommending the adoption of such measures as in their wisdom may appear best calculated to repress them; thereby offering to the King, my master, a pledge that his excellency admits the necessity of indemnifying them as far as possible. It is, however, with great regret that I have to remark on the delay in carrying such urgent measures into execution, and that the injuries complained of have not been prevented by a due observance of the laws of nations and of the existing treaty, which, by the constitution, has the force of a law in all the courts, in consequence of its ratification by the President and the Senate.

I pray you [etc.].

1050

*Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

February 10, 1817.

SIR: In addition to the schooner *Hipolita*, which I informed you, in my note of the, 16th of last month² had been captured by the pirate *Jupiter*, in the pass of the Balize of New Orleans, at anchor, within musket-shot of the land, I have just received official notice of the capture, by the same pirate, of the Spanish brig called *Reyna de los Angeles*, proceeding from Campeachy. This vessel was also at anchor in the Balize, very near the land, and with the pilot on board to ascend the river; but no consideration was sufficient to restrain that pirate in his injustice. I am informed that Commodore Patterson, in consequence of the reclamation made by the consul of His Majesty in the said port, has despatched a vessel in pursuit of her, and there are appearances that he will succeed in rescuing the prizes, and placing them at the disposition of their owners; but you cannot but know that, if the perpetration of this crime go unpunished, as has been the case on other occasions, or if their es-

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 187.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1049.

cape be permitted, as has happened in Baltimore with the captain and crew of the pirate *Mongore*, neither the vassals of His Majesty will be able to obtain the evidence which might be drawn from their declarations, in order to reclaim their property, nor the crimes discovered that they may have committed, nor the number of these robbers be diminished, who so highly commit the neutrality of the Government, robbing, indiscriminately, the vessels of all nations, confident that all the harm that can happen to them is, that they should be deprived of some of the proceeds of their piracies.

In proof of the solidity of these assertions, I ought to add that, at the time these captures took place at New Orleans, in violation of the territory of this republic, General Hubbert [Humbert?], the chief of a band of robbers, armed and equipped in the province of Louisiana, who had occupied Galvezton, had arrived at New Orleans to solicit provisions and munitions for that establishment. Not only have they been sent under the American flag, but the agent (Mr. de Souvinet) has bought a brig with the products of the robberies of these pirates, which are now deposited in the Bank of Louisiana, amounting to \$180,000, as you will see by the annexed paragraph of the Gazette of New Orleans; and this vessel is preparing to carry more provisions and munitions to that establishment, and to take back to the United States the spoils of the Spaniards, which are not considered secure in that place.

In the port of Baltimore, the brig *Peace*, (*Paz*), mounting sixteen guns, commanded by Captain Stafford, well known for having before commanded the privateer schooner *Maria*, which was confiscated in Port au Prince, has been lately bought for the purpose of cruising against the Spanish commerce. According to information which I have received, the brig called the *Fourth of July* has gone out of that port with the same object, commanded by Captain Watkins, and armed by order of the famous Thomas Taylor, commissioner of Buenos Ayres: finally, schooner *Romp*, whose outrages and piracies are of public notoriety, has again sailed for Norfolk, with the design of equipping there, to proceed again on her cruise.

I consider it my duty to make you acquainted with all these acts, which are in manifest contravention of the treaty existing between the two nations, to the end that the President, giving them the consideration which they deserve, may issue the orders that may appear to him best adapted to restrain them, until Congress determines to destroy them at the root, whereby the commerce of all nations may be secure.

I renew [etc.].

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1817.

SIR: When I had the honor to communicate to you that, in virtue of the orders which the President had sent to the marshal at Baltimore, the pirate *Mongore* had been detained and embargoed in that port, I had a right to believe that the marshal, as well as the attorney of the United States, would have caused the captain and crew to be immediately arrested, to take from them the declarations which public vengeance and the interests of Spain, as well as of this Government, required, to ascertain the names of the vessels plundered by that pirate, the depository of the effects, and the fate of the Spanish crews.

You may consider what was my surprise on receiving positive information that the marshal has liberated the captain and crew of that pirate; that he has not proceeded to take from them any declaration; and has even permitted that the *Mongore* should go to sea again, under bond, to commit her piracies. The said vessel is yet in the river, stopped by the ice, and her captain (Barnes) very tranquil in his house, occupied in taking out of it, publicly, the effects plundered by him, which, it is calculated, exceed eighty thousand dollars in value, without any impediment being put to his proceedings by the authorities at Baltimore.

It is extremely painful to me to interrupt your attention so often, on such unpleasant subjects; but I should be wanting in my duty if I should delay to inform this Government of the manner in which the orders of the President are eluded in Baltimore, in order to heap injury upon injury on a friendly nation, and promote the revolution of its provinces. In vain will it be alleged, in order to cover this proceeding, that the laws are not sufficient to pursue, without a positive evidence, those citizens who commit hostilities against Spain. The treaty which exists between the two nations is a law of the republic; and no tribunal can decline its observance. The proofs of its infraction cannot be more manifest or decisive. The Spanish schooner captured by this same vessel, which is permitted to go out to sea, is now in a port of this Union; the effects on board of the one and the other belonging to the King's vassals. The seamen, the log-book of the respective vessels, and the captain himself, ought to give all the evidence that justice requires to decide. If these are not examined, on the equivocal pretext that they cannot be found, or that there is no evidence for proceeding against them, the consequence will be the continuation of an organized piracy for the robbery of all nations, that public vengeance will remain unsatisfied, and humanity exposed to all the horrors of such highway robbers.

I cannot do less than repeat my solicitation to the President, in the name

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 187.*

of the King, my master, that the corsair *Mongore* may be secured; that the effects found on board may be deposited, as well as those which may have been already discharged from her; that the papers on board be examined, as well as the journals, crew, and captain; and that it be proposed to make all the investigations that would, under similar circumstances, be made in Spain, if a like case should occur to the United States, in order to remedy the damages and prevent their repetition.

I flatter myself that you cannot fail to find my solicitude just, and that the President will accede the more cheerfully to it, as it is agreeable to the sentiments of humanity and impartiality which characterize him, and to the desire which he has manifested to me to strengthen the bonds of friendship with my sovereign.

I renew [etc.].

1052

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1817.

SIR: After my official letters of the 10th and 11th of this month² were written, I received advice from Baltimore that Captain John Chase was now there, and that it was understood that he had left the command of the privateer *Potosi*, (*alias* the *Spartan*, of Baltimore,) and likewise that there were in that city more than thirty officers and sailors who had belonged to the said privateer, and who had come there for the purpose of claiming from the said Chase their portion of the prize money from the Spanish ship *Ciencia*, of which they had taken possession at sea, in the manner you will see detailed in the declarations of four of the sailors of the said privateer, copies of which are enclosed.

This, without doubt, is a case which merits all your attention, as it is proven, in the most positive manner, that a certain number of American citizens had armed and equipped a vessel in Baltimore, had gone to sea in her, and had committed an act of hostility against Spain, contrary to the laws of nations, and in violation of the fourteenth and of other articles of the treaty existing between the two nations; thus compromising the dignity of the United States, who cannot but disapprove such conduct, and violating the rights of the King, my master.

The consul of His Majesty in Baltimore has, without loss of time, proceeded judicially against the before-mentioned John Chase, by soliciting his arrest; and at the same time is taking measures to attach, in the hands of Mr.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 188.

² See above, pt. XIII, docs. 1050 and 1051.

Didier, merchant, of Baltimore, twenty odd thousand dollars, which it is known he has received from the said prize; but I see at once that all the efforts of the consul will be in vain, unless this Government interpose all their authority, by giving the proper orders for vindicating their own dignity, which has been compromitted by the atrocious conduct of these bad citizens. I do not deem it necessary to repeat to you the many observations I have had the honor to make to you, upon various occasions, on occurrences of this kind; and I therefore limit myself to asking of you to communicate this case to the President, who, I ought to expect, will take such measures as he may think best adapted to the correction of this disorder, and for doing justice to the aggrieved party.

I renew [etc.].

1053

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1817.

SIR: In confirmation of what I had the honor to state in my note to you of the 12th instant,² I now enclose a list of the articles which Mr. Henry Didier, a merchant of Baltimore, has landed there, under the usual forms of the custom-house, from on board the American schooner *Remittance*, Captain James Rogers, from Aux Cayes; they being the same which had been plundered from the Spanish ship *Ciencia* by the privateer *Potosí*, Captain James Chase, by whom they were transhipped on board the said schooner, and consigned to the above-mentioned Didier.

In consideration of these proofs, I trust that you will be pleased to obtain from the President the necessary order to effect the delivery or security of this property, for the benefit of its lawful owners; and that you will have the goodness to advise me of the same for my Government.

I renew [etc.].

1054

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States*³

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1817.

SIR: The session of Congress being within two days of closing, and the Senate not having given its assent to the bill passed by the House of Repre-

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 188.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1053.

³ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 188.

sentatives for the purpose of putting a stop to the armaments making in different parts of the Union, in violation of the laws of nations and of the treaty existing between His Catholic Majesty and this republic, I have considered it my duty to represent to you the injuries resulting from this delay to Spain, and likewise to all the nations of Europe; to the end that, if the President sees fit, he may be pleased to cause this subject to be taken into serious consideration.

I renew [etc.].

1055

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, March 10, 1817.

On this affair [proclamation of Morillo] I wrote on the 26th September, 1816, and was answered October 17th, that an "*informe*" should be taken of the *almirantazgo*; I wrote again on the 25th October, and remain *without any answer*.

1056

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State of the United States*²

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1817.

SIR: In an official letter, under date of the 11th³ of last month, which I had the honor to direct to the Secretary of State, I represented to this Government that, contrary to my expectation, I had just received positive information that the marshal at Baltimore had left at liberty the captain and crew of the pirate *Mongore*, and had even permitted her to go to sea to renew her excesses, without having even so much as taken their declarations, which the public vengeance and the interests of both Governments demanded; I dwelt on the great injuries which would follow to my nation from the impunity and toleration which these highway robbers met with in this country; and requested that the President would give the correspondent directions for preventing this injury.

In my official letter of the 12th⁴ of the same month I took occasion again

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 159.

² *Ibid.*, 188.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1051.

⁴ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1052.

to call the attention of this Government to the same subject, though in a different case, in consequence of having received advice that Captain John Chase, who commanded the privateer *Potosi*, *alias* the *Spartan*, of Baltimore, and more than thirty persons belonging to her crew, had arrived at Baltimore, of whom four had given very detailed declarations respecting the capture of the Spanish vessel the *Ciencia*, of her halting place, and of the existence in Baltimore, in the possession of Mr. Henry Didier, [of articles] to the amount of more than \$20,000; and requested that the Government would interpose its authority to give effect to the prosecution which the consul of His Majesty had set on foot against the person of Chase, and [to] the legal proceedings under which he has succeeded in attaching, in the hands of Mr. Didier, the said interests; and, under date of the 22d¹ of same month, I enclosed a list of these effects, which were in the hands of Mr. Didier.

I have not, as yet, had the honor to receive an answer to any of the above-mentioned notes; and I have just understood that the authorities at Baltimore, contemning the evidence of the four witnesses who had presented themselves, and the entry in the custom-house, in the name of Didier, of the effects robbed from the Spanish, have permitted the said Captain Chase to go very tranquilly to Norfolk, to enjoy the fruits of his depredations; that, with universal scandal, and notwithstanding the character of Captain Barnes, as a pirate, was established by the decision of the court of the United States in Boston, which had declared as illegitimate his prize, the Spanish schooner *Pastora*, and ordered that she should be restored to her owners, he has sailed from Baltimore, with his privateer *Mongore*, as soon as the ice permitted, and gone down the bay, to go to sea, to repeat his cruelties, without its having been possible for the consul of the King to get the declaration of Barnes and his people taken as to what had been the lot of the crews of the Spanish vessels which they had captured; declarations which, not only by the laws of nations, but by the more sacred law of humanity, should have been taken, considering the vehement and well-founded suspicions there were that they had assassinated all the individuals who had had the misfortune to fall into their hands.

In consideration, then, of the excesses committed against the subjects of the King, my master, and of those which, from the impunity and toleration on the part of the authorities of this country, are in a state to be repeated, with vessels purchased, armed, manned, and equipped in the ports of these States, contrary to all the laws of nations, to the express stipulations of the treaty which exists between the two countries, and to the laws of humanity itself, I cannot do less, in discharging my obligation, than to represent and reclaim, in the name of my sovereign, the damages and injuries which have resulted, and may hereafter result, to his subjects, and to protest against the authors of all of them. At the same time, I cannot omit to beg you, with

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1053.

earnestness, to be pleased to inform me of the measures which this Government may have taken for the purpose of having restored to the Spanish owners the effects of which they have been robbed, and also to ascertain the fate of the unfortunate crews of the Spanish vessels which have been captured and destroyed by the two pirates above mentioned, as likewise by the other two, called the *Orb* and the *Romp*, that were, in like manner, armed in Baltimore.

I hope you will have the goodness to give me the information I ask, that I may bring it to the knowledge of the King, my master.

I renew [etc.].

1057

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1817.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your note of the 13th instant, in which, by order of the President, you enclose a copy of the act passed by Congress on the 3d, entitled "An act more effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the United States," by which the President trusts that my Government will perceive a new proof on the part of the United States of a desire to cultivate just and friendly dispositions towards Spain.

I cannot but be highly gratified by all those occasions on which the Government of these States manifests a disposition corresponding with that entertained by the King, my master, to maintain and strengthen the amicable relations subsisting between the two nations; and I therefore hope that the President will cause the most effectual measures to be taken to enforce an observance of this law by the officers of this Government, with greater exactness than has hitherto been paid to the existing laws, and to the express stipulations of the present treaty between the two nations.

I shall embrace the first opportunity to transmit a copy of this act to my court, for the information of my sovereign; and, with renewed assurances [etc.].

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 189.

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1817.

SIR: I have just been informed that there have entered at Norfolk two pirates, under the flag of Buenos Ayres, the principal of which is called the *Independencia del Sud*, armed with sixteen guns and one hundred and fifty men; her captain is the well-known pirate called Commodore Chaytor. The second is the schooner *Romp*, which, to enter that port, has her name changed to that of *Altavela*; she has a crew of seventy men, and appeared to be commanded by a person called Grennolds. Both vessels were built and fitted out at Baltimore, belong to citizens of that place, and others in this republic, and their crews and captains are of the same. Their entrance into Norfolk has been public, to revictual and return to their cruise against the subjects of the King, my master; but their principal object is to place in safety the fruits of their piracies, which must be of great importance, if we attend to the information from Havana, which states that they have robbed a single Spanish vessel coming from Vera Cruz of ninety thousand dollars; and to the fact that, on the 21st of the present month, they had deposited sixty thousand dollars in the Bank of Norfolk, had landed a number of packages of cochineal, and had declared that they had taken to the amount of two hundred and ninety thousand dollars. I am informed that the person called Commodore Chaytor was about to set out for Baltimore, probably to settle accounts and divide his robberies with the persons interested in the outfit. It is a circumstance worthy of remark, that these two pirates saluted the fort at Norfolk, and that it returned the salute upon the same terms as would have been done with a vessel of war of my sovereign, or of any other nation acknowledged by all independent Powers.

It would be superfluous to take up much time in representing to you how sensible my sovereign, and likewise all maritime nations, must be, to see that their flags are treated on an equality with pirates in the territory of this Union. So obvious a reflection cannot be withheld from your knowledge and that of the President. I therefore do not doubt, that if, as I persuade myself, there has been a mistake in the honors paid to these pirates, you will be pleased to disapprove of the conduct of the commander of the fort, and give suitable orders to prevent its happening in future.

At the same time that I expect this measure from the justice of the President, I claim, in the name of the King, my master, that all steps be taken for the arrest of these pirates, whether they be at Norfolk, or that they repair, as is probable, to Baltimore, where their principal associates are; that they be proceeded against according to the act of Congress of the 3d instant, and to

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 189.*

the stipulations of the treaty between His Majesty and this republic; that legal means be taken to ascertain all the captures made by them during their cruise, the fate of the Spanish crews that have fallen into their hands, and the places of deposit of the property taken from on board them, in order that, by attaching the same by the competent tribunals, it may be held for the disposal of the owners who may prove their property.

This request, being moreover founded in justice, is supported by the friendly sentiments of this Government towards His Catholic Majesty, by the assurances which the President has given to me of his sincere desire to put an end to a piracy which, although in opposition to the sentiments of the administration, highly compromises the dignity and character of a people distinguished for their rectitude, morality, and refined virtue. I, therefore, cannot but confidently hope that you will enable me to inform my Government of the measures which may be taken in this matter

1059

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

March 26, 1817.

SIR: The pirate *Orb*, fitted out at Baltimore, under the name of the *Con-greso*, and flag of Buenos Ayres, commanded by Joseph Almeyda, a Portuguese, and a citizen of this republic, has had the audacity to return and enter the said port, there to deposit a part of his robberies. The piratical character of this vessel is as fully acknowledged, as it is proved that she was armed and manned with people of this country and of others in the above-mentioned port, and that she had made different prizes in the neighborhood of Cadiz and other points, since there now is in the port of New York the Spanish polacre, the *Leona*, captured by her, whose cargo, consisting of two hundred thousand dollars, is concealed—where, it is not known; and in the same port of Baltimore, there are deposited the proceeds of the Spanish brig *Sereno* and her cargo, captured by the same vessel. No evidence can, in my judgment, be offered, which gives greater certainty to facts so notorious. If, by chance, anything could be added thereto, it would be the acknowledgment of their atrocities. Nevertheless, I have the mortification to say, that neither this notoriety nor the reclamations of His Majesty's consul at that port have as yet been sufficient to produce those steps which are required by humanity, to secure the person of this notorious pirate, to take the declarations of the crew, and to prevent their enjoying their plunder to the prejudice of the lawful owners.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 190.

I think it my duty to bring this incident to your knowledge, and I doubt not that the President, when informed thereof by you, will take it into the serious consideration which it merits, and give the most positive orders that a suit be instituted against this pirate, that an attachment be laid on all his property and funds wheresoever they may be placed throughout this republic, and that they be held at the disposal of those owners who may prove their property.

As I propose to despatch a messenger in a few days to my Government, and it will be very agreeable to me to give to His Majesty an assurance that the United States are seriously disposed to put an end to the injuries resulting to Spain from the non-observance of the treaty between the two nations, I will thank you to inform me as speedily as possible of the measures which may be taken in this case, and in that on which I address you in a separate despatch of this date.

1060

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, *March 29, 1817.*

SIR: By your note of yesterday² I am apprized that the President, on being informed, by the notes to which you have replied, of the audacity with which the pirates armed in this country introduce into it the fruits of their robberies, has been pleased to give suitable orders to the authorities at Norfolk and Baltimore that, having ascertained the facts which I have brought to his knowledge, they should duly proceed according to law against the violators of the laws of this republic. The district attorney for the United States at Baltimore has replied to the King's consul there that he has no evidence upon which he can proceed against Captain Almeyda; but if a witness should offer, who will depose to the facts referred to, he will proceed to order an embargo to be laid on his vessel. I am perfectly aware that good order, the personal security of individuals, and the prevention of any violence being committed upon them, require that suits should be instituted according to the rules of court: but when a crime is notorious to all, and is doubted by none; when the tranquillity and security of the state, the honor of the nation, and the respect that independent Powers owe to each other, are interested in putting a stop to crimes so enormous as those I have had the honor to denounce to you, it appears to me that the magistrates are authorized to collect a summary body of information, to inquire whether the public opinion is

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 190.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 34.

doubtful, and if there be ground to institute a suit. The collector of the customs cannot be ignorant that the three vessels which I have named to you were built and fitted out at Baltimore; that they were cleared at that custom-house as Americans; that their crews were, at their departure, composed of citizens of this Union, as were their captains; and that the effects which they have landed can only come from Spanish countries. What stronger testimony (if more is wanted) than their own declaration can be desired, to proceed against these pirates?

The ships' papers, the declarations of the crews, the log-book, are all testimony which can throw light upon the truth or falsehood of the crime alleged, and makes it unnecessary to trouble them, until it be ascertained that there is ground for proceeding judicially against them.

It must have been known to you, sir, that when the rebel *Mina* armed and equipped at Baltimore for the purpose of attacking the dominions of the King, His Majesty's consul presented two declarations, sworn to by two officers, who had accompanied him, setting forth all the plans and projects of this traitor, and the manner in which he had violated the laws of the republic; that, on another occasion, the same consul presented the declarations, on oath, of four sailors of the pirate *Potosi*, stating the prizes they had made, the merchants to whom were addressed the effects stolen from the vassals of the King, and that, in both cases, they were considered insufficient to proceed against these highway robbers, and to afford the vassals of His Catholic Majesty that protection which they had a right to expect of a friendly Power.

At this very moment I have received advice from His Majesty's consul at Norfolk, stating that a quantity of zeroons of cochineal, indigo, and Jesuit's bark, brought in by the two privateers, the *Independence of the South*, Captain Chaytor, and the *Altavela*, alias *Romp*, Captain Grennolds, has been shipped at that port on board the packet which sailed on the 23d instant for New York, in order that, by changing place and appearing to be cleared out by other merchants, the vassals of His Majesty may be deprived of their property, and the pirates and merchants who have fitted them out become the owners of the booty. No one renders more justice to the rectitude of the President than I do, and to the sincere desire that he has to put a stop to practices so contrary to the virtue and good faith which characterize this republic; but it is that very cause which lays me under the necessity of exposing these practices, with an entire confidence that the President will only see in this communication my anxious desire to prevent any obstacles being thrown in the way of the friendly arrangement now pending between the two Powers. The treaty of limits and navigation existing between them establishes, in the most positive manner, that the two nations have agreed to consider as pirates all vessels fitted out in the two countries, respectively, manned and commanded by their respective subjects or citizens, acting in a hostile manner against one or the other of the two contracting parties under

a foreign commission. The acts of Congress of the 5th of June, 1794, of the 14th of June, 1797, and the second section of that of the 30th of April, 1790, prescribe the punishment to be inflicted on these persons, and the steps to be taken on both sides to restore the property to its lawful owners.

I rely on your justice and friendly sentiments towards my Government for promoting with the President such orders as, in his wisdom and foresight, will seem to him best adapted to prevent the evasion of the laws, and the sacrifice of that portion of His Catholic Majesty's subjects who have been robbed by these pirates.

I renew [etc.].

1061

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1817.

SIR: Although I have always made it a duty not to intrude on the attention of this Government by remonstrances which are not founded on incontestable facts, or at least on moral evidence, yet it appeared to me, in the conference which I had with you yesterday, that you were not satisfied with the complaints I lately addressed to you against the pirates *Potosí*, *Mongore*, *Congreso*, *Independencia del Sud*, and *Altavela*. I have now the honor to annex a copy of a letter from the owners of the Spanish ship *Nuestra Señora de los Dolores*, and of one from the consignee at Havana, by which you will be informed that the said vessel was captured near to Cadiz by the pirate *Independencia del Sud*, Captain James Chaytor.²

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 191.

² The three enclosures mentioned, reprinted from the same volume, pp. 191 and 192, are as follows:

No. 1.—Francisco de Paula de Maura to Thomas Stoughton

HAVANA, December 17, 1816.

SIR: The foregoing is a copy of my last of the 4th instant, which I confirm. I am again obliged to trouble you by requesting you would be on the watch, if the ship called the *Na. Sa. de los Dolores*, alias the *Primera*, should put into any port of the United States; which vessel I despatched for Cadiz on the 10th of July, under the command of Captain Nicholas Larrea, with a cargo of sugar consigned to the owner, Don Juan Fscó. de Vergara, of the same place, who, under date of the 3d of September, informs me of her capture on the 27th of August, near Cape St. Vincent, by the privateer *Independencia del Sud*, Captain James Chaytor, and gives me authority to claim or ransom her, as you will see by a copy of his letter, enclosed. I therefore hope you will do me the favor to advise me of whatever may turn up in the affair, that the requisite orders may be promptly given.

No. 2.—Juan Francisco de Vergara to Francisco de Paula de Maura

CADIZ, September 3, 1816.

SIR: On the 27th of August last, at the distance of twenty-two leagues from Cape St. Vincent, the ship *Na. Sa. de los Dolores*, alias *Primera*, Captain Nicholas Larrea, which sailed on the 10th of July of the present year, was captured by the insurgent

I also enclose to you the declaration, on oath, of Joseph Ojeda, captain of the Spanish schooner *Catalina*, captured by the pirate Almeyda, commanding the *Orb*, alias the *Congreso*. By this declaration you will see the number of Spanish vessels he has plundered, those he has burnt, and those he has sent to other ports. I flatter myself that you will find in these documents, if not all the evidence required by the laws of the United States for the punishment of a man who has committed so many atrocious acts, at least sufficient to

schooner brig of Buenos Ayres, called the *Independencia del Sud*, commanded by James Chaytor. On being captured, Captain Larrea endeavored to ransom his vessel and cargo, and the commander of the privateer actually agreed to estimate the sale at \$50,000, including therein \$5,000 for the vessel, the ransom to be paid in Cadiz. When they were on the point of drawing up the necessary writings, the brig *Golondrina*, from Cumana, appeared in sight, which being likewise made prize of, she was afterwards liberated to carry to Cadiz the crew of the *Primera*, and on that account the ransom was not carried into effect. As it appears, by information, that the privateer which captured her was fitted out in North America, and commissioned by the insurgent Government of Buenos Ayres, she will be purchased for little or nothing. I understand that she will be ordered to the Cayes of St. Louis, St. Thomas, St. Bartholomew, North America, Jamaica, or some other English port. It will, therefore, be for my interest and that of your brother, Don Pascal, &c.

No. 3.—Declaration of Diego José Ojeda

BALTIMORE COUNTY, State of Maryland, to wit :

Be it remembered that, on the 1st day of April, 1817, personally appeared before me, Daniel Rogers, notary public for this State, Diego José Ojeda, and, being first duly sworn according to law, deposes as follows: That he was captain of a Spanish schooner called the *Nueva Catalina*; that he was taken in the said schooner, on the coast of Cuba, by a privateer called the *Congreso de Buenos Ayres*, commanded by Joseph Almeyda; that, in the night of the same day, the 9th of February last, his said schooner was taken by the Spanish brig of war *Campeador*, and immediately afterwards taken again by the same privateer; when, having taken out all the provisions and best part of the sails, fire was put to the said schooner *Catalina*, and her crew put on board an American schooner, with the exception of the captain, the second mate, the cook, and two passengers; whom Captain Almeyda said he would not liberate until the same had been done with one of his officers and five men who had been taken prisoners there; during the deponent's stay on board of Almeyda's privateer he took the schooner *Ardilla* from Omoa with a cargo of sarsaparilla and \$2,000; which sum was taken out and the schooner burnt.

On the 19th of February he captured two brigs, the *San Antonio de Padua*, from Vera Cruz, for the Havana, in ballast, and having some money on board; this vessel was also burnt. The other brig, *San José*, from Havana to Campeachy, with a cargo of brandy, wine, and other goods, was completely plundered, and the prisoners of the *Ardilla* and *San Antonio*, with the two passengers of the *Catalina*, were put on board of her, keeping a man of each vessel on board of the privateer; the *San José* was then allowed to proceed to Campeachy.

On the 24th he captured the *Paz*, bound from Sisal to Havana, on board of which vessel a prize-master and eight sailors were sent, as also the mate of the *Catalina*. She was then despatched for Galvezton. Her crew were put on shore at about eleven leagues from the port of Sisal; and this deponent further states that Almeyda made sail for this place, where the said deponent was not allowed to land until the 28th of March last, when he was sent on shore without any of the papers of his vessel, Almeyda having taken possession of them.

In testimony whereof, the said deponent hath hereunto subscribed his name, and I, the said notary, have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, the day and year first hereinbefore written.

DANIEL ROGERS, Notary Public, [L. S.]
DIEGO OJEDA.

The foregoing is a copy of the original, transmitted under this date to the district attorney for the district of Maryland.

PABLO CHACON.

justify the detention, for the benefit of the lawful owners, of the property which he is endeavoring to introduce clandestinely into this country, in violation of the treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation now existing between the two Powers.

I hope, sir, that you will allow me to use the term *pirates*, in speaking of these banditti. My impression is, (and I found it upon the treaty of amity I have just referred to,) that every vessel built or fitted out within the jurisdiction of this republic, manned and commanded by citizens of the Union, which is navigated and commits hostilities under a foreign flag, is and must be deemed a pirate; that, as such, it is liable to confiscation, with all the property on board, that it may be afterwards restored to the lawful owners, although no one should present themselves to make the claim in their behalf, as would be done in the case of any known murderer, or of one against whom there existed strong suspicions of having committed a crime against society, and this for the purpose of satisfying the calls of public vengeance. I hope that you will have the goodness to inform me if I am mistaken in this conception, and, in case it should be that of the President, that you would be pleased to obtain such measures of him as, in his wisdom, he may deem most proper to prevent the vessels above mentioned, together with their captains, again putting to sea, and to afford that protection to His Majesty's subjects which they have a right to expect, from the close friendship existing between the two Governments, by laying an attachment on the property on board those vessels, that it may be delivered up when its owners are ascertained.

I renew [etc.].

1062

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1817.

SIR: As nothing can be more flattering to me than to prove to you that all my reclamations bear the stamp of the most scrupulous exactness and truth, I have the honor to enclose the declaration, an oath, of two seamen of the Spanish brig *San Antonio de Padua*, captured by the pirate Almeyda, by which you will see that this pirate has not confined himself to taking and burning Spanish vessels, but has also detained and robbed an English vessel upon the high seas.²

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 192.

² The enclosure, reprinted from *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, follows:

BALTIMORE COUNTY, *State of Maryland*, to wit:

Be it remembered that, on the 4th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1817, personally appeared before me, a justice of the peace of said county, Lewis Falcone and

I hope that you will have the goodness to bring the said document to the knowledge of the President, as a corroboration and support to the reclamations which I have addressed to you, in order that the property plundered by that pirate, and by the *Potosi*, *Independencia del Sud*, *Mongore*, and *Altavela*, may be secured for the subjects of the King, my master, and that they may not be permitted to return to sea, to continue their depredations. I renew [etc.].

1063

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, April 6, 1817.

Upon the whole Sir I conclude, that the course which this government will take, the more or less zeal with which it will act, the more or less moderation & good faith which it will display, will very principally depend on its always fluctuating hopes & fears on the side of England: should its disputes with the king of Brasil ripen into a serious rupture, it will certainly make an attempt on Portugal; then a breach with England of course; but this I consider to be a remote probability. The question as to the slave trade has created considerable discussion between the two governments. England as I understand has offered to his catholick majesty a certain sum for the relinquish-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIV.

Bernard Falcone, Italians, and, being first duly sworn according to law, depose as follows:

That they belonged to the crew of the Spanish Schooner *San Antonio de Padua*, he, the said Lewis, being gunner thereof; that having sailed from St. Jago de Cuba, bound for Havana, on or about the 28th of January last, they were chased and captured the same day by a Buenos Ayres privateer, called the *Congreso*, commanded by one José Almeyda, who took the deponents on board his vessel, depriving them of fifty boxes of segars, four barrels and five bundles of Spanish tobacco, and a bag containing silk handkerchiefs; that, during their stay on board Almeyda's vessel, he took seven Spanish prizes, three of which he burnt; and on or about the 15th of March, near the port of Havana, he fell in with a British brig, chased her under Spanish colors, and, when sufficiently near, fired into her, hoisting at the same moment the Buenos Ayres flag. The brig, being armed, was defended by discharges of grape shot nearly the whole day, but, being boarded in the evening, was compelled to surrender: during the whole transaction the British ensign was at her main peak, and no other flag. Her crew were taken on board the *Congreso*, and the vessel plundered of several valuable articles of gold and silver. She was given up and allowed to proceed. Her mate received a musket-shot through the head, of which wound it was almost impossible he could recover. And these deponents further state, that Almeyda after this proceeded to the United States, and arrived at Baltimore on or about the 28th of March last.

LEWIS FALCONE,
BERNARD FALCONE, his X mark.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, by Anthony Canno,

THO. W. GRIFFITH.

ment of the traffick, & he has demanded a larger sum. The question turning upon this point cannot be considered as one of great difficulty. With respect to the colonies, I believe it to be very certain that England has offered her *mediation*. But here the two governments cannot agree. Spain in the true spirit of her system, insists on their returning to their ancient unqualified allegiance, & her pretensions are still upheld by calculations on the flattering intelligence, true or false, which she every now & then receives from various parts of South America. England besides the reasonable objections which she has to appose to such absurd & hopeless overtures, cannot find that she has any interest in making them; she does not wish to separate the colonies from Spain, on the contrary; but she desires that the trade to them may be open. The full extent of the British policy in this respect is quite obvious, & the Spanish cabinet is fully aware of it; hence they have mendicated mediation in other quarters. It is understood that their application has been favorably received, yet it were vain to expect success from any mediation in which England is not a party, or indeed that any mediating power will act on other than her principles.

The famous General Toledo arrived in this city on the 16th or 17th March; on the night of the 18th a council of ministers was held in the palace, to hear whatever information he had to give, & such plans as he had to propose. A great mystery is made of all this, & he has been ordered not to appear in publick.

I understand that the conversion of Toledo had commenced previous to his visit to Washington, & that his first overture was sent from N. Orleans by a friar named Ledilla who has served as a spy in the United States. After his visit to Washington, Toledo's intention was to go to London, & there to wait for his pardon; but being pressed by certain personal considerations, arising out of a dispute with a Mr. Mitchell, he hastened his departure from Philadelphia by the first vessel which sailed, & that happened to be bound to Bordeaux. Some demur was made to granting him passports to come hither; they were finally granted, but the pardon which he expected did not accompany them, & he was privately advised by his friends here not to put himself into the hands of the government: confiding however in a *very private* letter of recommendation from Mr. Onis, & in the importance of the services which he was able to render, he did not hesitate to avail himself of his passports. Whatever these Services may be, it appears to be quite problematical whether they will send him to the galleys or make a Lieutenant General of him.

With the Most perfect Respect [etc.].

George W. Erving, *United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

Private & confidential.

MADRID, April 6, 1817.

DEAR SIR: My last private letter was dated March 2d.² In a postscript of March 5th (to the original of that letter) I mentioned General Toledo. In my despatch of this date³ I have said of him whatever is proper for such a communication. I must here add that Mr. Onis's *private* recommendation of him is (as I have reason to believe) marked with the want of candour & the extravagant suspicion, which he has manifested on all occasions, & which degrade the good sense, & obscure the useful talents of that minister. He states that Toledo very much contributed to what "the Americans call" the "*glorious*" defence of N. Orleans; that Gen'l Jackson acknowledged his great services, & mentioned him in the highest terms to the President; that this recommendation, & his character of Mexican chief had introduced him to the "*friendship & unlimited confidence*" of Mr. Monroe, & the heads of government; that his wife became the *friend & companion* of Mrs. Madison &c. &c.; finally that he had made himself master of the *secret policy* of the American government. Such has been the temptation to receive Toledo; but, unfortunately for him, in the place of Mr. Cevallos who was a man to believe & act on every thing which Onis should say, he has found Mr. Pizarro, who has no such disposition, & is moreover a personal enemy of Cevallos, & of all Cevallos's friends. Yet I expected to hear something from Mr. Pizarro in consequence of Toledo's communications, but just about the time of the night Examination we received the debates in congress on the late laws. A day or two afterwards, at the weekly audience of the minister, I observed to him that poor Toledo had arrived in a very unlucky moment, since he could get no merit in exposing the "*Secret policy*" of the American government; for there it was *puris naturalibus* all displayed in newspaper print. As he had intended even the arrival of Toledo to be a profound secret, he was rather embarrassed with my attack, & was awkward in answering; what he said amounted to nothing worth repeating. In fine, as to *information* from Toledo, I presume that they must be disappointed; as to his *plans*, as far as these are hostile to us, they will probably be of the same character, as those of the famous Col. Sheene—the old story of getting back Louisiana &c. &c.—as far as they may relate to the pacification or subjugation of the colonies, they might, for any thing I know be useful, if this government had sense enough to act on any plan. It is not however to be supposed but that the independents will derive an useful lesson from the defection of Toledo, giving no trust hereafter to any Spaniard whatever. . . .

¹MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIV.

²Not printed.

³See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1063.

Withal Mr. Toledo finds something very alarming in his present situation. Thro' different channels he has sounded me to know what opinion I had of him, & whether I acted against him with the ministry. To these questions I refused to give any kind of answer. More lately he has in the same way assured me, that he would do nothing prejudicial to the American government: to this I replied that I did not care what he was doing.

A want of liberality & gratitude is a leading feature in the character of these people (I speak of those in general who undertake to discuss political affairs)—hence the message of the President is stupidly considered as a confession that we (as a nation) have assisted the insurgents hitherto; & the act of congress passed in consequence of that message is attributed to our apprehensions of the effects to be produced by the discoveries of Toledo!! The government, which has not yet had time to analyze, nor to weigh very scrupulously whatever advantages it is to derive from the act, see it at present in a very flattering point of view.

The English embassy here keeps its secrets very well, but it is not difficult to perceive that affairs do not go to their liking. Their disgust cannot be attributed to the slave-trade question, nor do I think that it can have arisen out of the difference of their plans as to the proposed mediation. There is some collision between the cabinet politicks of St. Petersburg & those of St. James, & the influence of the former prevails here, & seems still to be gaining ground. This of itself is sufficient cause of dissatisfaction. The strict alliance of England to Portugal, & what may be reasonably enough suspected of the ultimate views of the former in regard to the colonies, these circumstances properly made use of by the enemies of her influence must also be very operative. At the head of these enemies is Mr. Tertischeff the Russian minister who is bitterly hostile to England & every thing English. By his acts & intrigues he has gained the entire confidence of the king, & does not fail to use his influence to withdraw Spain entirely from her connexion with England. At the same time he promotes objects of major importance. What has been related to me of his pretensions & plans, tho' comporting with the well known inordinate ambition of his master, yet, is so extravagant, & even so wild & absurd, that it is impossible to give credit to it: that Russia, wanting to get footing in the Mediterranean should endeavour to wheedle Spain out of Majorca or Minorca, is natural; but that she should imagine the possibility of obtaining, or if so, of establishing herself in the province of *Texas*, surpasses all power of belief! What then can be said of a proposed cession to her by Spain—of Louisiana!!—& what is she to give for these magnificent acquisitions?—her *mediation* with Austria respecting Parma, which as yet has produced nothing; her mediation with Brasil, who having the support of England, will not accept it, & her *mediation* with the revolted colonies which

must needs laugh at her. But Mr. Tertischeff is adroit, & the king in his weakness imagines that if he has the great Emperor Alexander for his friend, he has nothing to fear. There is an under cabinet here called by contempt "*camarilla*" (little chamber) composed of individuals neither great nor wise, but very servile. These inferior persons the king delights to talk with, & to put confidence in; they control even the measures of ministers, & keep them in awe; here Mr. Tertischeff has established his authority, & there is no saying how far by this influence he may be able to lead his majesty.

1065

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to the Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1817.

SIR: By the information which has been transmitted to me by His Majesty's consul at Baltimore, in relation to the legal steps taken by him for the seizure of the pirate *Congreso*, Captain Almeyda, and the attachment of her cargo, it appears that the court of Baltimore county has declared its incompetency to take cognizance of this cause, on the plea that the Congress had not the power to alter the mode pointed out by the constitution, in which similar causes are heard and decided in the Supreme Court of the United States; from which decision it follows that no State judge, or justice of the peace, has power to arrest any individual for a violation of the laws of this republic. I will not permit myself [to indulge in] any reflection upon the form of law which may be laid down for cases of this nature, nor upon the powers which are, or are not, within the competency of the Legislature; but I cannot the less express to you my surprise that the States' attorney has not given the direction recommended by the laws to an affair which, in addition to the justice due to the subjects of His Catholic Majesty, so essentially interested the honor of the United States, by the violation of its statutes, its treaties, and its neutrality with foreign nations.

The result of all which is, that the pirate Almeyda is at full liberty; that his vessel, the *Congreso*, is released from attachment; and that he is free to land, and place in safety, the fruits of his piracies; that, during several weeks, he has had thirty hands at work upon his vessel, sheathing her with copper, making new sails, and giving her a thorough repair; and that there is an appearance that he will profit by the first favorable wind to put to sea, and continue with greater fury his atrocities and piracies, before the suit can be

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 193.

instituted in the court which is now designated, if effectual measures be not taken to prevent him.

I therefore hope that you will be pleased to lay the foregoing subject before the President; and I doubt not that, animated by his desire to preserve the friendship which happily subsists between Spain and this republic, he will adopt those measures which appear to him most suitable to prevent the evasions employed to obstruct the course of justice, and burden the United States with an indemnification for injuries of such magnitude, occasioned to the subjects of the King, my master, by reason of the non-observance of the treaty which exists between the two nations.

1066

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to Richard Rush, Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1817.

SIR: Although I was persuaded that the act of Congress of the 3d of March, relative to the preservation of the neutrality of the United States, in addition to the treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation, existing between Spain and this republic, and to the act of 1797, which prescribes the mode of pursuing the violators of the laws of this republic, would exempt me from again calling your attention, by new reclamations, to the injuries which the subjects of the King, my master, incessantly experience from the privateers armed in the ports of this Union, the annexed copies of notes which His Majesty's consul at Norfolk has addressed to the States' attorney, and to the collector of the customs, and the answer which he received from the latter, show you that nothing is sufficient to put a stop to the evil of which I have so often complained to this cabinet.²

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 193.

² The enclosed documents to which reference is made, reprinted from *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 193-7, follow:

No. 1.—Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul at Norfolk, to Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk

NORFOLK, April 10, 1817.

Sir: I found it my duty, on a former occasion, to make an official application to you, in the case of the armed schooner *Potosi*, Captain Chase, said to be acting under a commission from the pretended Government of Buenos Ayres, (where, by the by, she had never been,) but which had been fitted out, armed, and equipped in the port of Baltimore, to cruise against the subjects of Spain, contrary to the law of nations, and in violation of the neutrality of the United States, their laws, and stipulations in the existing treaty between the two nations, concluded on the 27th October, 1795, and in opposition to the intentions of the Government, manifested in the President's proclamation of the 1st September, 1815, and since more fully displayed by the act of Congress passed on the 3d March ultimo, entitled "An act more effectually to maintain the neutral relations of the United States."

By these documents you will see, notwithstanding the proofs presented by Don Antonio Argote Villalobos, that the pirates *Independencia del Sud* and

I do not doubt, sir, but that you participate in the indignation which every honest man feels at the lawless proceedings, the greedy rapacity, and, in many instances, horrid cruelties of this set of sea depredators, who, being for the most part citizens of the United States, are a disgrace to this country; but still, you did not think yourself authorized to interfere, though in your reply, dated the 16th of December ultimo, you expressed that you would take care in that, as in other cases, to see that the laws of the United States and other regulations of the Government are duly observed.

Impelled again by duty, and relying on the assurance (just quoted) in your said letter of the 16th of December ultimo, I do myself the honor of addressing you the present letter, to request you to interpose your authority for the purpose of detaining the armed brig *Independencia del Sud*, alias the *Mammoth*, commanded by James Chaytor, and the schooner *Altavela*, alias the *Romp*, Captain Grennolds; both which vessels have been armed and equipped in this country, in violation of the law of nations, the neutrality, laws, explicit stipulations, and professed intentions of the Government of the United States, and are commanded, and principally manned, by citizens thereof.

As these violators of all law pretend to shield their conduct under a commission from a Government the existence of which is not acknowledged by this or any other civilized country, it becomes necessary for me to call your attention to the fourteenth article of the treaty existing between Spain and this country, by which you will find that it is expressly forbidden to the citizens and subjects of either nation, respectively, to take any commission from any prince or state with which the other nation shall be at war; and such as will take such a commission are punishable as pirates. Upon the strength of this article, and in vindication of the laws and honor of the United States, I must solicit you to put a stop to the further proceedings of these freebooters, and to deter them from going on in their criminal course to the great detriment of the commerce of Spain, a nation in amity with this country, and to the annoyance of the peaceable commercial subjects of all other nations. I must further solicit you to stop these vessels, on the ground that they have in this port improved their equipment and considerably augmented their crews, by enlisting several individuals, contrary to the said act of Congress of the 3d of March ultimo; which enlistment is the more aggravating, because most of the individuals so enlisted are known to be citizens of this country. I also solicit you to stop and keep in your possession certain stolen goods, namely, cochineal and indigo, which I am told are now in the custody of the custom-house under your direction, reserving to myself to prove hereafter the true owners of this property. I must add the request to be furnished with a copy of the entry or manifest of the goods or articles of merchandise imported by, and landed at this port from, the said cruisers.

In closing this letter, I cannot forbear expressing a hope that you will give to this application all the attention which the nature of the case requires, and that you will not delay your answer, from the tenor of which I shall regulate my conduct, so as to acquit myself of that duty to my King and country imposed upon me as well by my office as by my personal feelings.

With great respect, I remain, [etc.].

No. 2.—Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul at Norfolk, to William Wirt, District Attorney of the United States at Richmond

NORFOLK, April 10, 1817.

Sir: The enclosed is a copy of an official letter which I have addressed this day to the collector of the customs of this port.

As there is no question but that the Government of the United States are bound to punish such of their citizens as, in defiance of all law, have committed hostilities against a friendly nation, and also to arrest them in their progress when they are seen within their jurisdiction preparing to continue their nefarious course; and as it is in your province, as district attorney, to see that the laws of the Union are duly enforced, both in the punishment of crimes and in the prevention of them, I make the same application to you that I have made to the collector, requesting you, in the name of my Government and the suffering subjects of Spain, to issue such process as will deter James Chaytor and Captain Grennolds, their officers and crews, mostly American citizens, from going out of this port to renew their depredations on Spanish commerce; at the same time that I leave it to your discretion to institute any further proceedings that the nature of the

Altavela were both fitted out at Baltimore; that their captains, Chaytor and Grennolds, are American citizens, as well as their crews; that both the one

offences already committed may admit of, and of which I shall furnish proofs in due time. I must also request you to secure, in behalf of the true owners of the stolen property which can be come at, namely, a parcel of cochineal and indigo, landed by these privateersmen at this port, and said to be now in the custody of the custom-house.

I hope, sir, that you will see the propriety of my applying to you in the present instance, and that you will do me the favor to answer this letter, apprizing me of the course you mean to adopt, for my information, and to enable me to give proper intelligence to my minister.

I remain, [etc.].

No. 3.—Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk, to Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul at Norfolk

NORFOLK, April 11, 1817.

Sir: I had the honor to receive your note of yesterday, in relation to the two armed vessels now lying in this port, under the flag of the Government styling itself "the United Provinces of the river Plate," the one called *Independencia del Sud*, and the other *Altavela*. You require me to detain these vessels upon the grounds that, in violation of the law of nations, the neutrality, laws, explicit stipulations, and professed intentions of the Government of the United States, they have been armed and equipped "in this country, and are commanded and principally manned by citizens thereof"; that, under the fourteenth article of the treaty between Spain and this country, they are pirates; and that, in violation of the act of Congress of the 3d March last, "more effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the United States," "they have in this port improved their equipment, and considerably augmented their crew, by enlisting several individuals." In reply to which, I conceive it proper only to remark, that these vessels have not been unnoticed by me, and that, in my conduct towards them, I shall endeavor, as I have done, to observe that course which my official duties appear to me to have prescribed. In pursuing which, that I may have the aid of every light to guide me which facts can afford, and the allegations thus made by you in an official form must be presumed to be bottomed on positive facts, which have come to your knowledge, you will have the goodness, I trust, to furnish me, with as little delay as possible, with the evidence of their existence in your possession.

In respect to the merchandise landed from these vessels, and deposited in the public store, which you request me to retain in my custody for proofs to be obtained by you as to the owners of it, I have to observe, that the circumstances of the case, as far as they are at present known to me, do not seem to require that I should take upon myself the responsibility; on the contrary, that these goods should be regarded as the property of those who deposited them, subject to be delivered to them, on complying with all the requisites of the laws for the protection of the public revenue.

There was no regular manifest or entry of these articles, or a copy of it should be furnished to you, according to your request; but simply a memorandum of them, and a receipt of the keeper of the public store, from which it appears that there were ninety-two bales or packages of cochineal, jalap, and varilla, consisting chiefly of the first-mentioned article.

I am, [etc.].

No. 4.—Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul of Norfolk, to Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk

NORFOLK, April 12, 1817.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, in answer to mine of the day before, soliciting you to detain the privateers *Independencia del Sud* and *Altavela*, on the grounds that those vessels have been originally armed and equipped in this country, and are now commanded and principally manned by citizens of the United States, and because they have in this port improved their equipment, and augmented their crews by enlistment; and further, soliciting you to retain in your possession, and not to re-deliver to those privateersmen, certain articles of stolen goods now under your custody; in reply to which you are pleased to observe, that those vessels have not been unnoticed by you, and that you shall endeavor to observe, with regard to them, that course which you think your official duties prescribe to you; requesting me, at the same time, to furnish the evidence to prove the facts that I have set forth,

and the other have received commissions, and cruised under a foreign flag, against the Spanish commerce; that they were then strengthening their

in order that you may have the aid of every light to guide you; and, finally, you observe that, from the circumstances of the case, you do not think you ought to take upon yourself to retain possession of the property above mentioned, of which you give a description in general terms.

With regard to the evidence you require, I will not hesitate to say that, as the facts I have stated are matter of public notoriety, known to every body, and I had no reason to suppose that you were ignorant of them, I did not deem it incumbent upon me to add any proof to the simple narration of them; and I was confident that, by going on to point out to you the stipulations and laws which are infringed in consequence of those facts, you would think yourself authorized to interfere in the manner requested.

I will assert, sir, as a known fact, that the brig, now called *Independencia del Sud*, is the same vessel which was formerly known under the name of the *Mammoth* privateer, belonging to Baltimore, armed and equipped in that port, from which she sailed under the command of the same Chaytor who still commands her; that the very same James Chaytor was necessarily then, and cannot have ceased since to be, a citizen of the United States; is settled, and has a family in Baltimore, whence his wife came down a few days ago in the packet *Walter Gray*, and is now in this town on a visit to her husband; that he has enlisted men in this port, many of whom are not so obscure as not to be generally known. I will mention, as an example, Mr. Young, of Portsmouth, who is now acting as first lieutenant on board the said brig. I will assert as a fact that the *Altavella* is the very schooner known before under the name of the *Romp*, the same that underwent a trial for piracy before the federal court in this State; that her present commander, Captain Grennolds, is a native of one of the neighboring towns, and very well known in this place; and, finally, that this vessel has been at one of the wharves altering her copper, which I call an improvement in her equipment.

If these public facts, falling within the knowledge of every individual, require more proof than the public notoriety of them, I must request to be informed as to the nature of that proof; and, also, whether you are not warranted to act upon just grounds of suspicion, without that positive evidence which is only necessary before a court of justice.

Respecting the property which I have solicited you to stop, as you seem not to think yourself authorized so to do, I must observe to you that, by the law in general practice in this and other countries, property in suspicious hands is frequently stopped; and I will go further, and assert that there is no doubt of the goods in question being stolen goods, or what, by way of softening the expression, are called prize goods; and all such property hitherto brought into this country by this sort of cruisers has been adjudged by the federal courts stolen property, and has been ordered to be restored to the rightful owners. I do, therefore, most solemnly lay claim to this property in behalf of the lawful owners, who, I am confident, will, at no distant period, come forward themselves to demand it; and I hereby reserve to them their rights unimpaired, to sue and recover from whomsoever they may be entitled to claim under the law of nations, and in conformity to the sixth and ninth articles of the treaty between Spain and this country, concluded on the 27th of October, 1795, and under any other law that may make in their favor.

I will now conclude by expressing a hope that, upon a thorough view of the subject, you will consider it consistent with the duties of your office to accede to my solicitation for the relief of the injured subjects of Spain, and to prevent a number of bad citizens of this country from committing further depredations on their commerce.

I remain, [etc.].

No. 5.—Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk, to Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul at Norfolk

NORFOLK, April 14, 1817.

Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 12th instant, and have bestowed upon it all the attention which the limited time allowed me would admit of.

From the view I have taken of the facts, as now stated by you, which it is to be presumed are to be regarded as specifications under the more general charges set forth in your letter of the 10th instant, I must really confess I do not at present see grounds sufficient to justify the steps you require me to take against the armed vessels now in this port, and the merchandise which has been permitted to be landed from them, and deposited in the public store.

You assert, as known facts, that the brig now called the *Independencia del Sud* is the

armament and increasing their crew; and, finally, that the same collector, who acknowledges they bring no manifest (*registro*) of the articles they have

same vessel that was formerly known under the name of the *Mammoth* privateer, belonging to Baltimore, armed and equipped in that port, from which she sailed under the command of the same James Chaytor who still commands her. That this very same James Chaytor was necessarily then, and cannot have ceased since to be, a citizen of the United States; is settled, and has a family in Baltimore, whence his wife came down a few days ago in the packet *Walter Gray*, and is now in this town on a visit to her husband. That he has enlisted men in this port, many of whom are not so obscure as not to be generally known; and you mention, as an instance, Mr. Young, of Portsmouth, who you allege is now acting as first lieutenant on board the brig. You further assert as a fact, "that the *Altavella* is the very same schooner which was known under the name of the *Romp*, the same that underwent a trial for piracy before the federal court in this State; that her commander, Captain Grennolds, is a native of one of the neighboring towns, and is very well known in this place." And, finally, that this vessel has been at one of the wharves altering her copper, which you call an improvement in her equipment.

Now, sir, supposing these facts to be what you affirm they are, matter of too great public notoriety to require any thing like demonstration; do they prove so clearly that the brig now called *Independencia del Sud* was originally fitted out in this country to aid the United Provinces of the river Plate in their struggle for independence? that James Chaytor, a citizen of the United States, assumed the command of her with that intention, under a commission from that Government, in the port of Baltimore? and that he commenced his cruise against the vessels of the subjects of His Catholic Majesty, with whom the United States are in amity, from that port? On the contrary, do they not, with equal or greater certainty, tend to show that this brig, which you acknowledge was formerly the *Mammoth* privateer, belonging to Baltimore, was fitted out during the late war between this country and Great Britain, to cruise against the vessels of the subjects of His Britannic Majesty; that she was then under the command of, and probably owned in whole or in part by, the said James Chaytor; that on the termination of that war, the owners of the said vessel, having a right to dispose of her wheresoever and to whomsoever they thought fit, may have sent her under the command of the said James Chaytor, from Baltimore to Buenos Ayres, where she may have been purchased by the Government of that place, and put upon their naval establishment, and that the same James Chaytor might then and there have accepted the commission appointing him to the command of her? I wish not to be understood as contending that this was the case, but that it is an inference which may be fairly deduced from the facts as specified by you. The log-book and other documents which I have in my possession seem, moreover, to corroborate this view of the subject. It appears from them that she is a public armed vessel, not a privateer, and commenced her cruise from Buenos Ayres under the orders of that Government (be it whatever you may please to term it) in May, 1816. Whether the said James Chaytor had the right, under such circumstances, to accept the commission or not; or whether, when he sailed from Baltimore, being then a citizen of the United States, he cannot have since ceased to be one, appears to me plainly and simply the question: has a citizen of the United States the right to expatriate himself, and enter the service of a foreign Power not at war with his native country? A question which it is not my province to discuss, but about which, I apprehend, there can be but little doubt in this country, whatever be the antiquated notions prevailing upon the subject in the old Governments of Europe. His having a wife in Baltimore, and her coming to see him here, does not appear to me to affect the case at all; inasmuch as nothing is more common than for foreigners to have wives here, natives of the country; an illustrious instance of which might be given.

With respect to the facts assumed by you, of the enlistment of men in this port, of which you mention Mr. Young as an evidence, suffice it to say, that from intimations I had received anterior to the date of your letter, I had determined to make the proper inquiries, and to be satisfied upon this point before those vessels are permitted to sail, and shall be governed by the result; although it does not appear altogether perfectly certain that such an augmentation of their force is interdicted by the act of Congress of the 3d of March last, which, being a law highly penal in its nature, will admit of no latitude of construction. Permit me to observe, "*en passant*," that this Mr. Young is by birth an Englishman, served several years in the British navy, several in ours, and, I suppose, has now an equal right, provided it be not done in a manner to violate the laws

on board from any authority or port, known or unknown, thereby evidently proving that they were stolen on the high seas, refused to arrest this property,

of the United States, to enter into the service of the Government calling itself the "United Provinces of the river Plate," or any other Government that will receive him.

With respect, also, to the vessel called the *Altavella*, asserted by you to be the very schooner formerly known by the name of the *Romp*, and tried for piracy, I proceed to remark, that this vessel furnishes a strong argument against you; for, after a full investigation of all the charges against her, supported, as I believe they were, by some of *her own crew*, she was acquitted, as well as the commander of her, Squire Fish, who had previously been an officer in the navy of the United States. The same remark will apply with equal force to her present commander, Captain Grennolds.

Upon the subject of the fact lastly stated by you, of the improvement in the equipment of this vessel at one of our wharves, I have to observe that, on the arrival here of these vessels, I had them examined, and an inventory of their armament, equipment, &c. taken; and before their departure I shall cause a re-survey to be made, with a view to ascertain whether they have undergone, in any respect, any alterations prohibited by the laws of the United States. I cannot agree with you, however, that a mere alteration of her copper, rendered necessary, perhaps, by some damages which I understand were sustained in the bottom of the vessel, can be considered as an improvement "in her equipment."

As for the merchandise which you "most solemnly lay claim to," in behalf of those whom you term the lawful owners, which you assert "there is no doubt of being stolen, or what, by way of softening the expression, are called prize goods," I can only say, that I neither officially nor individually have any claim to it whatsoever. It is only deposited in the public store for safe-keeping, to guard against injury, as in other cases, which might result to the revenue of the United States; and I see no reason, from any thing you have advanced, to change the opinion expressed in my last upon the subject. I know of no decisions, such as you speak of, in the federal courts, adjudging prize goods to be "stolen property, and ordering it to be restored to the rightful owners." If there be any such decisions, they only go to show that it is by *such authority only*, and not by any that *I possess*, that the articles in question can be detained or restored.

Having thus, sir, gone through the different topics presented by you for my consideration, I shall conclude by assuring you it did not require any thing you have pointed out to me to remind me of any duty which the circumstances of this case have rendered, or may render, it incumbent on me to perform.

I am, etc.].

No. 6.—Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul at Norfolk, to Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk

NORFOLK, April 15, 1817.

SIR: I have received the letter which, in answer to mine of the 12th instant, you did me the honor to address to me yesterday.

Without denying any of the facts, on the strength of which I requested your interposition to prevent two armed vessels now in this port, commanded and principally manned by citizens of the United States, from sallying forth to renew their depredations upon the commerce of Spain, you state that you do not see sufficient grounds for stopping those vessels, or the merchandise landed from them, and now in deposite in the public storehouse in this place.

I do not mean to enter, on the present occasion, into a minute discussion of the several reasons you assign for the line of conduct which you think proper to pursue in this case, because I think it sufficient for me to transmit copies of my correspondence with you to my Government, through the channel of the minister plenipotentiary of His Catholic Majesty in this country. Still, you will permit me to advert to that part of your argument, purporting that it is not so clearly proved that Chaytor's views on leaving Baltimore with the armed vessel under his command, were to cruise against the subjects of Spain under a commission from the pretended Government of the river Plate; upon which I will remark, that it is no longer necessary to form conjectures about the probable intentions of men, when facts and overt acts have already fully developed their evil purposes. Thus, whether James Chaytor, in going out of Baltimore with the armed vessels still under his command, had hostile views against the subjects of Spain, a nation in amity with this country, is sufficiently solved by the hostilities which he has already committed, and still intends to commit, in the *same vessel*, against the said subjects.

unquestionably stolen, to hold it at the disposal of the owners, who might prove their claims; and to detain the vessels, which, in manifest violation of the laws of this republic, and, above all, of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, are there preparing to return to their cruise.

I shall abstain from fatiguing you further upon a subject to which I have so often claimed your attention and that of the President. I flatter myself that the transmission of the proceedings, such as they have been transmitted to me, and the elucidation afforded by the annexed copies, will be sufficient to induce the President to acknowledge the urgency of adopting measures really effectual, at once to put an end to these piracies; otherwise His Majesty will not be able to see, in a continuance of these excesses, a confirmation

I must also be allowed to notice that part of your argument, "that, whatever may be the antiquated notions prevailing upon the subject in the old Governments of Europe, there is little doubt in this country about the question whether a citizen of the United States has a right to expatriate himself, and enter the service of a foreign Power not at war with his native country." In this you certainly appear to me to have set up a mere speculative opinion in opposition to a positive law, namely, the stipulations in the fourteenth article of the treaty with Spain, by which the United States have solemnly pledged themselves not to permit their citizens to accept commissions from any prince or state at war with Spain, for the purpose of cruising against her subjects, and to punish as pirates such of their said citizens as will act contrary to that stipulation.

With regard to the schooner *Altavella*, formerly the *Romp*, which vessel, you say, "furnishes a strong argument against me," because, although tried for piracy, she was not actually condemned, I cannot avoid remarking, that since the time when she escaped merited condemnation, and her commander and crew condign punishment, she has been out cruising with the armament and commission she took out from this country; (it is pretty well ascertained that she has never been at Buenos Ayres;) and that, in every respect, she is evidently a pirate, under the true meaning and intent of the said fourteenth article of the treaty with Spain; and that her said commander and crew are actually engaged in piratical pursuits, in which course it behooves the constituted authorities of this country to stop them when within their jurisdiction and completely in their power.

Nor can I forbear to observe, before I dismiss the subject, that the self-styled Government of the United Provinces of the river Plate will gain very little "in their struggle for independence" by commissioning such a gang of greedy freebooters, the scum of this and other countries, who, caring little for the fate of that deluded people, excite, by their voracious appetite for plunder, the indignation not only of the people of Spain, but of the honest and good of all other nations.

I will now conclude, sir, by repeating my solicitations and assertions contained in my letters of the 10th and 12th instant, and by solemnly protesting, in the name of my sovereign, against permitting a number of citizens, now within their jurisdiction, and under their control, to go out to cruise against the commerce of Spain, and to renew their hostilities against her subjects; and I do also protest against delivering back to them certain articles of merchandise, described by you in general terms in your letter of the 11th instant, which articles of merchandise are obviously taken from Spanish subjects, contrary to law, and especially contrary to the fourteenth article of said treaty with Spain, and which, from the tenor of the sixth and ninth articles of the same treaty, ought to be retained in behalf of the lawful owners.

I am [etc.].

No. 7.—Charles K. Mallory, Collector of Customs at Norfolk, to Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish Consul of Norfolk

NORFOLK, April 15, 1817.

SIR: I have been honored with your letter of to-day, in answer to mine of yesterday, and am perfectly pleased that our correspondence has issued in a determination on your part to transmit copies of it to your Government, through its minister in this country.

I have nothing further to add on my part, but assurances of the respect with which I am [etc.].

of the assurances which the President has given me of his desire amicably to adjust, by means of a treaty, all the differences pending between the two Governments, and to strengthen the friendly relations with His Majesty by new arrangements mutually advantageous to both states; nor the pledge which I have already given him, that if the above-mentioned act of the 3d of March did not repair the evils suffered by his subjects until that period, it would at least prevent those by which they were threatened in future.

I renew [etc.].

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*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, July 9, 1817.

SIR: I am under the necessity of calling your attention, and that of the President, to what has occurred at Baltimore, in relation to the two privateers or pirates which have lately entered the bay of Chesapeake, and now are within the proper limits of the State of Maryland; the one commanded by Captain Taylor, and the other by Captain Stafford. It is notorious that these privateers, manned and armed in the ports of the Union, sailed on a cruise against the Spanish commerce, and have returned to the waters of Maryland with a part of the plunder and booty they have taken on board of Spanish and Portuguese vessels.

For the due conviction of this outrage, the necessary orders or warrants were sent, at the request of the consul of His Catholic Majesty in Baltimore, to the marshal of that city, to proceed to the arrest of the aforesaid privateers, and for its execution a gun-boat was granted by the collector of the customs. All this, however, was in vain; the marshal gave no effect to the orders issued for this arrest; and His Majesty's consul, seeing that eight days had passed without the marshal taking a single step to fulfil the orders he was charged with, called upon him, and claimed their execution; upon which he replied, categorically, "that he was unwilling to proceed to the arrest of the said privateers, because it was not his duty to execute it, except they had entered the port of Baltimore; but by no means in the bay, although within the district of the State." The consul lately applied to the district attorney, complaining of this conduct; and he acknowledged that indeed it was very extraordinary, but he took no steps to remedy it, or to enforce the observance of the laws of the United States in a case of so scandalous an example. These facts speak for themselves, and the mere statement of them is sufficient to make you and the President thoroughly sensible of the monstrous conse-

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 441.

quences which the irregular conduct of this marshal may lead to. It is perfectly evident that the public treaty between Spain and the United States, and the late act of Congress, sanctioned as a general law for the more strict observance of the neutrality of the same States with foreign Powers, are scandalously trampled under foot in Maryland; and that the marshal, by formally disobeying the lawful authority of the State, and that of the General Government of the Union, protected the hostilities and piracies carried on against the trade of a nation in a state of peace and amity with the United States. I cannot, therefore, do less than to remonstrate in the name of the King, my master, against so manifest a violation of the neutrality of this republic, of its laws, and of the treaty existing between the two Powers; and to request that you will be pleased to obtain of the President the most prompt and effectual orders to cause the marshal of Baltimore to do his duty, and all requisite justice to the subjects of His Majesty.

It is my duty, also, to call your attention and that of the President to the conduct of the adventurer, Sir Gregor McGregor, who, since he was in arms with the bands of insurgents in the province of Venezuela, has come to these States, and been constantly engaged in enterprises to invade or disturb the tranquillity of His Catholic Majesty's possessions in that part of the world. He lately recruited in Charleston a great number of adventurers, and among them several persons of note, viz: one Rouse, son of a colonel of that name, an inhabitant of that city; one Champion, who was a commissary in the service of the United States in the late war, and storekeeper of ordnance; one Heath, a lawyer of the same place; and many others whose names I pass over. He purchased, under a borrowed name, a brig of considerable burden, which he despatched with passengers to New Orleans on the 19th of last month; and on the following day he went on to Savannah in the stage, according to common report, to recruit more people. His subsequent proceedings and hostile preparations in the bosom of this Union, against the possessions of the Spanish monarchy, are notorious, and announced with a scandalous publicity in many papers of these States. I hope, then, that you and the President will apply the energy of your zeal for good order and the observance of the public laws, by restraining these excesses and vexations, which compromit the neutrality which the President has proposed to preserve in the dispute subsisting between the King, my master, and some of his provinces in rebellion, and render null, as you may imagine, the security in which the Government of His Catholic Majesty rests, in a reliance on the safeguard of the said laws, and on that of the general principles of public good faith, which serve as the basis of the tranquillity and friendly intercourse between the nations and governments of the world.

I renew [etc.].

*José Pizarro, First Secretary of State of Spain, to George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain*¹

[EXTRACTS]

PALACE, August 17, 1817.

SIR: In answer to your esteemed note of the 29th ultimo, and to conform with your wishes, I shall proceed to present you in this letter with my ideas as to the plan of an arrangement which may at once terminate in a friendly way, with reciprocal utility, and without leaving seeds of discord for the future, all the questions pending between the two Governments. . . .

8th. It shall not be permitted that vessels employed in cruising and committing hostilities against the Spanish Government and vassals, or their commerce, shall be armed or enter armed in the ports of the United States; and the vessels and effects which such armed vessels may take from the vassals of His Majesty, and which may be carried into the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be embargoed and secured by the authorities of the same, and definitively delivered to the minister or to the consul of His Majesty who may be at the nearest place, to hold at the disposal of those who may prove that they are the legitimate owners. And for the purpose of preventing and prohibiting clandestine armaments, which may be made in contravention of this stipulation, the United States promise to give the strictest orders to the officers to whom it belongs to watch over and frustrate all attempts of this kind, the United States obliging themselves to detain all suspected vessels, without permitting their departure till the suspicions respecting them shall have been cleared up, or till they have given bonds to the satisfaction of the respective consuls of His Catholic Majesty, guarantying that they shall not commit such piracies and aggressions against the vassals of His Catholic Majesty, who, on his part, obliges himself to do the same in the ports of Spain with respect to the United States.

9th. It being notorious that divers American citizens, in violation of the law of nations, and of the stipulations of the existing treaty, in its articles 9, 12, 14, and 16, have occupied themselves for some time past in hostilities against the Spanish commerce and subjects, under the pretext and cover of certain unknown flags; and that others, with equal irregularity, have carried and supplied arms, ammunition, and other aid to the rebels of some Spanish ultramarine provinces which are in a state of insurrection; several of the said citizens having gone to the extent of taking arms, and acting openly in support of said insurrection, His Catholic Majesty does not doubt but that the Government of the United States, disapproving of the conduct of said individuals, and animated by a spirit of justice, and of a religious observance of the law of nations and of the treaty, will oblige itself, by an article of the

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 445.

present arrangement, to promulgate, and cause to be executed, decrees and orders, which may restrain and prevent such excesses in future; in which way, also, may be avoided the reclamations consequent on the injuries occasioned by the same excesses. And His Catholic Majesty, in just reciprocity, will oblige himself, on his part, to repress and prevent, in the same form, whatever excesses of the same or a similar nature his vassals may be guilty of, to the prejudice of the Government and citizens of the United States, or of their commerce.

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*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to José Pizarro, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, August 19, 1817.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your excellency's letter of the 17th² instant, in which you are pleased to communicate to me the outline of such a plan of adjustment of the several questions existing between the two Governments as you believe to be well calculated to effectuate our common object of restoring a perfect good understanding, and laying a foundation for perfect harmony. . . .

With respect to the eighth and ninth articles of your excellency's project, I will only observe that no stipulations can be necessary. The United States have done, and continue to do, all that their neutral position and good faith can require; and where the existing laws of the country have been insufficient, there new provisions have been enacted, as you have seen by the law of Congress of March 3d, (called "*An act more effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the United States,*") which I have had the honor to communicate to you.

As to the alternative which your excellency proposes, on the supposition that your plan may not be acceded to, of referring our differences to the arbitration of other Governments, it is certainly unnecessary for me to assure you that I have no powers or instructions which can authorize my speaking on the matter.

Having, as I trust, now said enough to convince your excellency that your proposals are wholly inadmissible, I refrain from a variety of other observations which your letter has naturally suggested, desiring not to agitate questions which are only fit for discussion where there is a possibility of eliciting from it the grounds of accord.

I renew [etc.].

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 449.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1068.

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

Private.

MADRID, August 27, 1817.

DEAR SIR: Since Mr. Pizarro has been in office he has several times expressed to me his regret that the negotiation had been transferred to Washington, & intimated his readiness to make a treaty here, if Mr. Onís should fail there. . . . In our conference of the 25th he spoke with a great degree of confidence as to limits, & an emotion rather excessive as to the encouragement which he supposes to be given by our government to the insurgents, & the outrages committed by our citizens. On these points I could scarcely procure a hearing, but I kept myself perfectly cool; in fact the accounts which they receive, passing through very corrupt or very impassioned channels, are much exaggerated, but they are received with entire confidence, & of course produce strong impressions. On this head I told him that seeing that it was not likely that I should be able to convince him in his then state of mind, & desirous that our conversation might not become too animated, I would refrain from any question on the facts to which he referred,—but be they as they might, the American government would observe with good faith its duties as a neutral power, & that it were idle to expect that it will go further. On the question of limits nothing very new was said. He told me that he perceived by my conversation that we had determined not to come further back to the Mississippi than the Colorado. I did not say so expressly, but he seemed to penetrate my mind. Throughout the conversation I perceived that he had not entertained a hope of his terms being accepted, but that his sole object was to get the reference. I did not enter further into this matter than to advise him, as a friend to peace, not to confine Mr. Onís to that alternative. He intimated in a sort of half menace that in a quarrel between the U. States & Spain “others might take part”. This suggestion I merely smiled on. He seemed to wish me to propose something. I told him that if his proposals had approached anything reasonable, I might have ventured to suggest an alteration; but such as they were, I saw that it was absolutely impossible that we should ever agree, & therefore it was useless for me to propose anything but that he would make his instructions to Mr. Onís more liberal. He hoped to excite me, by informing me that he had received advice from America that I had been lately instructed “*to do nothing.*” I told him that this was a point on which I was not obliged to answer him, & it would be very easy to evade the question, but he might assure himself that had I received such instructions I should not have written him a word, or opened my lips to him on the subjects in question; I told him in fine that I had not received any new instructions whatever, &

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIV.

he remained satisfied on that point, taking care to assure me that it *was not* from Mr. Onis that he had received this false information.

What encouragement this government may have received to expect the countenance of others in its disputes with the United States, or their assistance against the colonies I do not know;—but I know that it has been very busy in seeking such aid, & hence infer that its delays have been caused by its hopes of success in those negotiations. Some time since I understood from the best authority (Sir Henry Wellesley) that England had refused to mediate between Spain & her colonies unless on the condition that the trade should be thrown open, & that Spain would not consent to that condition; but now Mr. Pizarro tells me expressly that it is the intention of this government to open the trade, & if so it is probable that it will come to an agreement with England; or it may be that Russia will take the place of England in the mediation. The influence of Russia certainly preponderates here at present, yet England has lately been able to settle the slave trade question so long in dispute; she has agreed to pay 4,000,000£ Stg. (I think is the sum) by annual instalments, & Spain is to give up the trade gradually: thus one need not despair that they may come to terms about the Colonies.

Whether Russia or England or France have given any encouragement to Spain in her disputes with the United States, or not, it is quite certain that in case of a rupture Spain will appeal to one or all of them. Your information from those quarters will best enable you to judge how those powers will act. Of their ministers here I am inclined to think that the Russian at least (certainly not the English) who meddles with every thing, has interfered with his advice, & that I see the influence of it in the last part of Mr. Pizarro's note, as well as in the earnestness with which he urged the reference in conversation, but if you will please to read what I have before written respecting this gentleman (Mr. Tertischeff), you will readily conceive that he may have acted in this matter without any orders from his government.

Upon the whole however I do not think that the hopes of Spain founded upon the interference of others are so strong as to induce her to decline reasonable overtures, & therefore suppose it possible that an arrangement may be made upon the terms of the ultimatum given to me, & even better *in one respect*; our claims to be settled as by those terms, & theirs, if persisted in to be buried in that part of the territory west of the Mississippi, which is beyond the ultimatum. I cannot think that Mr. Onis will be bound to the alternative as Mr. Pizarro would have me suppose; on the contrary I suspect that his instructions will be much more liberal. He will always commence high, & be for some time obstinate, & may even show to you *a set* of instructions, but as this government has made up its mind to cede Florida, I trust that it will not finally resist reasonable proposals on the other points.

Mr. Onis is extremely anxious to come home, & naturally will desire if possible to conclude his long & laborious mission with a treaty.

Dear Sir, with very sincere respect [etc.].

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, August 27, 1817.

SIR: By a gentleman who left Cadiz for the United States about the 15th inst. I transmitted to you in my letters of July 20th & August 1st, copies of two important notes from the Spanish Secretary of State, & of my replies to them; duplicates of those papers are herewith enclosed.

I have now the honor to submit copy of a third note (dated 17th inst.)² from the same secretary, which communicates the outline of his project for a treaty, & of my reply³ to it, which closes the correspondence.

Whilst this correspondence was carrying on, as well as previous to it, I cautiously avoided all conversation with Mr. Pizarro on the matters in question; and in my notes to him, at the same time that I have endeavoured to make impressions which might have an useful effect on his instructions to Mr. Onis, I have been careful not to compromit either my government or myself on any point. No time has been lost in these communications, for the instructions to Mr. Onis are not yet prepared, it is probable that the messenger (Mr. Onis's secretary) will not be despatched before the middle of September, & I trust that I have gained by it some knowledge of the real views of this government, with which there is good reason to suspect that the extraordinary delay that has taken place is in some degree connected. What suggests itself to me on this point I will take the liberty of communicating to you in a separate letter. . . .

Upon the whole Sir, tho' the case is full of difficulties, yet it appears to me that the greatest arises out of the misconception of this government with regard to our obligations as neutral between her & her colonies. She thinks that we ought not even to trade with them, not to admit their flags into our ports; she would make us responsible for all the excesses which our citizens may commit, out of the jurisdiction of the United States, & tho' they never should return within it; & she would have us pass such laws, constitutional or not, as in effect would make us a party against the independence of the colonies.

. . . I concluded the conversation by requesting that Mr. Norli might be charged with my despatches also, & that he might be sent off as quickly as possible. Mr. Pizarro said that the messenger should not be detained a single day longer than necessary.

With the most perfect respect [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIV.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1068.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1069, under date of August 19th.

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*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, *September 2, 1817.*

SIR: The viceroy of New Spain informs me, in several despatches which I have lately received, of the frequent cases which have occurred of American vessels, both merchantmen and armed ships, which, in running along the coasts of those parts of the dominions of His Catholic Majesty, enter their bays, roads, and harbors, sometimes for the purpose of exploring the country and examining the state of things there, and at others for that of assisting the rebels with provisions, arms, and warlike stores, and of landing adventurers and other dangerous persons, whose object is to join the insurgents. The viceroy states that the American Colonel Perry had joined the traitor Mina with five hundred men; and Savary, the commandant of the mulattoes, with another body, having gone from New Orleans to incorporate their force with that of Mina and Aury at Galvezton, a place within the Spanish dominions; that American vessels are continually sailing from New Orleans with supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions, for those banditti; that the American schooner *Saeta*, from New Orleans, entered the harbor of Tampico, under the pretence of stress of weather, but, without any manner of doubt, for the purpose of examining the country; and that the privateer or pirate *Jupiter* had captured two Spanish vessels off the bar of the Mississippi, very near to several American vessels, &c. The viceroy concludes by saying, that he cannot possibly think that so many acts of hostility and violation of the laws of nations and of the existing treaty can be permitted or tolerated by the Government of the United States; and that, being desirous to contribute on his part to the maintenance of the amicable relations subsisting between this Government and that of His Catholic Majesty, he had treated the American vessels and citizens, even in the cases of hostility and violation referred to, with unexampled kindness; but that now he left it to my zeal to endeavor to obtain of this Government effectual remedies against these excesses; that, in the mean time, he had given orders to the governors, commandants, and other officers, at the most suitable places within his viceroyalty, neither to admit nor tolerate any American vessel, or of any other foreign nation, without the requisite passport and license; and that he would exercise the rigor of the laws against those who should disturb the good order and tranquillity of the King's dominions.

In consequence, therefore, of this request of the viceroy, I add this recclamation to those which I have already had the honor to address to the President, through the medium of the Department committed to you, on similar cases, and in the name of the King, my master; and I trust that, on

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 198.

your laying the whole before his excellency, he will cause the most effectual measures to be adopted to prevent the continuation of these excesses, and to enforce the due observance of the general principles of the laws of nations, and of the treaty which governs between Spain and the United States.

I renew [etc.].

1073

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, September 19, 1817.

SIR: A complaint having been laid before His Catholic Majesty's Government, by a part of the crew of the Spanish polacre *Santa Maria*, captured on her passage from Havana to Cadiz by the pirate called the *Patriota Mexicano*, commanded by José Guillermo Estefanos, manned with citizens of these States, and covered by their flag, under which he chased and brought-to the said polacre, until, having ascertained her capture, he hoisted the insurgent flag. I have received the commands of the King, my master, to request of the President, through your medium, the most decisive measures for putting an end to the abuses practised in the ports of this Union, by arming privateers to cruise against the Spanish trade; thus prostituting the flag of the United States by these predatory acts, and trampling under foot, with unparalleled audacity, national rights and the existing treaty between Spain and these States.

I, therefore, now renew those urgent reclamations which, on former occasions, I have submitted to the President, through your Department, on this important point; and I trust that the numerous instances of these abuses and horrible depredations will induce his excellency to adopt energetic measures to restrain these excesses, which so deeply compromit the neutrality of the United States in the eyes of all nations, and are wholly repugnant to the friendship and good understanding happily subsisting between them and His Catholic Majesty.

I renew [etc.].

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 198.

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, November 2, 1817.

SIR: I have just received a statement, dated the 14th of July, addressed to me by the directors of the Royal Philippine Company at Madrid, informing me of the unfortunate fate of two ships belonging to the said company, the one named *Nuestra Señora del Buen Suceso*, alias *La Esperanza*, and the other *El Triton*, captured, the first on the 8th of June last, the day on which she sailed from Cadiz for Calcutta and Manilla, by the pretended insurgent privateers *La Independencia del Sud*, commanded by James Chaytor, of 18 guns and one traversing 42-pounder; and the *Mangore*, under the orders of the same Chaytor, of 14 guns and one traversing 36-pounder; and the ship *Triton*, from Calcutta and the coast of Coromandel, which was captured off the Cape de Verd islands, after a gallant defence of two hours and a half, in which she lost twenty killed, and sprung her foremast, by a privateer (of the same description as the two above mentioned) called the *Regent*, alias *Trepacamara*, commanded by one Manson, who, when seventeen days out from Baltimore, fell in with the *Triton*, and conducted her as a prize to Buenos Ayres, where she arrived on the 2d of April last, according to the advices received by the underwriters at Lloyd's from their agent at Buenos Ayres.

The directors of the Royal Philippine Company, in giving me an account of these distressing events, inform me that they have understood, by the advices which I have given to the principal Secretary of State of the King, my master, that Captain James Chaytor, of the piratical vessel *La Independencia del Sud*, kept depending a demand made at the instance of the Spanish consul at Norfolk, relative to the safe-keeping of certain Spanish property deposited in the custom-house of that port by the above-named pirate, and one called the *Altavela*; whence it is incontestably proven that the armament of *La Independencia del Sud* is made in the ports of these States, and that the captain, officers, and the greater part of her crew, are likewise subjects of the same States. From presumptive causes and circumstances, they suppose that the other privateer may be the *Regent*, alias *Trepacamara*, Captain Manson, which vessel sailed from Baltimore seventeen days previous to his capturing the *Triton*.

I have repeatedly found myself under the painful necessity of representing to the President, through the medium of your predecessors, that the fourteenth article of the treaty between His Catholic Majesty and the United States establishes the most positive right of reclamation on the Government and those citizens who have taken or do take part in the numerous armaments of privateers which have taken place in the ports of this republic,

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 201.

under cover of the pretended commissions so profusely circulated by the insurgents of the revolted provinces of the King, my master, to attack openly and in a barefaced manner the subjects and commerce of Spain; and that the same article declares those to be pirates who engage in these horrid cruises, and consequently obliges the contracting parties to punish them as such, as a just atonement for their offences. On the 2d and 15th of January, and on the 29th of March¹ last, I officially addressed your immediate predecessor, and remonstrated against the robberies and outrages committed by various privateers, and, among others, by those called *Independencia del Sud* and *Mangore*, the captains of which, James Chaytor and Barnes, are citizens of these States. In the note transmitted to the Secretary on the 4th of March, [14th March,] I found myself under the necessity, in consideration of the excesses committed against the subjects of the King, my master, and of those which, through the impunity and toleration of some of the authorities of this country, were about to be repeated by vessels bought, armed, manned, and equipped in the ports of this republic, in violation of the laws of nations, of the express stipulations of an existing treaty, and of the rights of humanity; and in discharge of my duty, I was laid under the necessity, I say, of representing and remonstrating, in the name of my sovereign, on the subject of the injuries and losses which had already resulted, and might further result, to his subjects; and, at the same time, of protesting against the authors of the same. The capture of the ship *Esperanza* has been one of the fatal consequences of allowing the privateer *Independencia del Sud* to proceed freely to sea from Norfolk, after His Catholic Majesty's consul, Don Antonio Argote Villalobos, had made proof of the illegal conduct and atrocious acts of her captain, James Chaytor; and that of the ship *Triton* proceeds likewise from toleration granted in this country of arming and equipping against the trade of Spain; under which supposition, I cannot refrain from stating to you, in order that you may be pleased to communicate the same to the President, that the aforesaid Royal Company of the Philippines have an incontestable right to claim of this republic full compensation for the value of the said ships and cargoes, by reason of the armament of the privateers which captured them having been made in its ports.

I have the honor to enclose, for the suitable purposes, a note of the articles shipped on board the *Esperanza*, at Calcutta and Manilla, for the account of the Royal Philippine Company, and of the return cargo of the *Triton*, from Bengal and the coast of Coromandel to Cadiz; which sums united, amount, according to the invoice, to that of seven hundred and one thousand nine hundred and eighty dollars; to which is to be added an interest of fifteen per cent. on the disbursement of the amount of the cargo of the *Triton*, for the period of one year and a half, and of six per cent in Europe on the cargo of the *Esperanza*.

¹ See above, pt. XIII, docs. 1046, 1047 and 1060.

I hope you will take into consideration the contents of this note, and be pleased to call the attention of the President to the interesting subject treated of in it, that His Catholic Majesty may adopt such measures as his wisdom may dictate to him, for the purpose of collecting, as far as it may be possible, any parts of the two prizes above named, for the benefit of their owners, and at the same time giving orders to the competent authorities in the ports of this republic to discover such effects as may arrive, making part of the same.

I therefore hope this from your established zeal, and the well-known rectitude of the President, deferring to my return to the seat of Government the verbal communication of a plan which I have meditated, from a desire to settle amicably an affair of such importance.

I avail myself [etc.].

1075

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

PHILADELPHIA, November 2, 1817.

SIR: His Majesty's consul at New York has transmitted to me a copy of his correspondence with the United States attorney for that district, whereby he requests that, in conformity with the act of Congress of the 3d of March last, he would oblige a certain armed brigantine to give security, or cause her to be seized; the said vessel having arrived at that port from Norfolk, under the flag of Venezuela, and recruited men to increase her crew, in order to proceed afterwards to Amelia island, there to join the adventurer McGregor, and to co-operate in his nefarious plans against the possessions of my sovereign and against the Spanish trade.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of the said correspondence,² on the

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 199.

² The enclosed communications from the Spanish Consul in New York, reprinted from the same volume, pp. 199–201, follow, a second deposition similar to that of September 16th being omitted:

No. 1.—*Thomas Stoughton, Spanish Consul at New York, to Jonathan Fisk, District Attorney General of the United States*

NEW YORK, September 16, 1817.

Sir: Some days ago there arrived in the port of New York an armed brig proceeding from Norfolk, which, I have been very credibly informed, is a vessel pretending to have a commission from Venezuela, but whose object, in coming to this port, was to procure an additional supply of men wherewith to commit hostilities against the subjects and possessions of the King of Spain. A few days ago I presented to the collector of the port of New York an affidavit of a man named John Reilley, stating that he had been requested to enlist on board of a vessel, which was represented to him to be the privateer schooner *Lively*, bound to Amelia island, to join General McGregor, to invade the territories of His Catholic Majesty.

I am now informed that the brig above mentioned is the vessel alluded to, Reilley having either been mistaken in the name, or designedly deceived by the agents of the

contents of which I think it entirely superfluous to make any comment; leaving it to you, sir, to decide whether the solicitude of His Catholic Maj-

privateer. I now enclose the affidavit of John Finegan, by which you will perceive that the officers of the above brig (whose name is the *Americana Libre*, commanded by Captain Barnard) are enlisting, and have enlisted, men in this port to proceed against the Spanish possessions. I have caused application to be made to the collector, who doubts the extent of his authority in interfering with this vessel. Now, as there must be provisions in the laws and treaties of the United States vesting an authority in some of its officers to prevent the equipment of vessels and the enlistment of men in the United States to proceed against a foreign nation at peace with the United States, I make this application to you, most urgently requesting you to take whatever measures may be necessary immediately, in order to prevent the departure of the above vessel, at least until she shall give bonds that she will not commit hostilities against Spanish subjects. The vessel, it is said, will sail to-morrow morning.

Indeed, if an inquiry were instituted, I am induced to believe that the above brig would be found to be a pirate.

I have the honor, [etc.].

No. 2.—Deposition of John Finegan

STATE OF NEW YORK, ss:

John Finegan, at present in the city of New York, being duly sworn, saith: That he was requested by a man, who is represented to be the commissary of the vessel next mentioned, to go out in the patriot brig now lying at the quarantine ground; that the destination of the said vessel is to fight against the Spaniards; that the deponent was told, that, on his arrival in the Spanish possessions, he was to join the land service of the patriots; that deponent knows of five persons who have been engaged in like manner, who are about to proceed on board said brig; that deponent was told, that, as soon as he gets on board, he will receive his advance; that officers are at present employed in the city of New York, in looking out for men, and endeavoring to enlist them to proceed in the said vessel.

JOHN FINEGAN, his x mark.

Sworn this 16th day of September, 1817, before me,

SAMUEL B. ROMAINE.

Es copia: THOMAS STOUGHTON.

Es copia: LUIS DE ONIS.

No. 3.—Thomas Stoughton, Spanish Consul at New York, to Jonathan Fisk, District Attorney General of the United States

NEW YORK, September 17, 1817.

SIR: I enclose the deposition of John Reilley, relating to the privateer brig, about which I yesterday had the honor to address you. You will perceive, by the affidavit, that officers belonging to that brig are openly employed in this city in recruiting and enlisting men to join with General McGregor, and invade the possessions of the King of Spain.

I need not remind you that, by the existing laws of the United States, these enlistments are unlawful, and that not only the vessel on board of which they are to embark is liable to seizure and forfeiture, but that the captain and the officers thereof, who are engaged in this business, are liable to a heavy fine and imprisonment. As these are flagrant violations of the laws of the United States, and calculated to produce serious injury to the property and to the possessions of His Majesty's subjects, I flatter myself that you will take, without delay, such steps as may be necessary to put a stop to these proceedings.

I have the honor, [etc.].

No. 4.—Jonathan Fisk, District Attorney General of the United States, to Thomas Stoughton, Spanish Consul at New York

NEW YORK, September 17, 1817.

SIR: I have duly received your notes of yesterday evening and of this day, and have referred to the statutes providing for the punishment of the offences stated. It is not a case, from the evidence mentioned, that would justify the collector in detaining the vessel; the aggression is to be punished in the ordinary mode of prosecuting those who are guilty of misdemeanors. Oath is to be made of the facts by the complainant, who

esty's consul at New York has been in conformity with the laws and the above-mentioned act of Congress, and whether the attorney for that district will

enters into a recognizance to appear and prosecute the offenders, before any process can issue. This oath being made, and recognizance taken, the judge of the circuit court will issue a warrant to apprehend the accused, and bring them before him, to be further dealt with according to law. When apprehended, it is the province of the attorney of the United States to conduct the prosecution to judgment. I have no authority to administer an oath, or to issue a warrant, nor have I the power to issue any process to arrest and detain the vessel in question, unless by the direction of an executive officer of the United States. By the reference you have furnished, the parties complained of are to be prosecuted either under the fourth section of the act of Congress passed on the 3d March, 1817, or under the second section of the act passed 5th June, 1794. By adverting to these statutes, it will be seen that the vessel is not liable to seizure for the act of any person enlisting himself to go on board, or for hiring or retaining another person to enlist. The punishment is personal to the offenders; and those who disclose the fact, on oath, within thirty days after enlisting, are protected from prosecution. The offenders are to be arrested and prosecuted in the manner I have stated. I beg you to be assured, sir, that it is not from a disposition either to shrink from the performance of my duty, or to decline interfering to defeat any illegal enterprise against the subjects or possessions of a Power with whom the United States are at peace, that I have stated to you the embarrassments I must encounter in attempting a compliance with your request upon any information with which I am furnished. If it is in your power to procure the names of the parties, and the evidence upon which a prosecution for a misdemeanor can be founded, I will readily co-operate with the proper authorities in having every offender arrested and brought to justice. It is impracticable for me, or any other officer of the United States, to take any legal measures against aggressors upon the indefinite statement of certain persons being concerned in an illegal transaction. Since the receipt of your notes, I have had an interview with the collector, and we are unable to discover any other legal course of proceeding in this case than that adopted in the ordinary cases of misdemeanor.

I have the honor to be, [etc.].

No. 5.—Thomas Stoughton, Spanish Consul at New York, to Jonathan Fisk, District Attorney General of the United States

NEW YORK, September 19, 1817.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge having received yesterday your letter dated the 17th instant, in reply to mine of the 16th and 17th, wherein you mention that the case whereof I informed you in those communications was not one which would justify the collector in detaining the vessel; that the aggression is to be punished in the ordinary mode of prosecuting those who are guilty of misdemeanors; that oath is to be made of the facts by the complainant, who enters into a recognizance to appear and prosecute the offenders before any process can issue; that this oath being made, and recognizance taken, the judge of the circuit court will issue a warrant to apprehend the accused and bring them before him, to be further dealt with according to law; and that, when apprehended, it is the province of the attorney of the United States to conduct the prosecution to judgment; that you have no authority to administer an oath or to issue a warrant, nor have you the power to issue any process to arrest and detain the vessel in question, unless by the direction of an executive officer of the United States.

In reply, permit me to request that you will take this subject again into your serious reflection. I do not urge it for the present occasion, because, even though you should upon consideration adopt a different opinion from that which you have communicated to me, it is now too late, since the vessel in question sailed from this port this morning. But, sir, can it be possible that the doctrine can be correct which you lay down in your letter, and which forms your reason for declining to proceed against the persons who were enlisting men in this city, with the open and avowed design of taking them in a privateer under the Venezuela flag to join with McGregor, and commit hostilities against the Spanish possessions? I furnished you with the affidavits of two persons stating the fact, and you will excuse me in saying that I cannot think the laws of the United States render it incumbent upon me to present myself before a judge of the circuit court, and enter into bonds to appear and prosecute the offenders. On the contrary, sir, the thirty-fifth section of the judiciary act imposes upon the attorney of the United States for each district the duty of prosecuting all delinquents for crimes and offences

rightfully have conformed thereto, by his strict observance of them, in obliging the owner or captain of the said armed brigantine to give the requisite security that he will commit no hostilities against the subjects of His Catholic Majesty, and in preventing him from proceeding freely to sea to commit new depredations.

It is very disagreeable to me to have to repeat to you sir, what, unfortunately, I have been several times under the necessity of submitting to the President, through the medium of your predecessors, namely, that the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1817, has in nowise lessened the abuses by which the laws are evaded, and render entirely illusory the laudable purposes for which they were enacted. From the greater part of the ports of these States there frequently sail a considerable number of vessels, with the premeditated intention of attacking the Spanish commerce, which carry their armament concealed in the hold. It rarely happens that they can be arrested, inasmuch as the collectors of the customs say that they have not at their disposition the naval force necessary to effect it; on the other hand, armed vessels, under the flag of the insurgents, enter into the ports of the Union, and not only supply themselves with all necessaries, but also considerably in-

cognizable under the authority of the United States. I conceive, therefore, that as soon as the attorney of the United States receives information of the infraction of the laws, it becomes his duty to take such measures as may be necessary to bring the offenders to justice; he is the person who must take the witnesses before a judge or magistrate; he must become the informer; he must prosecute; that is, he must take, or cause to be taken, the steps which are necessary to arrest the offenders and bring them to punishment. I am the more confirmed in this belief, because the thirty-third section of the judiciary act directs that offenders may be imprisoned by a judge or magistrate, at the expense of the United States, and leaves it discretionary to the witnesses to appear and testify. That act does not require that the informer should enter into bonds to appear and prosecute. The offence of which I have complained is of a most serious nature. The United States should not afford means to one nation at peace with them to annoy and invade another nation also at peace with them. And it becomes the duty of all the officers of the United States, as they value the reputation and the interest of their country, to discharge with alacrity and zeal those duties assigned to them, which can preserve the neutrality of their country, and prevent its becoming the centre of reunion for the enemies of Spain, and to prevent their own citizens joining in measures of hostility and aggression. It is a matter of notoriety that the insurgent Governments of South America all have their agents in this country; that swarms of privateers are fitted out, armed, and equipped for war in the United States; and all the injuries and desolation committed by them upon the Spanish commerce emanate from the facilities which they find in the United States to prepare for themselves these outrages. And, sir, Congress having passed laws rendering these acts illegal, I cannot admit that individuals must undertake the task of informing against and prosecuting the offenders. These offences are against the dignity of the country; they affect the community at large. I cannot, therefore, bring myself to believe that it is the province of individuals to bind themselves to prosecute offenders, any more than I can think that it is the duty of an individual who gives information that a murder has been committed to enter into bonds to prosecute the murderer. No, sir; the laws must have confided this odious but necessary task to its public officers; they must see that offenders are brought to punishment; and, sir, I do further consider that this duty has by law been devolved upon you. Regretting, therefore, that this expedition has been permitted to proceed unmolested, notwithstanding the information which I communicated to you, you will excuse me if, on all future occasions of a similar nature, I should renew my application to you to prevent a new aggression.

I beg you to be assured, [etc.].

crease the means they already have of destroying the trade of Spain, as has recently been the case at New York, whereby the (so called) privateers of His Majesty's revolted provinces, which are in reality nothing more than pirates, manned by the scum of all countries, enjoy greater privileges than the vessels of independent Powers.

I request you, sir, to lay particularly before the President the case which now obliges me to trouble you, in order that his excellency, being made fully acquainted therewith, may be pleased to take such measures as are within his reach to cause the provisions of the laws of this republic to be carefully fulfilled, to preserve the observance of the neutrality with others Powers, and prevent the infraction of the treaty existing between the two nations; and thus avoid not only the serious evils that the said pirates cause to the subjects of His Catholic Majesty, but the increase of the difficulties which the two Governments are endeavoring to overcome, for the purpose of establishing their relations upon a more friendly and permanent footing.

I flatter myself that you will honor me with your answer; and, reiterating my respects, [etc.].

1076

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, *January 10, 1818.*

SIR: I had yesterday the honor to receive your dispatch No. 1 (Nov^r. 11th)² and though this had been thrown into the English Post Office without any special precaution to ensure its safe transmission, and passed with its original cover through Portugal, I have the pleasure to say that its highly important contents had not been examined.

Mr. Pizarro in an interview which I had with him last week, mentioned the information which he has received respecting the missions of Messrs. Rodney, Graham and Prevost.³ I perceive that he is not aware of the objects which our government has in view; he presumes or suspects that these Gentlemen are authorized formally to acknowledge the Independence of some of the new Republics. The English Ambassador mentioned the subject to me in the same sense, but whether he derived his opinion from Mr. Pizarro, or it is that of his own Government, I did not ascertain. I said but little in reply to either of these Gentlemen, stating merely that I had no

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XV.

² See above, pt. 1, doc. 42.

³ See above, pt. 1, docs. 40, 41 and 44, July 18, and November 21, 1817.

other information than what the newspapers gave. If it may be supposed that Sir Henry Wellesley spoke after communications from his own government, it is important to observe, that his manner of treating the subject was not only friendly but expressive of an anxious concern, lest the recognition of the independence of any of the Spanish Provinces might thwart the conciliatory views of Great Britain, and he entered into a reasoning to shew that it would be the interest political and commercial of the United States to accede to the plan of adjustment which England had proposed—their interest respective to the Colonies—for far from intimating any thing of a menacing character, his solicitude seemed to dwell wholly on the idea that the efforts of England might be rendered fruitless by the recognition of the United States. I took this then as a ground to press upon him the necessity of his making to me the most frank and full communications as to whatever negotiations may be carried on for the pacification of the Colonies.

It has been generally supposed here and in England that the mediation has been agreed on, and the principles on which the reconciliation of the Colonies with Spain is to be effected have been minutely detailed: the establishment of provincial assemblies, the admission to Office of the Indigenes, the right of self taxation, liberty of commerce with the whole world, the right of making restrictive laws as to importation and exportation—these demands of the Province of Venezuela to be taken as a basis. But I have ascertained in a conversation with Mr. Pizarro that though it is true that Spain has addressed each of the allied Sovereigns, mendicating assistance in some shape or other, offering motives for their mediation or arbitration, soliciting in the most urgent manner even their forcible interference, and though she has been favorably heard by some of them, & *pourparlers* of considerable importance have been had, yet to this day nothing has been agreed on: what I learn from Sir Henry Wellesley is in accord with this; and further that his Government three or four months past communicated to the allied powers in a formal paper her views on the subject, that these were of a very liberal character offering to the Colonists all the guarantees that can be reasonably desired. An answer has been received from all of those powers, Russia excepted, and there the matter rests: so far then from the mediation being agreed on, it is to be suspected that nothing further will be done towards it 'till the effect of this new expedition with the Squadron bought of Russia shall be ascertained. Spain does not feel her cause to be so desperate as to require her assent to the terms of Venezuela, or probably to terms as liberal as those proposed by Great Britain, and she must be assured, for it is perfectly certain, that in no case whatever will Great Britain engage to use forcible means, and without her an engagement to that effect by Russia or the other powers would evidently be not only futile, but might be prejudicial to the cause of Spain. . . .

The mediation offered by the allied sovereigns in the disputes between this

Government and that of Brazil having been accepted by the latter, Count Pamela its Ambassador in London (now appointed Secretary of State) received in the month of September the special commission and instructions enabling him to negotiate on those affairs with the Plenipotentiaries of Spain and of the mediators, and soon after repaired to Paris where this Congress is held. The preliminary demands made by Spain, are that its sovereign right in the Territory lately invaded by the King of Brazil shall be formally acknowledged, its flag every where hoisted, and Monte Video &c. instantly restored. These things being done, she will consent to discuss those points respecting Olivenza &c. on which the reclamations of Portugal are founded. In a note presented to the Congress in November Count Pamela accedes readily to the first demand; as to the second, suggests the expedient of agreeing upon a flag neither Spanish nor Portuguese, and, as to the third, declines admitting it, upon grounds which he details at length, insisting particularly on the necessity of the case arising from the critical position of Brazil in relation to the Insurgent Colony—in fine urging the same reasons for holding, that she had for taking possession, and reinforcing these by the motives of policy growing out of her actual relations with Buenos Ayres. The views of the Brazil Government being thus announced, it has been very difficult to persuade Spain to appoint a Plenipotentiary to the Congress, but she has finally consented, and a few days since powers were sent to the Count of Fernan Nuñez her Ambassador at Paris.

With the most perfect respect [etc.].

1077

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1818.

4. The Government of the United States to engage to take effectual measures to prevent all hostile armaments in their ports and territory against the commerce and possessions of Spain, either by Americans or any other Power, or by adventurers of any other nations, or by the rebels of Spanish America; and, for their due execution, the President to issue positive orders to all persons employed by the Government, charging them, on their responsibility, to guard against any infraction or violation of them whatsoever, extending the same measures to the preventing of any vessels employed in cruising against the Spanish commerce, or otherwise hostilely engaged

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 464.*

against the Government and subjects of His Catholic Majesty, from arming in, or entering armed, the harbors and waters of the United States. Every vessel of this description found within the jurisdiction of the United States to be seized without remission, and subjected to the rigor of the law by the American officers and authorities; and the vessels and property so captured, belonging to the subjects of the Crown of Spain, to be laid under attachment, and definitively delivered up to His Majesty's minister, or the nearest Spanish consul, to be held by them at the disposal of the lawful owners. This proposal contains nothing beyond the obligations already imposed by the laws of the United States, the law of nations, and the existing treaty. But as it is evident to you, and to the whole world, that abuses and infractions of these laws and solemn compacts have been, and continue to be, frequently practised, it is absolutely necessary that suitable measures be adopted, fully and effectually to prevent the repetition of similar abuses and infractions.

By these four proposals the rights and interests of both Powers are reconciled upon principles of manifest justice and reciprocal utility; they settle and terminate all pending differences, in my judgment, satisfactorily to both nations; and I must presume that the President will view them in the same light, and substantially admit them. In case there be any other question of secondary or minor importance to be in like manner included in the general and definitive adjustment, it will be easy, and follow of course, after we have agreed on the most essential articles or points; we will then also determine the true import of the several propositions laid down, and explain each one of them with the necessary clearness, accuracy, and precision.

If, however, you should find any difficulty or obstacle to the acceptance of the proposals I have now the honor to make to you, and are of opinion that by any other mode we may attain the desired object, without deviating from the fundamental principles and basis of justice and reciprocal convenience, I will, with great pleasure, be ready to adopt it, provided it be compatible with the powers given me by the King, my master. In this view you can propose such changes or modifications as you may see fit, as are calculated to remove all difficulties on both sides, and reconcile the rights, interests, and wishes of both Powers.

In the mean time, I hope that the course pursued by the President (*en la marcha de su conducta*) will correspond with the sentiments and uniform profession of amity and perfect harmony existing between His Majesty and the United States; and I am, therefore, constrained to reclaim and protest, formally, as I now do, against all measures whatsoever injurious to the rights of the Crown of Spain, and to renew, as I hereby do, the protest already made against the occupation of Amelia island, and against the orders to occupy Galvezton, inasmuch as the United States having no right whatever either to the said island or to Galvezton, they neither had, nor could have, a just

motive or cause to sanction similar acts of violence in the midst of peace.

I await your answer to this note in order that we may accelerate the moment of agreeing on just and fit measures for carrying the definitive settlement of all pending differences into effect.

In the mean time, I renew [etc.].

1078

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

Private.

MADRID, *February 10, 1818.*

DEAR SIR: Since the date of my last despatch (No 59 Jany 10)² nothing has occurred in our concerns here of sufficient importance to be communicated to you. The projected mediation in the affairs of the Spanish colonies, mentioned in that despatch, has not advanced; nor does there appear to be the least probability that the liberal terms proposed by England will be acceded to by this government. Mr. Pizarro & the ministry in general are sufficiently enlightened on the subject to adopt any reasonable course, but the ancient obstinate policy of never conceding still prevails in the council of state, before which all such matters are discussed. The members of this council for the most part inveterate in the prejudices of former times, are wholly unfit for the direction of state affairs in this day. There are also amongst them those who by system, in the absence of all patriotism, oppose every ministerial plan however salutary. In fine the proposals of England offer to the colonies an happier lot than these people can ever be brought to consent to, tho' it may be that on some points they will bend to the influence of Russia. The determination of that cabinet is not yet known. In the meantime it appears that France & Prussia coincide with the views of England, & consent that London shall be the seat of negotiation. On this point as on every other the government of England is very positive, so that if Spain under the influence of Russia should not consent to the whole project, the whole must fall to the ground. But after all, since there is no question of using forcible means (or even if there was [were]) will the colonies, Buenos Ayres particularly, acquiesce in the decisions of this congress. I believe that Great Britain scarcely expects it. It is too much (to use a pleasantry of Mr. Sheridan in the English House of Commons) like Dame Partletts calling her fowls, "Come biddy; biddy come & be killed." Such as the proposals of Great Britain are, I think that she offers them in good faith; indeed is not

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XV.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1076.

the plan of holding the conferences in London one evidence of this? If she intended a state-juggle she would surely fix on a more distant place, & the more distant the more to her purpose: at least Sir Henry Wellesley is in good faith, I perceive in him a growing anxiety, arising out of our last news from the United States (which comes down to 25 Dec^r. via England) lest we should acknowledge the independence of Buenos Ayres & Chili, considering that such recognition would render the intermediation of his government useless as regards those provinces.

The Russian fleet still tarries in England repairing the damages which it sustained in heavy storms during its passage thither. Probably it was not in the most perfect state when it left the Baltick. Publick rumour says that it is taking on board merchandize for the colonies; this is not to be believed. With more appearance of probability it is suggested that the fleet waits to receive the 400,000£ stg. due in this month by Great Britain to Spain on the slave trade suppression treaty, which sum may be about the price of the fleet. However these things may be, its non-arrival at Cadiz within the time agreed on, has created some little discontent here.

Mr. Garay's plan of finance still goes on, but as the opposition to it has augmented rather than diminished, it is far from producing the results which he calculated on; tho' it has certainly brought a great deal of money into the publick coffers, yet these are actually as empty as tho' it had never gone into operation, & every branch of the publick service suffers nearly as much for want of money as before Mr. Garay was made minister. He is wearied, & his health begins to fail, & the king beset by the minister's Enemies begins to give way;—he still supports the man, but does not enforce the measures which he recommends, & it is to be apprehended may be finally induced to give up the direct taxes, the most essential point, which will in effect be an abandonment of the whole project.

1079

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, February 26, 1818.

SIR: In my last despatch (of Jan'y 10th)² I had the honor to submit to you whatever I had been able to learn respecting the mediation of the "allied sovereigns" in the disputes between this court & that of Brazil, & as to their proposed interference in the affairs of the Spanish colonies.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XV.² See above, pt. XIII, docs. 1076 and 1078. It was the preceding numbered dispatch; but see his confidential dispatch of February 10.

The views of the Russian government on those two objects are explained in a memorial given at Moscow on 17th Nov'r last,¹ to serve as an instruction to her ministers in the congress, & near the parties concerned;—this has not yet been officially communicated at Paris, but it is informally known there, & in the same way has come to the hands of a person of distinction in this court from whom I have obtained a copy which I have the honor herewith to enclose. The Russian minister Mr. Tertischeff is at Cadiz; this may perhaps be the reason why this government has not hitherto received any communication upon the matter of this important paper, but its authenticity *may be wholly relied on.*

The Russian Squadron arrived at Cadiz on the 22d inst.; to all appearance the projected expedition will be of considerable force—according to the publick opinion it is destined for Buenos Ayres, but it is impossible to learn any thing certain on this point.

1080

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

MADRID, *March 1, 1818.*

DEAR SIR: My last "private" letter to you was of Feb'y 10th sent (as all my letters are) by duplicate. On 26 Feb'y³ I despatched my publick letter No. 60 & intended to accompany it by a few private remarks on the important paper⁴ which it enclosed; but besides being then much pressed for time, on reconsideration I thought that you would readily dispense with such commentaries as I might be able to make, particularly useless to you who have a personal & intimate acquaintance with the cabinet of St. Petersburg. I will only then reassure you in this that the memorial is quite genuine.

I have said that I cannot give to you any certain information respecting the destination of the late Russian now Spanish squadron, & it seemed idle to occupy your attention with various reports on the subject, were I to believe even the most specious of these. The opinion which I have always expressed of the fatuity of this government were [was] much short of what it ought to be: can it be imagined that in circumstances so urgent, when as it were, Spain, collects her breath to give "one puff", in which puff she may "expire", that this effort should be directed to Montevideo, actually under the safeguard of Brazil, & the fate of which is already referred to the decision of their

¹ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1011.

² MS. Dispatches from Spain, XV.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1079.

⁴ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1011, Russian memorial, November 17, 1817.

mutual friends?—that merely to be consistent in obstinacy & vapouring pride, she should waste in this extravagant quixotism, a force which well directed might extinguish the insurrection in Buenos Ayres, & of course take from the king of Brazil all further pretence for continuing to occupy the territory in question?—& yet, of all that is conjectured, this is what I am most inclined to give credit to. It is however to be observed, that so vacillating at all times are the plans of this government, that full reliance can never be placed on its carrying into Execution any one of them. It is evident that if she takes possession of Montevideo with or without the consent of Brazil, her force even tho' it were 10,000 men must be stationary there to protect it, blocked in, as the Portuguese now are.

I have said that to all appearance the expedition will be of considerable force, yet it is very difficult to conjecture when any portion of it can be ready to sail. The ships & guns, good & in good order, have been delivered, but nothing else. Every species of Equipment & provisions is to be furnished here, & the magazines as well as the treasury are empty: nor is it easy to conceive where the necessary provisions are to be had, still less the naval materials, for the arsenals are unprovided. Such is the want of precaution of system of management which pervades every branch of administration in this government. If I were to hazard a conjecture, it would be that this *squadron* will never sail, & that the most which can be done within two or three months will be to despatch 2 or 3 ships, perhaps a couple of transports & as many men as the whole can carry crowded on board to suffer by insufficient & bad provisions, & to be stifled by the heat.

As a matter of mere curiosity I take the liberty of herewith enclosing that official article in the *Madrid Gazette* of 28 Febr'y¹ by which the arrival of the

¹ Translation of the official article in the *Madrid Gazette* of February 28:

MADRID, February 27.

On the 21st instant at 1. p. m. anchored in the Bay of Cadiz a Russian Squadron of Five Men of War of 74 guns and Three Frigates of 44 guns; commanded by Vice-Admiral Moller, in a complete state of equipment, and in condition to undertake long voyages. The arrival of this Squadron in the Ports of Spain, is the result of the unceasing vigilance of The King, our Lord, for the benefit of his People and of the commerce and prosperity of his subjects in Europe and the Colonies. During the long period of the desolating War sustained by the Peninsula, the exertions of the Provisional governments administering the Kingdom in the absence of His Majesty, were necessarily directed, exclusively, to repelling a perfidious foreign invasion, by applying every resource to the organization of a Military Force essentially requisite to the safety of the Nation at so critical a juncture. This important object, exclusive as it were by its nature, unavoidably produced, a considerable neglect and decay of the Naval Force, which having engaged the attention of The King, became one of the principal objects of his concern, and acquired an additional interest, as soon as a sensible injury, resulting from the causes just alluded to, was experienced by the National Commerce, by its frequent interruption both in the Seas of Europe and America. In addition to this serious evil, the faithful subjects of His Majesty, in some of his Dominion, beyond Seas, were exposed to the greatest inconvenience by the want or failure of the succour necessary to preserve them from the disorder and anarchy to which anterior circumstances had given rise. The delay attending the construction and repair of ships, although undertaken and accelerated, with a special view to the object, was far from satisfying the earnest desire of the King, to apply a remedy to these evils with all possible expedition; happily the Wisdom

squadron is announced (under date of Feb'y 27) made as all such articles are to land in true castilian language the wonderful forecast & wisdom of his majesty, & his paternal care of his vassals. What is particularly curious in this piece (probably from the pen of Mr. Pizarro himself) is that his majesty, as tho' he had no minister fit for the business, or in whom he could confide, takes the merit of having conducted in person, & brought to a termination this arduous negotiation: this however added to the assertion that "no sacrifice" but a pecuniary one has been made to this important acquisition, necessarily confirms the suspicion that some secret articles exist by which other "sacrifices" are made. In fine the squadron consists of 5 ships of 74 guns each & 3 of 44, all completely armed. These are to exterminate the pirates in both hemispheres, to restore commerce to its rights, the insurgents to the rule of their lawful sovereign, to make agriculture, manufactures & the finances flourish & to give peace & prosperity to the whole world.

A day or two since I received from our Consul at Lisbon the President's message of January respecting the occupation of Amelia Island &c. From the language of the message I infer that you are yet in negotiation with Mr. Onís. Should you come to terms I conclude of course that these new grantees of all the lands in the Floridas will be shut out; but they seem to be "sure of their fact" & some of them are taking measures to dispose of their property. The king certainly has not been aware of what he was doing, or of the value of what he gave away; in Spanish theological phrase this is *repartir la capa de Christo entre ladrones*.

Sir Henry Wellesley has repeatedly expressed to me the sincere wishes of his government to see the disputes between us & this country amicably

of the King has found the means of supplying every deficiency in the resources of his paternal heart, and in the sincere friendship of His August Ally, the Emperor of All the Russias. A direct Negotiation on this subject having been opened by His Majesty himself, and brought to a happy conclusion, His Majesty has been enabled to acquire for Spain the property of this Squadron which we owe to his efforts, without any other sacrifice than the just payment, in Money, of the fair value of the vessels composing it, and to effect this payment His Majesty has found ample resources which will prevent the necessity of imposing any burthens upon his faithful Subjects. The August Sovereign of All the Russias, who to his immortal Glory, has so powerfully contributed to the Salvation of Europe, by rescuing it from an ignominious Yoke, and reestablishing Order and Legitimacy, will also contribute, by this Transaction, to the augmentation of the Naval Forces of The King, to the Protection of Spanish Commerce, to extirpating the Pirates which infest our Seas, defending the faithful Subjects beyond Seas who are there exposed to the horrors of Anarchy and Disorder, and restoring to Europe the benefits of which it has been deprived by the commotions in America. If Providence, as we are bound to hope, favours the just views of His Majesty, in this and other measures adopted to carry his beneficent intentions into effect, we shall again see Commerce revive with security; Agriculture and Industry flourish by the easy and advantageous export of their productions; the Funds of the State advance; order restored in our American Dominions, and all the Spaniards of both Hemispheres, united in the Bonds of Fraternity, glorify the Sovereign, to whose Wisdom and paternal Care they will be indebted for so many Blessings; and that from the Southern Extremity of Europe there will be but one feeling of sympathy and veneration for the noble and generous sentiments of the August Autocrat of the North, who in his friendship for our Beloved Sovereign, has afforded him an aid so important towards remedying the Evils under which His People suffers.

settled, & lately has told me the particulars of a conversation between you & Lord Castlereagh just previous to your leaving London, in which that minister spoke to the same effect. Upon the whole therefore I have lately encouraged hopes that some way has been found to get over what appeared to me to be nearly insuperable difficulties: but however the negotiations may terminate I pray you not to be unmindful of the desire with respect to myself which I took the liberty of mentioning to you previous to your return home.

With Sincere Respect [etc.].

1081

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1818.

SIR: I have received official advice, through different channels, that the expedition of French adventurers which left Philadelphia towards the end of last year, with the apparent intention of going to Tombigbee, but in reality to Galvezton, is now receiving, at the former place, a considerable number of recruits, and large supplies of military stores from the ports of New Orleans, Charleston, Savannah, and others within this republic; from whence they proceed in small parties to Galvezton, and thus elude the vigilance of the Government.

From the period at which (namely, on the 6th of September last) I announced to you the preparations for this expedition, referring for its unquestionable certainty to the plan communicated to this Government by the minister of France, which offered the most indubitable proof that Joseph Bonaparte was at the head of it, with the rash project of being crowned King of Mexico, I have relied on your assurances to the same ambassador, and which were forthwith communicated by him to me, that the most effectual measures had been taken by the Government to prevent its execution. But, perceiving that this expedition daily takes a greater consistence, and that the recruiting and supplies clandestinely sent from this republic are not put a stop to, I can no longer refrain from again calling your attention, and, through you, that of the President, to the enormous abuse of the hospitality offered by this republic, on the part of Joseph Bonaparte and his adherents, with a view to disturb the tranquillity of Europe, and especially that of the possessions of the King, my master.

I would have considered myself dispensed from the necessity of again pressing this subject on your attention, if it had appeared possible for me to

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 494.

restrain these armaments by the employment of judicial means; but, unfortunately, the act of Congress of the 20th April last for preserving neutrality with foreign nations, and others already in force, although highly judicious, are easily eluded; and although these practices are public and notorious throughout the whole Union, His Majesty's consuls advise me that, through a deficiency of evidence, they cannot be restrained by a regular application of the law.

Convinced, however, as I am, that nothing is more remote from the intention of the President than to tolerate hostile expeditions within the territories of the republic, directed against Powers with which it is in a state of profound peace, I cannot for a moment doubt that his excellency will take into his most serious consideration what is due to the demand which I now make in the name of my sovereign, that Joseph Bonaparte, the generals Lallemand, and other Frenchmen now residing in this country, be compelled to keep themselves within the bounds prescribed by the hospitality and generosity with which they have been received, and prevented from continuing to organize expeditions for the purpose of invading the territory of His Catholic Majesty, and disturbing the peace enjoyed by his subjects.

I therefore hope that you will be pleased, sir, to inform me of the measures which may be taken on this subject, in order that, in communicating them to my sovereign, His Majesty may see in them a confirmation of the amicable sentiments of this republic towards his monarchy.

I renew [etc.].

1082

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

BRISTOL, June 9, 1818.

SIR: At my passage through Baltimore, on my way to Philadelphia, it was represented to me by His Catholic Majesty's consul for the State of Maryland that there were then in that port four pirates, or privateers, if you please so to call them; namely, the *Independencia del Sud*, Captain Grennolds; the *Pueyrredon*, alias *Mangore*, Captain Barnes; the *Republicano*, Captain Chase; and the schooner *Alerta*, Captain Chaytor. These pirates, denominated privateers or vessels of war of the pretended Government of Buenos Ayres, have entered the port of Baltimore for the purpose of dividing the spoil resulting from their depredations on Spanish commerce, and of refitting and arming to renew these excesses on the high seas. It is a matter of universal

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 494.

notoriety at Baltimore that three of the above-named vessels were fitted out there, and the fourth is a schooner captured by them from Spanish subjects; it is no less so that their commanders, and the greater part of the crews, are American citizens, and that there is scarcely a single individual belonging to Buenos Ayres to be found among them.

Whoever has read the so-called constitution and the provisional laws existing at Buenos Ayres, (for there is nothing there but what is provisional,) must know that no vessel of the rebels can sail under their flag unless the captain and one-half of the crew be natives of that country, and that no foreigner can be naturalized there till after five years' residence. I submit to your judgment, sir, whether, on such grounds, the vessels in question can be admitted to be Buenos Ayrean privateers, or whether the American captains and crews that man them, commissioned or not by that rebel Government, can be considered as citizens of that country; and whether, agreeably to the laws of nations and the existing treaty between His Majesty and this republic, they can be viewed in any other light than as pirates; and if it be possible for you to conceal from your discernment that the captains and crews of these vessels have violated the laws of this Union in perpetrating these atrocities to the dishonor of the American name. I repeat, that I submit it to your consideration to determine whether the prizes made by vessels under these circumstances ought not to be restored to their lawful owners or that these persons ought to be indemnified by the United States, seeing that they have tolerated such armaments in violation of their laws, of the laws of nations, and of the existing treaty between Spain and this republic.

I am aware, sir, that you will tell me that the courts are open to the recognition of claims of this nature, and ready to apply the law to such cases as occur and are supported by suitable testimony; but I am under the necessity of declaring to you that it is in vain to seek such testimony, however clear it may be to every body. I have remonstrated in the most pointed manner with His Majesty's consul on his attention to points of so much importance; but he has proved to me that a great portion of the commercial people of Baltimore being interested in the cases which produce my present reclamations, no one is willing to come forward and offer testimony against what is termed the general interest; and thus the wise measures of Government are eluded, justice is paralyzed, and the suits procrastinated and deferred from court to court, with a view to deprive His Majesty's subject of that justice which they have an undoubted right to seek in the tribunals on all their claims.

Presuming that all I have stated is well known to you and to the President, I cannot but persuade myself that it is highly disapproved of, and I am entirely willing to believe that, if these abuses are not remedied, it is owing to a want of due attention to the execution of the orders of the Government;

but my duty compels me to call the attention of the President to this important point, and to represent to him, through the medium of your Department, that (as far as I have been able to ascertain) the vessels in question, in addition to their object in coming hither, for the purpose of conveying to the parties interested at Baltimore the proceeds of their spoliations on the Spanish commerce, and, among others, that of the Philippine Company's ship *Triton*, to the amount of a million and a half of dollars, captured by the pirate *Independencia del Sud*, and carried to Buenos Ayres to be sold there, have a project in fitting out anew, and of attacking some possession of the King, my master, on this continent, to which they may more easily send their prizes; that these same privateers have brought in two Spanish prizes, which are at this moment in the port of Baltimore, one of them a vessel belonging to the royal navy. I therefore demand, in the name of the King, my master, the restoration of those prizes, as having been made by American citizens and vessels fitted out in this country, in violation of the existing treaty between the two Powers; and that the sailing of the said privateers be stopped, and they compelled to give security for the result of an expedition, of which, without knowing positively that they intend to execute it, I have the strongest grounds for presuming they mean to do. I therefore hope that this subject will receive all the attention which I claim, and that you will be persuaded that, in taking the liberty to trouble you with it, it is because I have no other recourse, as I have in all other cities of the Union, where the officers of the Government afford the requisite attention to the reclamations of His Majesty's consuls, and the citizens are disposed to offer the necessary testimony in support of justice and the maintenance of the laws.

I seize this occasion to renew [etc.].

1083

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *June 11, 1818.*

In my letter No 59 (Jan'y 10)² I had the honor to communicate to you what I had then learnt respecting the mediation of the allied Sovereigns in the disputes between Spain and Brazil, and that special powers had been finally given by this government to the Duke of Fernan Nuñez its Ambassador at Paris.—I have just now been favored with a sight of the notes of the Plenipotentiaries of either party submitted to the Congress of mediators.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XV.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1076.

Count Pamela admitting the Sovereign title of Spain to the territory in question, proposes that the pacification of Buenos Ayres shall precede the evacuation of Montevideo by the troops of his master. The Duke of Fernan Nuñez rejects this proposal, and it appears that the Congress take side with him on this point. Count Pamela then states that tho' not authorised to stipulate for the immediate evacuation of Montevideo, yet from a desire not to arrest the progress of the negotiation, he will propose the terms on which he will consent to such evacuation. These terms are:

1st. That Spain shall send a force sufficient to protect Montevideo not only against Artigas, but against the people of Buenos Ayres, and that since Brazil is at peace with Buenos Ayres and has only to defend its possession against the attacks of Artigas, the Spanish force ought to be at least equal to that of Brazil.

2nd. That the expenses incurred by Brazil in taking possession shall be reimbursed by Spain.

3d. That the boundaries between the Brazilian and Spanish Territories in that quarter shall be definitively ascertained and agreed on.

4th. That the stipulations made by the King of Brazil with the people of Montevideo shall be faithfully observed by Spain.

On such terms Pamela offers to sign a treaty *sub spe rati*.

Fernan Nuñez agrees that a force shall be sent even greater than that of Brazil, and he agrees that the stipulations made with the people of Montevideo shall be observed, but he declines paying to Brazil the expenses of her expedition and he proposes to defer settling the boundaries to a future day; he takes occasion to reproach Brazil for being on good terms with the "insurgents" of Buenos Ayres, and objects to the reserved form in which Pamela would sign the Treaty. Pamela replies with respect to the boundary that on evacuating Montevideo it will be necessary that the troops of Brazil should establish themselves on the frontier of that kingdom to defend it against all danger, that there fortifications and other expensive establishments must be made—hence the necessity of immediately determining the boundary line. He replies victoriously to the reproach of Fernan Nuñez as to the good understanding of Brazil with the "Insurgents", shewing that the government of Spain itself has approved of the policy of Brazil in this respect, and he professes a disposition on the part of his master to co-operate with the allied Sovereigns in bringing that people back to their allegiance, *providing that no forcible means shall be resorted to*; he re-urges the right of Brazil to be indemnified for her expenses; and finally as to the mode in which he has proposed to sign the Treaty he observes that it will occasion no delay, for in whatever mode signed the ratification will be always necessary &c.

1084

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

BRISTOL, July 27, 1818.

SIR: It is some time since I have received positive and circumstantial information that a person, acting under a commission from the rebels at Buenos Ayres, had given orders for the building of two frigates, of twenty-eight or thirty guns each, at New York; and that, armed, equipped, and manned with citizens of this republic, they are to proceed from that port on a cruise against the commerce and subjects of His Catholic Majesty.

Although so manifest a violation of the laws of the United States, to the injury of my sovereign, imposed on me the duty of immediately soliciting of the President such measures as are in conformity with the laws of the Union and the peace and good understanding existing between the two nations, and would put a stop to this evil, yet, faithful to the system I have laid down of not trespassing on the attention of your Government, except in cases of indispensable necessity, I directed His Majesty's consul at New York, after he had obtained all the legal evidence required by the courts, to have recourse to them with that calmness and confidence with which the justice of his cause should inspire him when submitted to impartial and enlightened magistrates.

His Majesty's consul has just informed me that, agreeably to my instructions, he had applied to the district attorney, stating that he was possessed of sundry declarations of persons, corroborating each other, showing that the laws of the United States had been violated, and requesting him to cause the said vessels to be stopped and proceeded against, together with the parties concerned in their equipment, in the manner prescribed by the act of Congress of 20th April last, section 11. The district attorney appears not to have been very anxious to carry the act into execution, as he replied that he would not do so, although fifty such declarations were presented to him. I do not pretend to inquire into the motives of the attorney's feelings or conduct, which, to say the least, was extraordinary; but I deem it indispensable to transmit to you four of the original declarations referred to,² that they may be laid be-

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 500.

² The documents follow:

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City of New York*, ss:

Samuel Samuels, by profession a mariner, at present in the city of New York, being duly sworn, says: That, about the 11th or 12th of July instant, deponent was at Dominick Morris's house, where they were shipping hands for the *Curiazo*; he met there a Mr. Brown, who was the man who attended on shore to the enlisting and shipping of the crew; this gentleman asked deponent whether he did not wish to ship on board of the *Curiazo*, and upon this requested him to walk up stairs, and he would inform deponent all about the object of the vessel; they went up stairs, and Mr. Brown then said that the *Curiazo* was destined to go around Cape Horn, or would go to Buenos Ayres

fore the President, and that he may be pleased to direct, with the urgency required by the case, the collector of the customs at New York to stop the above-

in the patriot service; that she would join the other ship, which was lying in North river, named the *Horatio*, and they would be absent about two years; deponent signed articles, at the office of the notary, Mr. Palmer; he did not read the articles at the time of signing; the wages were fourteen dollars a month, and two months' advance, which sum is paid in like manner to all the crew, fourteen dollars at the time of signing the articles, and fourteen dollars after getting on board; he went on board on Tuesday, the 21st of July instant, and found sixty hands on board, agreeably to the muster which was made; and there were others on shore who had enlisted but not yet come aboard; there were a captain, several lieutenants, a sailingmaster, many midshipmen, a boatswain, boatswain's mates, boatswain's yeomen, several quartermasters, a gunner, gunner's mate, and two quarter-gunners, two captains for each of the tops—fore-top, mizen-top, and main-top, two captains of the forecastle, two captains of the after-guard, a captain of the hold, and green hands to form a company of marines; deponent was captain of the main-top of the larboard watch; the hands were exercised every day in loosing and handling the sails; some of the hands were employed in making wads for the cannon; the guns were not yet come on board, but they were expected daily, and the hands conversed about the stations which they would hold at the guns; the exercising of the crews, which he has before mentioned, was the same as is customary in the service of the United States on board their vessels of war; there was a regular watch kept up during the day and night, one-half of the crew being on watch all the night; the hands were all piped by the boatswain and the boatswain's mate at their several meals; when officers came on board, the sides were manned for them by way of salute; and, in every respect, the discipline and duty kept up was the same as is practised in the navy service.

When the deponent shipped, the notary told him to leave a will and power to enable the landlord to receive the prize-money which deponent might become entitled to; which deponent did accordingly in favor of Dominick Morris. The general understanding on board the vessel is, that they were to cruise along the coast of South America after their arrival at Buenos Ayres. The vessel is built in every respect as a vessel of war; the water below is secured exactly in the manner that it is done on board a man-of-war, which is different from what is usual in the merchant service. Deponent further saith not.

SAMUEL SAMUELS, his X mark.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 23d day of July, 1818,

JAMES HOPSON, *S. Justice.*

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City of New York*, ss:

George W. Lynch, of the city of New York, merchant, being duly sworn, says: That on the 23d day of July instant, he went on board the ship *Curiazo*, lying in the North river, in this port, in company with a Mr. Atkinson, who said he was the purser of the said vessel; deponent counted thirty cannon lying on the deck, and a number of new gun-carriages which were lying upon one another, and appeared to be equally numerous; he was presented to the several officers, was told by them that there were a captain, four lieutenants, and a number of midshipmen; that the captain was named Delano, the first lieutenant is named Van Beuren, the second Grinnel, the third Smith, and the fourth Cobbett; he was told by the purser that the vessel, together with the *Horatio*, another ship lying near, was bound to Buenos Ayres; there appeared to be a great number of men on board; he was told by said purser that it was their intention to take one hundred men; that the crew were paid two months' advance, and that, as a further inducement to them to ship, they had the prospect of prize money. In conversation with a Mr. Sullivan, who is at the head of the surgical department for the two vessels, and was now on board the *Curiazo*, he (Mr. Sullivan) said, "I am sorry that the guns are not carronades instead of gunnades;" but then immediately added, "however, it is better as it is; we shall want long guns to fight the Spaniards." Deponent was carried through the vessel, and the different parts of it were pointed out to him; the captain's room, the lieutenants' room, and the midshipmen's room, were severally and respectively designated; there was a quantity of cannon balls between the decks; all hands were piped by the boatswain while deponent was on board. This vessel is newly built, has been launched but a short time, and is now preparing for her first voyage; she is pierced for many guns, and is built in every respect like a frigate.

Deponent left this vessel in company with the surgeon, Mr. Sullivan, and proceeded

mentioned vessels, in order that they, as well as the parties engaged in their outfit, may be proceeded against in due form of law, and the necessary force employed for the faithful execution of his duty.

with him to the other ship, the *Horatio*. This gentleman is the surgeon of the *Horatio*, and told deponent that he had selected the surgeons for this and the other vessel, (the *Curiazo*;) that he had examined them in order to ascertain that they were duly qualified; he mentioned that the crews of each vessel would consist at present of one hundred men for each, but that their complement was three hundred men for each; that the medical list which was handed to him for both vessels was for six hundred men; he showed deponent his medicine chest, his tools, and other implements, and said that he had every thing in complete order; he showed deponent into a room below the cabin, which he said would be his station in time of action; deponent said he supposed there would be little fighting, to which Mr. Sullivan answered, "I don't know, the Spaniards have got a fine frigate out there with five hundred men." Deponent was told on board of this vessel by the said surgeon, and by another officer, the second lieutenant, that, besides the captain, Skinner, who was commodore of the two vessels, the *Horatio* had four lieutenants and a number of midshipmen; the first lieutenant is named Currie, and the second Eakin; deponent was shown into the several rooms of the captain, lieutenants, and midshipmen; the cannon had not yet been brought on board of this vessel, but the officers told deponent they expected them shortly; this vessel resembles the other in every respect, was built at the same time, and has never yet been to sea. Speaking about the complement of men for these vessels, Mr. Eakin, the second lieutenant, told the deponent that although they would take out for the present only one hundred men each, they would have no difficulty in making up the full number, which would be three hundred, at Buenos Ayres, because sailors there would leave the privateers to enter these vessels. He said that if Mr. Aguirre, when he commenced the building of these vessels, had employed a merchant, instead of making the contract himself, he would have saved a great deal of money, at least fifteen per cent.; that Dacy and Didier, of Baltimore, had received money from Aguirre, and had offered to transact all the business of these vessels, and to bond them for five per cent., but that he was unwilling to allow them more than two and a half per cent.; they offered also to allow him bank interest for his money while it was in their hands; but they came to no agreement, owing to the smallness of the commission which Aguirre was willing to allow them; and that the vessels had cost him a very large sum of money, every thing having been fitted up in the most costly manner; that the cannon had been made by Mason, of Washington. The surgeon, Mr. Sullivan, speaking of the discipline of the two vessels, said that of the *Horatio* was superior to the *Curiazo*; that, on board of the *Horatio*, the medical returns were made daily, the same as on board a man of war. When deponent went on board of the *Horatio*, the sides were manned, which was also done when he left it; this ceremony is a compliment or salute to the person who comes on board, and is customary on board vessels of war, and not in merchant vessels.

While on board the *Horatio*, the said Eakin said that he had always been treated well by the Spaniards, but said some other words, the import of which was that this was a speculation, and that he must do the best he could for himself; Mr. Currie, the first lieutenant, also said that he had always been well treated by the Spaniards, and that he would treat them so until he could not help doing otherwise—alluding to what he would do in time of battle.

Mr. Wynans, of the firm of Ten Eyck, Wynans, & Co., told deponent that they, together with two other block-makers, made the blocks for both of the said ships; they were employed by Captain Skinner and Mr. Aguirre jointly, both being together; but Mr. Aguirre gave the directions to Skinner, and appeared to be the owner; that he (Wynans) called frequently upon Aguirre for directions; and, when all the work was done, Aguirre paid him.

Mr. Bakewell, a sailmaker, told deponent that Mr. Aguirre made the agreement with him for the sails of one of the ships, and paid him the amount.

GEO. W. LYNCH.

Sworn this 25th day of July, 1818, before me,

CHARLES CHRISTIAN.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City of New York*, ss:

John B. Sickles, being duly sworn, says: That on the 22d of July instant he called upon Joseph Skinner, whom he understood to be the captain or commander of the two vessels named the *Curiazo* and *Horatio*, which are fitting in this port for Buenos Ayres; he met

This demand, which I renew in the name of my sovereign, being in strict conformity with the laws of this republic, I cannot for a moment doubt that the President will readily comply with it; and that you will have the goodness to advise me of its having been carried into effect, that I may direct the

him in the neighborhood of Washington Hall, at his residence, and found a large number of gentlemen collected; there were about twenty, among whom was Mr. Aaron H. Palmer, the notary; the conversation was exclusively relating to those vessels, their arms and equipment, some saying that a portion of the guns were larger than others. On the 23d of July he saw Captain Skinner again, and asked him to provide the deponent with an officer's birth on board of one of the said vessels; Captain Skinner referred him to Mr. Palmer, who said that all the officers' stations were full; deponent repeated his desire to be employed, and Skinner told him he might go as supernumerary in the capacity of acting midshipman. During this conversation Mr. Palmer told Captain Skinner that he was short of funds; to which Skinner replied, "You must go to Mr. Aguirre for them, you know I am not the owner." On the 24th of July deponent saw Captain Skinner again at Mr. Palmer's office; deponent asked when he should go on board. Skinner told him during the course of the day. Deponent accordingly went on board on the 24th, in company with William Nesbit, a young man who was also told by Captain Skinner that he might go as supernumerary; when deponent got on board of the ship *Horatio*, which was lying in the stream, he reported himself to Lieutenant Currie, who was the first lieutenant on board thereof. Currie told deponent and the said Nesbit that he could not receive them unless they brought a written order from the captain, because they had so many officers already; deponent remained on board about four hours, during which time he got into conversation with several of the officers; one of them, named Weed, told deponent that he is the captain of marines on board; that when the vessels arrived out at Buenos Ayres the officers expected to receive their warrants from the Buenos Ayrean Government; that Captain Skinner had promised them that he would get them from that Government for these officers; deponent was told by Mr. Weed that there were three lieutenants on board, that there were eight midshipmen on the list, and twelve supernumeraries besides deponent and Mr. Nesbit; that after the vessels got out to sea, if these persons were wanted, they would be turned forward; this deponent understood to allude to their being wanted in time of action. He said they had on board at present ninety-five men, and they intended to get more; he said he expected that it would be a troublesome job for him to exercise his marines, which he would have to do soon; the discipline on board this vessel is the same as that on board a vessel of war; the watch was changed while deponent was on board, and the lieutenants also changed their watch, the hands being piped by the boatswain; the arm-chest, containing guns, pistols, cutlasses, &c., was brought on board while deponent was there; he was told that the great guns were expected on the following day, (the 25th,) that the guns of the *Curiazo* were eighteen pounders, between carronades and gunnades, but that those of the *Horatio* were long eighteens, that being the commodore's ship; that they were brass guns, and had been selected for this vessel; that these guns were different from those of the other vessel, because these were intended for long fighting, or fighting at a distance, and the others for close engagement. After being on board for several hours, deponent came ashore with the said William Nesbit, and called upon Captain Skinner, told him what Lieutenant Currie had said, and asked him for an order, which Captain Skinner gave, and which is in the words following: "Mr. Currie: Sir, you will please to receive Mr. J. B. Sickles and William Nesbit on board the ship *Horatio* as supernumeraries, and you will oblige yours, Joseph Skinner. July 24, 1818." This note is directed "Mr. William Currie, ship *Horatio*." Deponent further says, that when he was on board the *Horatio* on the 24th, the officers were speaking about the cannon which was expected on board the *Horatio*, and that which was on board of the *Curiazo*, and said that they would mount it, because they did not expect that there would be any opposition from the Spanish consul; there was a large quantity of potatoes on board, which they were employed in assorting, and, while thus engaged, one of the officers said those were very bad potatoes for a cruise; the number of barrels deponent supposes nearly two hundred. And further the deponent saith not.

JOHN B. SICKLES.

Sworn this 25th day of July, 1818, before me,

CHARLES CHRISTIAN, *S. Justice*.

consul to produce the necessary testimony for the elucidation and decision of a case transcendently important to the interests of my sovereign.

I renew [etc.].

1085

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

BRISTOL, July 28, 1818.

I had the honor yesterday² to transmit to you the declarations of four individuals, affording the most positive proof of the violation which has taken place in the port of New York of the laws of this republic, to the signal injury of the interests of my sovereign. I now enclose three other declarations,³ corroborating the former, and establishing the fact to which I refer.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 503.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1084.

³ The declarations follow:

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City of New York*, ss:

James Young, by profession a mariner, at present in the city of New York, being duly sworn, says: That about three weeks ago the deponent was requested by a former shipmate of deponent's, named David Rees, to enlist on board the ship *Curiazo*. Deponent went on board that vessel, and there saw Mr. Grinnel, who was the second lieutenant thereof. This gentleman gave deponent a note to Mr. Brown, who was the shipping officer of the vessels, recommending him to take deponent as boatswain's mate for the said vessel. Deponent saw Mr. Brown, who told him there was no vacancy for boatswain's mate, because he had already shipped two, but that he might have the birth of quarter-gunner; this birth deponent accepted, and afterwards went to the office of the notary in Pine street, whose name deponent believes is Palmer. At this time deponent was told by Mr. Brown that the vessel was going to Buenos Ayres or to the Cape of Good Hope. Deponent did not read the articles when he signed them, which was about the same time before mentioned. Deponent went on board the said vessel, the *Curiazo*, which is commanded by Captain Paul Delano. This vessel is pierced for thirty-two guns, although there may be more, as deponent has never counted the number of ports. Since deponent has been on board, they have taken in a great quantity of extra spars and rigging, and a quantity of cordage, much more than is used in the merchant service. She has a long-boat, yawl, and sundry other boats, six or seven in number altogether. Deponent continued on board until last Friday, the 17th instant. There are on board, and in the service of the vessels, a captain, three persons whom deponent knows to be lieutenants, a sailingmaster, master's mate, and more than half a dozen midshipmen, but how many precisely deponent does not know. When he left the vessel there were about seventy hands or sailors on board; and deponent was informed on board, by the people generally, that the number was to be increased to one hundred and fifty more. The third lieutenant said, in deponent's presence, that when they had one hundred and fifty men more they would look quite smart. There are a boatswain and two boatswain's mates, four quartermasters, two captains of the fore-top, two of the main-top, and two of the mizen-top, two captains of the after-guard, two quarter-gunners, of which the deponent was one, a captain of the hold, and boatswain's yeoman. The crew are mustered every Sunday; the hands are piped to breakfast, dinner, and supper; and when an officer comes on board, the boatswain attends the side, and the whole service and duty is performed in every respect the same as is done on board a man-of-war, which deponent is conversant with, having served in the English navy nearly five years. A quartermaster is kept constantly on the look out, to prevent any persons

I assure myself that, in consideration of these circumstances you will have no doubt of the justice of the demand I now make, in the name of the King,

coming on board without leave, and at night some watch forward, and some aft. It is the understanding of all the hands on board, that when they arrive at Buenos Ayres they will be employed in the service there; and the officers have said they will make their fortunes by it. The boatswain, Mr. Crisp, told deponent yesterday that, the night before, the cannon were taken on board. James Johnson, the quartermaster, told deponent the same thing, and that thirty-two eighteen pounders had been taken on board, besides a quantity of shot. The same was mentioned by the boatswain's mate. He further says that the above deposition has been this day read to him, and that he declares the same to be in every respect correct. The *Curiazo* is a new vessel, just built in the port of New York, and has never been to sea. Captain Joseph Skinner, deponent has heard and believes, is captain of another ship, also lately built in the port of New York, and which has not yet sailed, but which is intended to go on the same service with the *Curiazo*. The name of the first lieutenant is Mr. Van Beuren.

JAMES YOUNG.

Sworn this 25th day of July, before me,

GEO. W. MORTON,

Commissioner in the circuit court of the United States of America for the S. D. N. Y.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City of New York*, ss:

David Rees, being duly sworn, says: That he has heard, read, and examined the preceding deposition of James Young; that all the facts therein stated, relating to the condition and armament of the said ship *Curiazo*, are correct and true in every respect; that deponent is employed at present on board the said ship *Curiazo* in the capacity of boatswain's yeoman; he was shipped by Mr. Brown, the shipping officer of the vessel; he signed articles at Mr. Palmer's; has been on board the *Curiazo* since the 11th of July instant. On the 22d and 23d of July, the great guns were taken on board; last evening, and until a late hour of night, these cannon were taken from on board again, as also the shot, and were put on board of a sloop which, it was mentioned, and generally understood on board, was going down towards Sandy Hook, to be put on board again there. Captain Paul Delano commands the *Curiazo*; that a few days ago deponent told said captain that he could wait no longer, and would not go with the vessel; Delano urged him to remain, said he was only waiting for his sweetmeats, (meaning his cannon,) and that, as soon as they were got on board, they would show the Spaniards play; that at present they cleared out for Buenos Ayres, and all hands shipped as seamen, because they did not dare to do otherwise; but that as soon as the vessels got out to sea, then the several stations would be assigned to the men, respectively. This vessel is completely a frigate, duty is done on board the same as in the State service, and she has forty-two different signals, many of which deponent has seen. Captain Joseph Skinner commands the other ship, called the *Horatio*, which is to be used in the same service; he is the commodore of both vessels. Deponent was going to hoist a pennant one morning on board the *Curiazo*, when the lieutenant ordered him to stop and see whether the commodore (meaning the other ship, the *Horatio*) would hoist, and, finding that he did not, deponent stopped, and the pennant was not hoisted.

Both these vessels were lately built in New York; they have not yet been to sea.

DAVID REES.

Sworn this 25th day of July, 1818.

GEORGE W. MORTON,

Commissioner in the circuit court of the United States of America for the S. D. N. Y.

CITY OF NEW YORK, ss:

James Stoughton, being duly sworn, says: That the preceding are correct copies of original depositions now in the possession of deponent, and which he retains for greater safety in the matters therein mentioned.

JAMES STOUGHTON.

Sworn this 26th day of July, 1818, before me,

GEO. WILSON, N. P., *New York*.

STATE OF NEW YORK, *City of New York*, ss:

Thomas Stoughton, consul of Spain, being duly sworn, says: On the 1st day of September last, (1817,) he had a conversation with Mr. Noah Brown, of the city of New York, who told him that Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre, the agent or represen-

my master, or of the urgency with which I claim of the President to issue the necessary orders to the collector of the customs at New York to detain the two Buenos Ayres armed ships alluded to, and the requisite instructions to have the case immediately brought before the proper tribunal.

I trust, sir, that you will have the goodness to transmit to the aforesaid collector the seven declarations forwarded to you, for the purpose of preventing the escape of these two armed vessels, as they have already endeavored to do; it being confidently relied on that, if the suit be once instituted, nothing can save them from the impartial justice of the court.

I beg you to pardon this trespass on your time, to which circumstances have compelled me, and that you will accept [etc.].

1086

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, August 9, 1818.

SIR: In my letter No. 71 June 11,² I had the honor to communicate to you what had just then passed at Paris in the negotiation by intermediation respecting the disputes between Spain & Brazil. I am now informed of all that has subsequently passed on the same matter, but as I have not had an opportunity of taking notes from the papers relating to it, I can only state their contents from memory. After a great deal of preliminary negotiation in conference, between the Duke of Fernan Nuñez Plenipotentiary of Spain, and Count Palmela & the Marquis of Marialva Plenipotentiaries of Portugal, all turning upon the propositions made on either side in the month of June, Fernan Nuñez was desired to put his thoughts on paper. His note is of the 12th July and contains but some trifling modifications of his former proposals. The Portuguese Ministers instead of replying specially to that note, address themselves directly to the Congress; they make but a very slight and not a very respectful mention of Fernan Nuñez his note and then enter into the matter, presenting formal projects of a Treaty & Convention.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVI.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1083.

tative from the Buenos Ayres Government, had contracted with him (Brown) and with Mr. Cheeseman, of this city, to build two vessels, of twenty-eight guns each, for the use of the Government of Buenos Ayres; that their tonnage would be seven hundred tons each, for which he would pay forty dollars a ton for the hulls; that they would be launched about the 30th December, 1817; that they would cost, when armed, about eighty thousand dollars each.

THOMAS STOUGHTON.

Sworn this 26th July, 1818, before me,

GEORGE WILSON, N. P., New York.

The substance of these is thus: Montevideo shall be delivered up to the troops of Spain; the amount of those troops shall be 10,000; six (or three) months notice shall be given to the Portuguese Minister in Spain of the time fixed for their departure; the transports in which they are carried shall after landing them be placed at the disposition of Brazil to carry off her troops; the formal delivery of Montevideo shall be by commissaries of the intermediating sovereigns; at the time of delivery Spain shall pay to Brazil the expenses of the occupation estimated (I think) at about 8 millions of francs; the delivery of Montevideo to Spain shall not be made in any such way as may compromise Brazil against the people of Buenos Ayres; she will only join her good offices to those of the allies to reconcile that colony to the Mother Country; the people of Montevideo shall be restored to all the rights which they had before the revolution, there shall be a general pardon for them and total oblivion of the past; their commercial relations shall be secured on the same footing that they have under the Portuguese administration; all the articles of this Treaty shall be kept perfectly secret 'till the arrival of the Spanish troops at Montevideo. The limits between the territories of Spain and Brazil in *Europe* (this alludes to Olivenza &c.) and America, shall be settled by a Treaty hereafter to be made with the intermediation of the allies; 'till that Treaty is made Brazil shall have the same line that she had in the year 1815; the Portuguese troops on evacuating shall take up a military position to cover the Brazil frontier, which shall commence with and include Maldonado and extend along the range of mountains on the left bank of the River—the details to be regulated by a military convention; 'till the troops of Spain shall arrive and take possession, Brazil shall be reimbursed by Spain for the expenses attending the holding possession.

Fernan Nuñez aware that the Portuguese plenipotentiaries intended to present a project to the Congress, gave in one of his own on the same day. He proposes to send troops to take possession; he will pay the expenses incurred by Brazil, but these shall be ascertained by a mixed commission; pardon shall be granted to the people of Montevideo; the frontiers (in America) shall be settled by a separate Treaty. His project is very *maigre*, the greater part of his paper is taken up in exordium; finally the Plenipotentiaries on either side are invited to discuss their pretensions before the Congress; there seems to be but little prospect of their coming to accord; if on every point they could agree, this of Olivenza would be a nearly insuperable difficulty, the Portuguese will insist on its being restored, and the Spaniards have not the least disposition to restore it, their accession to the acts of the Congress of Vienna notwithstanding. Here they seem to think that the King of Brazil has risen in his pretensions since the victory of Genl. St. Martin; under that impression it is not very likely that the instructions which Mr. Pizarro is now occupied in preparing for Fernan Nuñez will be of the most conciliatory character.

I take this opportunity of transmitting to you copy of a very curious paper, it is a note to the French government by the Duke of Fernan Nuñez dated 29 June.¹ It is understood to have been made circular as it expresses; and it is as you perceive another attempt of this government to enlist the allies in its favor upon the disputes between Spain and her colonies, the note is neither profound nor eloquent nor persuasive, but you may rely on its being genuine. Amongst the numberless faults in its composition is one in the second page, where he speaks of *la rébellion américaine* which most readers may understand to mean our revolution, but he meant there undoubtedly the insurrection in the Spanish colonies which he immediately afterwards specifies.

I have the honor [etc.].

1087

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACTS; TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1818.

SIR: Notwithstanding the unfortunate events which have occurred since April last, I have received from my court solemn assurances of the sincere desire of His Catholic Majesty to see every ground of complaint and disagreement between the United States and Spain completely removed, and of his earnest wish to strengthen and cement a good understanding and the most cordial friendship between the two nations. . . .

His Majesty, carrying his particular consideration for the United States, and his sincere desire to meet the wishes of your Government, as far as is compatible with the rights and dignity of his crown, has authorized me to remove the principal difficulties, and to offer the Government of this republic the liberal proposals which I have the honor to enclose in a separate paper.

If these proposals should, as I hope, appear admissible and satisfactory to your Government, all the rest which it will be requisite to change, or add, to perfect the definitive adjustment between the two Powers, cannot fail to follow of course, and be easy to arrange. Finally, if there should arise any difficulty or doubt in the mind of the President upon any one of them, which I can remove or clear up, I shall be happy to be made acquainted with it, and most cheerfully do for that purpose whatever may be within the limits of my powers and instructions. I conceive that what I now purpose is best calculated to conciliate all the different views and claims, and to adjust all pend-

¹ Not printed in this collection. Covering five manuscript pages and consisting chiefly of sonorous phrases, it mentions the bases on which negotiations with the revolted colonies are contemplated, and says the king is disposed to adopt the measures which his Allies consider appropriate, provided they are compatible with the preservation of his dignity and rights.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 526.

ing differences upon just and liberal principles; it being evident, moreover, that the advantages are wholly in favor of the United States.

In concluding this note, I beg leave to repeat that if, before we agree on what is requisite to effect the desired arrangement, and with a view to proceed to it with a more perfect conviction of the unquestionable rights of each one of the two Powers, you should think it advisable that we should modify and correct any points stated in the present note, by the production and examination of the documentary proofs which I have offered, I am ready to submit them the moment I receive such intimation from you.

In the mean time, I repeat [etc.].

[ENCLOSURE; EXTRACT]

6. Although the two high contracting parties oblige themselves to cause the stipulations contained in this treaty, and in that of limits and navigation of 1795, to be complied with in all their parts, nevertheless, desirous of avoiding all doubt or misinterpretation of their respective clauses, they oblige themselves to make the declarations or laws requisite for the most exact observance of all that is above stipulated, as good faith and the honor of both Governments require, adopting the most efficacious measures to remedy and cut up by the roots the abuses which, contrary to the laws of nations, and contrary to what is expressly stipulated in the treaty of 1795, above cited, daily occur in some ports in this Union, in consequence of the vague and arbitrary interpretation which, it seems, the measures until now adopted are susceptible of, and by which means the law is eluded.

1088

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS; TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1818.

SIR: I have attentively perused the note of the 31st of October last² which you addressed to me by order of your government, in answer to mine of the 24th of the same month³. . . .

Nor do I find any difficulty in agreeing to the modifications you offer to my fifth proposal, and proceeding to the sixth, the object of which is to remedy the abuses and violations, repeated pernicious examples of which have occurred in different ports of this republic, through the toleration and countenance given therein to piratical and privateering armaments, against the

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 531.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 67.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1087.

commerce and navigation of Spain. I observe you state that what I propose is inadmissible; but I have received orders from my sovereign to insist on this point, and to claim of your Government such measures as are imperiously called for by the very nature of these abuses and violations, as they not only contravene the existing treaty, but are in direct opposition to the most respectable compacts founded on international and public law.

Whatever may be the forecast, wisdom, and justice conspicuous in the laws of the United States, it is universally notorious that a system of pillage and aggression has been organized in several ports of the Union against the vessels and property of the Spanish nation; and it is equally so that all the legal suits hitherto instituted by His Catholic Majesty's consuls in the courts of their respective districts, for its prevention, or the recovery of the property when brought into this country, have been, and still are, completely unavailing. The artifices and evasions, by means of which the letter of the law has on these occasions been constantly eluded, are sufficiently known, and even the combination of interest in persons who are well known, among whom are some holding public offices. With a view to afford you and the President more complete demonstration of the abuses, aggressions, and piracies alluded to, I enclose you correct lists, extracted from authentic documents deposited in the archives of this legation, exhibiting the number of privateers or pirates fitted out in the United States against Spain, and of the prizes brought by them into the ports of the Union, as well as of those sent to other ports, together with the result of the claims made by Spanish consuls in the courts of this country. Among them you will find the case of two armed ships, the *Horatio* and *Curiazo*, built at New York, and detained by His Majesty's consul there, on the ground of their having on board thirty pieces of cannon concealed, with their carriages, and a crew of one hundred and sixty men; on which occasion it was pretended that it could not be proved that these guns were not an article of commerce, and they finally put to sea without them, the extraordinary number of officers and crew passing for passengers. The number of privateers or pirates fitted out and protected in the ports of this republic, as well as of the Spanish prizes made by them, far exceeds that contained in the within lists; but I only lay before your Government those of which I have certain and satisfactory proofs. The right of Spain to an adequate indemnity for all the spoliations committed by these privateers or pirates on the crown and subjects of His Catholic Majesty is undeniable; but I now submit it to your Government only to point out the extreme necessity of putting an end to these continued acts of hostility and depredation, and of cutting short these enormous and flagrant abuses and evils, by the adoption of such effectual precautions and remedies as will put it out of the power of cupidity or iniquity to defeat or elude them. In vain should we endeavor amicably to settle and accommodate all existing differences, and thus establish peace and good understanding between the two nations, if the

ENCLOSURE No. 1

[TRANSLATION]

LIST OF SPANISH VESSELS CAPTURED BY PIRATES AND BROUGHT INTO THE UNITED STATES, STATING THE RESULT OR ACTUAL STATE OF THE CLAIMS MADE FOR THEIR RESTITUTION TO THE LAWFUL OWNERS, WITH THE CARGOES BROUGHT IN BY SOME OF THEM

Names of vessels	Cargoes	By whom captured	Where arrived	Issue or present state of claims
Ship Alerta.....	153 slaves.....	L'Epine privateer.....	New Orleans	Restored to the owners
Polacre San Francisco de Paula.....	Wine, brandy, &c.....	Felix privateer.....	New Orleans	Restored to the owners
Schooner Amable Maria.....	Nothing.....	Barrataria privateers.....	New Orleans	Restored to the owners
Schooner Cometa.....	Nothing.....	Barrataria privateers.....	New Orleans	Restored to the owners
Schooner Dorada.....	Nothing.....	Barrataria privateers.....	New Orleans	Restored to the owners
Schooner Caridad.....	Nothing.....	Barrataria privateers.....	New Orleans	These two vessels sold by orders of the admiralty court; proceeds ordered to be paid to the owners
Schooner Bolivar.....	Nothing.....	Barrataria privateers.....	New Orleans	Restored to the owners
Schooner Santa Rita.....	Colonial produce.....	Barrataria privateers.....	New Orleans	The court declared its incompetency to take cognizance; property retained by the pirates
Ship Junta Central, alias Bruch.....	Nothing.....	Carthagena privateer.....	New Orleans	do. do. do. do.
H. C. M.'s corvette Indagadora, alias Cary Mary.....	Nothing.....	Decoyed on the Costa Firme.....	New Orleans	do. do. do. do.
Polacre Regla.....	Quicksilver, public and private property.....	Schooner Alerta.....	New Orleans	Amount of vessel and cargo ordered to be restored to the owners
Ship Cleopatra.....	Wine, brandy, &c.....	Carthagena privateer.....	New Orleans	The court declared its incompetency to take cognizance; property retained by the pirates
Schooner Alerta.....	Wine and specie.....	Barrataria privateer.....	New Orleans	Ordered to be restored to the owners
Schooner Estrella.....	Unknown.....	Barrataria privateer.....	New Orleans	Ordered to be restored, but still pending
Polacre Virgen del Mar.....	Unknown.....	Caracas privateer.....	New Orleans	Ordered to be restored, but still pending
Schooner San Felipe.....	Unknown.....	Venezuela privateer.....	New Orleans	Ordered to be restored, but still pending
Schooner San Antonio.....	32 slaves.....	Amelia privateer.....	New Orleans	Ordered to be restored, but still pending
Schooner Politana.....	100 slaves.....	Amelia privateer.....	Savannah	Depending
Brig Monserat.....	Unknown.....	Amelia privateer.....	Savannah	Depending
Brig Maria Francisca.....	Sugar.....	Amelia privateer.....	Savannah	Depending
Brig Conception.....	Wine, &c.....	Commodore Champlin.....	Savannah	Depending
Schooner Sirena.....	Unknown.....	Commodore Champlin.....	Savannah	Depending
Schooner Santa.....	Unknown.....	Galvezton privateer.....	Charleston	Ordered to be restored to the owners
Schooner Isabella.....	Unknown.....	Galvezton privateer.....	Charleston	Ordered to be delivered to the owners
Schooner Florida.....	Nothing.....	Amelia privateer.....	Charleston	Depending
Polacre brig La Cruz de Mayo.....	Slaves.....	Brig Patriot, Taylor.....	Norfolk	Depending
Ship Providencia.....	Salt, from Canaries.....	Mongore, Barnes.....	Norfolk	Sold by order of the court; proceeds ordered to be paid to the owners
Brig Sereno.....	Home commodities.....	Congreso, Almeyda.....	Baltimore	Depending
Schooner tropica, alias La Leona.....	Sugar.....	Congreso, Almeyda.....	New York	Depending
Schooner San Roman.....	Nothing.....	Congreso, Almeyda.....	Providence, R. I.	Depending
Polacre Divina Pastora.....	Unknown.....	Mongore.....	Boston	Depending
Ship Industria, alias La Rafaela.....	Unknown.....	Congreso, Almeyda.....	Portland	Depending

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practice of these abuses, and the course of these hostilities and piracies on the commerce and navigation of Spain should, as heretofore, continue uninterrupted in the United States. From the tenor of the documents now enclosed, and of the reflections suggested by the very nature and state of things, the President cannot hesitate to assent to my proposal on this subject; and as the Congress is now in session, I feel assured that the proper opportunity is afforded for the adoption of the necessary measures I have alluded to, and which I solicit as an essential basis of securing and maintaining a mutual friendship and good understanding between the two nations.

ENCLOSURE No. 2

[TRANSLATION]

LIST OF VESSELS ARMED OR EQUIPPED IN THE PORTS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION, AGREEABLY TO DOCUMENTS DEPOSITED IN THE ARCHIVES OF HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY'S MINISTER, UNDER MY CHARGE, TO WIT:

Names of vessels	Captains' names	Ports of armament or equipment	Destination
Schooner L'Epine.....	Bellige	New Orleans	Gulf of Mexico
Schooner Felix.....	Debray	New Orleans	Gulf of Mexico
Schooner Petit Milan.....	Amigory	New Orleans	Nautla
Schooner Presidente.....	La Maison	New Orleans	Nautla
Schooner La Guerriere, <i>alias</i> La Creole.....	Rartigne	New Orleans	
Pilot-boat La Couleuvre.....	Drouet	New Orleans	
Pilot-boat Josephine.....	Domingue	New Orleans	
Schooner Alerta, <i>alias</i> General Morelos.....	Semet	Barrataria	Gulf of Mexico
Schooner Jupiter.....		Charleston	Amelia island
Schooner Rebecca.....		Charleston	Amelia island
Schooner Lovely Lydia.....	Hodson	Philadelphia	West Indies
Schooner Hornet, <i>alias</i> Gernudis.....	John Smith	Philadelphia	Atlantic
Schooner Orb, <i>alias</i> Congreso de Buenos Ayres.....	Joseph Almeyda	Baltimore	Coast of Spain
Brig Calypso, <i>alias</i> Calipsou.....	Thomas Boyle	Baltimore	Gulf of Mexico
Brig Fourth of July, <i>alias</i> El Patriota.....	Thomas Taylor	Baltimore	Coast of Cuba
Brig Paz, <i>alias</i> El Patriota.....	Joseph Stafford	Baltimore	Coast of Spain
Brig Mammoth of Baltimore, <i>alias</i> La Independencia del Sud.....	James Chaytor	Baltimore	Coast of Spain
Brig Clifton.....	Davy	Baltimore	Buenos Ayres
Schooner Swift, <i>alias</i> Mongore.....	James Barnes	Baltimore	Coast of Spain
Schooner Spartan, <i>alias</i> Potosi.....	John Chase	Baltimore	Coast of Spain
Brig Regent, <i>alias</i> Tupacamaro.....	Francis Mason	Baltimore	Coast of Spain
Schooner Romp, <i>alias</i> Santafecino.....	Fisk	Baltimore	Norfolk
Schooner Felix Cubana, <i>alias</i> Aret.....	Revilla	Baltimore	Port-au-Prince
Schooner Young Spartan.....	Moore	Baltimore	Straits of Bahama
Brig True-blooded Yankee.....	David Tewet	New York	Savannah
Schooner Capelin, <i>alias</i> Artegas, <i>alias</i> Minerva.....	Champlin	New York	Unknown
Corvette Horatio.....	Skinner	New York	Buenos Ayres
Corvette Curiazo.....	Delano	New York	Buenos Ayres

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1089

*Luis de Onís, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT; TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *December 12, 1818.*

Until I receive fresh orders, it is my duty to insist on the adoption of such measures by your Government as will promptly and effectually put a stop to the piracies which, for a series of years, have been carried on in various ports of this Union against the commerce of Spain. This system of plunder has been carried to a height unexampled in history; and the clamors of the reflecting part of the people of the United States denounce it to the whole world as a public calamity.

1090

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, *January 4, 1819.*

SIR: Since the date of the last letter which I had the honor to address to you, nothing of importance in our affairs here has occurred. Mr. Yrujo and the French Ambassador, both remained in full confidence that a Treaty would have been concluded at Washington, till the 24th ulto., when I received (through a private channel) the President's message to Congress of Nov'r 17 . . . ; if the independence of the South American republics be acknowledged, the greatest evil apprehended will have come to pass, and of course the temptation to any sort of arrangement will be diminished; if the independence be not acknowledged, the Floridas being restored to their former state upon the principles laid down in the President's message, this government will lapse into security or indifference; twelve months will be gained for the operation of chances in its favor. Such is the system here: but in either of the supposed cases, should the President be authorized to take and to hold possession of the Floridas 'till the claims of the United States be satisfied, this pressure may produce a final adjustment. . . .

No very important change has taken place in the affairs of Brazil and Spain since I last mentioned them.³ The project of the mediating powers accepted by Count Palmela, was transmitted to his government; Mr. Yrujo

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 612.

² MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVI.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1086, Erving to Adams, August 9, 1818.

has lately offered to him another project which contains many important variations, these Count Palmela declines to discuss; it contains also a proposal for indemnifying Brazil for her expenses by a cession of territory instead of by money; this proposal Count Palmela consents to treat separately and conditionally.

I cannot learn that anything further has been done in the mediation between Spain and her Colonies since I last wrote on that matter, nor does it appear to me that anything of importance is likely to ensue from the qualified acquiescence of the allies to the request of this government. In the meantime what is called the "great expedition" from Cadiz is preparing, but so slowly, as to discourage even the most sanguine to hope that it will be in a state to depart before the month of July next. The finances of this Country continue in the most deplorable state, and are every day becoming more desperate.

1091

*George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *February 11, 1819.*

I spoke to Mr. Yrujo also respecting the decree of Jany. 14th transmitted to you with my last letter, I asked why it had not been communicated to foreign governments; he answered that it was a measure of domestick policy with which foreign governments had no concern!! I reminded him that it outraged incontestible principles of law in that it punished with death the commerce in munitions of war, whereas the heaviest penalty inflicted by the law even when the neutral attempted to force a commerce with a blockaded port was confiscation of the property. He replied that this was in cases of ordinary war, but here was a war between a sovereign and his rebellious subjects. I pointed out to him the cases in which this distinction was nothing *quo-ad* the neutral and in which he might exercise his own judgment in favor of any well regulated and established government *de facto*. Such a government had even a *right* within a reasonable time to be recognized as independent. By a decree like this in question that epoch might be precipitated, but could not be retarded. Besides that the measure opened a broad way to an infinity of horrid abuses to be practised by officers on distant stations, and thus might force foreign powers into the war contrary to what would otherwise be their policy. Mr. Yrujo wholly denied that any power had a right to acknowledge the independence 'till Spain had acknowledged it. I

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVI.

asked him if this rule would be good for a century. He then said that the decree was only to be executed on shore. I told him that he should have stated so explicitly and have used the words "commerce by land" after the words "*auxilios de guerra*". He said that might be regulated by explanation hereafter!! That is to say, after all the mischief is done they will shew that they did not intend to do it. You will observe Sir by the decree that vessels sold to the Independents are included in "*auxilios de guerra*."

1092

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, August 22, 1819.

I have left no reasonable just and honorable expedient untried to produce a more fortunate termination of this business. From the government itself I have not been able to procure a statement of the causes of delay or the points on which explanations are desired. I can however say with confidence that these explanations as the Spanish Monarchy chooses to term them, but which will appear to be demands for additional stipulations on our part relate to the donations of land to Alagon & Punon Rostro and to the Patriot governments. The grants they wish to secure and they will ask either a guaranty of their American possessions or a positive assurance that we will not recognize any of the Revolutionary governments until their independence is acknowledged by Spain. What other stipulations may be asked can only be conjectured from the grounds of opposition to the Treaty occupied by those who pretended to reason on the subject. Including the particulars already referred to the points of opposition were that the King would disgrace his reign by a cession of Territory. That the transfer of Florida to the United States would give umbrage to Great Britain. That no cession should be made without a guaranty of the Spanish American possessions or a positive promise not to recognize the Patriot governments. That the ratification should not be made without involving the King in the unpleasant necessity of refusing the declaration of his Minister or of insisting upon an article of the Treaty agreed to by the United States for a reliance upon the incorrect information received from that Minister and lastly that our boundary ought not to have been *permitted to extend to the Pacific Ocean*.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVII.

1093

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

Confidential.

MADRID, *August 22, 1819.*

What these are I have collected from other sources. The first and great object in view is to procure an assurance that we will not recognize Buenos Ayres &c. The extreme pertinacity and anxiety on this subject has its origin in the disclosure made by Great Britain of the conversations between Mr. Rush and Lord Castlereagh on the contemplated reception of a Consul General to reside officially in the United States from the Provinces of La Plata. This disclosure has done us no good.

. . . The next time I saw the Russian Minister he said if you can give assurances that there will be no recognition of the South American governments, the Treaty will be ratified. I replied if that is the case there will be no ratification. I had previously furnished Duke Laval with a memorandum on this topic which, after keeping 24 hours and I have no doubt shewing it to Lozano Torres who is supreme here, he returned it to me. The substance of it was that the system of the government was an impartial neutrality; it had been adhered to when we had in our differences with Spain the most powerful inducements to abandon it. That when these differences were settled there could be no inducement to change it. If Spain desired us to remain stationary in the dispute with her Colonies the first step to secure her object was to ratify our Treaty, then to consult our wishes and so to shape her policy as to inspire a sentiment of good will powerful enough to counteract the prepossessions naturally entertained for the people of South America by the people of the United States. This was the rational mode and in fact the only mode of reaching her point. To refuse our Treaty and ask as a condition of it that we would not recognise was the certain way to disappoint their wishes. The government would not consider such a proposition. This memorandum I shewed to Tatischeff. He said what it contained was true and just but there was no reasoning with ignorance and presumption. I did not hold any of these conversations until after the note of the 10th was received and I was careful to express the desire that these Gentlemen should do what was done not with a view to our interest but to prevent Spain from injuring herself and endangering what is termed the pacifick policy of Europe.

On the whole I am impressed with the belief that they will propose to exchange ratifications in Washington with the insertion of a promise not to recognise the Patriot governments and to preserve the grants. The latter will be as a *dernier* resort given up as the price of the first. Without this or something equivalent we may do ourselves justice, they will not.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVII.

*Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1820.

SIR: In conformity with the orders of my Government, which were communicated to Mr. Forsyth on the 16th of December last by his excellency the Duke of San Fernando and Quiroga, and with the earnest desire of the King, my master, to see a speedy adjustment of the existing difficulties which obstruct the establishment, on a permanent basis, of the good understanding so obviously required by the interests of both Powers, I have the honor to address you, and frankly to state to you that my august sovereign, after a mature and deliberate examination, in full council, of the treaty of 22d February of the last year, saw, with great regret, that, in its tenor, it was very far from embracing all the measures indispensably requisite to that degree of stability which, from his sense of justice, he was anxious to see established in the settlement of the existing differences between the two nations.

The system of hostility which appears to be pursued in so many parts of the Union against the Spanish dominions, as well as against the property of all their inhabitants, is so public and notorious, that to enter into detail would only serve to increase the causes of dissatisfaction. I may be allowed, however, to remark that they have been justly denounced to the public of the United States even by some of their own fellow-citizens.

Such a state of things, therefore, in which individuals may be considered as being at war while their Governments are at peace with each other, is diametrically opposed to the mutual and sincere friendship and to the good understanding which it was the object of the treaty (though the attempt has failed) to establish, and of the immense sacrifices consented to by His Majesty to promote.

These alone were motives of sufficient weight imperiously to dictate the propriety of suspending the ratification of the treaty, even although the American envoy had not at first announced, in the name of his Government, and subsequently required of that of Spain, a declaration which tended directly to annul one of its most clear, precise, and conclusive articles, even after the signature and ratification of the treaty.

The King, my master, influenced by considerations so powerful as to carry with them the fullest evidence, has therefore judged it necessary and indispensable, in the exercise of his duties as a sovereign, to request certain explanations of your Government; and he has, in consequence, given me his commands to propose to it the following points, in the discussion and final

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 680.

arrangement of which it seems proper that the relative state of the two nations should be taken into full consideration:

That the United States, taking into due consideration the scandalous system of piracy established in and carried on from several of their ports, will adopt measures, satisfactory and effectual, to repress the barbarous excesses and unexampled depredations daily committed upon Spain, her possessions, and properties, so as to satisfy what is due to international rights, and is equally claimed by the honor of the American people.

That, in order to put a total stop to any future armaments, and to prevent all aid whatsoever being afforded from any part of the Union, which may be intended to be directed against and employed in the invasion of His Catholic Majesty's possessions in North America, the United States will agree to offer a pledge (*ádar una seguridad*) that their integrity shall be respected.

And, finally, that they will form no relations with the pretended Governments of the revolted provinces of Spain situate beyond sea, and will conform to the course of proceeding adopted, in this respect, by other Powers in amity with Spain.

In submitting to you these just and natural demands, I have received the orders of the King, my master, to make known to the President that they would have been regularly communicated to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at Madrid, if, in the excess of his zeal, he had not, at an early period, been induced to express himself in terms disrespectful to the dignity of His Majesty; and I am, at the same time, commanded to give the assurance that, in alluding to an incident of so unpleasant a nature, it is not intended to make the conduct of Mr. Forsyth a subject of complaint, but merely to make your Government fully acquainted with the motives of my august sovereign in adopting the resolution as already stated.

I flatter myself that the President, on an attentive examination of the contents of this note, entirely dictated by sentiments of justice, will see a decisive evidence of the sincere desire of the King, my master, to attain with promptitude the definitive settlement of a transaction no less important in itself than it is essential to the mutual interests of the two countries.

I eagerly avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

1095

*Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *April 19, 1820.*

SIR: In answer to your note of yesterday's date, and in compliance with the request stated in its first point, I have the honor to enclose a copy of my full powers.

I have at the same time to inform you that I am not the bearer of the ratification of the treaty of the 22d of February, 1819, signed by Don Luis de Onís; nor does it seem agreeable to the natural course of things, and to established usage, that a treaty should be ratified previous to a removal of the obstacles which have expressly caused the suspension of its ratification; but I am enabled to assure you that I am fully authorized to offer a solemn promise, in the name of the King, my master, that, if the result of the proposals presented in my first note be satisfactory, the ratification of the treaty will be attended with no further delay than the time indispensably necessary for the arrival at Madrid of one of the gentlemen attached to my legation, who has accompanied me for that especial purpose.

I renew [etc.].

1096

*Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *April 24, 1820.*

SIR: In acknowledging the receipt of your Note of the 21st instant,³ I have the honour to remark in the first place, that you appear to have misconceived a material part of my letter of the 14th,⁴ by reproducing arguments which have been already sufficiently refuted by my Government. You will therefore excuse me from reviving them here, in so far as they relate to the question, whether a Sovereign is, or is not, bound to ratify what may have been Signed by his Negotiator; it being well known, that various instances may be cited, of cases, in which the Ratification of a Treaty has been justly suspended, without alledging, as the motive for so doing, that the

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 681.

² MS. Notes from Spanish Legation, VI. The same is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 682.

³ See above, pt. I, doc. 82.

⁴ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1094.

Negotiator had transcended his Powers or Instructions. There may, unquestionably, be other reasons sufficiently valid to exonerate him from the obligation of ratifying, supposing that to have been the case.

It is evident, that the scandalous proceedings of a number of American Citizens, the decisions of several of the Courts of the Union and the criminal expedition set on foot within it, for the invasion of His Majesty's possessions in North-America, at the very period when the Ratification was still pending, were diametrically opposite to the most sacred principles of Amity and to the nature and essence of the Treaty itself. These hostile proceedings were, notwithstanding, tolerated by the Federal Government and thus the evil was daily aggravated; so that the belief generally prevailed throughout Europe, that the Ratification of the Treaty by Spain and the acknowledgment of the Independence of her rebellious trans-Atlantic Colonies, by the United-States, would be simultaneous acts. The pretensions advanced by Mr. Forsyth, in relation to the 8th article, were also evidently calculated to render the Treaty illusory. It is, therefore, not possible to assign reasons more powerful, or more completely justificatory of the Sovereign Resolution of the King, my Master, to suspend his Ratification of that Instrument.

In my first Note I also hinted at the offensive terms employed by the American Minister at Madrid, from the very outset; which you notice no further, than by taking up the second point, upon which the one which I now have the honour to contest, essentially turns. Although H. M. might certainly have kept aloof from a deportment so void of moderation and so derogatory to his dignity; it is obvious, that any discussions commenced with the Minister so situated, were only likely to produce unprofitable results, his correspondence tending more powerfully to disunite than to reconcile the Contracting Parties. It was indeed a subject of great regret, that the incident just referred to; the distance of Spain from the New World, which, from the obstructions to correspondence, produced unavoidable delay in receiving correct information of the events passing here and which, to His Majesty, appeared incredible; and, in fine, his wish to avoid whatever had the appearance of an unfounded complaint and an unpleasant difference between the two Governments, should have retarded my arrival and the happy conclusion of the transaction now pending.

I have further to state to you, that I am not authorized by His Majesty, to give the necessary orders to the Spanish authorities in the Floridas to deliver up those possessions to the United-States; nor was this to be presumed:—since, if it appeared contrary to the natural order of things and to established usage, that the Treaty should be ratified previous to receiving the explanations which necessitated its suspension, it would consequently seem the more so, that it should receive its due accomplishment before it was finally ratified.

It is with equal surprize and concern that I observe in the conclusion of your Note, that you intimate the intention to decline any discussion of my proposals *previous* to the possession of the Floridas; since it appears to me that such discussion could not be long; in the event of your Government being ready to accede to them; (in which case, I repeat, that I am authorized, solemnly to promise, in the name of His Majesty, that the Ratification of the Treaty shall be no longer delayed) nor, that the delay unavoidably produced by that particular cause, in the occupation of the Territories in question, could be considered as derogatory to the dignity of the United-States; and the more so, as until then, His Catholic Majesty would not be in the full possession of His Rights.

I flatter myself, that on a consideration of the contents of this Note, you will favour me with an answer more agreeable to my wishes; in the mean time, I reiterate the assurance [etc.].

1097

*Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1820.

SIR: In answer to your Note of the 3d instant² and in pursuance of what I expressed to you in both our late conferences, I have to state to you that I am satisfied upon the first point of the proposals contained in my Note of the 14th ultimo;³ and am persuaded that if the existing Laws enacted for the suppression of Piracy should prove inadequate, more effectual measures will be adopted by your Government for the attainment of that important object.

I also admit as satisfactory the answer given to the second point; but I cannot assent to your assertion, that the Laws of this Country, have always been competent to the prevention of the excesses complained of; it being quite notorious that the Expedition alluded to has not been the only one set on foot for the invasion of His Majesty's Dominions; and it is therefore not surprizing that the King, My Lord, should give credit to the information received in relation to that Expedition, or that He should now require of your Government a pledge that the integrity of the Spanish Possessions in North-America shall be respected.

I mentioned to you in conference and I now repeat it, that the answer to the third point was not such as I could accept as being satisfactory, agree-

¹ MS. Notes from Spanish Legation, VI. The same is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 684.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 83.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1094.

ably to the nature of my Instructions; and that although His Majesty might not have required of any of the European Governments the Declaration which He has required of yours, yet that ought not to be considered as unreasonable; it being well known to the King, my master, that those Governments, so far from being disposed to wish to recognize the insurgent Governments of the Spanish Colonies, had declined the invitation intimated to them some time past by yours, to acknowledge the pretended Republic of Buenos Ayres. I, notwithstanding, renew to you the assurance that I will submit to His Majesty, the verbal discussion we have had on this point and accompany it with such additional arguments as will, in my judgment, probably determine His Majesty to declare himself to be satisfied therewith.

In the event of the King's receiving as satisfactory, the answer of your Government to the third point of my proposals, the abrogation of the Grants will be attended with no difficulty; nor has that ever been the chief motive for suspending the Ratification of the Treaty; for the thorough comprehension of which I waive at present any reply to the remarks which you are pleased to offer on that topic. I cannot however refrain from stating to you, that in discussing with you, the validity or the nullity of the Grants referred to, I merely said, "that in my private opinion, they were null and void, through the *inability* of the Grantees to comply with the terms of the Law."

It is to me a matter of great regret, that I have it not in my Power to repeat the solemn promise that His Majesty will ratify the Treaty; inasmuch as I cannot agreeably to my Instructions accept as satisfactory, the answer given to the third point of my Proposals. I am, however, persuaded, that His Majesty, upon consideration of the representation which I shall have the honour to lay before him, and of the reasons assigned by your Government for withholding its assent to the third point, will consider himself as satisfied and ratify the Treaty.

I further conceive it my duty to state to you, that at the time I communicated to your Government the substance of my present answer, I mentioned, speaking in my individual capacity, that although I had no official information of it, yet I consider as authentic the current intelligence of an important change said to have taken place in the Government of Spain; and that this circumstance alone would impose on me the obligation of giving no greater latitude to my promise, previous to my receiving new Instructions.

I therefore hope that your Government, upon consideration of what I have now submitted to you and of the contents of my former Notes, will agree to await the final decision of the King, my Master, upon the only point still pending, and the adjustment of which is not within my competency; so that the past differences may be satisfactorily terminated and the Treaty receive its final accomplishment, thereby securing and perpetuating a perfect harmony and good understanding between the two Governments.

Be pleased to accept [etc.].

1098

*Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1820.

SIR: In answer to your Note² of yesterday's date, I am in the first place to give you the explanation requested of me, on the import of my last proposal, and in doing so, to repeat in other words, that I am authorized Solemnly to promise to this Government the Ratification of the Treaty by H. M., only in case the third point of my proposals be satisfied; but as the answer given to this point has not been such as I could, agreeably to my instructions, receive as satisfactory, I can by no means commit myself by giving a greater extension to my promise than that stated in my Note.

My object in intimating to you that, although I knew nothing officially, yet I considered as authentic the information in circulation of an important change in the Government of Spain, a circumstance which would of itself effectually prevent me from giving greater latitude to my Promise; was, to make known to (apprize) your Government, that as by the adoption of the Constitution of 1812 in Spain, the powers of the King would be limited, it would no longer depend on His Majesty alone, to fulfil my solemn promise, admitting that my Instructions had authorized me to give such a promise. So that my sole motive for offering a remark upon that topic was to [give] greater force to the grounds of my Proposal and further to enable your Government so to appreciate as no longer to withhold its assent to it.

I shall now waive a reply to the arguments reproduced by you *in extenso*, on the question of H. M.'s obligation to ratify the Treaty, and confine myself to a single remark; that all the authorities cited by you lay down the peace and happiness of mankind in general and of States and their respective people in particular as a fundamental principle; and having shewn in my first Note the notoriously hostile disposition prevailing throughout the Union towards the interests of the Spanish Monarchy; it necessarily follows that when the objects of Treaties are not attained, the Ratification of that of the 22 February 1819, would, in like manner, become illusory, and that therefore, that His Majesty's motives for suspending were founded upon a competent view of evident facts.

I shall also submit it to the general sense of the reflecting part of mankind, to decide, whether the reasoning you rely on to shew the motives of the American Government for proposing to other Powers to acknowledge the Revolted Provinces of Spanish America & in exhibiting them as favourable

¹ MS. Notes from Spanish Legation, VI. The same is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 688.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 85.

not only to suffering humanity but to the interests of Spain herself are not in the highest degree specious; for if such maxims were to be adopted, Nations could no longer count upon the integrity of their possessions, or on the maintenance of that mutual amity and good understanding which it is equally and their interest to cultivate in their relation with each other.

I have the honour [etc.].

1099

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Private.

MADRID, June 29, 1820.

DEAR SIR: The enclosed paper is extracted from a memorandum given to me yesterday by a man whose situation and character afford him the means of knowing much of the affairs to which it relates. He is said however to be of a very intriguing disposition. Subsequent events in the new and old world will have a tendency to postpone if not entirely to defeat the execution of such a project if one has been really contemplated. A copy of the paper I shall send by the first safe conveyance.

This government remains very much in the state it was when I last wrote. Preparations are making for the meeting of the Cortes. The Junta *preparatorio* was held a few days since. The business of the meeting was conducted with decorum and order.

A commission has been given to a Mr. Cummin to go to South America. The ostensible object of his mission is to propose to the revolting governments the acceptance of the Constitution; if refused to propose to them to appoint commissioners to come to Spain to treat directly with the government here. What other directions have been given to him are not known.

I have had two conversations with the new Minister Perez de Castro since his arrival. In both he professed to be too ignorant of the affairs of the two Countries to speak frankly and openly. I was careful to say to him that I had no *directions from Washington* and therefore spoke to him only from my personal anxiety that the business might take a favorable direction in the Cortes and to impress upon him the importance for both Countries of doing whatever was determined upon promptly. Of this he professed himself perfectly convinced and he promised to let me know what was determined upon as soon as the determination was made. As he said he was examining the correspondence relating to the Treaty I offered to him for his perusal a translation of the remonstrance of the 18th Oct'r saying that *officially*, altho'

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVIII.

it was of consequence that he should be possessed of the sentiments of the American government on the subject of the grants. He received it and replied that without saying what would or would not be done he would venture to assure me that individual interest would not be permitted to interfere with that of the publick. As I propose to write to you officially as soon as the Cortes is organized, I reserve for that occasion a more particular statement of what occurred.

I am [etc.].

[The enclosed paper mentioned in the first sentence, which was received in cipher, follows:]

The agents of Chili, Buenos Ayres and Carracas met in London in May took into consideration the new occurrences in Spain and the consequences which the re-establishment of the constitution would produce. From this resulted that at least the agent of Buenos Ayres directed confidential communications to the Cabinets of Russia and Germany suggesting that of their families and that of G. B. should be selected princes for Spanish America, giving from that of Brazil one to Buenos Ayres.

It is believed that the two Emperors were interested for Mexico, the Agent of Chili gave notice of the situation of Spain and of this project to his government by letter. The Agent of Carracas proposed to go in person to communicate them to his Government and to Bolivar.

1100

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, July 13, 1820.

SIR: A few days after the arrival of the Minister of State Perez de Castro, I called at his office to see him on our affairs. I stated that the time for the meeting of the Cortes was near at hand, and I was desirous to know what was proposed by this government to be done. He declared himself to be unable to converse on the subject of the negotiation with the United States;—he was not master of the correspondence,—and that his numerous and pressing engagements had rendered it impossible for him as yet to become so. He was examining it and hoped to speak advisedly on it in a short time. I gave him a translation of the remonstrance of the 18th of October to apprise him of the state of the dispute in relation to the 8th article of the Treaty. Not officially but as a document for his own examination, telling him that I did

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XVIII.

not conceive it necessary, from the disposition manifested since the revolution, to make an official representation on this subject. He received it very willingly: He had seen as he stated in the foreign newspapers that it was asserted by the American government that the Treaty was obligatory upon Spain, although not ratified. This position he could not consider as founded either in the opinion of the best authorities, or in the usages of Nations. I explained to him that we considered the Treaty as obligatory *in justice* and *in honor* as if ratified by Spain. As no satisfactory reason had been, or as we believed could be, given for the refusal to ratify,—there could be no question as to our right to resort to any measure we deemed proper to obtain satisfaction. The least we could do was to execute the Treaty and when we gave to Spain all the advantages she could derive from it, we should take from her all just cause even to complain of the course pursued. He spoke a good deal at large of the charge of bad faith which was urged against Spain and said she had no motive of avarice or ambition to gratify in her negotiation with us and if her policy required her to procrastinate this was no reason to charge her with ill faith. To all this I answered that the systematick procrastination altho' at all times vexatious had never been urged as a proof of bad faith; it was the non-compliance with engagements actually made, by persons duly authorized and empowered by this government. That if the avarice or ambition of the government was not known in the negotiation, that of individuals who had possessed influence in Spain was but too visible. I saw him again after ten days. He had run over the whole correspondence; talked of the Treaty of 1803—the proposals of Mr. Pinkney—the guarantee of the Spanish American dominions as an inducement to cede Florida; in short of all that had passed prior to the Convention of 1819—of the losses Spain had sustained and of our gains. I listened patiently to all he had to advance and when he had finished I replied that we had gained nothing from Spain; if her arrangement with another power was matter of regret it was not our fault. What we had obtained was purchased and paid for; that I had no instructions from the President since August 1819 and therefore could not speak certainly of what might be the wish of my government, but that it appeared to me it would be better for Spain at the present juncture not to look beyond the Treaty of 1819, but to consider what obligations were imposed upon her by it and by her as yet unexplained refusal to ratify it. He did not seem unwilling to adopt this idea and entered into a short examination of the conduct of the United States in the dispute between the Colonies and Spain. The expeditions fitted out by Miranda Mina &c. &c. of the patriot privateers &c. &c. I replied that we had done all Spain had a right to expect from us. That determining to be neutral between the contending parties we had taken every means necessary to preserve that neutrality. If the laws of the United States had been sometimes violated with impunity it was what had occurred and would occur in all nations by the escape of per-

sons who had committed offences. That all reclamations founded upon these causes of complaint were renounced by the Convention &c.

Previous to this conversation I had seen in the English newspapers the President's message to Congress of the 9th May, headed by a sort of abstract of your correspondence with General Vives, in which it was stated that this government had not asked explanations of me relative to the Treaty because of my intemperate conduct. I remarked to the Minister that this was not the fact. Explanations were not asked of me because anticipating what would be required, I had given the Ministry to understand that upon the subject of the dispute with the colonies I had no explanations to give, and that it was informally made known to me before the 22d of August that I could have the Convention, if I was authorized to promise that the government of the United States would not recognize the independence of the patriot government. He said he had read the note I had given him and those previously written, and that there were expressions stronger than he had ever met with in diplomattick correspondence, but he supposed they were written when I was a little warm. I questioned whether he had ever met with a similar case in the history of diplomacy and that I was not a little warm, but indignant at seeing the character of a great Nation and its peace, and that of my own Country, put in jeopardy for the sake of and by the intrigues of selfish individuals. As the Minister had not seen the message I promised to procure and send it to him. He was not prepared to say what course would be recommended to the Cortes upon whom every thing depended. I pressed upon him the necessity of doing what was intended promptly. He was satisfied of the importance of doing so and promised to let me know the determination of the Ministry as soon as it was made. At parting he referred to the assistance received from Spain during our revolutionary war which he said we ought not to forget; the reply was we never forget, when you permit us to remember it. I met the Secretary of State at dinner on the same day at the English Ambassador's. He told me he had received that morning from General Vives dispatches, the President's message and the correspondence sent with it to Congress. He had not yet had time to read it attentively but appeared to be pleased with what he had seen in glancing over the papers. On the 4th of July Mr. de Castro dined at my house and brought with him a copy of the message and correspondence which he left with me, to be returned as he had but the one copy. On the 6th the Cortes was installed. Espiga was chosen President, a priest but one of the most liberal, and Quiroga Vice President. I was in the Tribune prepared for the diplomattick corps during the votation and went from it to the office of Mr. de Castro to restore to him the documents he had loaned me. He was just going to the King and had but a few minutes to converse with me. In these few he said he thought that the President did not look beyond the ratification of the convention, the grants being set aside; these he said were

not valid and there could be no difficulty about them. It was his opinion that this should be done, I do not say he continued that it will be done—that depends on another body but it is my opinion that it will be; what say you, he asked, will this be satisfactory. I reminded him that I had no instructions, hoped to receive them. I could give him only an opinion in turn. Judging from the correspondence and message, I saw no sufficient reason to change the opinion already given to Mr. Jabat that the ratification of the Treaty accompanied by satisfaction for the injury caused by the delay would be accepted by the United States.

I was present at the session of the Cortes on the 9th. The oath required by the Constitution was taken by the King in due form and an address made to him by the President. The King said a few words in reply and then read his speech. Copies furnished by the department of State are enclosed as also copies of the answer of the Cortes prepared by a select committee appointed for that purpose. The answer to that part of the King's speech which refers to the dispute with the United States is marked by the introduction of a very emphatic word. The King says "although the complication of various circumstances has not permitted as yet the adjustment of these differences (with the United States and Portugal) I hope that the justice and moderation of the principles which direct our diplomatick operations will produce a result decorous to the Nation and agreeable to the pacifick system &c. &c. of Europe." The answer is, the Cortes, "only regret that there exist differences with the United States and his most faithful Majesty, but the principles of justice and moderation that will direct *now* our diplomatick negotiations give hope to the Cortes that they will conclude in terms, which being a termination decorous to the Nation may not interrupt the pacifick system &c. &c. of Europe." . . .

Since this letter was begun I had an opportunity of conversing at leisure with Mr. de Castro. I pressed him very earnestly to say when the business of the United States would be presented to the Cortes. He told me that it had been delayed by the sickness of young Heredia the Son in law of Onis who had been specially charged to prepare the necessary documents to be laid before the Council of State. He was now recovered and labouring at the work. The business was to be considered by the Counsel and then after ascertaining the King's wishes he, the Minister, would present it to the consideration of the Cortes. He hoped and believed the affair would be satisfactorily adjusted; spoke of the good effect produced in Washington by the Revolution of Spain and of the happy effect produced here by the act of Congress for permitting the admission of armed vessels only into particular designated ports. What gratified me most in his conversation was an apparent earnest conviction that what was done should be done with frankness and promptitude. It is likely from some of his observations that it is intended to present the business to the Cortes in secret session. I have some

fears that the American deputies will be opposed to the Session of Florida to the United States. The ostensible ground will be that *the Cortes have no right to sever any portion of the Empire* and especially as *at present constituted* have no right to pass away any portion of ultramar. The real motive which will direct some of them will be a belief that a contest between Spain and the United States will result in a complete separation of all South America and of Mexico from Spain. Some of the leading American deputies have this object always in view and while they make fair weather with the Ministry and promote their private interest by procuring lucrative situations they at the same moment by all unsuspected means seek the accomplishment of their great project.

I am [etc.].

July 20th. I have this day received your No. 12 of the 25 May & rejoice to find that I have acted in conformity to the wishes of the President. The King and Minister of State are at Sacedon at present. I shall send immediately to Mr. de Castro such a representation as is required by your instructions.

1101

*Thomas L. L. Brent, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Madrid, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, July 10, 1821.

SIR: The late Session of the Cortes had far advanced when most of the Deputies from Mexico arrived. They had been detained two months at Vera-Cruz by the Commander of the Frigate *Pronta* & were at last obliged to make the best of their way to Spain in foreign vessels, running every risk & incurring great expence. They had not been long in Madrid when they began to press their claims and on the 3rd of May Count Toreno, one of the most distinguished members of the Cortes of Old Spain, a friend as is supposed to their cause, made a motion in the Cortes that a special committee be appointed composed of Deputies of Ultramar & Europe to consider of & propose, conjointly with the executive, such measures as they should deem most proper to "terminate the dissensions prevailing in the various parts of America." This motion was agreed to & the committee appointed.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIX. It is printed with its enclosures in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 829. Brent, Thomas L. L., of Virginia: Commissioned secretary of legation in Spain, October 15, 1814; acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from April 15 to May 8, 1820, and from November 16, 1820, to August 17, 1821; left, August 19, 1822; commissioned secretary of legation, in Portugal May 8, 1822; acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from June 30, 1824, until received as chargé d'affaires, June 24, 1825; commissioned chargé d'affaires, March 9, 1825; received passports, at his request, November 25, 1834.

While this committee were engaged in their important duties the news was received, about the beginning of June, of the insurrection of Iturbide & the form of government proposed by him to be adopted, copy of which I transmit (marked A); & in consequence of a resolution offered by an American Deputy the Minister appeared on the 4th of June before the Cortes, to give an account of the occurrences that had taken place in New Spain. The American Deputies availed themselves of this occasion to shew to the Cortes & Executive the impracticability of the provinces of America being governed as those of the Peninsula according to the provisions of the Constitution, on account of their great distance from the Metropolis; proved the necessity of adopting prompt & efficacious measures & pressed the government & committee to come to an early decision. They then moved that the government should be requested, without delay, to direct the Viceroy of Mexico to inform Iturbide that the Cortes were occupied in projecting a plan of government for America & to propose a suspension of hostilities until the resolution should be finally made by the Cortes & Executive. It was stated that should this step be taken they were perfectly convinced that Iturbide & those under his standard would suspend hostilities the moment they knew that the Deputies of New Spain had arrived at the Capital in time to be able to make the "just reclamations of those Spaniards." This was not agreed to. A resolution was then offered & adopted directing that the Minister of Ultramar, "in consideration of the state of New Spain, should propose the measures he might think proper whilst the Cortes were occupied in taking radical ones for its complete pacification."

The Committee laboured with great assiduity & had various conferences with the Ministers, who at first coincided in the opinion advanced & in the arrangement proposed by it to be adopted in regard to Spanish America, and which would have been satisfactory to the American Deputies. When however it was laid before the King he was strenuously opposed to it on the ground, as he informed them, that the arrangement contemplated would be a violation of the Constitution; that the public opinion was not prepared for it; that it was against the interest both of the Peninsula & America,—and finally he spoke of the opposition that might be made to it by foreign powers since they had not been consulted. In consequence of this, the accord between the Ministers & Committee ceased; and, as according to the resolution of Count Toreno which gave rise to the appointment of the Committee, it being unauthorized, without the concurrence of the executive to offer any plan, none was proposed to the Cortes. The Committee made their report to the Cortes on the 24th of June, (copy marked B) and state that the Government not believing the moment arrived of convenience & necessity for the adoption of certain measures, they can do nothing more than excite the zeal of the Ministers to the end that the wished for moment may be accelerated; and recommend that the executive should be pressed "to present

to their deliberation with the greatest despatch the fundamental measures they may think proper, as well for the just & complete pacification of the revolted provinces of America as to secure to all of them the enjoyment of a firm & solid happiness."

The disappointment & vexation of the American Deputies at this result was proportionate to the flattering hopes that had been excited by the unanimity of sentiment that prevailed at the first conferences of the Ministers & the Committee. They then determined to present, themselves, a plan to the Cortes having the object in view & the propositions (copy marked C.) were made on the 25th June which in substance are the same as those that had at first met the approbation of the Minister.

These propositions are that there shall be three divisions made of America. In each a Cortes having the powers delegated by the Constitution to the General Cortes with the exception of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th powers, that part of the 7th relative to the sanction of Treaties of offense and the 2nd part of the 22nd power. In each division a delegate appointed by the King from among the persons most distinguished for their high qualifications not excluding members of the Royal Family, removable at his will; who shall exercise in the name of the King the executive power; to be inviolable with respect to the American Cortes and only responsible to the King and General Cortes. In each, four Ministers: of the Interior, of Finance, of Grace & Justice, and of War and Marine. In each, a Supreme Tribunal of Justice and a Council of State. The commerce between the Peninsula and America to be considered as from one Province to another, and the inhabitants of the latter to have equal eligibility with those of the former to all publick employments.

New Spain binds herself to pay 200 millions of reals in six years and contribute annually 40 millions of reals to the support of the Navy. The other parts of America to contribute in the manner that shall be subsequently arranged. New Spain will also pay all the debt contracted within its territory; and all publick property to belong to it. On the sitting of the 25th June two of the Deputies offered an amendment to the 5th Article having for object to prevent the appointment of delegate being conferred on any of the Royal Family.

These propositions were preceded by an *exposé* read in the Cortes, copy of which I transmit herewith. In it they state that "they desire the Constitution which ought to make them happy, but which in the actual state of things they consider to be a beautiful theory that can only be reduced to practice in the Peninsula. The Americans are freemen, they are Spaniards, have the same rights as the Peninsulars. They are acquainted with and have sufficient virtue and resources to support them."

The measure recommended by the Committee to request the government to present a plan at an early period has been acted upon, as you will perceive by the King's speech, in which he says that his government "urged by the

Cortes to propose the measures they may think proper for their welfare, on a consideration of the state of those Countries, will do so immediately and with all possible generosity." These will without doubt be proposed on the meeting of the Cortes Extraordinary, which the speech of the President of the Cortes to the King will have shewn you is to take place. It is supposed that its convocation will not be delayed longer than the first of October if so long.

You will perceive that the Deputies do not demand an acknowledgement of independence and pretend not even to aspire to it, and they have declared in the Cortes on the 4th June that if the Revolutionists desire Independence it is because means have not been devised that should make the welfare of those provinces compatible with their union with the Peninsula.

The Commissioners of Bolivar, who are still here, on the contrary insist upon the acknowledgement of their independence as the basis of any arrangement with Spain.

Nothing has been concluded between them and this government and all negotiations are suspended.

It is difficult to conjecture what will be the determination of the Cortes and the Executive on this great and interesting question, when we consider on the one hand that they cannot be wholly blind to the just claims, the strength and resources of America, and view on the other the prejudices and illiberality that still exist in a high degree in the executive and a great portion of the members of the Cortes and the observation in the King's speech "that the Spaniards of both hemispheres ought to be persuaded there is nothing he desires so much as their felicity, *founded in the integrity of the Monarchy and in the observance of the Constitution.*"

As far as I have been able to form an opinion it is that the foreign powers during the agitation of the American question have endeavoured to prevent any arrangement between the parties.

On the 9th Ins^t. I received a note from Mr. Ravenga, one of the Commissioners of Bolivar requesting an interview with me (copy marked D) to which I immediately replied (copy marked E) stating that I would receive him that very evening.

In this interview he spoke of his mission to Spain; he said that when he left Colombia he had no idea of meeting with the least obstacle; he had calculated to a certainty that his object would be immediately accomplished. He spoke of the ignorance of this Country of the real state of Spanish America, of their illiberality and their prejudices with warmth, and particularly so of the expression of the King in his speech respecting Spanish America. He calculated, he said, upon the friendship of the United States to promote the Independence of the Republic of Colombia; he had a full conviction that he could rely upon it. Mr. Monroe when Secretary of State had informed him that all the Ministers of the United States in Europe had

instructions to advance the acknowledgement of their independence by foreign powers.

I sympathized with him in the unpleasant situation in which he was placed and feared that the sentiment in Spain was not so favorable as could be desired. He was perfectly justified I said in relying upon the good dispositions of the United States. It was their interest and their sincere wish that the acknowledgement of the Independence of Spanish America should be accelerated. The United States had not only been more forward than any other power in publishing to the World their wishes with respect to her, but had accompanied them with actions which certainly afforded the best proof of their sincerity, and among these I adverted to the Message of the President to the Congress of the United States at the commencement of its last Session in which, alluding to the proposed negotiation between the late colonies and Spain, the basis of which if entered upon would be the acknowledgement of their independence he says, "to promote the result by friendly counsels, including Spain herself, has been the uniform plan of the government of the United States."

The friendship of the United States he said was very grateful to the Republic of Colombia and he hoped and expected that at the commencement of the next meeting of Congress the acknowledgement of its independence would be decided upon. The moment had arrived when all the powers of the world would see the propriety of it. He calculated that the United States would be the first to take this step. Hoped to see a confederacy of Republics throughout North and South America united by the strongest ties of friendship and interest, and he trusted that I would use my exertions to promote the object he so much desired.

I heartily concurred with him in the hope that all governments would resolve to adopt a measure so conformable to justice, joined with him in the agreeable anticipation of the progress of free principles of government of the intimate union & brilliant prospects of the states of our New World. I presumed I said it was not necessary to bring to his mind the high interest felt by the United States in their welfare, an interest in which I deeply participated and desired as much as he possibly could the happiness & independence of our Spanish American brethren. What would be the determination of the United States at the period of the commencement of Congress it was impossible for me to foresee. Whether they consider it as a seasonable moment for doing that which was so much desired, was a point I could not resolve.

Perceiving in him great acrimony towards Spain and fearing that he might in consequence thereof be induced to throw himself into the arms of European powers which I presumed it might be the policy of the United States to avoid, I guarded him against it. I observed that these powers were particularly interested in distressing Spain with a view to the destruction of the free principles of its Constitution. It was, as long as the general peace

between them continued, an object they would not for a moment lose sight of. They might therefore pretend to favor the independence of Spanish America. But I confessed I did not wish to see the virtuous & free people of that country form connexions with any of the Powers of Europe, the fundamental principle of whose policy was at this moment, especially of those of the Holy Alliance, the destruction of liberty. They would open their arms in apparent friendship to his Republic to answer their particular views with respect to Spain and would in turn crush her when no longer necessary to subserve their purposes, if they had it in their power; for it would not be doubted that they were deeply interested that liberty should not take root in Spanish America. It was however true that the Republic of Colombia had a right to the acknowledgement of her independence and she should persist in demanding it of Spain, but I begged he would not, unless it became absolutely indispensable connect himself with any European powers. It was the true policy of North and South America to be unconnected as much as possible with the European States.

In this interview Mr. Ravenga confirmed to me, what I had previously learned, that his instructions do not authorize any terms short of the acknowledgement of Independence. I observed that I presumed no arrangement would be made under them that might have an injurious bearing on the commercial interests of the United States. To this his reply was that none would be entered into by the Republic of Colombia with Spain that was not perfectly reciprocal.

I have the honor [etc.].

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*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *September 19, 1821.*

Since the date of my last the Commissioners of Venezuela have been ordered at a very short warning out of Spain; and the Commissioners who were sent shortly after the revolution of March 1820 to Buenos Ayres from this country, have returned without effecting anything. The Com^{rs}. of Venezuela had no authority to treat unless the acknowledgement of the Independence of their country was made the basis of negotiation.—Notwithstanding the ill success of the mission to La Plata this Gov^t. still clings to the hope that the Revolutionary provinces may yet be restored to its dominion, arising I presume from their distracted state.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIX.

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*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, December 17, 1821.

The convention made by Iturbide & O. Donojou [O'Donojú] is known here, altho' not yet officially communicated to the Gov^t. of Spain; and this Peninsula is in a most critical state: Portions at Andalusia and at Galicia are in open and declared opposition to the orders of the Government with regard to Mexico "the System of Passivity" will be continued. This Gov^t. (without having or seeking to obtain the means of taking advantage of them when they occur) will wait for favorable events: In other words things in Mexico must take their own course. The authority of O'Donojou [O'Donojú] will be disavowed: the King will not be Emperor of Mexico and the Cortes will not suffer Carlos or Francisco to move from Spain. If the present plan of the independents of Mexico is executed some other Bourbon must be selected: France will no doubt be pleased to see her intrigue for La Plata partially successful in Mexico. Whatever may be the policy of our Gov^t. on this matter you may rest assured that nothing can or will be done of importance here. If the Independents are beaten in Mexico by the efforts of the officers of the Royal army or the people of that country it is very well: Praises and honors will be bestowed upon the active and loyal:—Assistance except in promises of reward and favor cannot be given.

1104

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, February 14, 1822.

I have the honor to enclose to you a hurried translation of the last dictamen of the commission of the Cortes on the affairs of Spanish America, and the determinations made by that body.

DICTAMEN OF THE COMMISSION TO WHOM IT WAS REFERRED TO REPORT
ON THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES OF ULTRAMAR, PRESENTED
FEBRUARY 12, 1822

The commission has meditated maturely and circumspectly on the proposition of the Minister of Ultramar, and, after having heard him,

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XIX.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 847.

has considered the diverse circumstances in which the provinces of both Americas are at present, and may be found hereafter; the fruitlessness and inefficacy of the commissions that have been directed to the Government established in them; and, possessed with the noble desire that the same may not again, with the waste of public treasure, and the sacrifice of humanity, occur, is of opinion that the Cortes ought not to lose time in considering the proposition of the ministry, since it will be a consequence of the results; and, in order to obtain them, the Government, and the commissioners it elects, ought to be authorized to hear and to transmit to the legislative power every class of propositions, be they what they may; at the same time it judges that the national decorum, and the protection which in justice is due to the European and American Spaniards, call for the establishment of a basis useful and conducive to the welfare of the Spains.

Before fixing this basis, and that it may be as productive to the common felicity as policy and the national honor require, the commission lays down the fixed principle that this new, grand, and legitimate path for pacific communications being opened, all treaties be esteemed of no value or efficacy that have been formed between Spanish chiefs and American Governments, which ought to be understood as null, as they have been from their origin, as respects the acknowledgment of independence, inasmuch as they were not authorized, nor could such authority be given them, unless by previous declaration of the Cortes.

The commissioners may hear all the propositions that may be made to them in order to transmit them to the metropolis, excepting such as take away or limit in any manner the absolute right of the European and American Spaniards, residing in whatever part of the ultramarine provinces, to remove and dispose of their persons, families, and property, as they may think proper, without being opposed by any obstacle or measure that might prove injurious to their fortunes. With this explanation, the commission reproduces its anterior dictamen; and the Cortes will resolve what may be most proper.

ESPIGA,	OLIVER,
CUESTA,	MURPHY,
ALVAREZ ESCUDEN,	NAVARETTE,
TORENO,	PAUL.
MOSCOSO,	

The particular vote of the Señor Oliver proposes to add the following clause to the dictamen:

That it ought to be understood as not affecting the responsibility which persons, whoever they may be, may have incurred in this affair, nor the rights of the Spanish nation represented by the Cortes and the King.

The particular vote of the Señors Moscoso, Toreno, and Espiga, proposes the following additions to the dictamen:

1. That the Cortes declare that the treaty called that of Cordova, celebrated between General O'Donojú and the chief of the dissidents in New Spain, Don Augustin Iturbide, as well as any other act or

stipulation relative to the recognition of Mexican independence by that general, are illegitimate, and null in their effects as to the Spanish Government and its subjects.

2. That the Spanish Government, by a declaration to all others with which it has friendly relations, make known to them that the Spanish nation will regard, at any epoch, as a violation of the treaties, the recognition, either partial or absolute, of the independence of the Spanish provinces of Ultramar, so long as the dissensions which exist between some of them and the metropolis are not terminated, with whatever else may serve to convince foreign Governments that Spain has not yet renounced any of the rights belonging to it in those countries.

3. That the Government be recommended to take all possible measures, without any delay, to preserve and reinforce those points of the provinces of Ultramar that remain united to the metropolis, obedient to its authority, or that resist the separation from it by the dissidents; proposing to the Cortes the resources it requires, and are not at its disposal.

4. That the Cortes declare that the provinces of Ultramar that have declared their independence of the metropolis, or do not acknowledge *de facto* the supremacy of the Government of it, ought not to have deputies in the Cortes during their continuance in this state.

The additional vote of Señors Murphy, Navarette, and Paul, to the anterior dictamen, states that it is their opinion that, in case of the approbation by the Cortes of the dictamen of the commission, they should not approve the additional votes presented by some individuals if it, as being contrary to the ends proposed by the same commission, but should put in execution the measures included in the dictamen without delay, without prejudice to what the ordinary Cortes may opportunely resolve upon, whatever else they may esteem convenient.

After a short discussion, whether the dictamen should be discussed by itself, or with the additional votes, it was determined that the dictamen of the commission should be first discussed. During the discussion, propositions to the following effect were presented by the Señor Solanot, viz:

That the Cortes, with a generosity peculiar to the constitutional system by which we are governed, and for the general interest of the Spaniards of both worlds, declare the independence of all those provinces of both Americas that actually are so at this day, on condition that each one of those Governments pay an annual subsidy in recompense of the rights which are renounced; that a treaty of commerce be formed on the basis most convenient to the reciprocal interests of the American and Peninsular Spaniards; that all hostilities be completely suspended until this treaty be completely approved; that all the Spaniards who may wish to retire to the Peninsula may do so freely, with all the funds belonging to them, without being obliged to pay any duty whatever; that any Spaniard who wishes to live in America shall have preserved to him the enjoyment of all his rights and property; that every Spaniard who may have been deprived of his property and of his rights, in consequence of the anterior disturbances, shall be reinstated in them; that

all the wealth and property belonging to European Spain shall remain at its disposal, and be removed to the Peninsula at the expense of America; that all the troops that are actually in America, belonging to European Spain, shall be maintained in the same points at the cost of the American Government, until the ratification of this treaty; that European Spain may dispose of the naval force it has in America; and that there be established a confederation composed of the American Governments, under the protection of European Spain, upon the basis that may be most convenient, and guarantied as may be accorded.

Señor Munoz Torrero demanded that the author of these propositions should withdraw them immediately, as he had no powers to authorize his making them, or, if he had, to exhibit them. The Cortes accorded that these propositions should be withdrawn, as contrary to the power given to them by the constitution.

After considerable discussion, the Cortes approved of the dictamen as proposed by the commission.

On the following day the particular votes were discussed, and decided as follows:

That of Señor Oliver was not admitted to a vote.

That of Señors Moscoso, Espiga, and Toreno, the three first articles approved, and the fourth withdrawn by its author.

1105

*Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *March 9, 1822.*

SIR: In the *National Intelligencer* of this day, I have seen the message² sent by the President to the House of Representatives, in which he proposes the recognition by the United States of the insurgent Governments of Spanish America. How great my surprise was, may be easily judged by any one acquainted with the conduct of Spain towards this republic, and who knows the immense sacrifices which she has made to preserve her friendship. In fact, who could think that, in return for the cession of her most important provinces in this hemisphere; for the forgetting of the plunder of her commerce by American citizens; for the privileges granted to their navy; and for as great proofs of friendship as one nation can give another, this Executive

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 845.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 101, dated March 8, 1822.

would propose that the insurrection of the ultramarine possessions of Spain should be recognised? And, moreover, will not his astonishment be augmented to see that this Power is desirous to give the destructive example of sanctioning the rebellion of provinces which have received no offence from the mother country to those to whom she has granted a participation of a free constitution, and to whom she has extended all the rights and prerogatives of Spanish citizens? In vain will a parallel be attempted to be drawn between the emancipation of this republic and that which the Spanish rebels attempt; and history is sufficient to prove that, if a harassed and persecuted province has a right to break its chains, others, loaded with benefits, elevated to the high rank of freemen, ought only to bless and embrace more closely the protecting country which has bestowed such favors upon them.

But even admitting that morality ought to yield to policy: what is the present state of Spanish America, and what are its Governments, to entitle them to recognition? Buenos Ayres is sunk in the most complete anarchy, and each day sees new despots produced, who disappear the next. Peru, conquered by a rebel army, has near the gates of its capital another Spanish army, aided by part of the inhabitants. In Chili, an individual suppresses the sentiments of the inhabitants, and his violence presages a sudden change. On the coast of Firma, also, the Spanish banners wave, and the insurgent generals are occupied in quarrelling with their own compatriots, who prefer taking the part of a free Power to that of being the slave of an adventurer. In Mexico, too, there is no Government; and the result of the questions which the chiefs commanding there have put to Spain is not known. Where, then, are those Governments which ought to be recognised? where the pledges of their stability? where the proof that those provinces will not return to a union with Spain, when so many of their inhabitants desire it? and, in fine, where the right of the United States to sanction and declare legitimate a rebellion without cause, and the event of which is not even decided?

I do not think it necessary to prove that, if the state of Spanish America were such as it is represented in the message; that if the existence of its Governments were certain and established; that if the impossibility of its reunion with Spain were so indisputable; and that if the justice of its recognition were so evident, the Powers of Europe, interested in gaining the friendship of countries so important for their commerce, would have been negligent in fulfilling it. But, seeing how distant the prospect is of even this result, and faithful to the ties which unite them with Spain, they await the issue of the contest, and abstain from doing a gratuitous injury to a friendly Government, the advantages of which are doubtful, and the odium certain. Such will be that which Spain will receive from the United States, in case the recognition proposed in the message should take effect; and posterity will be no less liable to wonder that the Power which has received the most proofs of

the friendship of Spain should be the one delighted with being the first to take a step which could have only been expected from another that had been injured.

Although I could enlarge upon this disagreeable subject, I think it useless to do so, because the sentiments which the message ought to excite in the breast of every Spaniard can be no secret to you. Those which the King of Spain will experience at receiving a notification so unexpected will be doubtless very disagreeable; and at the same time that I hasten to communicate it to His Majesty, I think *it my duty to protest as I do solemnly protest, against the recognition of the Governments mentioned, of the insurgent Spanish provinces of America, by the United States, declaring that it can in no way now, or at any time, lessen or invalidate in the least the right of Spain to the said provinces, or to employ whatever means may be in her power to reunite them to the rest of her dominions.*

I pray you, sir, to be pleased to lay this protest before the President, and I flatter myself that, convinced of the solid reasons which have dictated it, he will suspend the measure which he has proposed to Congress, and that he will give to His Catholic Majesty this proof of his friendship and of his justice.

I remain, [etc.].

1106

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *March 21, 1822.*

On the 18th inst. Sanchez, deputy from Seville proposed to the Cortes to make some important additions to the powers to be given to the Commissioners to be sent to Spanish America in virtue of the resolution of the ex-Cortes of the 13 Feb. If his plan, which has been once read in the Cortes is adopted, the commissioners in addition to the authority given them under the former resolution will have power to negotiate a suspension of every hostile act, military and political, for six years, things remaining *in statu quo*: No forces are to be sent during that period to the provinces that have separated themselves, nor is the Spanish Gov^t. to meddle in any of the affairs of those countries: When that term expires, with the guarantees which their situation permits to enter fully into the principal discussion (meaning I suppose the recognition of their independence) and to agree to such measures as circumstances may permit. Also to negotiate and conclude a provisional treaty of Commerce with all the provinces separated *de facto* on the bases of

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XX.

mutual privileges and advantages (*sobre bases privilegiados y ventajosos a ambas partes*). This Gov^t. to understand, in preparing the instructions for the commissioners, that the Cortes esteem this affair so important to the national prosperity that they are disposed to make whatever modifications may be necessary in the Tariff respecting ultramine [ultramarine] effect and the product of national Industry and Agriculture, and even to give the absolute freedom of a port in the Peninsula if the Gov^t. should think it necessary to attract and fix in it the Commerce of all the fruit of the Americas.— If this proposition is adopted I shall give immediate notice of it to you.

I am [etc.].

1107

*Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

PHILADELPHIA, April 11, 1822.

SIR: I have had the honor of receiving your note of the 6th instant,² in which you were pleased to inform me that this Government has recognised the independence of the insurgent provinces of Spanish America. I despatched immediately to Spain one of the secretaries of this legation to carry to His Majesty news as important as unexpected; and, until I receive his royal orders upon the subject, I have only to refer to my protest of the 9th of March last, still insisting upon its contents as if its substance were repeated in the present note.

With the greatest respect [etc.].

1108

*Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[TRANSLATION]

PHILADELPHIA, April 24, 1822.

SIR: As soon as the news was received in Madrid of the recent occurrences in New Spain after the arrival at Vera Cruz of the Captain General and su-

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 847.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 103.

³ MS. Notes from Spanish Legation, VII. The same is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 807.

preme political Chief appointed for those provinces, Don Juan O'Donojú, and some papers were seen relative to these same transactions, it was feared that for forming the treaty concluded in Cordova on the 24th of August last, between the said General and the traitor Colonel Dn. Agustin Iturbide, it had been falsely supposed that the former had power from His Catholic Majesty for that act; and in a little time the correctness of those suspicions was found, as among other things the said O'Donojú, when on the 26th of the same August he sent this treaty to the Governor of Vera Cruz, notifying him of its prompt and punctual observance, he told him that at his sailing from the Peninsula preparation for the independence of Mexico was already thought of, and that its bases were approved of by the Government and by a Commission of the Cortes. His Majesty on sight of this, and of the fatal impression which so great an imposture had produced in some Ultramarine Provinces, and what must without difficulty be the consequence among the rest, thought proper to order that by means of a circular to all the chiefs and corporations beyond seas, this atrocious falsehood should be disbelieved; and now he had deigned to command me to make it known to the Government of the United States that it is false as far as General O'Donojú published beyond his instructions, by pointing out to it that he never could have been furnished with other instructions than those conformable to Constitutional principles.

In compliance with this order of His Majesty, I can do no less than observe to you, Sir, how unfounded one of the reasons is in your note of the 6th instant,¹ for the recognition by this Government of those of the insurgent Provinces of Spanish America, that it was founded on the treaty made by O'Donojú with Iturbide; since not having had that power nor instructions to conclude it, it is clearly null and of no value.

I repeat [etc.].

1109

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, May 2, 1822.

The President's message to Congress of the 8th of March, carried to Liverpool by the March packet from New York, was brought to this Government by a special messenger from Mr. Onis. The message was published in the French and English papers that arrived here on Monday week. On the

¹ See above, pt. I, doc. 103.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 372.

afternoon of that day I had a casual conversation with Don F. M. de la Rosa. I asked him if he knew such a message had been sent to Congress; he replied that he had seen it in the French papers of that morning. From his mode of expressing these few words, and his suddenly shifting the conversation to an indifferent subject, I saw that this event was not expected by the ministers here, and has created great sensibility.

You will find in the *Madrid Gazette* of the 29th ultimo, herewith inclosed, a circular of the Minister of War on the subject of the Spanish officers who have left the ultramarine army to return to this Peninsula. It is interesting, as, joined to other circumstances, it tends to show the determination of this Government to continue the war with some, at least, of their former provinces.

1110

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, May 20, 1822.

I had previously understood from the English Sec'y of Embassy, Mr. Hervey, Resident minister since Sir H. Wellesley's departure, that M. de la Rosa had spoken of the President's message of the 8th of March, as hostile towards the Spains, and the report of the Committee of the House of Representatives as an attack upon legitimacy. On my return to Madrid on the 18th I saw M. de la Rosa, and as instructed by your No 21, I assured him that the message "resulted from a disposition in no wise unfriendly to Spain". He spoke with a great deal of warmth on the subject, said it was what, from the friendly conduct of the Spains to the United States they could not have expected; in no state of circumstances could it have a friendly effect on the interests of this Govt.; that it appeared from the message itself, that not satisfied with taking this step ourselves, we had been and still were instigating other governments to do so likewise, and that the measure was adopted upon information incorrect in itself, and derived from sources of doubtful authority; as it regarded Mexico and Peru especially, there was absolutely no authentic information communicated to Congress with the message, as was proved by a copy of the published Documents in his office. He considered it particularly injurious to Spain at this moment when they were about setting on foot a negotiation with the different parts of Spanish America. He concluded by expressing an opinion that the Spanish Americans were unequal to self government and that their Independence, instead of

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XX.

being accelerated would be retarded by this act of our government. I replied that the message itself explained the ground upon which the step was taken, that the intentions of the President were not unfriendly to Spain. As to the effect of the measure, it would or it would not be injurious, according to the views of this Govt. If they were disposed to yield to circumstances and act prudently it could do them no injury. I made no reply to his remarks on the published documents as I had not seen them. As to the communications made to other Foreign Gov'ts, instead of being unfriendly, they had in reality proceeded from a contrary disposition—from a desire on our part that other powers more remotely concerned in the question, should express an opinion on it at the same time with ourselves, with a view to its effects on the policy of this government. That this step was taken in entire ignorance of the negotiation to which he alluded, the Cortes Extraordinary had authorized the govt. to enter upon this negotiation only in *February last*. The only information possessed by the Gov't. of the United States of [a] conciliatory attempt on the part of Spain was the knowledge of the mission to Buenos Ayres in 1820, and of the negotiation begun here with the Commissioners of Venezuela in 1821. The first had totally failed, the commissioners of Spain not being permitted to land, and the second had been interrupted by an order from this govt. to the commissioners of Colombia to leave the Kingdom. It might be convenient to Spain to delay, but circumstances did not permit other govts. to imitate her dilatory policy. That "the Spanish Americans were unequal to self Govt.," I thought an unfortunate observation, as it proved if true, that they were not fit to live under the Spanish Constitution. We should regret very much that a measure intended to be useful, should prove injurious to either of the parties, but should not be satisfied that such would be the effect until experience had proved it. The conversation terminated by a remark on his part that what was intended to be done by the President, was yet uncertain, and that they *would wait* to know how far the govt. of the United States would go. From Mr. Hervey I understand that the Infante Don Francisco is anxious to be sent to Mexico, and is intriguing to effect it; and that, altho' he now thinks it too late, he, Hervey, advised Spain twelve months since to send out one of the Princes. The *Russian Chargé* assures me, such was the wish of the English Gov't. *only five months since*.

There has been a Council of State on this Act of ours; a protest was recommended; the Minister of Spain not to be withdrawn from the U. S. *at least for the present*, and the preparation of the necessary force to act efficiently in Ultramar as formally advised by the same Council. This advice it is said has been sent to the Cortes, and is before the Commission of Ultramar; of this I have no certain information, but it is altogether probable.

The proposed admission of the Flags of the Spanish American govts. into English ports is said to be as vexatious as our determination to recognize

their independence. Of herself, Spain can do nothing but negotiate with the Spanish American govts.; nor has she the means to procure the assistance of other powers which she is willing to give and they willing to accept.

M. de la Rosa has spoken to some of the Foreign Ministers here of the proposed recognition as a violation of Treaty stipulations, referring I conjecture to the Treaties of Utrecht and of the Holy Alliance, with which we have as little concern as with the compact between Rome and Carthage. Constitutional Spain is no favorite with the Holy Alliance, and the Revolution of 1820, glorious as it was for this country, settled the question between the Spanish old and new world. The use of Force to be sent from Europe, since March of that year has not been seriously thought of. The liberal govt. adopted here, and the equality of rights and privileges offered to the Spanish Americans were supposed to be means sufficient to restore at least a portion of revolted Spanish America, and assure the fidelity of the parts still connected with Spain, to the Empire. The appeal of M. de la Rosa to the principles of the Holy Alliance, is a proof of mental weakness, I did not expect from him.

I am [etc.].

1111

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *June 23, 1822.*

Mr. de Barras arrived here twenty days since with Mr. Anduaga's protest against the message of the 8th March, and your reply. On the 21st I received from the Secretary of State two copies of a manifesto passed by order of the King to the different courts of Europe. One of them is enclosed with this despatch, with a copy of the note received with it, and of my acknowledgment of their receipt. This manifesto was prepared in obedience to the resolutions of the Extraordinary Cortes, a translation of which was sent to you with my No. 34. When it was written I do not know; but my belief is, that it has been prepared *since* a copy of the President's message of 8th March was received by this Government. I wait with some anxiety to receive instructions subsequent to the close of your correspondence with Mr. Anduaga on this subject. I cannot anticipate exactly what this Government will do. The probability is, that they will not do more than break off their diplomatic intercourse with us. If this is done by merely recalling their minister from the United States, I shall not feel at ease until I know the wishes of the President.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 374.*

The *informé* of the Commission of Ultramar, on the memoir of the Minister of Ultramar, which you will receive herewith, is an interesting document; although the question between the Spanish American Government and Spain is not considered under the new shape it assumed after the President's message of the 8th March, the *informé* will serve to put you in possession of the views of a respectable committee of the Cortes after the message was known to have been sent to Congress. The idea of establishing neutral ports in Spanish America, and a neutral flag *only*, for the Peninsular and American Spaniards, *is new*. The only propositions that promise any practical good are those made by Sanchez, already alluded to, and those with which Sbarra, a member of the Commission of Ultramar, concludes his particular vote. Everything which has been done on this subject proves, conclusively, that the Cortes and the Government are satisfied that they are without the power to produce a reunion of Spanish America with the Peninsula *by force*; yet, with this conviction, there exists a perverse determination not to adopt the only measure which promises to be advantageous to Spain. The Cortes will close its session in a few days; they will probably do something before they rise. I expect, however, nothing of a decisive character. There have been lately several secret sessions, with what object, as yet, I know not.

[The manifesto which he mentions as having been delivered to him follows:]

MANIFESTO THAT, BY ORDER OF HIS MAJESTY, THE MINISTERS AND CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES OF SPAIN HAVE PASSED TO THE COURTS OF EUROPE

[TRANSLATION]

His Catholic Majesty, in calling the attention of his august allies towards the dissident Spanish provinces of America, judges it not only useless, but unseasonable, to examine the causes which produced in those countries a desire to separate from the mother country; it is sufficient to his Catholic Majesty to have the consolation that it was not the abuse of power nor the weight of oppression which originated so serious an event; and that only extraordinary circumstances, and the terrible crisis in which Spain saw herself compromised, to free her throne and her dignity from the imminent risk of a foreign usurpation, could occasion a disunion so fatal between the members of one and the same family.

Since that epoch, as glorious as unfortunate, various have been the political aspects which the different provinces of Ultramar have presented; military events have succeeded each other with alternate success; the cause of the dissidents has taken a different direction in each one of the principal parts of that immense continent, and his Majesty sees with the most profound grief those interesting regions suffering all the ills and exposed to all the dangers which are the inevitable consequences of a revolution.

For the same reason his Catholic Majesty desires ardently to put an end to a situation so painful of anxiety and of uncertainty; and, carrying

into execution the beneficent resolutions of the *Cortes*, has named the respective Commissioners to proceed to the dissident provinces of Ultramar, hear their propositions, transmit them to the Spanish Government, and open a frank and sincere correspondence, which may have for object and end the good of those countries and that of the nation in general.

H. C. M. does not present himself to those provinces as a resentful monarch before his misled subjects, but as a pacific mediator in the discords of his children. He casts a veil over the past, in order to see the present without any kind of prejudice, and contemplates the actual situation under all the relations which unite it with the future. The common good of the provinces of both hemispheres; this is the only end of the negotiations; this, its only basis; this, the common centre where all its combinations must be directed.

Never has a more important transaction presented itself; but neither is it possible for a Government to prepare to commence it with greater loyalty and good faith. H. C. M. cannot persuade himself that the interest of the provinces of Ultramar can be found in opposition to that of European Spain; and this sentiment, so worthy of his heart, stimulates him to look for the means of reconciling their common advantages, and offers him a consolatory confidence that it will not be impossible to find it. H. C. M. gratifies himself with the flattering hope that this frank and generous confidence will spare those regions whole ages of misery and destruction; prevent civil war and anarchy from retarding the progress of civilization and improvement; avoid the depopulation, poverty and immorality which attend great political oscillations, and which condemn to disgrace and misery one generation without securing the repose or the felicity of the following.

H. C. M. believes, at the same time, that the greatest good he can procure to Peninsular Spain is to put an end to a desolating and fratricide war; and that, placed between brothers united by the ties of blood and of religion, of language, of customs, and even of convenience itself, his voice cannot fail to be heard with benefit to one and the other.

But H. C. M. extends his views to a more extensive horizon, and considers this great question as an European question. A long time passed before the prodigious effects of the discovery of the New World were perceived in this continent; nobody could foresee them, much less calculate them; it was an unknown, immense career, without any barriers to confine it within its space. The same, H. M. judges, may be said of the great events which are agitating America, and whose effects must influence necessarily, and in a very rapid manner, the lot of Europe. It is not possible to determine the degrees of this influence, nor the alterations which it must produce in the reciprocal relations of the one and the other hemisphere; but H. C. M. hesitates not to affirm that the transaction which fixes the lot of the Spanish provinces of America, and puts an end to the blind and impetuous course of its revolution, will be one of the benefits the most memorable for the civilized world.

Necessities, commerce, habit, communications of every species, have united with multiplied bonds the two hemispheres; and it is easy to conceive that an entire continent, delivered to the struggle of the passions, and made the theatre of a durable revolution, cannot fail

to influence perniciously the political and moral relations of Europe, when it has scarcely begun to recover from the agitations and disturbances it has labored under for the space of thirty years.

There will be, perhaps, superficial spirits who will see a solid and established Government and a constituted nation in each province which may have declared its independence; and who, without attending to obstacles of any kind, nor to the principles of public right, nor to the best known maxims of the law of nations, will believe that the mere fact of the separation of a province from the state of which it formed a part legitimates its existence! insulated and independent! and gives it the right to be recognized as such by other powers.

But Governments fortunately know, by a sad experience, the effects which are produced by a similar overthrow of principle; they foresee the consequences of its propagation, not less fatal to legitimate Governments than to the integrity of nations; and are well aware of the consequence to Europe of sanctioning in America, as some pretend, the undefined right of insurrection.

Thus it is that H. C. M. believes not only interested in this question those nations who possess colonies and establishments in Ultramar, to which the same theory could be applied, that it is now intended to legitimate with respect to the Spanish provinces of America; but that he also considers this business as intimately connected with those conservatory principles that offer securities to all Governments and guarantees to society.

Before this great and capital object all other considerations disappear by their smallness, and therefore H. C. M. does not recur to those subaltern reasons which, in ordinary times and circumstances, are employed by policy in support and defence of justice.

Although the question is viewed under this other aspect, Spain presents in all her relations new and powerful motives, which ought to excite in her favor profound sentiments of the most severe impartiality. Without any kind of ambitious pretension, placed with respect to all nations in an inoffensive situation, and dedicated exclusively to affirm and consolidate her interior felicity, she can neither provoke jealousies nor rivalries, nor cause to be desired the violent dismemberment of the various parts of the monarchy with the object of debilitating it. Spain, however powerful she may be, cannot threaten the repose nor the security of other nations; and Spain, rich and powerful, could advantageously influence the preservation of the equilibrium of power. An instinct of honor and of loyalty reunited the unknown elements of her strength, and engaged in the most unequal struggle, gave time to the continent to rise up against the common enemy and destroy his oppressive yoke. This fact alone renders unnecessary all reflections and commentaries. It alone inspires interest in favor of the magnanimous nation, and announces what ought to be its destiny, always beneficent, and never offensive; nature and policy designate it this advantageous position on the map of nations.

This grand political view was not hidden from the European cabinets when they saw destroyed the colossal and exaggerated power which Spain, alarming Europe, had exercised for the space of two centuries.

After a long struggle, it was determined at last to fix the lot of Spain, considering it inwoven with the federal European system, and, at the

same moment, was foreseen the advantage of affirming her power, securing it in America a point of support that might augment its weight in the political balance to obtain the equilibrium of Europe.

To such a point was given importance to this consideration of general interest, that Spain obliged herself not to transfer or dispose of, in any manner, any portion of her territory in America; and, in order to make its possession more secure and inviolable, and to remove even the motives for suspicion and want of confidence, she deprived herself even of the liberty of conceding to other nations, by any means or under any pretext, the commerce and trade with those countries.

Time, notwithstanding, has produced a very important alteration in this point and a more enlightened policy; the change in the mercantile relations, the rectification of economical principles, and a multitude of other combined causes, have convinced Spain that it will be as prejudicial to her peninsular interests, as injurious to the provinces of Ultramar, to aspire to the preservation of a commercial monopoly formerly viewed as the bond of union between the two great moieties of the monarchy.

H. C. M. judges, on the contrary, that those ties only are durable which are founded on the common interest, and that peninsular Spain may obtain commercial advantages favorable to her industry and navigation without aspiring to a privilege so exclusive; that new necessities and new desires, arising from the progress of civilization and of wealth, make necessary a more frank and liberal system for the provinces of Ultramar; and that, in place of struggling uselessly with the mercantile spirit, which has so much influence in the political system of modern nations, the true interests of Spain consist in conciliating it, instead of provoking it as an irreconcilable enemy.

Proposing to itself such important objects, all the laws, all the dispositions given since the restoration of the constitution, have a tendency beneficent, generous, and to the colonization of strangers in Spanish America, and to the freedom of commerce in those regions; and the experiment made in the island of Cuba has been sufficient to demonstrate practically that the general interest of all nations, the interest of the provinces of America and that of European Spain, all coincide in one same point.

By this simple and natural mean, H. C. M. has found absolutely removed the only obstacle that might prevent the most perfect union between the policy of Spain and that of the other cabinets. A solid, stable, and recognized Government, a faithful observer of its treaties, prepares to treat with the dissident provinces of America, and offers to the other powers the greatest commercial advantages; it would not be possible to designate (even when the question should be reduced to the simple calculation of lucrative interest) an object which might serve as a counterpoise in the opposite extreme.

The civil wars and the anarchy that frequently succeed revolutions, and especially when their elements are so heterogeneous and contradictory as in America, are surely not calculated to augment the exchangeable products of a country, nor to invite strangers with the effective and persuasive security which is the soul of commerce, nor can precarious and uncertain governments, without any guarantee, secure themselves the advantages which they may offer. It is now twelve years since

Buenos Ayres, delivered to its own fortune, has toiled in vain to consolidate a Government, and the misery and depopulation suffered by the provinces of Costa-firma have retarded, instead of accelerating their wealth and prosperity. In matters of this class, when facts come in support of reason, it is useless to oppose to certain and known results vague and indefinite hopes.

But it appears only as if a new calamity has taken place, in confirmation of the evils which should have been foreseen; the insurrection of the American continent has given color and support to the piracy of the seas, and commerce in general begins to suffer from the insecurity and dangers of this immoral and barbarous war, which knows no law but that of sordid interest, and which treats and despoils as enemies the industrious individuals of all nations, indiscriminately.

Hence, and by an admirable concatenation, everything concurs to establish the utility and urgency of a definitive arrangement of a business of such vast and profound ramifications, and everything contributes to stimulate the Spanish Government not to retard, by any secondary motive, a transaction so important.

H. C. M. flatters himself with the greatest satisfaction that, about to establish with the dissident provinces this ample and friendly communication, he will find in the other Governments that circumspect and deliberate conduct that justice prescribes, and that policy recommends, and that sentiments of impartiality and benevolence inspire.

The Spanish nation, treating to put an end to a domestic discord, the same inviolable respect which it professes to the rights of other nations inspires it with the just confidence of being treated reciprocally with the same considerations, not being able to suspect, even on the part of the nations who desire to continue in friendship and harmony with her, any hazarded step which might suppose already resolved the question which the Spanish nation is about to decide as its own, in use of its legitimate acknowledged rights, and which it has never in any manner renounced.

In which state the same means made use of to excite Government to the recognition of the independence of the dissident Spanish provinces of America will offer, on the contrary, a notorious and solemn occasion to sanction the fundamental principles upon which the integrity and tranquillity of nations and the public morality of Governments repose.

The tenor and spirit of treaties, the good faith which ought to reign between friendly powers, the conviction of an obligation supported equally by an enlightened and foreseeing policy, the real welfare itself of the dissident provinces, and even the general utility of all the potentates, offer an equal number of securities to his Catholic Majesty that his laudable desires will find in his august allies the most favorable and friendly reception.

1112

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *June 28, 1822.*

I have not been able to ascertain if anything has been said or proposed in the Cortes during their secret sessions with regard to the United States. There is one striking circumstance that renders it probable that there has. In the discussion of the business of Ultramar not even the most remote allusion has been made to the resolution of our Government to recognize the Spanish American Governments. The message of the 8th of March, your subsequent correspondence with Anduaga, and the determination of the Council of State when consulted by the ministers, are certainly known to the Cortes, if not, as is more probable, formally communicated to them. I can hardly conceive it possible that a reference to this step of ours should not have been made, if it had not been studiously avoided, and I see no sufficient motive for a studious avoidance of it if the subject had not been under consideration in a different shape. This is mere conjecture; you will give to it its due importance, as you are made acquainted with the foundation of it.

1113

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *July 18, 1822.*

Mr Hervey has given me a sight of his letter to the Gov^t. of the 8th and of their answer. I send you copies of them marked No 13. By separating himself from the other European ministers, and by a timely subscription of 3000 Reals to succor the militiamen wounded on the 7th Hervey has made himself quite popular here. I have seen I think several indications lately of a strong desire on the part of England to acquire influence with this Gov^t. Is this with a view to the affairs of Europe or of America? As it regards America and especially Mexico, I should be sorry to see them successful in acquiring it. I know not what changes may have been made by recent events in the policy of England, but her old plan to erect Mexico into an independent Gov^t. with one of the Spanish Infantes at its head, is in my view,

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 377.

² MS. Dispatches from Spain, XX.

one of the worst modes of settling the affairs of that country that could well be devised, both for the happiness of Mexico and the interests of the United States. The Mexicans are said to adhere to this plan, at present the Spanish Cortes and the Ministers are strongly averse to it, and have great hope that a reunion of Mexico with Spain may be effected under the Constitution of 1812. What the wishes of our govt. upon the subject are I can *only* conjecture from the documents that have been published and that I have seen here in the public journals. With the exception of the documents accompanying the President's message of the 8th of March, which I received the 23d of May, I have no information that is not collected from the newspapers. I wait with some impatience to hear from the Department. I presume it cannot be long before I shall receive a line from you.

1114

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, August 26, 1822.

The late events have had a favorable effect for us. The danger so near home has drawn their attention from American affairs and blunted the sensibility excited by our recognition of the Governments established in our hemisphere. Every one feels, too, that, among the Governments, the Spanish constitution has no friends but the United States, and perhaps England. Every one is sensible that Spain has no power to compel Spanish America to unite with the Peninsula, and that no assistance is to be procured from the European powers without a sacrifice of the free institutions now established here. The administration has passed into the hands of a party at all times more reasonable and less prejudiced on this subject than those who have heretofore administered the Government.

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 377.*

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States* ¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *October 31, 1822.*

It is altogether probable that the English Gov^t. will take the occasion to consult the Allied Sovereigns on the course to be taken with Spanish America. The time is extremely favourable to the Spanish American Governments. The State of Affairs in Spain will furnish to the European Powers the strongest motives to recognize the American Governments.

It is to be greatly regretted that the Spanish American Governments had not some direct communication with this Government. Agents of Ability well supplied with funds might do much in Madrid. The present Administration is completely occupied with European Affairs & is hopeless of reuniting the dissever'd parts of the Empire. A present pecuniary relief with large promises of future advantage from a liberal intercourse with Spanish America would I think produce a formal acknowledgement of the Independence of all the South American Governments. Probably Mr. Rush has already made you acquainted with the correspondence between L^d. Londonderry and Mr. Onís on the subject of South American Independence. It is but a short time since I became acquainted with the substance of it. It seems Onís ask'd an explanation of the views and intentions of the English Government some time in May or June. The answer was that England had not alter'd her sentiments of Friendship towards Spain. The occasion was taken to remind Spain of repeated offers to mediate that had been refused; of the anxious desire to see tranquillity restored; to warn Spain that events would of themselves decide the question of the Independence of her Colonies and compel European Governments to a formal recognition of them as Independent States; to advise liberal measures of reconciliation to be immediately taken & in conclusion to desire to know whatever the Spanish Government might resolve to do in this question so important to Spain & to the commercial world. This Government has not yet communicated its determination.

¹MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXI.

1116

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, *November 20, 1822.*

I understand that this Government are under serious apprehensions lest Cuba should declare itself Independent and place itself under our Protection. That they are inform'd a Society of Free Masons in Philadelphia has connection with a Society of Free Masons in Havana with the object it is supposed to hasten the declaration of Independence. This according to their usual mode of judging of our conduct is thought to be known and countenanced by our Government. The Squadron sent to Havana by the British, the pressure upon Spain at this moment when she has so much reason to dread the determination of the European Sovereigns, by Great Britain, all combine to shew the necessity of watchfulness on our part as to the designs of that Power and the probability of their accomplishment afforded by the present condition and attitude of this Country. A Commercial Treaty between Spain and England is desirable to England but it is not of sufficient importance to induce her to take up the Gauntlet for Spain against the combined Sovereigns. It is not of sufficient importance to induce her to guarantee the loans of money Spain must have for the support of the Constitutional System. What then is the object of the one Party, and how far will necessity oblige the other Party to assist in the accomplishment of it. England desires the weight of Spain as a European Ally; 2dly, the benefit of the Commerce of the Peninsula; 3rdly, to become the mediator between Spain and the Spanish American Governments; 4thly, the Possession of Cuba to give her the command of the Gulf of Mexico; 5thly, of the communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans over the Isthmus of Darien; 6thly, of Montevideo. With the 1 & 2, we have little concern; the 3d is of the deepest interest to us (see Cypher. No. 1. 2. 3. enclosed):

[DECODIFICATION]

1st paragraph.

Here if I had the fullest instructions nothing could be done to prevent Spain's accepting this mediation; nor is it probable she would accept one offer to mediate from us. To obviate the ill consequences recourse must be had to the Spanish American governments. If Spain accepts the offer of mediation it will be difficult for the South American Governments to refuse it, if the acknowledgement of their Independence is the basis of the mediation. I should presume that it would not be difficult to satisfy the Spanish American Governments that it would be prudent to accept of the mediation only on the condition that our Government should be invited to join in it, standing as we in the same relation to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXI.

them as Great Britain does to Spain. That Great Britain has any fixed determination as to the 4, 5, & 6 objects I will not pretend to affirm positively, but my impressions are strong, that she has. If she has, the means of success are a guaranty of loans, taking a lien upon some or all of them as an eventual indemnity, or a purchase of them. The guaranty of Cuba against the designs of the United States would not be an unlikely mode of proceeding. The island however will be most reluctantly surrendered by Spain, and the population of the Island itself is known to be hostile to any transfer to Great Britain. Montevideo and the Isthmus are considered in a different light, they are of no present use to Spain, and out of her possession; nor is there a prospect of their becoming useful to her if they could be recovered. What will be the result will depend much upon the Congress of Verona. If Spain is pressed by an armed force or by the Continued use of the means of corruption, she must make great sacrifices. The Commercial Treaty opens the road to Great Britain to profit by the necessities of Spain. If the Congress do nothing decisive I hope nothing of consequence will grow out of the determination to treat with England. Whatever may happen I am here without the (ge) (power) to do more than to give you notice of what may be done or intended. Without instructions I can make no offers to this Government in order to divert them from this course; nor [do] I perceive what offers we could [make] in her present situation [that] could induce Spain not to persuit [pursue it (?)]; and we are here, I am constrained to say, not considered in the friendly light we ought to be considered by Spain.

2nd paragraph.

By accident I became master of the purport of a conversation between Vives and Castanos the deputies from Cuba [. The Government is (?)] anxious that Vives should go to Cuba [as Captain General; but he would (?)] go with reluctance [since he (?)] dreads the Climate and the loss of the island during his Government convinced that it must be lost sooner or later. The inhabitants dread the party in favor of independence because some of the Agents are beli(cas)ved they have [are believed to have (?)] connection with Hayti. Vives thinks if the Separation becomes inevitable the interest of both requires the union of Cuba to [the] United States. He will as a good Spaniard use all his efforts to prevent or at least postpone this separation: El Richard Keane, formerly of Baltimore, goes soon to Bordeaux to embark for Havana from thence to New Orleans as a Spy either upon us or upon Mexico, or both. Feeling that we know him he hates us of course. He had for a long time a scheme for settling Texas, which was patronised by Arispe formerly deputy from Cohahuila, (15) one of the dignitaries of the Church of Iturbide [*sic*], but it was rejected by the Cortes. . . .

3rd paragraph.

1st, to incite the Government to form a commercial treaty with England;

2nd, that the Government should wait for proposals from England;

3rd, That a reduction of the duties should form the basis of the treaty;

4th, That the affair of South America might be taken into view in the negotiations.

The Cortes approved the first and rejected the second, third and fourth.

This jealousy towards us may be imputed to these causes: the disputes in Florida; the recognition of the Independance of the South American Governments without previous declaration of the determination to recognize; what has taken place with regard to the Boundary Commissioners; and the rumours of the designs on Cuba. I have reason to believe that Mr. Anduaga has represented that the change in the determination to proceed with the Boundary Commission was to be attributed altogether to the form of Government establish'd in Mexico. Had it been Republican we should have refused; as it was Imperial we agreed to proceed. The two first of these were dying away and I consider'd the ill effects of them as almost entirely removed by the change in the Ministry of July. The communications from Anduaga have been subsequently received and have served to revive the ill will previously entertain'd. On the subject of Cuba I have taken all due pains indirectly to remove the apprehensions of the Government. To several Deputies of the Cortes, and to persons who I presumed would repeat what I said to the Ministers, I have spoken of Cuba as a very desirable acquisition to any Power, but that our interest required, as there was no prospect of its passing into our hands, that it should belong to Spain. That as English property it would be infinitely injurious to us. As Colombian or Mexican it could not but be hurtful. Independent of its formidable position, its slave population would make us anxious to keep the Island out of the hands of Governments which would be compelled by their Institutions to make changes in it, extremely dangerous to the repose and prosperity of the Southern States. In a conversation with one of the Members of the Political Commission of the Cortes I express'd a conviction that Spain could procure by an immediate recognition of Colombia and Mexico and the adoption of a liberal system of commerce a guaranty of the Island from Colombia Mexico & the United States. The three Powers being equally interested to keep it in the hands of Spain, out of the hands of England and of each other. He ask'd permission to speak of it to the Ministers which I gave him provided he spoke of it to the Ministers as a matter of opinion on a subject which had never been even named to me by my Government.

1117

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, December 13, 1822.

I received a few days since a note from Mr. San Miguel, . . . informing me that the Spanish Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico was about to be reinforced ["in consequence of the frequent piracies"]. I supposed it probable that a similar note had been written to all the Foreign Ministers but find that this was not the fact. . . . What the motive is for sending a naval reinforcement you may probably understand better than I do having direct information from Havannah. As far as we are informed, here, a land force would be more useful for destroying the Piracies of Cuba, and of breaking up their connection with Havannah. It is more probable the view is to protect Cuba and to assist the Government party against the Mexican and Colombian Governments. The *Espectador*, a Spanish Paper of which San Miguel was the Editor, and over which he is still supposed to exercise controul, contains latterly some reflections of the subject of Spanish America as destitute of wisdom as those formerly made by the preceding Ministers. On one point the determination of the present Ministers is fixed, to wait the return of, or information from, their Commissioners before they do any thing on this important subject.

1118

*Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[TRANSLATION]

NEW YORK, December 14, 1822.

SIR: The expedition formed in the ports of this Republic, and which sailed from thence in the month of August last, to conquer the island of Porto Rico and to separate it from Spain, has fixed the attention of all Europe. The effect which this extraordinary event has produced on the citizens of the United States proves, to a demonstration, the sentiments of virtue and probity which animate an immense majority of them, and that the attempts which unfortunately so frequently stain the meritorious reputation of these inhabitants are the work of a small number, and are felt and detested by the mass of the nation. The publications made on this

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXI.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 383.

noisy subject, in all the newspapers of the Union, clearly display this truth; and, at the same time that I admire and respect the virtues and sensibilities of the American people, I can do no less than give them the tribute of my sincere gratitude for the indignation they have shown at seeing their laws so scandalously trampled upon, and a nation, their friend, and from which they have received such great proofs of esteem and regard, so perfidiously dealt by.

The nature of the aforesaid expedition, the manner in which it has been framed, the publicity which it had before its sailing, the criminality or negligence which has appeared in the officers of the United States, are so odious, and so clearly is it the interest of the Government to show to the whole world, for its own reputation, that, far from approving such excesses, it hastens to repress them, and to punish them, as soon as they come to their knowledge, that I flatter myself that the bare mention which I have made to you, sir, of this event in my former notes was sufficient for the President to have taken those means dictated by his justice that the delinquents should suffer the punishment which they deserved; that the conduct observed on this occasion by the officers of the customs should be examined, and to the end that, by means of some communication, I should have been enabled to calm the uneasiness and concern which have been caused to his Catholic Majesty by an event so opposite to the friendship which unites him with this Republic and to the laws of all nations.

I will not do the President the injustice to doubt for a moment that he has taken the measures which public vengeance and the honor of this Republic demand; but I must express how much I am hurt that in so long a time you have not had the goodness to give me any explanation on so important a subject, and the means of fully acquainting his Catholic Majesty with the object I have just mentioned.

Such is the publicity of the aforesaid expedition, of its authors, of those who are parties to it, and of its event, that I think I may dispense with distracting your attention with the particulars, except that I ought to fix it upon the circumstance, of which I am assured, of Mr. Irvine, one of the chiefs of it, having been claimed by the captain of the United States corvette the *Cyane* from the governor of Curaçoa, who had arrested him upon the petition of Spanish officers. If this circumstance should be certain, it would give rise to consequences which it is impossible to admit, and I am persuaded that the President will reprove the conduct observed in this case by the commander of the *Cyane*, contrary, no doubt, to the instructions and intentions of his Government.

Although I anticipate the communication the President will be pleased to order me relative to the said expedition, which can be no other than that which the honor of this Republic and justice imperiously claim, I take the liberty of asking you, sir, to have the goodness to transmit it to me as soon

as possible; my object in this request being to be able to dissipate, without more delay, the anxiety and uncertainty with which the silence of this Government upon a case so public and scandalous cannot fail to inspire his Catholic Majesty and all the Spaniards.

I repeat, [etc.].

1119

*John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, January 10, 1823.

. . . Yesterday was publish'd a decree² of the Cortes pass'd in secret session on the subject of the British Claims, of Ultramarine Commerce, and of the system to be adopted in relation to Ultramar (No. 2). During

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXI.

² A translation of the decree referred to follows:

The senate and congress of deputies in extraordinary session, exercising the right which the Constitution concedes to them and having examined the proposal made to the same by His Majesty with reference to various claims of the English Government, have decreed:

1. The decree of the senate and congress of deputies of the 27th of January, 1822, concerning the commerce of the Island of Cuba, shall be extended to all the Provinces

of Ultramar, in the manner that has been declared with respect to the said Island for a term of ten months, counting in each respective case from [the date of] publication [of the decree], for all those nations with whom the Government deems it expedient, to which end it is fully authorized.

2. At the same time it is likewise authorized, in order that it, either on its own part or by means of arbiters designated by itself and the British Government, may decide and settle the claims that it makes; any of the prizes which, for any reason, are of a doubtful character, such as those proceeding from the blockade of Costa Firme, being classified into categories and counterbalanced with the claims which Spanish subjects might have against Great Britain.

3. The nation now acknowledges in the great book the amount of 40 million reales more or less for the indemnification that may result from the mentioned transaction; giving with this a proof of the sincerity and justice of its principles, always trying to preserve amicable relations with Great Britain, and to repair whatever damage it may have caused to its subjects.

4. The payment of the claims of the English subjects of which the order of the senate and congress of deputies of June 27, 1822, speaks, remains a charge against the National Treasury, and anticipates the liquidation and adjustment that the same order provides for.

5. If the examination prescribed in Article 2, results in fraud or injustice in the adjudication of the shares in the proceeds of the prizes, or culpability on the part of the authorities, the Government will enforce the laws in order to punish the guilty and in order to protect the nation from ensuing obligations.

6. The Government proposes to the senate and congress of deputies in all possible brevity the system that it may agree to adopt in the provinces of Ultramar, both with regard to dissenters and to those that maintain unity; and the alterations that may be indispensable in the laws of commerce and navigation of the Indies may now be harmonized in the National power, or may now be combined with those of the other maritime powers by means of treaties.

the Congress of Verona a note very vague in its terms was written by the Duke of Wellington and [on?] the subject of Spanish America and I understand answer'd by the allied Sovereigns in terms equally vague. . . .

England you will perceive is reaping here the benefits of her efforts in favour of Spain at Verona and Paris, and of the timely pressure of her several claims upon the Government of Spain. All her avowed objects are accomplish'd, and there is great probability of her succeeding in *some* of those that are not avowed. You will observe that the decree for the settlement of the British claims is connected with the subject of the commerce of Ultramar and with the Policy to be observed in regard to Ultramar separated from, or yet united, to the Spanish Dominions.

1120

*Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

NEW YORK, *March 6, 1823.*

SIR: Under date of the 14th of December of last year I had the honor to address you a note,² requesting explanations on the expedition from these ports for the conquest of the island of Porto Rico, and the disapprobation of the conduct of the captain of the United States corvette *Cyane*, in the claim which he was said to have made to the Governor of Curaçoa in favor of Mr. Irvine, one of the chiefs of that expedition. Lately I have received official letters from my Government, in which is energetically expressed the surprise of his Catholic Majesty at seeing the possessions of Spain attacked in a manner so public and scandalous by the citizens of a power to which so great and so costly proofs have been given of its friendship; and although it has appeared to him extraordinary that the President should have been ignorant of preparations made with so little secrecy, and that a collection of men and of ships, laden with munitions of war, in the ports nearest to the capital, should have been able to be concealed from him; nevertheless, judging by his own sentiments of those which he believed animated the President, he did not doubt that it was so, and that this Government, the instant it should have notice of such an event, would hasten to take the most vigorous measures for the punishment of the delinquents and for preventing such excesses in future; and, above all, that to prove to his Majesty and to all Europe the indignation produced to it by this attempt, it would have

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 388.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1118.

been gratified in giving to the cabinet of Spain the satisfaction and explanations which so odious a breach of the laws of nations and of the friendship which unites this Republic with Spain so imperiously demanded. This persuasion was so natural that it is very easy to calculate what effect it would have on the mind of his Majesty, and on that of all the Spaniards, to know that this Government not only has thought proper not to give a spontaneous explanation on an event injurious to Spain, and which in so shameful manner stains the good faith and reputation of this Republic, but that an answer has been withheld for so many months to the notes which I have had the honor to address to it on this subject. The consequence which should be drawn from this cannot escape your penetration. It is very clear that if, from the ports of Spain, an expedition should depart for the attack and conquest of a province of the United States, and that his Catholic Majesty should not only not give at the time explanations of his ignorance and disapprobation of it, but that he should neglect the representations of the American minister at Madrid, the President would have a right to believe that that hostile measure had been carried into execution, if not with the consent of the Spanish Government, at least with its connivance. But if the conviction which I have of the equity of the President, and of his desire to maintain with Spain the amity which happily subsists, prevents me from drawing, in the case whereof I treat, that consequence, evident as it may appear, I cannot help seeing in your silence a singular indifference to the feelings of his Catholic Majesty, in respect to the attacks which his possessions and subjects receive on the part of the Americans. I know how painful this will be to my Government, and how grievous not to see its friendship towards this Republic answered in a correspondent manner, nor the proofs which it has given of it; and anxious to tranquilize it, I take the liberty of requesting you to be pleased to answer my note of the 14th of December last, not doubting but that it will be such as will calm the inquietude and uneasiness which must be caused in the mind of his Catholic Majesty by the expedition referred to, and by having left my notes unanswered.

I renew [etc.].

1121

*Joaquín de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

NEW YORK, March 7, 1823.

SIR: I have the honor to send you inclosed copies of the protest made in Pensacola by Don Jacinta Correa, captain of the Spanish schooner called

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 389.

the *Carman*, alias *Galliga the Third*, and of a judicial declaration made by the same before the consul of Spain in New Orleans.

In both documents are set forth the capture of the said schooner by the United States ship-of-war *Peacock* and the oppression and robbery committed by her crew, all which has been confirmed to me by the Captain General of the Havana, and by the consul of Spain in New Orleans. As the circumstances of these crimes are expressed in the inclosed documents I avoid repeating them in this note, and shall rest content with calling your attention to three of the principal, which are, the *Peacock* having made the capture with the *Spanish flag*, the violation of the public correspondence between two provinces of his Catholic Majesty, and the malicious contrivance of Captain Cassin in sending the crew of the *Carman* to Pensacola and the vessel to New Orleans, that there might be no one to defend her there. Such violations of all public law, and such refined perfidy, are so evident and odious that I think it unnecessary to insist upon them, since it would be doing an injury to the sense and justice of this Government. Notwithstanding the insidious precaution of Captain Cassin, scarcely had the courts of Pensacola and New Orleans examined the case, when the former declared the crew innocent and set them at liberty, and the other ordered the restitution of the vessel, which saves me the trouble of proving the illegality of the capture; and it only remains with me to request that the President would be pleased to order satisfaction to the owners of the schooner *Carman* for the losses and damages which they have sustained, and that the money and effects of which they have been plundered be restored to the crew. This is what it concerns me to ask in favor of said individuals; but the just satisfaction of my Government, the assurance in future of due respect to the Spanish flag and the lives and property of Spanish citizens, imposes upon me the obligation of speaking to you with that frankness which ought to subsist between two friendly powers whose interest it is to maintain the greatest harmony.

The injuries done by this country to his Catholic Majesty and to his subjects are not confined to expeditions of individuals for the conquest of his provinces, to hostilities under the insurgent flag, to building armed ships for the enemies of Spain, to furnish these men with munitions of war, &c.; but they have gone to attack publicly the vessels of Spain by ships-of-war of the United States, and to trample upon Spanish citizens by American officers; the excess being carried to such a pitch that his Catholic Majesty's territory is violated, and if a speedy check be not put to it the Spanish commerce must be in dread of the ships-of-war of a nation which is said to be friendly as it would of another with which it was in a complete state of rupture.

The violations of neutrality and of friendship between two nations, committed by individuals, always give room to the offended power to believe

that they have taken place without the knowledge and against the will of the Government of the aggressors, and that it will grant a competent satisfaction; but when this is not only refused, and not even private citizens but the ships and officers of that Government give the insult and commit hostilities with its approbation, since it neither punishes them nor prevents them from continuing their aggressions, the illusion must cease, and, alarmed for the intentions of said Government, the imperious obligation which it is under of protecting its subjects lays it under the necessity of demanding a frank explanation of them, and indispensable provisions for the putting a stop to the scandal of acts which continue could only be followed by consequences which his Catholic Majesty has a lively desire of avoiding, it being his most sincere wish to preserve inviolate the friendship which he professes towards this Republic.

Vain have been my repeated remonstrances to obtain satisfaction for the insults offered to my Government and fellow-citizens by the American officers. And if, in the courts of the United States, the Spaniards have found justice, the Government has not only refused my petitions, but has not even given an answer to the greater part of my notes. The very sentences of the courts prove the justice of my complaints against the said officers; and when it is seen that this Government, in spite of these complaints and the opinion of the most eminent and just judges of this Republic, refuses to his Catholic Majesty the satisfaction which is his due, does not answer the representations of his minister, and continues its protection and favor to the officers accused, the suspicion is allowed that its friendly sentiments towards Spain have undergone an alteration. This doubt will be extremely painful to his Catholic Majesty, wherefore I spend more time in requesting you to be pleased to clear it up, and this can be done in no other way than by giving to his Majesty the satisfaction which he has demanded for so great injuries, with the punishment of the officers who have committed them, and especially of Captain Cassin, and giving the most peremptory orders that they be not repeated.

The multiplied proofs of friendship which his Majesty has given to this Republic, the sacrifices which he has made in its favor, and the utility which results to both nations in the continuance of a good understanding between both, are to me a sure guaranty that the President, deigning to take into consideration the important contents of this note, will be pleased to order such an answer to it as will at once dissipate the disagreeable impressions which the acts of the American officers have made, and assure his Catholic Majesty that his desires for the continuance of the strictest friendship with this Republic will be fulfilled.

I repeat [etc.]

*John J. Appleton, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Madrid,
to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, March 20, 1823.

SIR: The Despatches from this Legation numbered 51, 53, 54,² and 58 will have furnish'd you with nearly all the facts by which we would determine, here whether England had, during the period they embrace, made overtures to Spain for a cession of the Island of Cuba. Altho' my own belief, founded on a close attention to these facts and on an intimate intercourse with persons who have a deep interest in being well informed, was, that no other proposals had been made in reference to the Island, but those which had for object the extirpation of piracy, I thought it my duty on receiving your despatch No. 28 "Marked Secret" to institute fresh inquiries.

The result of these inquiries, I am happy to inform you, confirms fully the impression previously entertained—that there have been, lately, no negotiations on foot between England and Spain for a cession of the Island of Cuba. The English Minister at this Court, has it is true, occasionally, expressed uneasiness about the fate of the Island and was advised [by?] his friends in the Government to watch closely all its relations with the United States. But the knowledge which he has of the temper of Spain in relation to its foreign Possessions did not permit him to go further. An offer to take the Island under the protection of England would I am persuaded have been rejected either from want of confidence in those who made the offer, or from a feeling of national pride which has as often influenced the Councils of Spain, as interest. She considers Cuba as an integral part of the Monarchy, and clings to it with the blinded energy of pride and interest. These feelings are so strong, so general that no Government could disregard them. The men who have been successively at the head of affairs in Spain, since the Revolution, have been anxious to retain their hold upon the Island of Cuba and the remaining transatlantic possessions by kind and liberal treatment, and none have among them, gone further than those composing the Ministry and the Cortes in the last periods of difficulty. Under them the history of the Relations between the Peninsula and the Island has been a succession of acts of deference, all manifesting the fullest respect for the rights, and the greatest solicitude for the prosperity of the Island on one part, and the deepest sympathy for the mother country on the other. On all occasions when measures were to be taken or important appointments made for the Island, the opinions of its deputies in Cortes, have been sought and generally governed the determinations of the Government. Of this you have had a conspicuous proof in the appointment of General Vives to the Command of the Island.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXII.

² See above, pt. XIII, docs. 1116, 1117 and 1119, Forsyth to Adams, November 20, and December 13, 1822, and January 10, 1823.

The situation was solicited by *General Quiroga*, whose influence at the end of the year that has expired was very great, but the Deputies of the Island insisted upon his not being appointed, and his revolutionary claims, great as they are, were overlook'd.

The creation of a free Port at the Havana, the exemption conceded to the Island of Cuba at the instance of its Deputies from the Extraordinary measures adopted in October last for the European Provinces, the revival of the naval ordonance and other legislative measures, shew, that the Cortes and the executive Power shared the same sentiments in relation to the Island. Its deputies in conjunction with others of Ultramar have for some time back been employed under orders of the Cortes in drafting a plan for the Political and Economical Government of their Provinces, which is now in process of discussion in the Cortes. The basis of this work is the acknowledged difficulty of governing these Provinces well, with redress, for abuses, so distant; and the object of it, is to find a remedy for the evil. It asks more than will probably be granted, but even if some of the articles are thrown out, as placing the Governments of Ultramar upon too Independent a footing, enough will remain to insure with time a full development of the resources of those Provinces. Among other faculties it gives to the Provincial Juntas, is the very important one, of keeping up a naval force for the exclusive protection of the Islands and their commerce—that of holding public Sessions—that of fixing the duties upon imports and exports according to a basis furnish'd by the Cortes—that of suspending in accord with the *Gefe Politico* the execution of any law or order from the Peninsula, if, from their being executed great prejudices might arise to the Provinces—that of reporting at stated times upon the conduct of all persons employed by the crown in the Provinces, and even suspending from duty all those who are not in the military service. With these Powers, the Provincial Deputations elected as they are by the people, might secure to the people nearly all the blessings of self Government.

The deliberate earnestness with which the Cortes are providing institutions for these distant Provinces indicate, certainly, no disposition to transfer them to another Power. If such a disposition existed here; however, I very much doubt whether there would be any on the part of the people of Cuba to be bargain'd away like their own slaves. To England I am fully persuaded they would not belong. National prejudices, the experience they have had of the English Colonial Policy when pressing upon the conquer'd French Islands and of her exertions to put down the slave trade, have not prepared them to receive the English as Masters or Protectors. Had they to choose between England and the United States their choice would not be doubtful. The classes, however, who have something to lose prefer remaining as they are, persuaded that an attempt to place the Island under the protection of either Power would inevitably draw down upon it the anger of the other and make it the theatre of a contest fatal to its prosperity. Such is the language

of the friends of Cuba with whom I am acquainted here, unwilling to depend entirely upon them for my impressions on the subject I determined to improve the first opportunity of sounding Mr. San Miguel. This opportunity was presented on the 15th when he inform'd me that he had resisted the demand of England to be permitted to land on the Island in pursuit of Pirates, I said, that if it was true, as circulated, that the British had landed 500 men at Matanzas they had not been satisfied with his answer. To this Mr. San Miguel replied that he did not believe the report, as the only pretext which the English would alledge for landing had been abandon'd by them on being assured that the Governor of Cuba would readily cooperate with their fleet for the destruction of the Pirates. I then observ'd that *I* was not disposed to give much credit to the report from a conviction that England would be very cautious of giving umbrage to her maritime rivals by so bold a step in that quarter—that, besides, I considered it her interest as well as ours that the Island should remain tranquil, and this depended upon its remaining in the hands of Spain. England and the United States I added derived now from the Island, without expense, nearly all the advantages which the possession would yield and well knew that they might lose all by attempting to get more. Mr. San Miguel acquiesced in my observations, and said that he felt no concern about the Island of Cuba. That were it threatened, he was sure it would be succour'd by the United States. I said that the United States could never see with indifference any attempt to change the present state of things in that quarter, but that I was not prepared to say how far they might be disposed to go to prevent such a change. That the information would however soon be furnished by Mr. Anduaga who I presumed from the conversation which had taken place between him (Mr. San Miguel) and Mr. Forsyth had already been directed to make the necessary inquiries. Instead of confirming this surmise, as I hoped, Mr. San Miguel merely observed that Spain would do all that was needful to secure the advantages which might be expected from the well known dispositions of the United States in reference to this important subject. Had the tenor of this conversation, or previous impressions led me to believe that England was actually pressing Spain for a cession of the Island, I would have made use of the faculty allowed by your letter, and spoken in the name of my Government. In the state in which I found things I thought that my duty required that I should not compromise the United States, unnecessarily. If by excess of prudence I have erred from the Presidents wishes, the error is, I flatter myself, of a nature to be easily mended by Mr. Nelson whose arrival I am daily expecting. In the mean while I shall derive satisfaction from an intimate belief that our interests are all safe at present, and that they are to have soon the support of talent and experience which are but ill supplied by my exertions.

I have the honor [etc.].

*John J. Appleton, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Madrid, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

CADIZ, July 9, 1823.

SIR: I have detained Mr. Wyre until now in the double expectation of having it in my power to transmit to you by him the determination of the Spanish Government in relation to its former Colonies, as well as any thing which might transpire, in addition to what I had the honor of communicating to you, in reference to the subject of your letter No. 28. marked "Secret".

The removal of the Government to this place has been fatal to the hopes which I had for some time back entertain'd, and in which I had been encouraged as you will have seen by my letters, that the "American question" would be presented fairly by the Ministers to the Cortes, and a determination would be taken upon their report favourable to the cause of Independence. The warmest friends of the Americans have been paralysed by the pressure of their affairs at home. Several Deputies with whom I have conversed here, and who were disposed some time back to take up the subject, now shrink from the difficulties and responsibility it involves. The fact is that one of the subjects of accusation brought up by the Madrid Regency against this Government, is, that by the constitution and the measures deriving from it, the Spanish Colonies have been lost—and that, were this Government, reduced as it is to a few Provinces in Spain, and blockaded in Cadiz, to take any determination friendly to the former Colonies the Regency and the French would protest against it, and appeal to it as a proof of the corruption and selfishness of the Persons in Power here, who to secure themselves, (it would be said) a retreat, have sacrificed the dearest interests of their country. There is no doubt that the accusation would produce its effect, among a large class of Spaniards who yet cling to the hope of recovering the Colonies, and that it would hasten the dissolution of the constitutional system. Notwithstanding all, there are a few deputies who appear determin'd to give the question a trial in the Cortes, and will in all this month, unless the Ministers should of their own accord and in compliance with a former decision of the Cortes anticipate them, call up the subject. Out of 110 members, of which the Cortes are now composed, in consequence of the desertion of some of its members, there will not be found 20 who will be in favour of deciding the question now. The objections that will be made are I am assured the following—

1st. The want of Powers in the Cortes by the Constitution to dismember any portion of the Monarchy from the rest.

2nd. The *impotency* of an *unconditional* recognition of the independence

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXII.

of the Colonies, and the *insecurity* of a *conditional one*, if Spain treats *alone* with the Colonies.

3rd. The unfitness of the present moment.

The first of these objections will not be strongly insisted on, for however indisposed they may be to recognise the independence of the former Colonies unconditionally, all their scruples would vanish if they could obtain the guarantee of England for the fulfilment of such conditions as might be imposed upon those Colonies, and receive, as the price of their acknowledgment of the Spanish American Governments, powerful assistance for the support of the independence of the Peninsula. From this you will perceive that, England has it in her power to fix the fate of Spanish America. With her some arrangement may be made, but I do not believe that there is any now on foot. Indeed if there were, the Deputies who are desirous of bringing the question up in the Cortes, *would be informed of it* and desist from their object, as prejudicial to Negotiations.

Sir William à Court still remains in Seville, waiting for instructions from his Government to remove to this place. Twenty eight days have elapsed since he sent a courier from Seville announcing the appointment of the Provisional Regency. Mr. Gomes, the new Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal named by Count Palmella, having found the Government here, has remained, and has spent his first moments in endeavouring to engage the Government to a removal of the two Princesses, daughters of the King of Portugal, to Lisbon with their children and has been unsuccessful. Mr. Briderman [?], the Chargé d'Affaires of Saxony, is also here. These two gentlemen, with myself compose the present Diplomatic Corps, at this Court. A commissioner of the British Government having applied for Papers the delivery of which is stipulated by the last convention between Spain & England, has been informed by Mr. Pando the Secretary of the Despatch of State, that Spain declined proceeding with the execution of the convention until the retreat of the English Minister was properly explained. As his conduct might inspire doubts, whether England continued to recognise the Constitutional Government. Mr. Jabat the Spanish Minister in London has received instructions framed upon the same ideas.

*John J. Appleton, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Madrid, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

CADIZ, August 6, 1823.
(closed the 8th)

This intimate conviction, I have confirm'd by a conversation this very evening (7th) with the Minister of Finance, Yandiola, who acts, *ad interim*, as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bringing up the subject of *Mexico* of his own accord, he said to me "your country should be on the alert as to the intrigues which France is setting on foot in that Country to induce it to accept a Prince of the House of Bourbon, as a republic such an arrangement cannot suit you, if we should be unfortunate, here, it cannot suit *us*." I observed to him that we had probably by this time a Minister at Mexico who informed *you* with every occurrence which would affect the interests of the United States, and that altho' he had no other means of influence there, but such as an upright Government would acknowledge to all the world, it was proper to suppose that such influence as he possess'd would always be thrown in the scale of liberty—that against any change in the present state of things in that country, he might calculate upon the character of those who were at the head of Affairs. The Minister answer'd that the last letters received from Fort Uloa, shew, that there was a growing disposition in Mexico for the Federative System, and that other letters which had been received today from Mr. Rivas their Chargé d'Affaires in the United States under date of the 27th of April announced to him the arrival of Commissioners in the United States to propose the annexation of the Province of Guatemala to the United States. I said that the Gazettes of the U. S. had announced the fact, but that if a proposition to that effect was made to the U. S. they would in a spirit of sincere friendship inform the Commissioners that their project had insurmountable objections, that the United States had yet felt no wish to extend their power beyond their proper limits, and that the happiness of their Province would be best promoted by uniting with its immediate neighbours. Mr. Yandiola said that the Congress of Mexico was animated by the most liberal spirit and had already inform'd Guatemala that they might dictate the terms on which they would be united with Mexico. I said that the fear of Iturbide and his absolute power could alone have induced Guatemala to have recourse to the U. S. and that the cause of disunion no longer existing it was probable that it would remain attach'd to Mexico. Mr. Yandiola then remarked that there was another interesting country that the fear of despotism might throw into the hands of the United States; that when he was in the Havannah he had observed a great tendency to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXII.

a political connection with the U. S. and that if liberty was lost in Spain, he believed that the people of Cuba would in imitation of the other Possessions of Spain dissolve the ties which hold them to the Peninsula and probably seek for protection in the U. S. I answer'd that I was in hopes that liberty was not yet lost in Spain—that if the Constitutional Govt. had means to support itself in Cadiz for a few months longer a re-action might be expected throughout the Provinces. He said that it certainly might be expected, but that if England persisted in refusing to do any thing for them pecuniary means would fail. How is it, I replied that England does not improve this occasion to secure some of her favorite objects in America? He replied, that he feared she was too deeply implicated with the Holy Alliance to consult her interests, that it would soon be known whether she intended to abandon Spain to her fate; if so, and France proposed no terms that could be accepted, their determination was fixed to hold out here as long as possible and take the chances of what might happen in Spain and in other countries. I then ask'd Mr. Yandiola on what pecuniary resources they counted for the present. He replied upon the 50,000,000 of reals which France had paid to the Spanish Consul General at Paris two months before the war, and which he had timely placed in England. (This sum was the amount of private claims, which France was bound to satisfy by the Treaty of Paris. The Spanish Consul received it in *Inscriptions* upon the *grand livre*, which were immediately converted into *Reconnoissances payables au Porteur* and thus placed beyond the power of the French Government.) That they had good reason to think that they could liquidate an account which they had with ——— amounting to ——— for which purpose they had sent two commissioners to England. I enquired whether these commissioners were the two who took a passage in the Frigate *Tribune*. He said they were—that the success of their mission depended upon its remaining secret—that if this liquidation was [were] effected it would produce 1088. 648. 1576. 794. 1384. 1453. 347. 1372. 500. 192. 668. 1384. 169. 1244. 1501. 1110. 1426. 1290 [no decodification]. He added “would nothing be done in your country by offering good security? We have the revenue of the Island of Cuba which would answer for more than we need.” This question brought on an answer similar to that which I had given to the Deputy of Cortes, adding, by way of illustrating my general propositions, that the duties paid by citizens of the U. S. upon the importation of effects in the Island of Cuba might amount to several hundred thousand dollars a year, and that exchequer bills receivable at the Havana for these duties might be negotiated in the U. S. that an operation of this kind might be undertaken if they had some one on the spot on whom *they* could rely. Mr. Yandiola replied that the idea struck him forcibly; that the Government had been deliberating upon the choice of a proper person to send as Minister to the United States, and had thought of Mr. Jabat their present Minister in London—that, however, nothing is yet

decided. (Mr. Jabat has property in Cuba to the amount of three or four hundred thousand dollars.) I said that the great object was to have a person in the U. S. who could not sell himself to the Holy Alliance, that after what had happen'd with the last Minister the Government would be disposed to treat with reserve any person who did not offer them the guarantee of an honorable character. Mr. Yandiola inquired, then, when Mr. Nelson might come. I told him that I had this very day received a letter from him in Gibraltar, denoting his anxiety to be here and enclosing a letter for the French General, in which he ask'd to be allow'd to pass thro his lines, and that the immediate object of my visit had been to ask him (Mr. Yandiola) to furnish me the means of having the letter deliver'd at headquarters. He said he knew that the French had declined receiving any communication except under the Spanish Flag, and supposed that I wish'd him to send my letter over. I replied that I would wish it. He said that he would immediately make it known to General Valdes in order that he might place a boat at my disposition with a Flag of Truce, and sent me an hour afterwards the billet of which a copy is enclosed. The answer of General Bourdesoul will be carried to Gibraltar by the person whom Mr. Nelson sent here, who will also be charged with this Despatch. My letter to the Duke of Angouleme, of which you will find a copy with my communications to Mr. Gallatin, will with those communications be placed at the disposal of Mr. Nelson; in order that *he* may forward them (for hence, there is no conveyance) if he deems it advisable, from Gibraltar. If Mr. Nelson is denied entry, I shall until Mr. Gallatin can clear up the business be on the watch that the interests of the [*sic*] as far as I understand them, suffer not by Mr. Nelson's momentary exclusion. It would have been most grateful to me, to have, at a moment like the present, replaced the Affairs of the United States in hands of a person calculated to do them entire justice.

You will find in the Gazettes of 3d Instant a report of the Commission of Ultramar proposing to the Cortes 1st to invite the Governments *de facto* existing in Spanish America to send Ministers to the Peninsula or to any neutral point of Europe designated by Spain, with full Powers, and consent to an Armistice with those who send such Ministers. 2dly that the Government of H. C. M. should name on its part one or more plenipotentiaries who may at the point designated negotiate Treaties of every kind, upon the basis that will seem to them most proper, not excluding that of Independence. 3dly that these treaties shall have no effect until sanction'd by the Cortes. This Report was taken up on the following sittings, as you will see by the Gazettes of the 4th & 5th, and laid at rest after an interesting discussion. It was known that this would be the result, there not being more than twenty persons in the house who could be brought to vote for the adoption of the commission's report *at the present juncture*. The decision took place upon the question whether the vote should be taken by yeas and nays. It was

decided by 53 against 43 that it should not. The house then laid the report on the table without a division. The most formidable adversaries of the report were Arguelles, Joaquim Ferrer, and Gomes Becerra. Arguelles hates the English, and is sincerely attach'd and devoted to the greatness of his Country. Joaquim Ferrer is also unfriendly to the English, but is too much accustomed to calculate like a merchant, to reject any advantage which might be derived from England, by sacrifices in America, if he thought that England was disposed *at this moment* to mediate between *constitutional* Spain and her former possessions. In February last *he* and Mr. Cooke, the agent and friend of Mr. Canning, settled the bases of a mediation at several interviews—indeed a sort of a protocol was kept, which Mr. Cooke carried to England. Mr. Ferrer has assured me, that Mr. Cooke had recognised the justice of the principle of indemnisation [*sic*] from the former colonies to the mother country, and said that England would perhaps consent to make good to Spain, immediately, the amount of that indemnisation [*sic*], receiving in exchange the stipulated rights of Spain upon Spanish America, and deducting from the amount thus to be paid to Spain by England the import of the unsettled claims of English subjects upon Spain. Mr. Cooke left Madrid for England in February promising Mr. Ferrer that he would let him hear from him as soon as he arrived, but has not kept his promise. This Mr. Cooke was Agent for a large amount of British claims the settlement of which had been stipulated by a Treaty which has long been in your possession, and the execution of which has now experienced some embarrassment from the retreat of Sir Wm. à Court. Mr. Becerra the other person I have mentioned as opposed to the Report, is a Spaniard of the old school who carries with him on all occasions a large number of the Deputies from the Interior. All opposition, however, would cease to the recognition of Spanish American Independence (except from Arguelles who is uncompromising), if it could be made the means of insuring the independence of Spain in Europe—the fate of South America is therefore in the hands of England—but, probably, the same reasons which prevent her acquiring any rights on Cuba, will not suffer her to come to an understanding with Spain about it. Losing this opportunity, she may not arrange afterwards the affairs of America to her liking. The French are evidently anxious to gain influence in that part of the globe and will, probably, to a certain extent succeed.

*Memorandum of a conversation between William à Court, British Minister to Spain, and John J. Appleton, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Madrid, December 7, 1823*¹

I learn'd this evening from Sir William à Court that Mr. Saez had told him a couple of days before his dismissal from the Ministry that he proposed to address him a note containing an invitation from the King of Spain to that of Great Britain to take part in a Congress to be held in Paris for the adjustment of Spanish American Affairs, and that Sir William had said to Mr. Saez that tho' he could not give any encouragement to the application intended to be made, he would transmit it to his Government as soon as he should receive it. On my inquiring whether this application had been made by Mr. Saez's successor, Sir William said *that it had not*. Sir William continued saying "You probably have heard of the conferences which were held in London upon this subject between Mr. Canning and the French Ambassador some time ago.² I said that I had not. "Then you do not know that one of the reasons assigned by Mr. Canning for not joining in the Congress was that your country had not been invited to send a representative to it. Come with me and I will shew you a memorandum of these conferences made by Mr. Canning, & approved by Mr. de Polignac"; so saying he carried me into his Cabinet and there put into my hands several sheets of paper, professing to be the memorandum he spoke of. From having been obliged to read it hastily, and in the presence of Sir William, I can only recollect the leading ideas it contained, without any reference to the words or order in which they were expressed. The first conference took place on the 9th of October. The French Ambassador came to this conference with instructions from his Government upon the subject to be treated of. Mr. Canning began by expressing the opinion of his Government, that time and the course of events had effectually separated the former Colonies of Spain, from the mother country, and that all further attempts on the part of Spain to regain empire over them by arms would be vain.—That England had always maintained a strict neutrality between the parties, and that let her determination be what it might on the question of recognizing the independence of the new States, she would persevere in this policy, so long as other nations remained neutral. That if however any other *Nation took part with Spain the question would be changed*.—That the first effect of an attempt of a third party to replace the former Colonies under the power of Spain by force, or even by *threats* would be *an immediate recognition* of their independence by England. That the anxiety of England for the restoration of peace, between the contending parties, had been abundantly evinced by the repeated offer of her

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXII. Enclosed in Nelson to Adams, December 18, 1823, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1126.

² See above, pt. VIII, doc. 799, under date October 9, 1823.

mediation to Spain. That in accepting this mediation in 1810, (tho' circumstances prevented its having effect) Spain had open'd to England the commerce of the Colonies, and thus placed her in a situation in relation to this commerce which interdicted her now from placing herself on a level with other Nations whom she was invited to meet in Paris for the adjustment of Spanish American Affairs. That altho' England was thus prevented from taking any part in the proposed Congress, *she disclaimed all thought of obtaining advantages for her commerce in Spanish America which might not be made extensive to all other Nations.* The only Nation whom she thought entitled to such advantages was the mother country. That as to the trade she already had with Spanish America she could not suffer it to be interrupted, for it employed now a British capital which could not be withdrawn from it without immense losses to her people.

Mr. de Polignac replied that France so far agreed with England, as to think it impossible to reestablish the relations between Spain and her Colonies on their ancient footing. That she thought however that the lamentable state of these colonies, in prey to anarchy, deserved the intervention of those Powers by whose wisdom and unity of council, Europe had been restored to order and tranquillity. That the interference of these powers would now be equally decisive of the cause of order in America, if England, pursuing the ideas avowed at Verona, consented to unite her efforts with theirs.—That he hoped that as Mr. Canning had declared that England did not wish for exclusive commercial advantages in Spanish America, she would think proper to desist from the objection to unite in Congress with her Allies, founded upon the difference she conceived to exist between her situation and theirs in relation to Spanish America. That the determination which Mr. Canning had avowed of recognising the independence of the States formed out of Spanish America, upon the interference of any other power in favour of Spain, would appear surprising, when confronted with the former declaration of England, on the same subject, which made her recognition to depend upon other grounds. That France could not propose any way of pacifying Spanish America, while King Ferdinand was not free: that she disclaim'd *all intention of interfering in favour of Spain by arms.* That her opinion, however, was, that Spanish America could only be recalled to principles of social union by establishing in it *Monarchical or Aristocratical Centres.*

Mr. Canning rejoined (I think at the next Conference which was held on the 12th October) that England had said nothing at Verona which could be construed into an invitation to other Powers to interfere for the pacification of Spanish America, and to prove this assertion refer'd to Despatches of the Duke of Wellington of that date shewing that the intention of England had only been to apprise her allies of the course she might pursue in order to give them an opportunity of acting simultaneously with her.—That however

gratifying it might be to England to see Monarchical or Aristocratical Governments form'd in Spanish America, she did not think after a close attention to the course of events in those Countries that their establishment was practicable—That, besides, there was a Nation, which, by its power, by its vicinity to the States in question, and by the interest she must be supposed to take in their fate, was entitled to be consulted on the present question—especially when Nations which were as little interested in its settlement, as Russia, Prussia & Austria were to be called to the Congress—and that England thought this pretension so just that she would not be disposed to attend a Congress on Spanish American Affairs to which the United States were not invited. Mr. Canning said also at this conference that he had heard thro' the ordinary channels of commerce that some French men of war had commenced hostilities upon Colombia, and wish'd Mr. de Polignac to say whether the information thus received was founded on facts.

Mr. Polignac replied to the foregoing observations of Mr. Canning by saying that on the subject of inviting the United States to the proposed Congress he had no instructions, that however, his own private opinion, without much reflexion, was, that there could be on the part of France no objection to inviting them. That as to the acts of hostility said to have been committed by French ships on Colombia, he knew nothing, but did not think them probable as the principal vessel employed on that Station, the *Jean Bar*, was order'd to return to France.

After having run over Mr. Canning's memorandum I enquired of Sir William whether the French Government had since said any thing upon that part of the memorandum which referred to the United States.—He said he did not know that she had, that he was, however, expecting a courier which would probably bring him new information on the subject. Sir William added that since these conferences the tone of the *others* (meaning Russia, Prussia & Austria), which at first had been very high on American Affairs had considerably lowered.

1126

*Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *December 18, 1823.*

You will doubtless have been apprized by Mr. Rush, of the Conferences which have been had between the French Ambassador at London and Mr.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXII. Hugh Nelson, of Virginia: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Spain January 15, 1823; took leave July 10; left Madrid July 14, 1825.

Canning, in regard to holding another Congress for the adjustment of the affairs of Spanish America. My information on this point is received from Mr. Appleton to whom Sir William à Court shewed a copy of the Notes which Mr. Canning had made and shewn to the French Ambassador for preserving greater accuracy of two different conferences which had taken place between them. It was admitted by the French Minister that the idea of restoring the former relations between those Countries and Spain must be given up by all. And Mr. Canning it seems in his great anxiety to take care of the United States has said that on a question so important and so interesting to the United States they ought certainly to be invited to send their Ministers to aid in the deliberations. A memorandum will be prepared by Mr. Appleton of the substance of this communication from the English Minister—which will be enclosed.¹

1127

*Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *June 18, 1824.*

There is also included in this Despatch the answer of the Count of Ofalia to my note on the subject of the publication in the Barcelona *Diario*, about the 14 Privateers fitted in the Ports of the United States to cruise on the Spanish commerce, as communicated to them by their Chargé d'Affaires near the Government of the United States. The Count affirms that he had before stated to me in conversation that this was not intended to be made public—but still reiterates the allegation that Privateers are fitted out in our Ports, but without the knowledge of our Government, to the very great destruction of the Spanish Trade. This is designed to keep up, what he has also insinuated in conversation, the counter-claim of Spain upon us, against the damages demanded on our part for the spoliations committed by their Privateers. The appellation of *Pirate* which he unites with the term Privateer, and applies to the vessels alledged to be fitted out in the American Ports, is intended to counterpoise our strong remonstrances on the subject of the Cuba Pirates.

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1125, December 7, 1823.

² MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIV.

1128

*Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *July 15, 1824.*

The reconquering the Provinces of South America, the extirpation of liberalism, and the fixing a solid foundation for the construction of despotism will doubtless be prominent objects in the deliberations of the Spanish Councils. If the means can be obtained for carrying on the expeditions against their ancient possessions on our Continent, the infatuation of the Rulers here will find no limit to schemes and plans for their subjugation. Every stratagem to keep alive the *penchant* of this people for their possessions and brethren in the New World is resorted to. And the pride and bigotry of the Spaniard is roused and inflated, by details of successes which have crowned their enterprises against the Anarchists and Rebels and by imaginary pictures of the oppression and persecution experienced by their holy religion. The King is said to be immovably fixed on this object of regaining his Territories. Russia is believed to encourage him more extensively than France in this design. This may change the ascendant, and Russia may now occupy the place in his affections which France has hitherto engaged. France held a strong "lien" upon him thro' the instrumentality of her troops who kept the crown upon his head. But those withdrawing gradually from around his person, and their office being supplied by his own Spanish troops, he may acquire confidence in his own soldiers and dispense with the further attendance of the Armies of France. If strong enough to stand alone, the influence of France will decay, and he will naturally fall into the hands of those who flatter him with the hope of indulging his propensities to Tyranny and Power, and he will discard those whom he will consider as having hitherto obstructed him in his restoration to the ancient grandeur and splendor of his crown, and to the wealth and magnificence of his Ultramarine Possessions.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIV.

*Francisco Hilario de Rivas y Salmon, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of Spain at Washington, to Daniel Brent, Acting Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

PHILADELPHIA, *September 29, 1824.*

SIR: I have had the honor of receiving your note,² in absence of Mr. Adams, in answer to mine of the 16th of August last, relative to the illegal armaments which have been made in this port on account of the separated Governments of Spanish America.

I shall, as soon as possible, transmit its contents to my Government, but I cannot say that it will be so satisfactory as you flatter yourself, as, at the very time that you were writing that note, three of the *twelve gun-boats* which I said were building on account of the Colombian Government were dropping down the river, and two more have sailed since, all despatched in the name of a Mr. H. Somers, scarcely known in this place. It is true, as I have been informed, the custom-house did not permit them to take on board the armament which they had prepared close by the very arsenal of the United States; but this is of little moment, because they can easily send this armament in another vessel as ballast. They run no risk in doing this, as they have done it before on many occasions. I do not understand, however, that the custom-house has used more rigor with these Colombian vessels than with those despatched by Mr. Meade to Mexico, because, if by chance there was any difference in the force or armament between these vessels and the former, they were stronger than those just sailed; and if the custom-house do not consider cannon of *very large calibre, and upon pivots*, as an armament, but as mere *signal* guns, as it appears the guns which these vessels ought to carry will be signal guns, as those were which the others carried, and, in this case, it will be cruelty to prevent those that sail now from carrying them as well as the others, *mounted on deck*, that they may be ready in case of need. But you will be pleased to observe that if said artillery were embarked for the sole purpose of *signals*, there could be no necessity for each boat carrying *two* pieces, nor for their being of so large a calibre as from 24 to 32-pounders, much less for any of them being on pivots, because for making signals it is not necessary to take aim, which is the only intention of a pivot gun. It is to be observed that the Fiscal (or Attorney General) of the United States for this district was unable to obtain the legal proofs which he sought from the different persons employed by the custom-house, whose information it was easy to anticipate, because it is to be supposed that if they had considered said armaments as illegal they would not have been wanting to their duty in permitting them to sail with them. Upon the whole, it appears by

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 405.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 133, Brent to Rivas y Salmon, September 22, 1824.

their correspondence with the said Fiscal that they were not entirely ignorant by whom and for whom these gun-boats were building. Neither are they fit for trade, nor can it be presumed that either Mr. Meade or Mr. Barry, who have retired from business, would make use of them. This alone, in my opinion, ought to have infused a suspicion founded on the real object which they had, and was a just cause for detaining them to investigate the case with certainty. The *ten gun-boats* which Mr. Meade despatched in this port are not the only vessels which he has got built in the United States on account of the Government of Mexico. According to information which I have, very worthy of credit, he has caused some more to be built in Baltimore, although there his name has not been mentioned. One of them, now called the *Yguala*, detains vessels of the United States themselves which go to the ports of Mexico, as I have lately seen in the newspapers. Another, called *Anahuæ*, a most beautiful schooner of 238 tons, came here before going to Mexico, carrying the armament in the hold, which consisted of twelve cannons, 18-pounders, with their carriages, besides other arms and oars, &c. She was despatched from hence with some cargo by Mr. R. Adams under the command of one Whigman, and at present is in New York, now with the Mexican flag. Her present captain, *Cochrane*, is a native of that port, where likewise his family resides.

The Colombian privateer, the *General Santander*, of which I made mention in the note which you answer, a little after came into Norfolk with a crew of 250 men, who only speak English, and although he who at present commands her is not now *Chase*, but one *NORTHRUP*, likewise a citizen of the United States, a native of Connecticut. In that port he recruited men and augmented his force with *four officers* and the crew of another Colombian privateer that was in Baltimore and belongs to Daniels, of whom I also spoke at that time. Being thus supplied, he sailed to cruise off New York, where there is a Spanish vessel which cannot sail without great risk of falling into his power. Thus it may be said that Spanish vessels seem blockaded in the ports of the United States themselves through the agency of their citizens. The consul of Spain gave information of this to the competent authorities that they might put a stop to it, but all excused themselves, saying they could not do it; that the laws upon this point were not sufficiently positive and clear. The same thing was told to the acting vice consul of Spain in Charleston on another occasion by the *marshal* of the United States in that district, (whose original letter I have in my possession,) and *Mr. Ingersoll* gives the same understanding in his correspondence which you now inclose to me. But, as I have already said before, his Catholic Majesty has nothing to do with the peculiar laws of this country. They, such as they are, are the exclusive work of the United States, and Spain, in this point only, ought to attend to the treaties.

But how do the United States fulfil these treaties with Spain? If his

Majesty's representative have recourse to the Federal Government, to prevent the armaments which the citizens of the United States fit out, to commit hostilities upon the Spanish commerce under insurgent banners, he is told that there are *laws* which have respect to the treaties, and *tribunals* which put them in force, and that it is necessary to apply to them. When, in virtue of this, his Majesty's consuls apply to those *tribunals*, requesting the punishment of such citizens as have applied for and accepted commissions from Governments enemies of his Catholic Majesty, they declare that they have no jurisdiction for it. When they request of the custom-houses (or other authorities) the detention of vessels built, armed, and manned in this country on account of those Governments, or of individuals who attempt hostilities against Spain, they answer that the *laws* are not sufficiently clear, and that they have not sufficient authority. If said vessels carry the armament in the hold, it is called *ballast*. If the artillery is mounted on deck, it is to make signals *only*. The consequence is, that these vessels and armaments and citizens of the United States sail publicly, and without any risk, and that they continue making innumerable prizes, and cause immense losses to the Spanish nation.

Permit me, sir, to make another important observation. A learned man so eminent as *Mr. Ingersoll*, charged with the execution of the laws of the United States, ought not to be ignorant of them; and when he says that he does not know in the present case another law applicable to it but the act of Congress of the 20th of April, 1818, it is to be believed that there is no other. But if, in effect, there be no more law than this for preventing the armaments which are made here, and punishing the citizens of the United States, who, with commissions of foreign States or Governments, make war on his Catholic Majesty, the irresistible consequence is, that the laws of the United States contradict one another. Because here we have one law, which is the present act, which prescribes to the courts an *arbitrary* punishment, to the decision of the judges, of only *fine and imprisonment* to the citizens, for instance, who accept and make use of commissions of any State or Government at war with a power at peace with the United States; whilst there is another, sanctioned at the same time also by Congress, which are the treaties with Spain, which point out a *determinate* punishment against those delinquents, and it is that of *death*, because they are called *pirates*. To which of these two laws, differing upon the same case, ought the tribunals to have recourse? They cannot depart from the letter of the law, nor impose *the punishment of death*, if they hold to the former, which prescribes only *fine and imprisonment*. I will not conceal from you, sir, that if, in the United States, there is no other law than the act cited by *Mr. Ingersoll* respecting illegal armaments, I have few hopes that the Federal Government can, with it alone, duly fulfil the existing treaties with Spain, although it should recommend the greatest vigilance to the local authorities. Besides, such an act appears to me little

serviceable and insufficient for the effect. The officers of the custom-house *may*, in virtue of this act, detain a vessel which they know or suspect to carry an illegal armament; but what responsibility have they if they do not? I see none. What obligation have they to inquire into these armaments? None. They are not ordered to take this trouble. Who will come to inform them of what is passing? No citizen of the United States has an interest in doing it; rather the contrary. What then, signifies this act, which appears so completely to defeat the intention of *the 14th article* of the treaty of 1795, with Spain? Can it be said that Congress, at the passing of said act, did not bear the treaties in mind? or will it be said (and may be even much worse) that it knew it, but that still it addressed the tribunals in other words, the following for example:

The treaties which we have with Spain call such of our citizens *pirates* as, with foreign commissions, make war upon her; and consequently, they incur thereupon the *penalty of death*. But we declare by this that you ought not to fulfil this part of the treaty. The *Government* of the United States, who concurred with Spain in imposing upon them a punishment so severe, atrocious, and disproportioned to the offence, was wanting to its duty and to the confidence of the nation which it governs. The *Senate*, which approved the treaty at that time, was not worthy of us, who, as being more illustrious, establish other laws more rational and humane. His Catholic Majesty will be very well satisfied with imposing upon these delinquents *a fine and imprisonment*, at your pleasure. *To diminish* the punishment is not *to change the treaty*.

The consequences of such a doctrine would be fatal. What would succeed if other nations should follow this example? England has just made a convention with the United States, as appears, relative to the abolition of *the slave trade*. If any of the two contracting parties should *afterwards* alter the punishment of those who are declared *pirates*, would not this be to change the essence of their stipulations, and in fact to annul such convention? It would be utterly to destroy the treaties which bind nations, if it were permitted to alter them in this manner by the particular legislation of each. Thus, then, it is not possible to expect this immoral and Machiavelian language from any Government of the civilized world; and it would be doing the greatest injury to the respectable and august Congress of the United States to believe that it would on any occasion alter intentionally the literal sense of the treaties, in the religious fulfilment of which its own honor is concerned. Whatever may be the defect which may be observed in the act of the 20th of April, (and what human law has not defects?) I am well persuaded that the intention was not *to alter*, as appears at first view, but, on the contrary, *to enforce* the fulfilment of the stipulations of the treaty referred to with Spain, although experience has proved that that noble object has not been realized, as we see by the infractions which still continue to be

committed in spite of it; and that the officers of the United States themselves do not hit upon the proper means of fulfilling it, and interpret it in different ways to the incalculable loss of Spain.

I have just received a letter from Charleston, an extract of which I have the honor to inclose,¹ which will give you some idea how considerable these losses and damages must be. You will be pleased to remark that that port was one of those which the privateers of which I complain frequented less till now; but the evil is spreading and augments in an extraordinary degree every day, doubtless because they see how little they have to fear in this country the consequences of their shameful intrigues. The privateer named the *Padilla*, of which it speaks, was last in the same port of Charleston, commanded apparently by a Frenchman called *Daverac*, but the true captain was (and when she sailed commanded her) one *Bradford*, a native of the United States, (as well as, also, were a great part of the crew which she carried,) and, having there surreptitiously augmented their number, returned to cruise against the Spaniards. Only since I sent my last note to *Mr. Adams*, two more Spanish prizes have entered, which I know, into the ports of this Union. One is the brig *Cazador*, of which the inclosed letter speaks, and another is the schooner *Tereza*, which has gone into Savannah to the care of one *Bureil*, a prize of the same privateer, the *Polly Hampton*. Such privateers, availing themselves of various pretexts and subterfuges, easily dispose of their robberies here. This is public and notorious, and there is no cause to conceal it if they see that it can be done with impunity. And, in truth, how can they cease to see this, if even the newspapers of the same United States publish and celebrate the part which they take against Spain in the war with the revolted Governments of her America, not as if it were some

¹ The enclosed extract, reprinted from *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 407, follows:

CHARLESTON, *September 19, 1824.*

One vessel had been fitted out of this port to cruise against the property of Spaniards; she was a sloop called *Amelia*. Said vessel was captured by the Spanish.

Several vessels arrived in this port under the insurgent flag have augmented their force in arms and men. This may be ascertained by some persons who shipped them; one, however, who was very instrumental in this business, died a few days ago of the yellow fever.

There have and continue to arrive prizes taken by vessels under the insurgent flags, who come in and pretend distress, and get liberty to sell a sufficient quantity to defray expenses, or repairs, &c., under which permission they generally sell the greater part of their plunder. This is the general impression.

Yesterday arrived the Spanish brig *Cazador*, *Williams*, with sugar, leather, corn, &c., prize to the Colombian armed schooner *Polly Hampton*, *Captain Natty*, captured four weeks since off Havana, in distress, leaky, bound to Cumana, Spanish Main, having sprung a leak on the 14th instant. This is a very likely story.

Ought to be taken into consideration Mr. Ortega's application to the district judge for process to have the property taken by the *Padilla* restored, she having made captures contrary to the law of nations, which he refused hearing.

One of the prizes of the *Centella* being run ashore at Key West, with an understanding of a certain *Captain Appleby*, part of the cargo was sent here to Mr. Street & Co., say, value about \$15,000 sugar, cigars, cochineal, indigo, &c.; the remainder was sold by the Captain of the schooner at public auction; with which circumstances I believe you are acquainted.

private and obscure citizen of the United States, but even men of the greatest distinction for their talents and ranks in society and *officers* of the very *Government*. The inclosed newspaper, which came to my hands a little after having sent my last note to *Mr. Adams*, is an undeniable proof of this. By it you will see, sir, that a *Consul General* of the United States, putting himself at the head of a body of insurgents in South America, has been probably the cause of his Catholic Majesty losing one of his best kingdoms.

I have been more diffuse in my thoughts, with the view of letting you know how little good has been produced by the means hitherto taken by the Federal Government to prevent the armaments of which I complain, and you supposed there was no reason to fear in future, whilst they were still continuing to carry them on. I will conclude by requesting that you will be pleased to inform the President of it, in order that if he sees fit he may adopt other means more efficacious and satisfactory to his Catholic Majesty. I should be very happy if on this occasion I could assure his Majesty that the correct intentions of the President would in future be realized, and that he had no reason to fear the sailing of more armaments from the ports of the United States against the Spanish trade.

In the meantime I have much satisfaction in the honor of offering to you [etc.].

1130

*Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *October 17, 1824.*

I have learned since I communicated the intelligence of the naval armament preparing at Ferol that a camp of soldiers is established in the neighbourhood or [of?] Ferol or Vigo composed of 2500 men which are said to be destined to the Havana. They may be intended either for Cuba or for Lima. The Fleet is believed to be destined for the latter place. They are sanguine in their hopes of success in Peru—and the accounts published here from time to time, which are alledged to be genuine seem to justify these expectations. They even talk of invading the Republic of Colombia by the forces which are said to have achieved the conquest of Peru. These 2500 men may probably be intended to reinforce the army of Cantarac.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIV.

*Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain, to John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, *November 22, 1824.*

SIR: Mr. Appleton will leave Madrid tomorrow bearing with him the Despatch containing the late communications from the Spanish Government. I announced to you in my Despatch No. 46. that he would set out soon to visit the United States: and I communicated to the Secretary of State of H. C. M. this determination with the view of hastening their answers to our applications which had been so long, and so repeatedly promised. A copy of these despatches will be sent tonight thro' Liverpool with a view of hastening their arrival in the United States, as I presume Congress will be anxious to know the state of our Relations with Spain as soon as possible after their meeting. I will also send a triplicate thro' Gibraltar endeavouring to make their reception doubly sure.

It is obvious that of late this Government has turned a more attentive ear to our demands. Their conduct wears the appearance of a more conciliatory character. Their feelings to us, and to our Political Institutions have not experienced any change, but their interests on our side of the Atlantic, and our ability to operate most effectually against them, should we assume a hostile attitude weigh'd with considerable force upon their councils. The circumstance of equipping a fleet in which a twenty-four gun ship is included, which has been repeatedly announced in the Gazettes of the United States, without doubt is felt here, and the measure of reprisals, as indicated in the report of the committee of Foreign Relations in the House of Representatives, which I have endeavour'd in all ways to hold up to their view cannot have failed to make a deep impression on them. The King of Spain still flatters himself with the hope of reconquering his South American Colonies—or a portion of them. All the reports which they receive from their agents there as well as the accounts brought by individuals coming thence to this country are calculated to deceive—and he flatters himself that his faithful subjects in that region are only restrained from the strongest manifestations of loyalty by a desperate band of infuriated insurgents. He will not listen to a suggestion of surrendering any portion of that country. He believes the people of every part of it actuated by the same spirit of loyalty, and that a successful expedition against one of the States will be followed by a surrender of the whole. As yet no loan is effected. It is known to you that the *Asia* and *Achilles* a 74 and a Brig are in the South Pacific. I now send you a list of the new expedition fitting out at Ferrol and Coruna. Ships at Ferrol: *Casilda* of 40 Guns; *Arethusa* 30; *Diamante* 26. Transports: *Sul-*

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIV.

tana; Concepcion; Socorro; and one at Coruna *Los cinco Amigos*. Two Frigates are on the stocks at Ferrol which will be ready to launch in the next month. The *Casilda* and *Arethusa* brought stores from Cadiz for them; but they have no cables. The force to be embarked is as follows "The Union" at Coruna consists of from 4 to 500 men, which is to be augmented by conscripts to 1000; another Regiment "The Espana" at Ferrol which is to be made up 1000 strong, but at present is weaker than the former. The embarkation is to take place immediately. I have received this information from a source which I think is worthy of reliance. It is from one of the Diplomatic Corps, whose means of obtaining intelligence are good. . . .

The eyes of the European Nations are turned towards the U. S. peculiarly in reference to the Affairs between Spain and her ancient Colonies. The President's Message at the opening of the late session—the fitting out more ships including one of the line, attract their close attention. Their effects in Spain are manifested in their late extraordinary regard so continually professed for the United States. It will be the part of sound policy to view the whole course of this Government as founded in treachery. Their armaments just on the point of departure for South America present vulnerable points in addition to their scattering commerce on the Ocean. They may be apprehensive that an open avowal of their real feelings and intentions might provoke a blow which at this time would prove fatal to their hopes about their Colonies.

The new Minister to the U. S. Mr. Heredia called today on Mr. Appleton and conversed with him in reference to his mission and the time of his departure. He will leave Madrid ere long for France where he will remain during the winter and thinks he will not sail until about the first of April. This delay is ominous and but little comports with the promise of his speedy departure given in the Secretary's Note. Mr. Heredia alledges as the apology of this delay the unpleasantness and inconvenience to his family of a winter passage. From this it is obvious he will not visit the United States until after the adjournment of Congress.

I have the honor [etc.].

1132

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

PARIS, August 12, 1825.

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that the arrangements, which I have been making here for my residence in Spain, are nearly completed; and that

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

I shall leave this place on my way to Madrid on Monday the 15th. I expect to arrive there about the 1st of September. I should willingly have staid to see Mr. Brown, who will probably return about the 20th, but I did not think it consistent with the intentions of the President or the objects of my mission, to make a longer delay than was absolutely necessary. It is a matter of regret with me that Mr. Brown's absence has put it out of my power to obtain a copy of the instruction to Mr. Middleton¹ on the subject of the intervention of the Allied Powers in the affairs of Spain and South America. I have applied to Mr. King upon the subject: and if I should not obtain a communication of this document from him I shall take the liberty of requesting it directly from the Department. . . .

Mr. Zea's party still maintains the ascendancy in the Spanish Ministry: but the struggle seems to be very active, and there is some reason to apprehend a violent and dangerous crisis. The Minister is however supported by the French Government: and must therefore in the end prevail; supposing what is perhaps not certain—that France herself is prepared to act on this subject with consistency and decision. Should the moderate party hold its ground, and acquire a permanent and solid footing in the Cabinet, one of the consequences would probably be a pretty early recognition by Spain of the independence of the Colonies. The French Government have made up their minds on this subject, and are preparing the way for their own recognition, not only by the informal missions which they have been sending for two or three years past to different parts of America, but more recently by the admission of Colombian vessels into their ports, and by their proceedings in regard to Haiti, which are intended to have an ultimate bearing upon the other and far more important subject. As they are anxious, if possible, not to take any formal step in anticipation of Spain, they will use all their influence with the King in favour of a speedy acknowledgment. Meantime the South American privateers, having now the asylum of the port of Gibraltar, are swarming round the coasts of the mother country and carrying the war home to her very doors. Add to this the late surrender of the two ships of war to the Mexicans; and it seems hardly conceivable that the Government, if it is not struck with judicial blindness or absolute insanity, can hold out much longer. I shall of course lend my feeble aid, after my arrival at Madrid, in endeavouring to bring about a result so advantageous to the United States and to all other nations not excepting Spain.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the *Moniteur* of today, which contains the King's ordonance, alluded to above, recognising the independence of Haiti. A telegraphic despatch was published in the papers of yesterday, informing that this *ordonance* had been "accepted by the *inhabitants of St. Domingo* with respect and gratitude." The details are not yet known. The substance of the act would of course be very agreeable to the

¹ See above, pt. 1, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

people of Haiti, although the form of it is not very gracious, nor the principal condition very honourable to the magnanimity of the French Govt. It is one of the singularities of the present system of administration in this Kingdom, that a measure of this importance and character, involving in form a considerable alienation of territory, should have been concluded on and carried into effect without consultation with the two houses.

1133

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, *September 8, 1825.*

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that I left Paris on the 15th ult. agreeably to the intention expressed in my last despatch, and arrived herein the afternoon of the 28th. The journey was more pleasant and less fatiguing than I had expected. The travelling accommodations in this country, at least in the parts of it through which I passed, are much better than they are commonly represented to be. The roads are excellent, the post perfectly well served, and the inns very little inferior to those of France. Robberies occur from time to time; and it happened that the diligence was attacked between Bayonne and Vittoria a day or two only before I left the former place. I had however determined to proceed without escort and met with no molestation whatever. I found guards posted in the mountains at Bergara and Loyosuela, which are considered the two most dangerous points.

I received before I left Paris, an answer from Mr. Zea Bermudez to the letter which I had addressed to him requesting an order for an escort, if I should find one to be necessary, and a permit for the entry of my effects. I wrote to him from Bayonne informing him of my arrival there and again from Madrid the morning after I reached that city. The next day I received his answer enclosing a passport for St. Ildefonso, where the Court is now residing, and inviting me to come on whenever I should find it agreeable. . . .

I FOUND MR. ZEA A PERSON OF PREPOSSESSING MANNERS AND APPARENTLY CAPABLE AND WELL INFORMED. HE WEARS AN EXTERIOR OF MUCH FRANKNESS BUT I AM INCLINED TO DOUBT WHETHER THIS QUALITY FORMS THE BASIS OF HIS CHARACTER. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE PREMATURE TO MAKE UP A DEFINITE OPINION OF HIM AFTER ONLY TWO OR THREE INTERVIEWS. THE

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV. The portions of this document printed in small capital letters were received in cipher.

RESULT OF THE LATE AFFAIR OF BESSIERS MUST, IT WOULD SEEM, VERY MUCH STRENGTHEN HIS INFLUENCE IN THE CABINET, AND YET THE CURRENT REPORT OF THE DAY IN THE DIPLOMATIC CIRCLE IS THAT HE HAS LOST GROUND EVER SINCE THE DEFEAT OF THE CONSPIRACY, AND THAT COLOMARDE THE RIVAL MINISTER IS GAINING THE ASCENDANT. THIS RUMOUR, I AM PERSUADED, IS WHOLLY GRATUITOUS.

I conversed very freely with Mr. Zea upon most of the interesting points in the relation between Spain and the United States. He was full of expressions of good will and conciliation; and appeared well pleased to find that I was possessed of powers to settle the questions in dispute. . . . I RESERVE FOR A FUTURE OPPORTUNITY A MORE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION I HAD WITH THE MINISTER UPON SEVERAL TOPICS OF GENERAL INTEREST PARTICULARLY THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN STATES. THE IMPRESSION WHICH I RECEIVED FROM HIS REMARKS UPON THIS SUBJECT WAS THAT HE DID NOT THINK IT SAFE (IN HIS OWN INTEREST) TO SUGGEST SUCH A MEASURE TO THE KING OR EVEN TO ALLOW IT TO BE SUPPOSED THAT HE HAD THE MOST DISTANT INCLINATION TO DO SO. SHOULD THE RIVAL PARTY PREVAIL THE PROBABILITY OF ITS ADOPTION IS OF COURSE STILL SMALLER.

1134

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, September 25, 1825.

The Minister came to town yesterday, and I had an opportunity of conversing with him for a short time at his office. I touched again upon the affair of the Consul at the Havana for the purpose of suggesting to him more particularly than I had done before that we had a strict right by the treaty to claim this concession. He did not appear to know exactly how to meet this argument, but answered in the first instance, in rather a vague way, that circumstances had changed very much since the conclusion of the treaty, that the admission of Consuls in the Colonial ports was not then contemplated, and that we had not recognized then, the independence of the New States.

He said that if matters could be restored precisely to the situation in which they stood in 1795, he had no doubt that the article would be liberally binding. I asked him whether he considered our recognition of the independence of the New States as having annulled the treaty. He replied at once, and

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

without hesitation that he did not, thereby yielding perhaps the only plausible ground he could have taken in support of his point. I then told him that if he allowed the treaty to be still in force, this article was unquestioned [*sic*] as completely binding as any other and gave us an undoubted right to claim the admission of our Consuls at every port where any other Consul was admitted whether in the Colonies or elsewhere. He found no answer to this remark, and said that he must examine the subject. I shall send him in a few days a note upon it, which is nearly ready and of which I shall probably transmit a copy with my next dispatches.

[The following, which was enclosed in this dispatch, appears to be a detailed report of the conference of the preceding day:]

NOTES OF A CONVERSATION OF MR. EVERETT WITH MR. ZEA

[EXTRACTS]

Our relations with the Island of Cuba, having been particularly alluded to by the Minister, I thought it a proper occasion to express to him my regret that the King had not acceded to the proposition made by Mr. Nelson for the formal recognition of our commercial agents at that Island and at Porto Rico, in the character of Consuls. He repeated to me in answer the same remarks in substance as are contained in his last note addressed to Mr. Nelson. He said that altho' Spain was willing as far as possible to overlook and keep out of sight, in all her relations with us, the unpleasant circumstances of our recognition of the independence of the Colonies, yet that she did not think it politic to admit into any of the American possessions an authorized public agent of a power which openly avowed the policy of encouraging the separation of these possessions from the mother country; that our Ministers and Consuls on the Continent were constantly holding a language favourable to the insurgents; that our consuls in the Islands would no doubt do the same, and that if they were formally recognized, there would be no means of preventing them; but that at present the authorities would have the right, if the consuls conducted themselves imprudently to proceed against them in the usual forms of law. He added that the admission of French Consuls was a favour granted to a power which had rendered them essential services, and that it could not be surprising to us, if they were disposed to do something more for a nation thus situated, than for one that stood only on the common footing of other friendly nations; that the refusal was not a measure directed invidiously against us in particular, but that it was extended in like manner to all other powers except France, and in particular to England. I told him that we had no intention to ask favours of His Majesty's or any other Government, and that we did not consider the free admission of our Consuls at all in that light; that we viewed it as a thing equally advantageous to both parties, since any measure tending to place our Commerce with these islands on a better footing, was at least of equal, not to say much greater importance to them, than to us, inasmuch as this commerce formed only a fifteenth or twentieth part of our whole trade, while it amounted to nearly three fourths of theirs; that we stood on this account in a different situation from any other

power, not excepting England, whose trade with the islands, was much less considerable than ours. I added that we nevertheless did not consider the matter as being of any very great consequence, and were not disposed to magnify it into more importance than it really possessed.

He then said, as he had done in his note to Mr. Nelson, that the King would perhaps be disposed to concede this point, if the United States would furnish any pledges or guarantees by way of security, respecting their future relations with the islands. I replied that I did not distinctly understand the nature of the pledges he appeared to contemplate; that the American Government had given to the world the example of a uniform observation of the rules of justice, good faith and humanity in all their past policy, which were perhaps the best assurances that could be had of the correctness of their future proceedings; and that I should be glad to learn what sort of pledges the King desired. He said that perhaps we might be willing to guarantee to them by treaty the possession of the islands. I replied that engagements of this kind were inconsistent with the standing rules of our foreign policy which was no other, according to the just and forcible expression of one of our Presidents, than: "peace and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none"; that independently of this objection, the value of the object was inadequate to the price demanded for it; that such a guarantee might place us at any moment under the necessity of going to war, and that the people of the United States would not consent to fight upon the question whether their representative at the Havanna should be called a commercial agent or a Consul.

He then said that perhaps a law like the one he had suggested before, requiring bonds to be given by all shipowners that their ships were not intended to act against friendly powers, would be looked upon as a sufficient consideration. In answer to this I repeated in part the objections which I had stated before to this proposition and told him that I should probably send him a written answer to the last note which he had addressed to Mr. Nelson on this subject.

In the course of this conversation upon matters touching so nearly the independence of the colonies, there were of course frequent opportunities of alluding to that question, and the Minister seemed to feel no delicacy or reserve in expressing his sentiments upon it. He remarked repeatedly that the King would never abandon his claim to these his ancient & rightful possessions; that the cause was a good one and that however unfavourable their prospect might appear at present, they had a right to suppose that they should in the end succeed; that we had seen of late, revolutions in political affairs at least as violent as this would be, for example the overthrow of Bonaparte, and the restoration of Louis the 18th. to the throne of his ancestors; that the party in the Colonies in favour of independence, though dominant and apparently unresisted, was not in reality so strong as was generally supposed; that it consisted of a busy and active, but in reality feeble minority; that the mass of the good citizens, constituting a great majority of the population, were in favour of the King, and were only waiting for some suitable occasion to come out in their strength and put down the insurgents, and finally that the cause being a just one, they had a right to suppose that

they should be assisted sooner or later by an interference of Providence. [Here follow six lines in cipher, without decodification.]

I said to him however, that I regretted to hear from him so decisive a declaration of the King's resolution not to acknowledge the new states; that my Government had hoped that the battle of Ayacucho, and the recognition of England would have been considered by H. M. as settling the question, and that he would have been induced to put an end to the violent state of things now existing, which was more or less injurious to all Christian nations, that enlightened men of all classes, parties, and opinions, in most of the civilized countries of Europe, and in the United States, were now satisfied that Spain could never recover her authority over the colonies. As a single instance I mentioned to him the opinion of the Bishop of Hermopolis, Minister of church affairs in France, and well known throughout Europe as one of the ablest and most decided adherents of the anti-liberal sect; whom I had seen at Paris on my way and who had told me expressly that they regarded the affair of South America as settled. To this he made answer that the Bishop had also in the time of Bonaparte despaired of the possibility of the King's restoration, and that he might be as much in the wrong now as he was then. I remarked that there were evident symptoms in the proceedings of the French Government of an intention to recognize the new States at no very distant period.—He said that France had hitherto stood by them faithfully in all their troubles; that he could not say how long she would be true to them, but should she even desert them, the King would still adhere firmly to his principles; that the standing and invariable rule of conduct observed by H. M. upon all occasions, was that of strict justice; that he made no concessions to expediency, acknowledged no distinction between politics and morals, and was prepared to sacrifice every thing rather than surrender what he knew to be his right. He then recurred to his favourite example of Louis 18th, said that they were by no means reduced to so low a point as he had been; that he too had often been solicited to abandon his claims to the French throne, but that by firmly rejecting all such propositions and tenaciously adhering to his purpose he had finally succeeded in recovering every thing. It struck me that the example of Bonaparte, who had lost all by obstinately refusing to make a timely surrender of a part, would have been rather more to the point; but I did not think it worth while to press this subject at present. I told him that I was not called upon to advise His Majesty's Ministers upon this or any other question, and that what I had said had been thrown out incidentally in reply to his remarks.

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Francisco de Zea Bermudez, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, *October 10, 1825.*

SIR: The President, having been informed that H. M. had thought proper to admit a French Consul at the port of the Havana, presumed that the same measure would be adopted as a matter of course in reference to the United States. . . .

The demand for the admission of the Consul of the United States at the Havana, being now founded in strict right, it is perhaps superfluous to urge in support of it the various considerations of expediency and mutual advantage by which it is strengthened; nor is it absolutely necessary to attempt to remove objections which may have had weight with H. M's. Govt. only because they were under the impression that they were quite at liberty to pursue any course in regard to this question which might appear expedient. Nevertheless as the difficulty suggested by Y. E. relates to a matter upon which the Govt. of the United States are anxious that their views and proceedings should be perfectly understood by H. M. I shall avail myself of this opportunity to add some farther explanations respecting it, which with those already given by Mr. Nelson, will prove I trust completely satisfactory. I shall afterwards subjoin a few remarks tending to show the peculiar propriety of admitting the Consul of the United States at the Havana, independently of the strict obligation to do it, resulting from the letter of the treaty.

The reason given by Y. E. for the determination of H. M. to defer the consideration of this subject, is the uneasiness which you say is felt by the inhabitants of Cuba in regard to the intentions and proceedings of the Govt. of the United States. As no other motive is alluded to, it must be presumed that this is the only one. On this head the fullest assurances of the pacific and friendly disposition of the U. S. have already been given both verbally and in writing by my predecessor. It was observed by Mr. Nelson in his note of June 23d to which Y. E.'s note of July 12 was an answer that he was authorised to "disclaim on the part of his Govt. all projects of aggrandisement in that quarter, and all connivance at or countenance of internal disension or of expedition or equipment having in view either the disturbance of the external repose of the island (of Cuba) or the dismemberment of the Spanish empire." Such is the language of his note, and Y. E. states in your reply that H. M. is highly gratified with this assurance. It is not easy therefore to see why the Spanish Govt. should entertain any farther apprehensions on the subject, or what pledges of neutrality could be expected or given

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

more solemn than the word of a nation which has never been false to its engagements. If however a renewal of this assurance will afford any additional satisfaction to H. M's. Govt., I have the honor to inform Y. E. that I am also authorized to disclaim in a formal manner in the name of the Govt. of the U. S. any hostile disposition or intention in regard to these islands. The U. S. are satisfied with their present condition, in the hands of Spain, and with their ports open to our trade. They have no wish to see this condition changed and have uniformly declined giving countenance to any project tending that way. Such is the policy of my Govt. in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico, and it will continue the same as long as the situation of these islands remains unaltered.

After mentioning that the King had received with pleasure the assurance to the same effect which was given by Mr. Nelson, Y. E. adds that H. M. is also persuaded that the U. S. in the observance of a strict neutrality will adopt all suitable measures to prevent the fitting out from their ports of armaments intended to act against the commerce of Spain in the neighboring waters, to attack the islands belonging to H. M. and to aid in bringing about the dismemberment of the Spanish Empire. Measures of this kind, you say are the more necessary, inasmuch as the Govt. of the U. S. cannot be ignorant, that in many instances, ships of war and privateers have been and still are built, armed, and fitted out in their ports at the expense and under the authority and flag of the Governments of Mexico, Colombia and Buenos Ayres, for the purpose of being employed in the war, which these states are carrying on against H. C. M.—Y. E. will learn I think with satisfaction, that the information which has been conveyed to you upon this subject, is a complete misrepresentation of the real state of facts. The Govt. of the U. S. have no knowledge of the existence of a single case in which a ship of any size has been armed and fitted out from a port within their jurisdiction for the purpose of making war against H. C. M. And as such an armament could not well have taken place without their knowledge, I feel no hesitation in giving you the most positive assurances that nothing of the kind has ever occurred. The intelligence which has been transmitted to Y. E. is probably an erroneous statement of the fact that the Agents of the Govt. alluded to, have occasionally purchased within the jurisdiction of the U. S. Ships and perhaps other articles, which from their nature may be employed for hostile purposes.

Y. E. is of course well aware that a traffic of this kind is perfectly free by the law and usage of nations, and that the neutral character imposes no restriction upon it. "If a nation" says Vattel (Lib. 3, Cap. 9, §110) "trades in arms, timber for shipbuilding, vessels and warlike stores, I cannot take it amiss that she sells such things to my enemy, provided that she does not refuse to sell them to me also at a reasonable rate."—I need not add that the ports of our territories are as free for this purpose to the agents of H. C.

M. as to those of the new Amn. Govt.—This lawful commerce, at which H. M. can certainly take no exception, forms, I am persuaded, the only real foundation for the reports that have been made to Y. E. of equipments and armaments, within our jurisdiction. It is barely possible nevertheless that cases of this kind may have occurred without coming to the knowledge of the Govt. If Y. E. possesses any information to that effect, you would oblige me very much by communicating it to me immediately, and you may be assured that the most prompt and decisive steps will be taken to bring the offending parties to justice, and to maintain the neutrality of the territory of the United States.

I cannot but flatter myself, that the full explanation, which I have now given upon this subject, in addition to the assurances already furnished by my predecessors, will completely satisfy H. M.'s Govt. that the U. S. have no hostile intentions or feelings whatever in regard to the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and will thus remove the only objection suggested by Y. E. to the admission of our Consul at the port of the Havana. . . .

I pray Y. E. to submit these remarks to the consideration of H. M. and have the honor [etc.].

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *October 16, 1825.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a note which I have lately addressed to the Minister upon the subject of the admission of our Consul at the Havana. I have directed his attention particularly to the strict right we now possess by treaty to demand this admission; and I also thought it expedient to dwell at some length upon the considerations of policy and mutual advantage which combine to make it proper. Our political relations with the island of Cuba have perhaps in reality little or nothing to do with this question, but as they were connected with it by the Minister in his conversations and correspondence with Mr. Nelson, I felt myself in some measure obliged to give upon this occasion such further explanations respecting them as my instructions authorized. The purchase of Ships in our ports by the Agents of the South American States is the real point of difficulty. On that subject I had no particular instructions from you. I have assumed in treating it, such principles as I think correct; and I hope that they will be approved by the President.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, October 20, 1825.

SIR: It was reported here very confidently a few days ago that the new consultative Junta or Council of Govt. was occupied in preparing the way for an arrangement with the South American States. Upon tracing this rumor to its origin, I found that it arose from the fact that the Council had deputed some of its members to confer with two Spanish officers, who lately arrived from South America by way of the Havana and New York, and are the same that were sent out by the Constitutional Govt. to Buenos Ayres as Commissioners. They landed at Bordeaux from New York and came on immediately to this place; remained here about three weeks, during which time they had occasional conferences with members of the Council, and afterwards proceeded to Cadiz. These facts being known, and it being also understood that the Council had been requested by the Minister to give their opinion upon the measures proper to be taken in regard to the colonies, it was natural enough to draw the conclusion that the conferences in question had some connexion with this subject, and that the persons with whom they were held, might perhaps have gone to Cadiz on their way to America as private agents of the Govt. Another and a more probable construction of the fact would be, that the Council had no other object in conferring with these gentlemen, than to obtain information respecting the state of the colonies.

About the time when this report was in circulation I went to the Escorial in order to be present at the celebration of the King's birthday, and when there, had of course frequent opportunities of seeing the Minister. In one of the conversations which I had with him I enquired of him what foundation there was for this rumour and whether there was any change of policy contemplated in regard to the American States: To this question he replied most decidedly in the negative, and entered anew and very readily at great length into an exposition of the intentions of the Govt., repeating in substance the same remarks which he had made to me at San Ildefonso. He declared that the King would never abandon his rights; that it was a matter of conscience with him to transmit his hereditary possessions to his successor; that the royalist cause was not so desperate as we supposed; that there were even now symptoms of a return of these provinces to their ancient loyalty; and that such an event would not be at all strange, considering what violent and sudden revolutions have been constantly occurring during

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV. Printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 795.

the last 30 years. From all that he said upon the subject I was quite satisfied that the reports of an intended arrangement were entirely groundless, and that the detention and examination of the above mentioned officers were merely for the purpose of obtaining information as to the facts. The tone and manner of the Minister during this conversation were such as to induce me to doubt the correctness of the opinion which I had entertained and expressed to you as to his private sentiments upon this subject. He spoke with so much decision and apparent openness of the probability of reconquering the colonies that I felt myself bound to give him credit for sincerity at the expense of his sagacity and good sense. He enquired of me at this time, whether I had any knowledge of the communications that had lately been made by my Govt. upon that subject to the Emperor of Russia. I replied in the affirmative and he then said that he had received the day before for the first time, upon his return to the Escorial from Madrid, an intimation (probably from one of the Ministers abroad) that some overtures had been made in that quarter and requested me to give him such information respecting them as I might think it proper to communicate. I was not quite so fully prepared upon this subject myself as I could have wished, not having obtained any answer from Mr. King to the request which I made to him for a copy of the instructions to Mr. Middleton, probably because he has had no good private occasion to send it. I however told him that my Govt. made no secret of their policy in regard to this business & that I had no objection to inform him that our Minister at St. Petersburg had been directed to express to the Emperor their full conviction that the contest between Spain and the colonies must be considered as finally settled in favor of the latter party, their persuasion that the interest of Spain and the general good of the civilized world would be promoted by the early acquiescence of H. C. M. in this revolt, and their wish that the Emperor, should he also entertain these opinions, would unite with them in advising and requesting the Spanish Govt. to put an end to the war by an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies. I took this opportunity of informing the Minister more precisely than I had done before that what I had already suggested to him in favour of this measure must be considered as expressing the wishes and policy of my Govt. and not my own individual sentiments which I should not of course think of obtruding upon H. M's. Cabinet. I told him that I was formally instructed to avail myself of any suitable occasion to suggest to him with the delicacy required by the nature of the subject the earnest desire of the Govt. of the U. S. to see this long struggle brought to an amicable conclusion, and their complete conviction that all farther efforts on the part of Spain to recover the Colonies must be wholly fruitless and more injurious to herself than to them.

Mr. Zea seemed to be a good deal struck with these remarks, and I was inclined to suppose from his manner that he had considered what I had said

to him before upon the subject as a merely personal communication. He replied that these proceedings of the Govt. of the U. S. placed him under the necessity of declaring in the most positive manner the King's unalterable resolution never to abandon his rights and to reject all offers of mediation or of amicable intervention which should contemplate an acknowledgement of the independence of the new States. He said that they were and always had been ready and willing to accept any proposal for mediation, or to treat directly with the colonies, upon the basis of their previous submission to the King's sovereign power, but that they would never consent to negotiate in any way upon any other terms; that the King being once satisfied on this head, would doubtless be disposed to grant his subjects in America every favour and indulgence which they could possibly wish, but that they must begin by proving their loyalty and their confidence in H. M's. justice and good intentions. He wondered that among the offers of mediation that had been made from time to time, especially by England, none had ever been proposed upon this basis. I told him that the reason probably was that the British Govt. as well as that of the U. S., considered the independence of the new States as now firmly established and were well aware that they would never treat upon any other terms than an acknowledgement of it by Spain; I added however that I should be well pleased to know if he were disposed to inform me, what concessions the King would be willing to grant to the Americans in the event of their return to their allegiance, as for example whether he would allow them to make their own laws in legislative assemblies of their own choice. My object in asking this question was of course merely to obtain a more complete view of the intentions and dispositions of the Govt. upon the whole subject. He replied that as to legislative assemblies he was far from being satisfied that they would suit the condition of the colonies, and that in general he thought the only safe course for the Americans would be to trust entirely and implicitly to the King's known good character. I should have thought from this answer, that my question did not make a very favorable impression upon him. At the close however of the conversation he recurred to it in such a way as induced me to think that he would have been glad to consider it as an indirect overture from some of the colonies. He said after I arose to go, that the conversation had turned upon a number of delicate and interesting topics, that on such occasions it was not always possible to distinguish between remarks that were merely of a private and personal description and such as were official, and that in order to avoid mistakes upon that point, he should be glad if I would state in writing what my instructions required me to communicate to him as the opinions and intentions of the Govt. and especially any propositions that I might be authorized to make in the nature of an overture from the colonies founded on the basis of submission. I told him that I had no authority from any quarter to make propositions of that description, but that I would

with pleasure, if he wished it, give him an official statement of what I had said to him by order of my Govt. in favour of the acknowledgement of the independence of the new states.—He replied that he was ready to receive any note that I might send him, but that on that head, the King's mind was completely made up beyond the possibility of change. Notwithstanding this, I have thought of preparing and transmitting to the Minister a pretty detailed communication upon this subject.—Such a paper if it does not produce much immediate effect upon the Spanish Cabinet, may perhaps in one way or another have a favorable bearing on the general question.

Previously to this interview with Mr. Zea, I had availed myself of such occasions as offered to converse upon the same subject with the British and Russian Ministers. The former is Mr. Frederick Lamb, brother of Lord Melbourne, a gentleman of about forty five years of age, regularly trained to the diplomatic line and apparently well fitted for it by his talents and information. The latter is Mr. D'Oubril who has also passed his life in the employment of a foreign Minister and has now reached the age of about sixty. He seems to enjoy the confidence of his Govt. and last year took the place of Count Nesselrode as Minister of foreign affairs during an absence of the latter from St. Petersburg which lasted several months. Both these gentlemen have shewn since my arrival here every disposition to be on friendly terms with me and have plainly manifested by their attentions, the high esteem in which they hold the American nation and character. Mr. D'Oubril in particular has been more civil than any other of the diplomatic body with whom I was not previously acquainted.

Mr. Lamb's sentiments in regard to the South American question are of course precisely the same with ours. I was desirous to ascertain whether the British Govt. had lately made any attempts to urge Spain to a recognition of the new States and questioned Mr. Lamb upon this point. He said that he had had one or two conversations with Mr. Zea, soon after his arrival (he has been here about 5 months) and stated the substance of what had passed between them. The Minister it seems gave to him the same answers which he has since given to me and cited to illustrate his argument, the same examples of Louis 18th and Bonaparte. No offer of formal mediation has been made by England since her recognition. Indeed her interest as a commercial and manufacturing country is now on the other side. The longer the war continues, the longer she enjoys a monopoly of the Spanish American market for her fabrics, and the more difficult will Spain find it to recover her natural advantages upon the return of peace. England will therefore probably be very easy in regard to this matter, and will leave Spain to pursue unmolested the course she may think expedient. I suggested this point both to Mr. Zea and to the Russian Minister, and was inclined to think from what they said of it, that it had more weight with them than any other consideration in favor of recognition. They both admitted the justice of my re-

marks and the great inconvenience that resulted in this way from the present state of things, and could only avoid the proper conclusion by reverting to their common places of the probability of a return of the colonies to their allegiance, which they really seem to imagine will come about sooner or later without any effort on the part of either Spain or her allies and by the aid of some unlooked for intervention of Divine Providence. I learned nothing material from Mr. L. excepting the fact that the British Govt. is now quiet in regard to this matter and makes no attempt to influence the decision of Spain. He professed to have but little information as to the state of the Spanish settlements in America, and having passed the greater part of his life, including the last 8 or 10 years on the continent, has been in fact rather out of the way of obtaining it.

Mr. D'Oubril was somewhat guarded in his language and did not seem quite willing to admit that it was the decided intention of the Emperor to encourage Spain in her present system. He said that individually he did not by any means take the same view of the subject which the Spanish Govt. did, and yet that he was not completely satisfied that an immediate recognition was the true policy: He cited in his turn the old instance of Louis 18th & Bonaparte, and was far from being sure that the internal divisions which did or would distract the colonies, might not bring them again under the Spanish Govt. He was aware nevertheless that Spain was daily and yearly suffering great injury from the effects of the present system, that by continuing it, she would probably lose her remaining possessions in America, and her chance of ever obtaining a due share in the trade with that continent, besides endangering her national existence at home. This was making out a pretty strong case in favor of recognition, but he still returned to his former text that he considered the question as extremely doubtful. In all that he said upon it he professed to declare merely his own personal opinions and feelings, and if I recollect right, did not say directly what language he was ordered to hold in his communications with this Govt. It is understood however that the influence of the Emperor has been employed in support of the present system, and the general impression which I received from his remarks coincided with this opinion. Mr. D'Oubril's private sentiments may possibly be different. Both he and Mr. L. enquired of me respecting the late overtures made by the President's order at St. Petersburg and appeared to have some though not a very minute acquaintance with the language of your instructions to Mr. Middleton. The representatives of France, Holland, Sweden, Saxony & Prussia, with whom I have had more or less conversation upon this subject have all expressed themselves strongly in opposition to the policy of Spain. Even the Pope's Nuncio and the Ambassador from Naples seem to be of the American party. The French I suspect are making pretty strong efforts in favor of the new States, but on this point I have at present no very precise information.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, November 21, 1825.

After conversing with the Duke² as much as was necessary upon the direct relations between the two countries, the opportunity being favorable for a longer interview, I availed myself of it to introduce the subject of the colonies, upon which I had not before said any thing to him. I told him that it was a part of my instructions to intimate to H. M.'s Govt. in the most delicate manner possible the full conviction of that of the United States that the question of the independence of the colonies was in point of fact, settled; and their strong desire that the war might as soon as possible be brought to a close. I enquired of him whether there was at present any disposition in H. M.'s Cabinet towards a change of policy upon this subject. He replied in the negative; but did not express himself to this effect with the same fulness and decision that I had observed in Mr. Zea's communications. I presume however that this difference which was certainly very perceptible and obvious, is rather owing to the difference in the characters of the men, and their habits of expressing themselves, than to any actual intention in the Cabinet to yield; at least I do not learn from any other quarter that such an intention is supposed to exist. The Duke said that the matter was a delicate one, that he could easily imagine how inconvenient and injurious it must be to the United States to have this struggle constantly going on at their doors, and that he was not surprised or dissatisfied that they should exert their influence in endeavouring to procure the termination of it in the way which they thought just; but that the King could not yet resolve to abandon his rights, or give up the hope that these countries would in one way or another be ultimately brought back to their allegiance. I then suggested to him particularly the opinion entertained by the Govt. of the United States, that the loss of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico would be the inevitable effect of the continuance of the struggle for two or three years longer; but that Spain by making peace at once might very probably retain them. When I made this remark to Mr. Zea he answered that the King did not consider these Islands as in danger in any event, and that H. M. confidently trusted that he should not only retain them, but reconquer very shortly all the other American provinces. The Duke's answer was quite different. He enquired of me in reply upon what evidence the American Govt. founded the opinion that Spain would be able to retain these islands in case of her

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV. Printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 879.

²Duke del Infantado.

recognizing the independence of the other colonies. This question seemed to suppose the persuasion that the islands must at all events be lost unless the King should recover the whole of his American possessions. I replied that the principal circumstance in favor of this opinion was the fact that no symptoms of a disposition to separate from the mother country had yet appeared in the islands; and that as their situation in consequence of the opening of the ports was extremely flourishing, there was room to suppose that they were contented with it. He acquiesced in this remark, and expressed his deep regret, that a similar system of allowing a full freedom of trade had not been adopted in season in regard to the other colonies. This was the substance of our conversation. The general impression I received from it was, that there is at present no direct intention in the Cabinet to change their policy, but that there is at least as much probability of a recognition now as before the late Ministerial revolution. I mentioned to the Duke that Mr. Zea had expressed a wish that I would give him in writing what I had to say by order of my Govt. upon this subject, and enquired of him whether this would also be agreeable to him. He said that he had no objection whatever to receive such a communication, and I shall accordingly at my leisure prepare and transmit one.

1139

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, December 12, 1825.

I received two or three days ago from Mr. King a copy of the instructions to Mr. Middleton² on the affairs of Spanish America. It came very opportunely while I was engaged in preparing the note which I intend to address to this Govt. upon the same subject. This communication, as it requires to be drawn up with care and caution, does not admit of being hastened, and will not probably be ready before the 1st of Jany. I learn with much pleasure, thro' the medium of Mr. Brown that the overture made by Mr. Middleton at St. Petersburg, has been well received, and is likely to produce a favorable effect. I shall take an early opportunity of conversing anew with Mr. d'Oubril upon the subject, and of ascertaining what are his present instructions.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV. Printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 880.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

1140

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, January 1, 1826.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of a decree which has just been published for establishing a Council of State. A council has already existed, I believe, ever since the King's return, bearing the same name, composed of nearly the same persons, and charged with substantially the same duties as this, but the King has not been in the habit of calling them together. The only thing, therefore, really new in the decree is the part which declares that the council shall meet every day and remain in session three hours. How far this regulation is likely to be observed is, of course, a matter of mere conjecture. It is rather singular that no allusion is made to an existing council, and that the decree purports to be for the establishment of an entirely new one. The measure is considered here as pretty important, but I do not see that it is likely to introduce any very great changes either in the principles or proceedings of the Government. The latent object of the institution is, probably, to get rid of the Ministerial Council established by Mr. Zea; no allusion is, however, made to the latter in the decree which thus supercedes two of these high state corporations, without naming either. Some of the most considerable members of Mr. Zea's council are transferred to the new one, including the President, General Castanos, a person much respected by all parties, and of known liberal sentiments. He told me yesterday that this was the fifth council to which he had been called, as they were successively instituted. He does not appear to anticipate any very important consequences from the innovation.

There are some things, however, in the decree, and in the composition of the council, which may be construed into indications that the measure has been taken with a view to a more careful consideration of the great question of America. Among the members named who, exclusively of the ministers, only amount to fourteen or fifteen, are the Archbishop of Mexico, the Viceroy of Mexico, Venegas, and Apodaca, under new names, the Duke de San Carlos, an American, and Father Cyril, who has been in America. The last is considered the ablest man in the council. It is worthy of remark, that none of these, except San Carlos, were of the old Council of State. General Castanos is friendly to the recognition of the independence of America. Provision seems to have been made in this way for bringing into the meeting a great deal of positive information upon American affairs. The decree also mentions that this question is one to which the attention of the council is to be particularly called; and speaks of it in terms which will bear a favor-

¹*American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 880.*

able interpretation, although they do not necessarily require it. Among other things deserving consideration are enumerated "the weighty affairs of the colonies in America, which are endeavoring to separate from the mother country, by a necessary effect of the dangers to which the Crown has been exposed." To acknowledge the necessity of the separation on any account seems to be a large step towards the acknowledgment of the new States, and to call the effort to separate a necessary effect of the late political crisis is, perhaps, to give the best possible justification of it. The passage may, however, be interpreted in a different sense; and there is, at present, no other evidence of any recent change on this subject, in the disposition of this Government. The French newspapers abound, as usual, with accounts, apparently authentic, of constant efforts made here by the foreign powers, especially the British minister, in favor of the colonies, but these accounts are also, as usual, without the slightest foundation. Mr. Lamb and myself converse, habitually, on this subject, with perfect freedom, and I am certain that he has said and done almost nothing for the Americans since I have been here; the others never interfere with the subject, excepting, perhaps the French ambassador, who has recently arrived, and with whose proceedings I am not so well acquainted.

I lately read to the Duke del Infantado a part of a letter I had received from New York, which spoke with great confidence of the probability of an early and successful attack upon the Island of Cuba by the Mexicans and Colombians. The intelligence evidently made an impression upon him. He asked me, among other things, as he has done before, what security there would be for the possession of Cuba in the event of recognising the colonies. I replied by stating the general reasons why they should not wish to separate. It has since occurred to me that the Duke, by his repeated questions to this effect, intended to intimate a desire that a guaranty for the fidelity of Cuba should be offered by the United States, or by the Spanish American powers. This was proposed directly by Mr. Zea to Mr. Nelson and to me as a consideration for admitting our consul at the Havana.

Since I wrote to you last I have been principally engaged in preparing my note upon the affairs of the colonies. It is now nearly ready, and I shall probably send you a copy of it with my next despatches. The other affairs remain in the same state. The intelligence of the death of the Emperor of Russia arrived here about ten days ago, and was soon followed by that of the quiet succession of his brother Constantine. It does not appear that the change will produce any immediate effect upon the state of political affairs. The money market is exceedingly depressed in France and England, and the distress among the merchants is greater than was almost ever known before; but the crisis appears to have arisen, in part, from pure panic and will, in all probability, pass off very soon, leaving the value of public stocks somewhat lower, perhaps, than it stood before. The French Parliament is summoned for the 31st of this month.

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of the notes which I have addressed to the minister since my last despatches, and of some official articles of general interest, and remain [etc.].

P. S. Upon looking again at the decree upon the Council of State, which was out of my hands when I was writing the above, I find that the council is not described as a new institution in such distinct terms as I had supposed and stated. The impression I had upon the subject was partly derived from conversation. The existence of the council had been pretty generally forgotten, and this revival of it has been commonly mentioned as the establishment of an entirely new one; in effect it is, as the King never called the members together under the former system.

1141

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to the Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

Confidential.

MADRID, January 20, 1826.

SIR: The Government of the United States of America have looked with deep interest at the war now existing between Spain and her ancient colonies, ever since its commencement. Situated in the immediate neighbourhood of the regions where it has been carried on, they could not feel the same indifference upon the subject, which has been shewn by some other nations inhabiting a distant quarter of the globe. Their position, and the relations naturally resulting from it, were circumstances over which they have no control; and it was not in their power, had they wished it, to shrink from the responsibility that devolved upon them. It only remained to meet the delicacy of the situation by a corresponding circumspection in their conduct; to proceed upon acknowledged principles and in conformity with the best information they could procure. Such has been in fact the course of their policy. They have spared no pains in endeavouring to obtain the most accurate accounts of the state of the war at its several periods; and they have adopted no important measure without great consideration and a careful enquiry into the laws and usages of civilized countries. In pursuance of this system they have considered it their duty to observe a fair and just neutrality between the two parties, and to entertain pacific and friendly relations with both alike; and they have with good faith to the best of their ability acted accordingly. They have lent no military or naval assistance to either; but have freely granted to both the hospitality of their ports and territory,

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV, enclosed in Everett to Clay, February 3, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1144, printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 1006.

and have allowed the agents of both to procure within their jurisdiction, in the way of lawful trade, any supplies which suited their convenience. When the independence of the colonies appeared to them to be well established, it became a duty to regard and treat them as sovereign powers; and their increasing intercourse with the United States made it convenient and suitable to organize the relations between the two countries in the usual form by exchanging diplomatic and commercial agents invested with the usual powers and characters. But while the Government of the United States felt themselves not only justified in these measures, but bound in duty to adopt them, they have continued to observe in word and in deed their former course of fair and honest neutrality. They have never taken upon them to express an opinion upon the merits of the quarrel, or upon the validity of the arguments advanced by either party in support of its pretensions; still less to interfere actively in favor of one or the other. The people of the United States, including as private persons the individuals composing the Government, have generally felt and manifested a strong sympathy with the inhabitants of the colonies in consequence of the similarity of their position with that of the United States half a century ago; but this natural feeling has not been allowed to influence the public measures. The President and Congress in acting upon this subject, have uniformly proceeded upon strict principles and known facts. Their decisions on important points were adopted with unexampled unanimity; and have been, it is believed, very generally approved throughout the civilized world. They have since been closely followed by the two enlightened and powerful Governments, whose position naturally called upon them to take the lead in this respect among the nations of Europe.

While pursuing this line of conduct, the Government of the United States have also considered it their duty and their policy to employ their good offices from time to time with both parties for the purpose of reconciling them to each other and bringing the war to a close. This tedious contest carried on in their immediate neighbourhood has been and still is a source of no little actual inconvenience to them in various ways. It has been in particular the ultimate cause of the prevalence of piracy to a fearful extent upon the waters that surround their coasts; an evil which compels them to keep a strong naval force in active service at a very unhealthy and dangerous port, and which nothing but the establishment of peace will ever completely eradicate. They have therefore the most powerful motives for seeking in their own interest to effect this great object. But independently of any such considerations, the common sentiments of humanity and the sympathy which all civilized and christian nations naturally feel in each other's welfare, lead them to desire the close of this long and cruel struggle. Entertaining, and wishing to entertain the most friendly relations with both parties they cannot but feel the deepest interest in the restoration of harmony and good un-

derstanding between them and in the consequent general pacification of the American continent. They have accordingly given to both, on many occasions, such counsels as they have thought most likely to promote this object. As the Independence of the Colonies has appeared to them for some years past to be well established, they can imagine no other way of effecting the great purpose in question, except by the consent of H. M. to treat with his ancient provinces on the footing of sovereign and independent states; and they have from time to time, with all the delicacy required by the importance and peculiar character of the subject, and with all the respect which they sincerely cherish for the Spanish Government and nation, advised this measure. These counsels although H. M. has not yet thought proper to act upon them have been received and listened to in the friendly spirit in which they were given: and the Government of the United States have been induced in consequence, and by the generally friendly character of their relations with Spain, to continue the same course as occasion may appear to render it expedient. I was accordingly instructed upon leaving my country to express to H. M. and his Ministers the firm conviction and earnest wishes of the Government which I have the honor to represent, in regard to this question. I have already communicated them in conversation to Your Excellency's Predecessor and to yourself. In order to state them with more distinctness and to enable Y. E. to lay them before H. M. in the precise form in which they are conveyed to you, I now take the liberty of troubling you with a few suggestions in writing upon this great and interesting subject.

The present moment seems to be a favorable one for reviewing the decisions that were taken at an earlier period of the war, and for considering whether events have not since occurred which make it expedient to change them. A course of proceeding which was apparently wise and politic ten or fifteen years ago may have been rendered by the subsequent progress of affairs impolitic and ruinous. It may have been natural for the King to make war upon his colonies at the time when they first declared their independence, when there was a probability of reducing them again to their allegiance, and when it was yet uncertain whether the efforts in which they were engaged were the work of a few factious spirits, or of the whole community: and it may nevertheless be in the highest degree inexpedient to continue the attempt to subjugate these colonies now that they have grown up into six or eight populous and powerful nations, situated in a distant quarter of the globe, in the full exercise of all the prerogatives of sovereignty, and respected and acknowledged as sovereign by several of the greatest powers of the world. It is the usage of prudent governments not to adhere with too much constancy to any system, merely because it has once been adopted: but to mark the course of affairs and to regulate their conduct by the present situation of things rather than the past. A statesman who attempts to counteract the force of circumstances, or in more religious and

juster language, to defy the will of God, will find his efforts ineffectual and generally injurious to himself. The epochs of a critical and important character, that present themselves from time to time in the progress of political affairs appear more especially to invite the Governments interested in them to reconsider the principles upon which they are acting, in order either to assure themselves that they are in the right, or to shift their course if they find themselves in error. One of these great epochs is just now occurring in the history of the Spanish American Colonies. After declaring their independence of the mother country, surmounting the obstacles that first presented themselves, consolidating to a good degree their political institutions, and maintaining their national existence for seventeen years without any organized concert among themselves, they are at this moment meeting for the first time by their plenipotentiaries in a general congress for the purpose of regulating their mutual interests and entering into an alliance offensive and defensive against their common enemies. This change in their position is evidently one of vast consequence: It calls imperiously upon the Spanish Government to consider well the system upon which it is now proceeding, and to examine anew the whole subject of its relations with these States. It has also been thought by the Government of the United States that the occurrence of this remarkable event furnished an occasion upon which neutral and friendly powers might with propriety renew their good offices in attempting to bring about a reconciliation between the parties to the war. They have been induced by this motive to communicate their opinions and their wishes to H. M. Ministers in a more formal manner, at this time, than they have hitherto employed; and to invite the leading powers of Europe to concur with them, as far as they might think it expedient, in this great and benevolent purpose. France and Portugal have lately led the way in a course of proceeding similar to that which is now recommended to H. C. M. It only remains for the King to give one signal proof of magnanimity and wisdom in order to complete the pacification of the whole American Continent. The President is well assured that the suggestions now presented by his order will be received as evidences of the friendly disposition of the Government of the United States; and he ventures to hope that they will be listened to with attention, and will not be without effect.

It has been thought a proper mark of respect to the Government of H. C. M. to accompany the communication of the opinions entertained upon this subject by that of the United States, with a statement of the reasons upon which they have been founded; that they might not appear to have been taken up capriciously and hastily, or to have been affected in any degree by a natural sympathy with the fortunes of the Colonies. They have been adopted in general upon a deliberate view of all the information that could be procured; and a full recapitulation of the particulars from which they have been deduced would embrace a mass of details much too large to be

brought within the compass of an official note. There might also be a difference, as respects some of these details, between the information that has been conveyed to the Government of the United States and to that of H. C. M. There are however certain great and leading facts in the history and present state of the war, notorious to the world at large and of course familiarly known to H. M.'s Government, which are considered by that of the United States as sufficient of themselves to demonstrate the impossibility of recovering the colonies. In the following remarks I shall confine myself as much as possible to these points, and shall endeavour to avoid any allusion to doubtful matters either of fact or of right.

It is now about seventeen years since the occurrence of the first movements in the Colonies. They were not occasioned by a rebellious or discontented spirit, but were the effect of the invasion of the Mother country and of the usurpation of H. M.'s throne by a foreigner. They were equally legitimate with the movements which were made at the same time in Spain for the purpose of shaking off the French yoke; and were indeed precisely similar to them in character. Five or six years elapsed before this great object was attained and before the King returned from his captivity in a foreign country. During this time the Peninsula was the theatre of constant war, occupied and wasted by contending armies, foreign and domestic, distracted by political divisions and upon the whole in a state approaching very nearly to entire anarchy. It is not singular that the colonies, having been compelled for a time to govern themselves should have continued so to do until the King's return, without regard to the authority which the successive ephemeral Governments at home might pretend to exercise over them. The King's return introduced another order of events; but the colonies were now and had been for several years in possession of the privileges of self Government, and a new state of things had in consequence grown up among them. They had formed new relations with each other and with foreign powers. Their whole political situation was completely altered. Were they bound under these circumstances to return at once to their ancient allegiance: or had the new position in which they had been thrown by events beyond their control brought with it new rights and new duties incompatible with their former relations to the Spanish crown? On this, which is the great question of right between the parties, the Government of the United States have never ventured to express an opinion. It is only on points of fact and expediency that they have felt themselves at liberty to offer their counsels.

Whatever may be thought of the merits of the case a war, under all the circumstances, was, in a manner unavoidable. It was accordingly undertaken by H. M.'s Government and carried on with all the vigor and perseverance which the situation of the Kingdom would admit. Soon after the King's return a powerful expedition was fitted out for America under the

command of one of the first Generals of the age, and directed against a very well chosen point in the territory of the Colonies. Had it been possible to subjugate them with the means at the disposal of Spain this expedition must have been attended with complete success. But the efforts of Gen. Morillo and his army to subdue the Americans produced no other effect than that of teaching them the military arts which they wanted, and of forming among them in the school of experience a great Commander whose name alone is now a tower of strength to his countrymen. Gen. Morillo, after seeing almost the whole of his army perish by his side; after performing miracles of courage, skill and perseverance; after meriting all praise, excepting that of humanity; finally returned to Spain. The few troops that remained of his army were soon compelled to shut themselves up in a fortress, and not long after to surrender. The attempt made at home to fit out another considerable expedition terminated in a revolution. The troops which had been stationed in Peru and Chili, after carrying on the war for several years with various success were finally reduced to capitulate by the splendid and decisive victory of Ayacucho, which exhibited a second great commander in a young man of only eight and twenty years of age. For some time before that event, there had been no royal forces in Buenos Ayres and none in Mexico excepting the garrison of a single fortress. This battle terminated the active military operations of Spain upon the American Continent and the war has been in fact for nearly two years past at an end.

Will it be said that it is the intention of the Spanish Government to renew it, and that other expeditions may be more successful than the former ones? Is it possible to suppose for a moment that Spain, in her present situation, her own territory jointly occupied by foreign troops, enfeebled and convulsed by the effect of seventeen years of almost uninterrupted revolution, invasion and war, without funds and without credit, can fit out armies equal to the conquest of six or eight powerful nations a thousand leagues off? Were it even possible, as it evidently is not, that another expedition should be despatched immediately, as strong and as well appointed as that of Gen. Morillo, would such an one be likely to succeed better now, than his did in fact several years ago? Would it be less difficult to contend with accomplished and veteran commanders at the head of disciplined armies, than it was with the fresh recruits and inexperienced officers, out of which these armies and their generals have been formed? Or would the organized and acknowledged Governments that now exist, offer a less formidable resistance than was made by the same communities when almost in a state of anarchy? These are evidently suppositions of things not merely improbable or in the common course of nature impossible, but chimerical. They involve impossibility upon the impossibility. It is impossible that new expeditions should be equipped: if they could be equipped, it is impossible that they should succeed. Since then the war is at an end, and cannot be

renewed, it would seem that a peace concluded on the best terms possible under such circumstances must immediately follow.

It is understood however that H. M's. Government without intending to make any further attempts to subjugate the colonies by actual force, never the less entertain the expectation that they may perhaps be brought back to their allegiance by the effect of internal dissensions: and that it is principally on this account that they consider it impolitic to treat with them as sovereign powers. This expectation is no better founded, according to the views of the Government of the United States than would be that of conquering them by actual war. It is believed that there is no greater probability of the occurrence of intestine troubles in these states than in other established and organized bodies politic; and that should they occur, they could not by any possibility be turned in future to the profit of Spain.

Every community which changes its form of Government violently and suddenly, is visited almost of necessity by a period of anarchy and civil war. This was an evil which the Spanish colonies in separating from the Mother Country had reason to expect that they should be obliged to encounter, and from which they have in fact suffered in greater or less degree. Serious divisions occurred in most, if not all, of them, soon after the declaration of their independence, and for a time threatened their existence as sovereign powers. In Mexico an adventurer usurped the Government by military force and assumed the title of Emperor. In Colombia the state of affairs was long unsettled, and there seems to have been at one moment considerable danger of insubordination among the blacks. In Peru and Chili, the leading public characters were frequently at variance; and Buenos Ayres was for a while the theatre of actual civil war. It was necessary that these troubles should terminate in one of two ways; either by bringing back the Colonies to their allegiance, or by subsiding and disappearing under the influence of the new independent Governments. The latter part of the alternative has in fact been realized. The difficulties to which I have alluded, and which accompanied so naturally the first attempts of the colonies to establish their national existence are now at an end; and the fate of those persons who were engaged in them has not been such as to hold out much encouragement to future imitators. The disturbers of the established order have met in almost every remarkable instance with signal defeat and exemplary punishment. Iturbide in Mexico, Gen. Piar in Colombia; the Carerras in Chili, were publicly executed as common traitors. Saint Martin, who deserted his post at the head of the Government of Peru at a critical period, lost his influence, sunk in to insignificance and is said to be now living unknown at Brussels. Pueyrredon, who appears to have been gained by the agents of H. M. while occupying the post of supreme Director of the Republic of the United Provinces of La Plata, could not carry with him a single man, was obliged to quit his post and his country, and has since, it is

understood died somewhere in obscurity of a broken heart. Such have been the fortunes of the principal authors of internal dissensions in America, and they are evidently not of a kind to encourage new attempts. In fact, since the disappearance of these first troubles, the reign of good order and of consolidated political institutions seems to have taken place every where and is apparently established. Five of the six principal States that have been formed out of H. M's. colonial dominions; not including Paraguay of which the internal condition is but little known to foreigners, present as tranquil an appearance as any part of Europe or the world. Peru is in some degree unsettled, but the tranquillity of that country is secured by the battle of Ayacucho and the final arrangements of its political institutions will not probably be long delayed. Having thus organized their respective Governments at home, these states are already beginning to extend their views abroad, and are at this moment assembled by their Ministers in a Congress at Panama for the purpose of forming among themselves some concerted scheme of action. This great event may be considered as indicating distinctly the consolidation of their several political institutions, and the disappearance of all pre-existing internal dissensions.

The troubles which naturally accompanied the first establishment of these new States, having thus subsided, they cannot in the natural course of events be expected to return. They were incident to a particular period in the history of the Colonies; and this period having passed away, the dangers incident to it, have necessarily passed away with it. The various epochs in the progress of communities, like the different ages in the life of man, are subject to particular disorders; but in both cases those that belong to one period can never be encountered at another. Troubles may doubtless occur in the nations that have been formed out of the Spanish Colonies, as in all others; but they will not be hereafter of the same kind with those which were occasioned by the separation from the Mother Country, and the attempt to establish an independent national existence. Let it be supposed however for argument's sake that internal dissensions should again arise equally serious with those which have already arisen and subsided; let it be supposed that a second Iturbide shall appear in Mexico, another Gen. Piar in Colombia, that Buenos Ayres or Chili shall again be the theatre of civil war, that a new Pueyrredon should be gained by H. M's. agents, or finally in order to exhaust every supposition however improbable, let it be imagined that Bolivar and Sucre shall belie their noble characters, disappoint the hopes of the world and turn out Bonapartes and Cromwells instead of Washingtons. Of what advantage would the occurrence of these or similar events be to the Royalists cause, or what additional probability would they furnish of the return of the Colonies to their allegiance? If H. M's. Government found it impossible to turn to any account the troubles that actually broke out at a time when the state of the Colonies was yet unsettled

and they had a large military force in the country, would they be able to do it now, when they have not a soldier, not under close siege, from California to Cape Horn, and when the new Governments have acquired consistency and vigor? If Iturbide when he overthrew the Mexican Government while the Royalist party was still improving and the prospect of success in the establishment of Independence uncertain, did not think of proclaiming the King, would another Iturbide do it now? If the insubordination of Piar under the eyes of Gen. Morillo could not be made the means of reducing Venezuela would another black insurgent be likely to prove a better instrument, with nobody present to direct and employ him? If Bolivar or Sucre should attempt to establish a military despotism, would it be in the name of the legitimate King, and under the Royal Spanish flag? These suppositions, like that of an actual military conquest of the country, are obviously not merely improbable but chimerical and full of inherent contradictions. The time to take advantage of internal dissensions, if ever, was the time when they might have been expected to occur, when they did in fact occur, and when the King had his armies in the country ready to back a discontented leader. If nothing could be done under all these favorable circumstances, it is vain to expect a better result at present when every circumstance is of an adverse character.

Finally such is the strength of public opinion prevailing throughout the Colonies in favor of independence, that nothing would be really effected even by successful attempts to create internal divisions, and to gain over the popular leaders. This is evidently shewn by the fate of Pueyrredon to which I have already alluded. Here was a person holding the supreme executive power in one of the new states, enjoying a high reputation, and apparently possessing great influence, who consented to employ it, in endeavouring to bring about a union of the colony under his Government with the Mother country in the most plausible way in which it could be done. This colony was precisely the one in which political dissensions had prevailed to the greatest extent, having assumed for a long period the shape of actual civil war. The negotiation presented an additional probability of success from being carried on under the auspices of one of the most powerful Monarchs of Europe in alliance with H. C. M. The King had at that time one or two considerable armies in America ready to lend their aid in promoting the intended object. Here was a case, if ever there was or will be one, in which something might be expected from the effect of internal divisions and from the adhesion of leading characters. What happened? Did Pueyrredon under all these favorable circumstances succeed in bringing back to its allegiance the colony under his Government? I have already stated that he did not carry with him a single man. He could not stay in his country. He was crushed at once to the earth by the execution and contempt of the whole American Continent, and in order to escape an ignominious

death was compelled to hide himself in some obscure corner where he has since died of chagrin and shame. Such is the history of the only considerable apostate that has yet been gained from the cause of independence in America. It proves that whatever may be the merits of the contests, there is a force of public sentiment arranged in support of this cause too strong to be resisted by any individual however eminent; that nothing can be hoped by Spain from the effect of internal dissensions in the Colonies and that no means, excepting that of actual physical force will ever bring them or any part of them again under the dominion of H. C. M. The impossibility of employing this means with success has already been shewn and is understood to be felt by H. M's. Government.

It has sometimes been said however, that Spain might reasonably be encouraged in the hopes of recovering her ancient colonies by the great and sudden revolutions that have occurred in Europe within our own time. The late King of France after being deprived of his hereditary rights and dominions for twenty five years finally succeeded in obtaining possession of them. Why may not the King of Spain in like manner recover his American possessions, although he should have lost them for an equal length of time? It is understood that this argument from analogy is considered by some persons of great respectability as the principal one that can be urged in favor of the continuance of the war, and it may therefore be proper to give it some attention.

The conquest of the Colonies must be effected if at all by the aid of means; and the example of the King of France is applicable in the present instance only as far as the same means which were employed to place him on the throne, are now at the disposal of the King of Spain for the purpose of recovering his lost possessions in America. What were these means and how far can they probably be employed at present by the Spanish Government? The revolution in the Government of France of which the return of Louis 18 was the natural consequence was accomplished by the military force of other European powers at a time when the King had not a soldier in the field in his own immediate service. Is it probable that there will be now, or ever, a similar alliance of these powers for the purpose of restoring to the King his ancient dominions in America? What was the motive which induced all the Sovereigns of Europe to unite in a joint attack upon the Government of Bonaparte? It was no other than the direct interest they had in overthrowing that Government on account of the inconvenience, more or less oppressive, which they all suffered from its continuance. Have they all or any of them any such motive for opposing at present the independence of the Spanish Colonies? It is evident that their direct interest, as far as they have any in the affair, is on the other side; and that the independence of America, instead of being an inconvenience to them, is rather advantageous than otherwise, as it affords them a greater freedom of intercourse

with those vast and wealthy regions, than they would enjoy under any colonial system however liberal. Their interest therefore would naturally lead them, considered merely as neutral powers, to take part with the Americans rather than with the Spanish Government. Such of them as possessed extensive and valuable colonies might be supposed perhaps to sympathize with Spain in this contest either because these colonies had actually thrown off their allegiance, or might be expected to do so, and these if any, are the powers, which would have an interest in assisting H. C. M., or in wishing at least for his success. What then has been the policy of the powers thus situated? France and Portugal have just acknowledged the Independence of their ancient transatlantic dominions. England and Holland, the only nations now possessing colonies of consequence, have acknowledged the independence of South America. It so happens therefore that the four powers, which have or had colonies are precisely those which have given the most unequivocal proof that it is not their intention to deviate from the line of neutrality by engaging in the war on the side of Spain. If such is the policy of these nations which alone had some little indirect interest in common with that of H. C. M. what can be expected from the rest, which have all a pretty strong interest on the other side? There is evidently no probability that they will enter into a great European Alliance for the reduction of America, like that which was employed for the overthrow of Bonaparte; nor is it believed that H. M's. Government expect any such cooperation or assistance. It is therefore not in their power to take advantage of the same means which were used by the King of France to obtain possession of his hereditary dominions, and his example, has, of course, no application to the present circumstances of H. C. M.

I fear that I may have taxed somewhat too severely the attention of Y. E. by the length to which these considerations have been already drawn out; but it is difficult to touch, however concisely, upon the several leading points of so great a question without entering into a pretty extensive course of remarks. If the above statement of the grounds upon which the Government of the United States have formed their opinion in regard to this question, be at all correct, it follows conclusively that there is no chance of recovering the colonies either by actual military force, by the effect of internal dissensions, or by the aid of foreign powers. The object of the war is therefore unattainable; what remains then, but to escape as soon as possible from its inconveniences and to conclude peace at once? Peace is of itself and in all cases, the greatest of blessings; and an almost indispensable condition of all public and private prosperity. The advantages direct and indirect, that would accrue to Spain from making peace at present with the colonies, are in the opinion of the Government which I have the honor to represent, of even more than ordinary value. I fear that I shall exhaust Y. E's. patience, but being charged by my Government with the expression of their

convictions and wishes upon a subject of such vast magnitude, I should have reason to reproach myself if the effect of their intercession were diminished and the war protracted by the omission of any topic that would be likely to have weight with H. C. M. Allow me then, my Lord Duke, to request your attention a little longer, and to state to you, very concisely, as they appear to the Government of the United States, the important benefits which would result to Spain from the restoration of peace and the establishment of friendly relations with her ancient colonies.

The immediate inconveniences suffered by Spain from the continuance of the war, are far from being inconsiderable; and the cessation of them, would constitute of itself a very serious advantage. These inconveniences are principally the heavy expense necessary to keep up military and naval establishments adequate to the defence of the West Indian Islands, and the almost entire destruction of the commerce of Spain by the armed vessels and privateers of the new American States. It is understood that the whole revenue which would accrue from the islands is at present absorbed by the charges of securing them against the danger of an attack. When to this great expense is added that of fitting out occasionally at home expeditions intended for their defence, it is clear that the burthen must be considerable, especially in the present embarrassed state of the finances. The restoration of peace would remove this evil at once, and would also give new life to the Spanish commerce, which is now almost destroyed by the American privateers. These enterprising navigators not only cover the waters of the Gulph of Mexico, and of the passage thence to Spain, but have lately ventured across the Atlantic and almost blockade at the present moment the ports of the Peninsula and the entrance of the Mediterranean. The coasting trade is nearly at an end, and as far as it is continued, must be carried on under convoy. It is true that the commerce of Spain under the national flag has not been for some years past very considerable; but the loss of the whole or the greater part of it, such as it is, is still a serious inconvenience. The desolation of the sea ports and the falling off in the amount of the customs, shew but too clearly the extent of the evil. The duties paid at Cadiz, which as Y. E. did me the honor to inform me the other day, were a hundred millions of reals before the commencement of the present troubles, are now, I understand, something less than four. When the inconveniences of the war are thus brought home to the resources of the Government and to the daily life of H. M's subjects, is it not time to consider whether it affords any advantages or hopes to constitute an adequate compensation for sacrifices of such vast importance?

In addition to these great mischiefs which are actually suffered and which would be removed by the termination of the war, there is another, perhaps still more serious, impending in immediate prospect, which, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, nothing but the speedy restoration

of peace can avert; I mean the loss of the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. These possessions are for all purposes of revenue already in a great measure lost; the whole amount of receipts drawn from them, being as is understood exhausted by the charges of their defence. The continuance of the war for two or three years longer, perhaps for one, must in all human probability occasion their complete alienation in one form or another. Hostilities being now at an end on the Continent, and the new states being compelled by the refusal of Spain to make peace to keep up their military and naval establishments they must of course employ them upon some active service. The Spanish islands present the most natural and advantageous point for attack and will of course be attempted. Without intending to disparage the valor of H. M.'s armies on this station; still less the efficiency of the Gov. General an officer of whom the Government of the United States have every reason to speak in the highest terms of respect and estimation: I may add that it can hardly be doubted, considering the nature of the population of the islands and their vicinity to the Continent, that an attack would result either in their immediate conquest by the new States, or in a protracted civil war, which would put an end at once to their present prosperous condition and would occasion in like manner their ultimate loss. It is believed on the other hand by the Government of the United States, that by making peace now H. M. might insure the possession of these valuable colonies for a long and indefinite period of time to come. Under the system of free trade, upon which they are now fortunately governed, they have flourished almost beyond precedent. The inhabitants are prosperous and wealthy and must of course be satisfied with their condition. Relieved from the burden incident to the defence of the islands they would find their situation still farther improved. There is no reason to suppose that under these circumstances any foreign power would attempt to molest them or to infringe upon the right of H. M. to their Government; and without pretending to prophecy what may happen in the course of centuries, it is every way probable that for as long a period at least as any political combinations formed at the present day can be expected to produce effects, these islands would continue to acknowledge quietly and cheerfully the supremacy of Spain and to constitute at once a rich appendage to the Peninsula and a convenient *entrepôt* for the immense trade, which in time of peace must necessarily grow up between the Mother country and the Colonies.

Such would be the consequences resulting from the mere termination of the war. The removal of the immediate evils occasioned by it, such as the decline of commerce and the burthen of defending the islands would be a real benefit. The assurance of preserving Porto Rico and Cuba would be another. But these negative advantages however considerable are of small importance when compared with those of a positive kind which this kingdom would derive from the conclusion of peace and the establishment of friendly

relations with the colonies. Permit me then Sir, to enlarge a little upon this topic and after touching very briefly upon the present unfortunate position of Spain, to present to you the more agreeable picture of her situation, as in the opinion of the Govt. of the United States, it might and would be under a system of free intercourse with the ancient colonies on a footing of equality and mutual independence.

The present distressed condition of Spain, is a fact too notorious to require proof and too painful to be dwelt upon without necessity. In alluding to it I shall quote the language of a report made last year by the Treasurer General to the Minister of Finance.

Spain (says this officer) has been the victim of political convulsions. It is extremely unpleasant to me to be obliged to relate disagreeable things and to present unfavorable pictures; but in the alternative of perhaps putting public tranquillity to hazard, I should consider myself criminal, if any fears, or private views made me conceal evils which require an immediate remedy; especially when with all my efforts I am unable to stifle the cries which are bursting forth in every quarter. The resources have diminished and are daily diminishing. The great sums which are used to be received from America and which in tranquil times, amounted annually to more than a hundred and sixty millions of reals, have fallen off. The customs, the tobacco duties, the salt duties, and other branches of the revenue, have sustained a defalcation, amounting by estimate to another hundred millions; so that the revenue is scarcely sufficient to cover half the expenditure. Public credit is ruined by the enormous weight of the debt and the measures that have been resorted to in this Department have failed to produce the expected results. So great a deficit and so general a want of confidence, create uneasiness in all classes of society. Men neglect their private contracts, and the country is constantly exposed to the terrible effects of the general discontent which is the necessary consequence of such a state of things.

Such is the alarming picture of the present state of Spain, presented in a public report of one of H. M.'s distinguished servants. The case as the Treasurer observes, is one that demands an immediate remedy. Fortunately the great measure of making peace with the colonies, so desirable and necessary on other accounts holds out, in addition, to the Kingdom the prospect of speedy and complete relief from its present distresses. The American states would doubtless consent to furnish in return for the acknowledgement of their independence, such pecuniary supplies as would be sufficient to remove all financial embarrassments and to reestablish the public credit on a solid basis. This great object being accomplished, the commercial relations that would naturally grow up between the mother country and the ancient colonies would open new, copious and permanent sources of wealth, amply sufficient to complete the work of restoration, and even in all probability to elevate this kingdom from its present state of depression to

a height of greatness and glory which it never reached before. Thus the King would not only in consequence of taking this measure be crowned with the gratitude and love of sixteen millions of Americans, but would merit and obtain by a single act through all succeeding ages the glorious title of the Restorer of the Spanish Monarchy.

In regard to the first of these points viz. the supplies that would probably be furnished by the Colonies in return for the acknowledgement of their independence, I wish to be understood as speaking entirely without authority from them, and without having the intention or the right to commit them in the smallest degree. I presume however that there can be no question upon this subject. The late example of Haiti shews to what an extent a community in the situation of the Spanish settlements in America is willing to make immediate sacrifices in order to obtain complete and permanent security. It may be added nevertheless that the sooner the recognition is decided on, the greater will be the probability of obtaining from it considerable advantages of this description.

The manner in which the establishment of commercial relations with the colonies would operate in restoring the prosperity and promoting the wealth and greatness of Spain is sufficiently obvious; but, as this is the most agreeable part of the subject I shall make no apology for dwelling upon it a little longer.

The decline of industry, occasioned by long and frequent political convulsions, has been the immediate cause of the decay of the wealth and greatness of Spain; and the revival of industry is the only possible means by which this decay can be checked, and a contrary course of recovery commenced. The return of peace, especially after long intestine wars has a natural tendency to produce such a revival as well by restoring to productive labor the hands that were employed in the armies, as by affording to the whole community that security for their persons and property which they cannot enjoy in the midst of convulsions and without which nobody can labor with spirit or effect. But in order to bring about so complete and extensive a revival of industry as is wanted in this country something more than this would be requisite, and it would also be necessary that some important change in the political or economical situation of the Kingdom should create a considerable increase of the ordinary demand for products of labor. This would produce immediately an increased demand for labourers, a rise of wages, an augmentation of profits in all the branches of industry and of the rents and value of land, and in its more remote consequences, the extension of industry in all its branches attended with an increase of population and of the comforts and well being of all classes of society. Now such an increase in the demand for the products of Spanish labor would be the direct consequence of the renewal of friendly relations with the colonies. New settlements possessing the tastes imparted by civilisation and situated at the same time like the Eu-

ropean colonies in America, in the midst of an extensive country not yet brought under cultivation, naturally turn their attention in the first instance to Agriculture, as the most agreeable and profitable of all occupations, and depend for manufactures on the labor of older nations. Among these the mother country in consequence of the community of language tastes and manners, must of course enjoy the preference. In this case therefore sixteen millions of Americans would immediately resort to Spain, for all the supplies which they wanted from abroad and which Spain could furnish. It is true that in the present state of industry in this country Spain would probably not be able to satisfy entirely this immense demand, and that the Americans would be obliged to seek in other countries many articles which they would not find in this. But the encouragement to labor afforded by this or by any other cause must of course operate at first only upon such branches of industry as are already established. If the new demand from America for the products of Spanish labor did not produce a revival of industry, the fact would prove that such a revival is impossible under the most favorable circumstances. But there is no reason to suppose that this is the case. Skill and labor enough still remain in this country to afford an ample basis for improvement and future progress. The demand from the colonies would operate in the first instance upon such products as now present themselves, and which, though chiefly agricultural, are not of the growth of America. The wines and fruits of the Southern provinces of the Kingdom, and the manufactures of the eastern, would be sought with avidity by communities whose tastes have been formed to them by long and hereditary usage. The transportation of these and other articles would employ the navigation of Biscay and Galicia, diffuse life through the seaports and give at once a wholesome spring to the circulation of the whole body politic. Such would be the first effects of this new situation, but its benefits would not end here. The profits resulting from the first impulse thus given to labor, would augment the capital in the hands of the enterprising classes of the community and would lead to the extension of all the existing branches of industry, to the establishment of new ones and in general to the full development of the resources of this naturally rich and favored kingdom. Foreign capital, if wanted, would take this direction. For every branch of industry thus established or extended, besides the large and increasing home demand, would be opened the vast market of the colonies, where the population, already so extensive, will probably increase with great rapidity, and require fresh and still augmented supplies; faster even than the augmented labor and enterprise of the Mother country would be able to furnish them. Under these circumstances every thing at home must necessarily flourish. The Agricultural products which now constitute the chief wealth of Spain, would be obtained in larger quantities and in higher degrees of perfection. Manufactures would be founded or enlarged and improved. The cotton fabricks

would no longer be driven out of the home market, by contraband foreign articles, but after supplying the demand of Spain would enter into competition through all the American States, with those of other countries and probably be preferred. The excellent wool of Castile and the silk of Valencia would no longer be exported and wrought up abroad, but would give employment and profit to millions of industrious hands at home. The mines that have been so long neglected would be explored to furnish materials for constructing the machinery necessary for these productive labors. New branches of industry, now entirely unknown in the country would spring up under the operation of this prodigious stimulus. Population would increase with rapidity and all classes would nevertheless enjoy a full share of the comforts of life. New communications by roads and canals would be opened, navigation and commerce would wear an entirely different appearance. The value of land and labor would rise in proportion. The ancient cities that are now deserted and decaying would again swarm with crowds of busy inhabitants. The waste lands would be bought into cultivation and a new life would animate the whole body politic.

Such would be the economical effect upon the Mother country of the establishment of friendly relations with the colonies. It is hardly necessary to add that corresponding advantages would result as respects the facility of administering the Government and the general political situation of the Kingdom. The secret cause of the power and influence of States, must be looked for in the industry and happiness of the individuals that compose them, as these in turn are the effects of wise laws and a just administration. Where the people are idle and of course poor and wretched, the Government by a necessary consequence is unprovided with resources and the State politically weak. Where the people are industrious wealthy and contented, the Government is also rich and powerful and the state politically strong. Under the change of circumstances which I have supposed, Spain, instead of finding it difficult to collect a revenue large enough to cover half the annual expenses, reduced to the lowest possible scale, would be one of the wealthiest Governments in Europe. It is intimated by the treasurer General in the above extract from his report, that the supplies anciently received from the colonies amounted annually to more than a hundred and sixty millions of reals. If this sum was then the measure of their value to the crown computed in money, it is certain that they would be worth much more in a state of independence. The immense revenue that might be derived from a free trade with the Colonies may be conjectured by observing what has actually occurred in England. The duties collected at the custom House in Liverpool in the year 1780, amounted to about £80,000. In the year 1823 they had risen to £1,801,402, and had thus increased twenty fold. It is well known that the augmentation in the trade of Liverpool, has been occasioned almost entirely by the separation of the United States from Eng-

land. If the receipts at the Custom House at Cadiz before the present troubles were a hundred million reals and we suppose them to increase only as fast as those of Liverpool under the influence of a much more powerful stimulating cause (since the population of the Spanish Colonies is now almost five times as large as was that of the United States at the close of the Revolutionary War) even on this very moderate supposition they would amount forty years hence, to about two milliards of Reals, and would present a proportional increase during the intervening years. A single port would thus furnish a sum equal to four times the amount of the whole annual receipts of the Kingdom and twice the amount of the whole annual expenses according to the present estimates. Such would be the effect upon one branch of the revenue of this powerful cause which would operate at the same time with corresponding vigour upon all the others. Nor would the failure of the supplies formerly received in money from the colonies be felt as a loss, since the islands which would still remain to the crown, under a system of free trade and liberated from the charges of defence would furnish of themselves probably a larger sum. The duties collected at the port of Havanna alone are said to amount at present to a hundred million reals, and would be greatly augmented by the opening of commerce with the Main.

The effect of such vast additional resources as these would soon be perceived in every branch of the government. It would shew itself in the augmented majesty and splendor of the throne, in a more vigorous and steady administration of justice, in larger and more efficient military and naval establishments and in an undoubted public credit. The internal dissensions by which the country has been long distracted and which have their final origin in its unfortunate economical situation would soon disappear. Spain under these new circumstances would be quiet at home and respected abroad. Instead of being attacked by foreigners every ten or twenty years, she would be in a situation to exhibit her own flag when occasion should require on the territory of neighboring and of distant nations. She would become in short what she was destined to be by her geographical position and great natural advantages, the leading power in the South of Europe.

Such according to the surest principles strictly applied would be the effects resulting to Spain in the natural progress of events from a single wise and generous measure. The probability of their occurrence is confirmed in every point by the splendid example of England and the United States, to which I have already alluded and which being parallel in every important circumstance must be regarded as decisive and deserves of course to be considered with great attention. It is now just half a century since the declaration of the Independence of the United States and about forty three years since the conclusion of the peace of England. Previously to that event the respective positions of the two parties were the same with those of Spain and her ancient

colonies at present. There was the same feeling of bitterness between them occasioned by a long period of mutual exasperation which preceded the war, and by the accidents of the war itself. England felt the same reluctance to treat with her colonies as sovereign states that is now felt by Spain. Their loss was generally viewed as a national misfortune, and many statesmen of the day predicted as its consequence the immediate decline and fall of the Mother country. Fifty years have since elapsed and where is England now? Instead of being ruined by the loss of her colonies she has exhibited since that event a developement of power and wealth wholly unparalleled in the history of any other country in Europe, and which seems at first view almost miraculous. Nay, this very loss of the colonies, from which so much mischief was anticipated, has proved to be a great blessing and has been in fact, as is now generally admitted, the principal cause of this prodigious prosperity. The rapid progress of the United States, which would never have flourished as they have done while dependent, has exercised a favorable reaction on the mother country, and has brought forth the wonders of improvements in England which the world has seen. This as I have observed, is a thing generally acknowledged and is also susceptible of proof. If we look in detail at the recent augmentation of the resources of England, we shall find that it has taken place chiefly in branches of industry unknown before the separation of the Colonies and growing directly out of that event. The principal of them is the manufacture of cotton. The exports of England in the year 1787 were valued at about fifteen millions sterling and included no cotton fabrics what ever. In 1822 they were valued at about Forty five millions sterling, including cotton fabrics to the value of more than twenty two. The exports of a country may be considered as an approximative though not direct indication of its economical state and considering the increase of the exports of England during the interval between these two periods, amounting to thirty millions, as a measure of her increase in wealth it will appear that three fourths of it have proceeded from the establishment of this single branch of industry. Thus far the improvement has been owing entirely to the independence of the United States. Before the revolution no cotton was produced in the Colonies and very little was manufactured in England. In the year 1784, the one following the peace, the first exportation of this article took place from the United States, and consisted of eight bales which were seized on their arrival at Liverpool on suspicion that they were not the growth of the country, as it was not known previously that cotton was cultivated there. The necessity of finding some Agricultural product with which to furnish the parent Kingdom in exchange for her manufactures soon extended the cultivation of this plant and in the year 1823 the number of bales of cotton imported at Liverpool from the United States amounted to 406,670. The cheapness and abundance with which this valuable article was supplied naturally extended the manufacture of it in Eng-

land, until, after satisfying an immense demand for home consumption, it furnished in 1823 the prodigious quantity for exportation specified above. Upon every bale of Cotton thus produced in the United States and wrought up in England it is calculated that the profits of the labor of England are to those of the labor of the United States in the proportion of twenty to one. Such are the respective advantages resulting to the two parties from the intercourse that naturally grows up between a parent state and its colonies; and yet the latter have no reason to complain. The cotton planters of the United States are among the most prosperous and wealthiest classes of the community, and this branch of industry is regarded by all as of the highest national importance.

Such has been to England the value of the increased market for her products produced by the independence of her colonies in this single department of labor. In others, such as the woollen and Iron manufactures the encouragement afforded if not so extensive has been still of great consequence, and as it is generally acknowledged, so it appears to be true on a close inspection that the vast accession of wealth she has exhibited since the American revolution is immediately attributable to that cause and could not have taken place without it. With the increase of wealth the population has been doubled and the comforts of life have been diffused through all classes. Cultivation has been extended, roads and canals constructed or improved, and the face of the country in a manner entirely changed. The Government has found its resources augmented in the same proportion, has risen from the rank of a secondary, to that of a leading European power, has sustained a war of thirty years against a most formidable combination of the Continental States, attended with expenses before unheard of, to the amount in one year of thirteen milliards of Reals; and notwithstanding this astonishing destruction of productive capital has still maintained its credit and remains one of the wealthiest, most powerful and most prosperous nations on the globe.

Such or similar to these, would be the advantages derived by Spain from the independence of her Colonies. The two cases are paralel nor can any good reason be given why the results should not be the same. It may be said indeed that because Spain is at present inferior in the perfection of her fabrics to some other countries, the new demand from the Colonies, would direct itself towards the latter, especially as commercial relations are already established with England, France and the United States. But those who draw this conclusion have not sufficiently considered the influence of a community of origin, language, religion and manners in determining the intercourse among men. Similar predictions were made at the time in regard to the direction which would be taken, by the commerce of the United States after their separation from England. They had received from France the most important aid in the Revolutionary War; and France was at that time

a nation much richer than England, not only in natural products, as she is now, but even in those of art. A close commercial relation had been established by the political alliance that existed during the war, and it was anticipated that after the peace, the trade of the United States with France would be much more considerable than that with England. No sooner however were the restrictions on the intercourse with the Mother country removed by the conclusion of peace, than the commerce of the United States returned into the old channels, from which it had been diverted for several years, and has continued ever since to take this direction. The trade with France, notwithstanding the superior advantages of it in an economical point of view, never flourished to any great extent; and the exports to that country have never been more than a fourth or fifth of those to England.

In like manner the trade of the Spanish Colonies would immediately take the direction of Spain as far as the Agricultural and manufacturing industry of the Kingdom is now capable of supplying their wants and in proportion as the resources of the Peninsula were developed under the operation of this beneficial intercourse, the trade would continue more and more to increase, bringing with it the favorable effects that I have already described.

Such, my Lord Duke, are the grounds upon which the Government of the United States have formed their opinion upon this subject, and the reasons by which they have been induced to recommend to H. M.'s Government the policy of a general pacification. If the facts I have stated are in any way correct, it results from the whole, that the recovery of the colonies is impossible, either by actual force, by the effects of internal dissensions, or by the aid of foreign powers: that the continuance of the war is attended with great inconveniences, among which must be reckoned, at no distant period, the loss of the islands; and that peace, besides the ordinary blessings which it always carries with it, would in this case administer immediate relief to the financial embarrassments of the Government and by its ultimate consequences restore the prosperity and greatness of the Kingdom. Deeply impressed with this view of the subject the Government of the United States have considered it an act of real friendship and duty to communicate their sentiments to H. C. M. and they cannot but hope that the communication will not be without effect. I have only to add that the efficacy of the measures recommended, both in removing the evil and in producing positive good, depends very much upon its being adopted immediately. Should the peace be delayed a single year it will in all probability be too late to save the islands. Should the acknowledgement of the independence of the colonies be deferred until it becomes a mere matter of form, it can hardly be presumed that they will be willing to purchase it by any great sacrifices, and it will not in that case bring relief to the finances. Finally if the trade of America is permitted to flow for too long a time in foreign channels it is at least uncertain, whether it will ever return to the Mother Country. What is to be

done should on every account be done quickly. If it should be thought by H. M.'s Government, that the good offices of that of the United States would be of use in bringing about an accommodation on the basis indicated in the present note, they will be employed with great readiness and pleasure; and I should be truly happy to contribute in any way by my personal services in effecting so great and benevolent an object.

Of the glorious actions achieved under the patronage of the Sovereigns of Spain predecessors of H. M. the greatest beyond a doubt was the enterprise of Christopher Columbus. The discovery and settlement of an unknown world, the foundation of a brotherhood of new nations, the diffusion of the noble Castilian language and with it of the lights of civilization and Christianity over a whole quarter of the globe; these were the results of the enlightened policy of Ferdinand the Catholic and his celebrated Queen. It has been reserved for his present Majesty to put the last finish to this great work by a measure that shall at once confirm the prosperity of Spanish America and restore the splendor and greatness of Spain. Seldom has it been in the power of any monarch or any Government to effect by a single act, so much good, as would result from this. May God, in his providence incline the King's heart to perform it.

I pray Your Excellency to submit this communication to the consideration of H. Majesty and avail my self of this occasion [etc.].

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to the Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

[TRANSLATION]

Confidential.

MADRID, *January 26, 1826.*

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that I received to day letters from New York of Decr. 21st which report on the authority of a letter from the Consul of the United States at Buenos Ayres of Oct^r. 25, that just before that date a serious and decisive action had taken place between the troops of Buenos Ayres and those of the Emperour of Brazil to the number of about two thousand on each side, which terminated in favour of the former. In consequence of this affair the Brazilians were besieged in Montevideo and the troops of Buenos Ayres occupied the whole of the Banda.

The same letters state that the fleet intended to act against the island of Cuba will probably rendezvous there sooner than was expected. It was

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV, enclosed in Everett to Clay, January 27, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1143.

thought that the Colombian squadron alone, would be sufficient to establish a complete blockade of all the ports independently of the Mexican fleet which became disposable by the surrender of San Juan de Ulloa. Y. E. has probably seen in the newspapers the statement of the arrival at Carthagena of the ships purchased at Carlsrona by the Colombians.

All these circumstances seem to increase the necessity of adopting some new system of policy in regard to America. I am assured that this subject was taken up in the Council the day before yesterday, and that Y. E. as well as the R. F. Cyrilo de Alameda, was in favor of an Armistice. This fact, if true, would be a source of high gratification to the friends of Spain and of humanity, since the opinion of the two leading members of the Council could hardly fail to carry with it very soon, the votes of all the rest. If an armistice should be decided on, it would be very important that the proposition should be made in such a form, that it would be considered equivalent to an acknowledgement of the independence of the new Governments; otherwise in the present state of the preparations for an attack on Cuba, it would probably not be accepted; and the King would not only have the mortification of seeing it refused, but would lose two or three months at this critical moment when every day brings with it, new events of high importance.

Permit me [etc.].

1143

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, January 27, 1826.

SIR: The first news of the surrender of St. Juan de Ulloa was received here on the 20th by one of our vessels which was chartered at the Havana for the purpose of conveying it to Cadiz. It seems to have made a good deal of impression upon the Govt. They had hitherto entertained the intention of equipping another expedition against Mexico and cherished some hopes, however chimerical, of success. The loss of this fortress must destroy even in their view, the least chance which they may have supposed to be yet left of doing something in that quarter. It is understood that Gen^l. Vives sent home by the same vessel that brought this intelligence a small supply of money (some say 12,000 dollars) requesting that it might be employed in expediting the equipment of the vessels destined for his aid; and assuring the Gov^t. at the same time that without powerful reinforcements he should not be able to hold out long. The ship of the line *Guerrero* or *Nuevo Conquistador de America*, now in the port of Cadiz is nearly ready to sail: but it seems

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

by the last accounts from that place that her crew deserted just as they were on the point of being embarked. The authorities are now endeavouring to collect a new crew to take the place of the other. This circumstance must necessarily delay the departure of the vessel and is but a poor omen of the success that was promised by her sounding title. There can be very little doubt that if she now sails, she will steer at once for the station of the combined American squadron.

I obtained through our Consul at Cadiz information of the fall of St. Juan de Ulloa, the same day on which the official notice was received here by the Govt. My note on the subject of the acknowledgement of the colonies was just ready, and thinking the moment a favorable one, I sent it in the same evening. The next day I had occasion to call upon the Duke del Infantado, and he mentioned to me that he had received and looked it over, although he had not had time to give it a thorough examination. I am not without hopes that it may make some impression upon him. I shall endeavour to send a copy with my next despatches.¹

The subject of America was the first taken up in the Council of State, and some propositions were made in regard to it, at the two meetings immediately succeeding the first formal one. Their purport is said to have been to recommend the policy of reducing the colonies by gentle means, and particularly the issuing of a proclamation. The King was not present on either of these occasions. On Tuesday the 24th another meeting was held at which the King was present and this subject was discussed again. The accounts vary a little as to the precise nature of the proceedings. I have heard from two respectable quarters that the Duke del Infantado himself proposed an armistice with the American States, that he was supported by Father Cyrilo de Alameda, General of the Cordeliers, who is the oracle of the clergy and of course of the Council; that the rest were all against it and that the Duke finding this to be the case, proposed adjourning the subject to a future occasion and conferring upon it in the meantime more particularly with the King. Other authorities equally respectable say that the proposition was not made by the Duke, but by some other person and do not mention that it was supported by Father Cyrilo. They also say that it was rejected by a full and general acclamation. They add however with the others that the matter terminated by the Duke's proposing to confer anew upon the subject with the King; and this circumstance, in which all agree, seems to suppose that he himself is in favour of the measure whether he proposed it or not. It is also agreed by all that the King said nothing while he was present and retired at one o'clock for the purpose of dining. The mere proposition of an armistice, however ill received, is a much larger step than has ever been taken before towards a reasonable course of policy, and if, as there seems pretty good room to suppose, the Duke and Father Cyril are really decided in favor of peace, it will probably be carried.

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141, Everett to Duke del Infantado, January 20, 1826.

I received yesterday, the 26th, information from New York of the victory gained in October by the troops of Buenos Ayres over those of Brazil in the Banda Oriental, and considering that every additional circumstance might be of some importance at this precise moment when the subject of America is pending in the Council I communicated the intelligence to the Duke in a private note which I sent to him last evening and of which I enclose herewith a copy and translation.¹

Contrary to the general expectation the controversy respecting the succession to the throne of Russia, which does not appear to have been from the beginning quite so amicable as was at first supposed, has terminated not without bloodshed, in favour of Nicolas. The Russian Minister here was under some apprehension, as I have intimated before, that he should not be retained; but has received already assurances that his new letters of credence will be shortly transmitted. I enclose herewith a copy and translation of a curious private note addressed to him by the Secretary to the Pope's Nuncio. I believe that I have before alluded to this letter, and the subject of it is sufficiently explained by its contents. It is filled as you will perceive from one end to the other with expressions of respect, esteem and *veneration*, but passes here for a piece of fine irony and concealed abuse.

I have the honour [etc.].

P. S. I had heard but forgot to mention in the above account of the proceedings in the Council of State on the subject of America, that it was agreed to ascertain before the matter should be taken up again, by consultation with the Foreign Ministers (of the Alliance of course) whether they were disposed to lend any aid in reducing the Colonies. Since writing the above I have been informed that on the evening after the meeting of the Council the French Ambassador was invited to give his opinion: but refused.

It is also said that at a subsequent meeting of the Council of State a report was received from the Council of Castile recommending the augmentation of the number of the Royalist volunteers, the suppression of the present System of Police, and the establishment of the Inquisition as a substitute, and that this recognition, whether that of the preceding day, was received with general approbation.

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1142, Everett to Duke del Infantado, January 26, 1826.

1144

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, February 3, 1826.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the note² which I lately addressed to the Duke del Infantado, on the subject of America. I have communicated it in confidence to some of the members of the diplomatic body here, and propose to send copies to the Ministers of the U. S. at Paris, London & St. Petersburg.

The Austrian Minister informed me upon this occasion that he had himself made a written overture to this Govt. upon the same subject, as long ago as last May, in which he insisted on the great probability of the loss of Cuba, should the war be continued, and offered the mediation of his Govt. and their good offices with that of England in attempting to bring about a peace. Russia seems to be the only foreign power that has used its influence here in such a way as to favor the present system.

I have the honor [etc.].

1145

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, February 8, 1826.

SIR: The great affair of America remains nearly in the same state as when I wrote you last. It does not appear that any decision has been adopted in the Council, but according to report the inclination is at present in favor of violent, rather than of gentle measures, which were those just proposed. Instead of a proclamation they now, it is said, talk of an expedition of ten or fifteen thousand men; but there is no appearance of any preparation for carrying the plan into effect.

I frequently converse with the Duke del Infantado upon the subject and generally communicate to him, as soon as I receive it, my intelligence from America which is, in most cases, the earliest that arrives. I read to him yesterday a letter from Cartagena, under date of the 23^d of October, published in the New York American of Dec^r. 20, and giving more ample details than had been made known before in any other quarter, respecting the force

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141, Everett to Duke del Infantado, January 20, 1826.

³ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

of the expedition intended against Cuba.—After this I had a good deal of conversation with him on American affairs in general; and he expressed himself, although with caution, in such a way as to satisfy me that his own inclinations are now in favor of immediate peace. I asked him in the course of the interview, whether he thought that the King was himself very strongly prejudiced against it, to which he replied in the negative; saying that the King personally took but little interest in the matter. It would seem therefore that the real difficulty is, in the first place, the apathy and *insouciance* which most of the principal persons in the Gov^t. probably share with H. M. in regard to this subject; and secondly the unwillingness of the few, if there be any, who feel its importance, to commit themselves by mentioning it, and pressing it upon the King's attention. They think, perhaps with great justice, that an exhibition of any warmth in favor of peace with the colonies would immediately be employed by some rival coterie as a means of intriguing against them and destroying their credit. These suggestions however are not supported by any thing that fell from the Duke yesterday. It had occurred to me that as none of his courtiers or counsellors are willing to speak to the King upon the subject, it might perhaps have a good effect if one of the foreign Ministers were to undertake it, and I told the Duke upon this occasion, that if in his opinion it would be of use, I would do it with pleasure. The proposition did not appear at first to strike him very agreeably; I told him however, that the thing was in itself a matter of entire indifference to me personally, and that I should only think of doing it, so far as it might be agreeable to him, or as he might think it likely to promote any views which he might himself entertain upon the subject, I then suggested to him that it might perhaps be of use if I were to present a short memoir to the King upon the single point of the great inconvenience and danger of delay in this matter. This suggestion appeared to please him and I then told him that I would in the course of a day or two, prepare such a memoir and read it to him and that if he then thought it would be useful for me to present it myself to the King, I should be very ready to do it. I accordingly wrote this morning a short French note of three pages, confined entirely to the point alluded to, and shall communicate it to the Duke tomorrow. I have not time to prepare a copy to accompany this despatch, but shall send one with my next.

. . . Soon after the news arrived of the fall of St John de Ulúa and the preparations for an immediate attack on Cuba, I took an opportunity to converse with him anew upon these points, and stated to him as strongly as I could, how much it was for the interest of Spain considering the critical situation of the island, to place her relations with the United States in every respect upon a fair and equitable footing. I presented this consideration to him under diverse points of view and illustrated my remarks by references to past incidents in the history of the two countries. He was finally very strongly impressed with the importance of this suggestion, and assured me

that he would immediately bring these affairs before the Council of State, and have them carried thro' with as little delay as possible. . . .

After I had written the above yesterday, the British Minister called upon me for the purpose of talking upon the subject of America. He said that he had lately conversed anew with the Duke upon that business, and that it appeared to him, as it did to me, that the inclinations of that Minister were now favorable to peace. He added that he should not be surprised if an overture were made immediately to the French Ambassador, himself and me to undertake to convey propositions to the Americans. I do not find however that he had any authority for the expectation except the indications of a favorable disposition in the Duke, and the obvious expediency of doing what is to be done without delay. He has a Courier in readiness to set off to night (by whom I shall send my despatches) but said that he should detain him if any thing of importance occurred, in which case I shall also give you notice.

Since my arrival here, Mr. Lamb has in general exerted himself very little in favor of the Americans; but seeing that I was more active in the business, and that the progress of events was giving great weight to any intercession of this kind, he probably thought that something might grow out of it, and that in that case it would be politic for his Govt. not to appear indifferent upon the occasion. These are my conjectures as to the motives of his increased interest. The fact however is certain, as I have it from himself, that he lately wrote to his Govt. for fresh instructions. A courier arrived with despatches for him last week, and it was supposed in the corps that they related to America. I inquired of him yesterday whether he had received any fresh instructions, to which he replied that he had not and that his Govt. had not even noticed his request: but that he interpreted this silence in connexion with his general instructions into an authorization to take any measures which he might think proper tending towards a pacification. This I have no doubt is the true state of the case. Under this authorization he has been, since the arrival of the Courier, endeavoring to concert measures with the French Ambassador for the purpose of offering a joint mediation, intending also to include me in it as a third party. The Ambassador professes to have no instructions to this effect, and will do nothing and propose nothing until he receives an invitation from the Duke: Mr. Lamb has accordingly, as I presume, altho' he did not say this to me expressly, advised the Duke to address to us three a proposition to undertake a mediation; and this being the case his expectations of receiving an overture on the subject from day to day are founded on what he thinks the probability that this proposition will be accepted.

I doubt much however myself whether this Govt. make any proposition of the kind. They detest the English, and have no very cordial feelings at present towards the French, who, as they also know, have little or no weight

in South America. If they decide upon peace, which is very uncertain, I should think it much more probable that they would recur to the mediation of the United States alone than to that of any other power or powers. I shall see the Duke today for the purpose of communicating to him the memoir alluded to above, and if there is any thing intended similar to what Mr. L. supposes, I shall probably hear of it, and in that case will add a Postscript to this dispatch.

I have the honor [etc.].

P. S. I met the Duke today, and have reason to suppose that the opinions above expressed in regard to Mr. L's. proceedings are correct. He sends off his Courier tonight without any overture; and he told me himself today that he had seen the Duke but had heard little or nothing from him. I gave my Memoir to the Duke who is to read it and see me again upon the subject tomorrow or the next day.

1146

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, February 13, 1826.

SIR: I added in a postscript to one of the copies of my last despatch² a brief notice of the result of my conversation with the Duke del Infantado and the British Minister, on the day when it was written, but was prevented by want of time from entering into any details. The object of my visit to the Duke, was, as you will recollect, to communicate to him a short Memoir which I had prepared upon the single point of the danger of any further delay in recognizing the Colonies, with the intention, if he should think it proper, of presenting it myself to the King. I found the Duke just preparing to go to the King for the purpose of accompanying him to the Pardo, where the Family were to go on that day, in order to take up their abode for two or three months. He was of course, not at leisure for conversation, but requested me to leave the memoir with him and to call again the day after.

In the course of the morning the British Minister called upon me to know what had passed, as I had informed him previously that I expected to see the Duke upon this business. He had been with him himself upon other affairs, but had taken occasion to mention the subject of America. In regard to this matter the Duke had told him that he was collecting all the information he could procure and intended to give the question a full and mature con-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1145, Everett to Clay, February 8, 1826.

sideration and to submit it to the Council of State. If this account of their conversation be correct and I have no reason to suppose it otherwise, it is evident that Mr. Lamb's expectation of an immediate overture had, as I intimated in my last despatch no specific foundation. Believing however that there was now a disposition in this Govt. to adopt a new course in regard to the colonies which might very probably terminate in an invitation to some of the Ministers of the Neutral powers to employ their good offices, I thought it right, to be, as far as possible, in readiness for such an event, and accordingly wrote by the English Courier to Mr. King, informing him of the present state of the affair and requesting him to ascertain whether the Ministers of the Spanish American States at London, are invested with powers to treat for peace.

Mr. Lamb said amongst other things that from what the Duke told him he was inclined to think that there was a disposition to employ the mediation of the Holy Alliance, as well as that of the Maritime powers, and that, if that were the case, his Govt. would have nothing to do with the matter. On this point however he necessarily speaks without authority, and very probably does not express the views of the British Cabinet. I told him that the U. S. would have no objection to act in concert with Russia or any other European Power in promoting the general object of peace, always reserving to themselves the expression of their own opinion upon every subject that might come under consideration, and the right of withdrawing from the mediation if any principles should be adopted by the other powers in which they could not concur. I agreed with Mr. Lamb however in the opinion that an attempt to obtain the good offices of all the great powers would be impolitic at the present moment on the part of the Spanish Govt. as it would necessarily produce a delay of at least three or four months and endanger very much the preservation of the islands.

Upon the following day I called again upon the Duke agreeably to his request. He began the conversation by telling me that neither the King nor himself, were satisfied with the justice of all the remarks contained in my Memoir, that in particular they did not believe in the probability of an attack on the Balearic islands, or an invasion of the Peninsula, but that there was certainly much force in what I had stated in regard to Cuba and Puerto Rico. I told him that it was not my intention, as he must have perceived, to attach any great importance to the other remarks and that the situation of the West Indian Islands was the point of peculiar urgency. He said that he had himself translated the Memoir into Spanish, for the purpose probably of laying it before the Council, and he then took the translation out of a Portfolio for the purpose of consulting me upon the sense of some passages. He said that he had communicated the original to the King and that he did not think there would be any advantage in my presenting it to him in person; that it would be taken into consideration by the Council in connexion with

the other note and with the information of all kinds which the Govt. possessed upon the subject; and that a decision would be formed upon a view of the whole. Finding that the Duke did not appear to wish that I should speak to the King, I of course acquiesced with perfect readiness in his desire. I am inclined to think indeed, from his own evident feelings in regard to the general question, and from what he said to me at our last interview respecting the King's personal disposition, that, as between them, the matter is settled, and that the only thing now remaining to be done, is to make the necessary preparations in the Councils of State and of Ministers for the publication of their decision. In this case any measure intended to bear upon the King in person would of course be superfluous. I would not be understood however to speak with great confidence upon this head, as the Duke may very probably colour more or less, every thing that he says to me upon the subject.

In the course of the interview, I conversed with him a good deal upon the form of the mediation & the persons to whom the first proposals should be made, both which subjects he introduced himself. He appeared to think that it would be expedient for the King to consult his allies in Europe and to obtain if possible, a guarantee from them of the Island of Cuba and he asked me at the same time whether the U. States would be willing to join in such a guarantee. I told him that I doubted very much whether they would, and that positive guarantees of this description were after all of no great value, being always at the mercy of any new political combination; that the only valuable guarantee was that of the force of circumstances, which, as it appeared to me, would operate in favor of the preservation of the islands. I told him however that altho' I did not believe the U. S. would enter into a positive guarantee of the islands, which if faithfully observed, would expose them to the risk of war, they were nevertheless very well satisfied that these possessions should remain to the Spanish Govt. at the peace, and would rather see them in the hands of H. M. than in those of any other foreign power whatever; that in fact one of their motives for desiring the immediate conclusion of peace between the King and his Colonies was, that a further continuance of the war and a removal of the theatre of it to this island, might and would in all probability lead to occurrences of a very unpleasant character, which might ultimately endanger the tranquillity of the U. S. & which at all events, they were extremely anxious to avoid. I then told him in regard to the mediation of the great powers of Europe, that in my opinion an attempt to procure it at the present moment would necessarily be productive of delay, which was what the Spanish Govt. should on all accounts desire to avoid, and that in this stage of the business, I did not perceive that their intervention could be of any use as they had little or no influence with the Colonial Govt., that the Govt. of the U. S. had more weight in that quarter than any other Power and that their good offices might be had with-

out any delay whatever as I considered myself authorized by my instructions to offer them as I had in fact done in my note of the 20th ¹ ulto. and was now ready to take any step which he might think expedient for carrying this offer into effect. I told him however that the opinion I had expressed against the policy of attempting to obtain the mediation of all the great powers of Europe did not arise from any disinclination in my Govt. to act on this occasion in conjunction with those powers, but was founded simply on the danger of delay, that far from feeling any such disinclination, the U. S., as he was already informed, had proposed to the Emperor of Russia and to the Kings of France and England to employ their good offices in concert with the President in endeavoring to bring about a peace. As to the quarter in which the first proposition should be made, I told him that the Govts. of Colombia and Mexico appeared to be on all accounts the leading powers and that, as their Ministers might be in attendance at the Congress of Panama, at the time when the proposals would arrive in America, they should naturally be carried at once to them. Notwithstanding the evident expediency of avoiding any thing that would tend to delay, I think that the Duke seems inclined not to act without the concert of all the great Powers. In regard to the other point, viz., the Powers to whom the first proposition should be transmitted, he did not appear to have any fixed notions of his own. Reflecting after I left him, upon what had passed between us, I thought that it might be of service to give him in writing a summary of the observations I had made, and accordingly addressed to him last evening a confidential note to this effect.

The British Minister called upon me again last evening to talk upon this business. He repeated in very strong terms his intention not to act in concert with the Holy Alliance, but admitted that he had no precise instructions to the contrary from his Govt. He said he was informed that within a few days the Russian Minister had communicated with the Duke upon this subject, but he did not exactly know what had passed. Some time before I presented my Note of the 20th ulto.¹ I consulted Mr. d'Oubril respecting it, and he was then of opinion that it would be inexpedient to make a communication of that kind. Finding that his views on this question were essentially different from mine I have not thought it worth while since that time to converse much with him about it, and as he has retired from company since the Emperor's death, I have had but little opportunity to become acquainted with his movements. I propose however to call upon him today or tomorrow and if anything of interest results from the interview, I shall inform you of it in my next despatches.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141.

1147

*The Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain*¹

THE PARDO, *February 14, 1826.*

SIR: I have read with the attention due to the delicacy of the subject the communication herewith transmitted, made by you under date of the 20th ulto.²

In order to make the proper use of this long and important document, it is necessary that it should be translated into Spanish; and while there would be some difficulty in having the version performed in my office on account of the great pressure of business on the department, it would also be impossible to commit a paper of a character so entirely private and confidential to the hands of a common interpreter. If therefore you think it important that this communication should have its due weight with H. M's. Govt. you would oblige me by sending me a translation of it; by which means you will be able to assure yourself that the version of this very delicate and highly important memoir is executed with the necessary correctness.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

1148

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *February 24, 1826.*

SIR: I mentioned at the close of my last despatch⁴ that I intended to have an interview with the Russian Minister for the purpose of conversing with him upon the American business. I met him accordingly at his house a few days after and we talked the matter over together at great length. I did not find him perfectly frank upon every part of the subject, and he evidently labors under very erroneous impressions as to the probability or possibility of the recovery of the Colonies.

I told him that as my Govt. had made a formal application to that of Russia to act in concert with them in endeavoring to bring the war with the Colonies to a close, I thought it proper to communicate to him the steps

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV, enclosed in Everett to Clay, February 24, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1148.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141.

³ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

⁴ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1146, Everett to Clay, February 13, 1826.

which I had taken here in regard to that business, and particularly to inform him that I had lately addressed a Memoir¹ to the Minister upon the subject which I should be glad to submit to his perusal in the hope that his instructions might authorize him to give it his support. He said that he had understood that I had transmitted such a note and should be very much pleased to see it: He then said that he had received no fresh instructions upon the subject from his own Govt. and had had but little particular communication with this since the last of September when he delivered to Mr. Zea copies of the despatch addressed by you to Mr. Middleton² and of Count Nesselrode's answer.³ He stated at that time to Mr. Zea by order of the Emperor, that H. M. did not feel himself at liberty to interfere in the business without an invitation from the King; but that he should always be ready, upon such invitation being given, to offer his advice and to employ his good offices. Since that time Mr. d'Oubril observed he had been in constant expectation of seeing (receiving) some communication from this Govt. and was surprised that none had yet been made. He did not consider himself authorized by his instructions to advise a pacification upon the terms of an acknowledgement of the independence of the Colonies or in fact to recommend any precise course of proceeding; but he had often taken occasion, especially since the fall of St. Juan de Ulúa, and the apparent danger of the West Indian Islands, to recommend very earnestly that this subject should be taken up and that something should be done. This and this only was the import of what he had said to the Minister upon the subject.

He did not appear willing to explain himself fully as to the terms upon which he thought that an arrangement might be made with the colonies. The basis of an acknowledgment of their independence was not, he thought, the only one practicable; but when I requested him to point out what means there now were at the disposition of Spain, which afforded the slightest prospect of a restoration of the King's authority, he replied that he did not feel himself at liberty to enter into much detail respecting them until the Emperor's mediation should be officially requested; that in such an event he should be prepared to propose certain measures which he considered might be efficient. These measures, of which Mr. d'Oubril thinks proper to make a mystery, could of course be no other than an offer of mediation by the Emperor on a basis similar to the one contemplated by Great Britain in her proposal of last year, that Spain should recognize the Colonies as independent States on condition that they should adopt a Monarchical Govt. under Princes of the Bourbon family. If these ideas were then found impracticable even under the mediation of England it is perfectly evident that they are still more so at present, when England would probably no longer encourage them, and when the United States would certainly use all their influence against

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141, Everett to Duke del Infantado, January 20, 1826.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

³ See above, pt. XII, doc. 1025, Nesselrode to Middleton, August 20, 1825.

them. Such however appears to be the project of Mr. d'Oubril. He is also fully persuaded that the Colonies are in a wholly unsettled state; that their present forms of Govt. are revolutionary and may be expected from one year to another either to crumble to pieces or to be forcibly overthrown by some successful military chieftain; and that the result of such a catastrophe would be the restoration of the King's authority. He appears to found these opinions principally upon the sort of analogy which he supposes to exist between the present revolution in the Colonies & those that have lately occurred in Europe. It is easy to reply, as I have done repeatedly in conversation with him, that the analogy is evidently much more direct and stronger with our revolution, the results of which were entirely different. Politeness compels him to answer this by complimenting the character of our population at the expense of that of the Spanish Colonies; but I suppose he thinks at bottom that we are also going rather more slowly through the same revolutionary process, and shall finally settle down again, at the end of it, under the protection of England.

He admitted that the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico were now in the most imminent danger, and his ideas upon this subject did not appear to differ materially from mine; but he still seemed to think that it was not necessary in order to save them to proceed to an immediate recognition. He must therefore of course suppose that his favorite proposal of Monarchy and a Prince from Europe would be sufficiently seducing to the Colonies to make them not only change all their present institutions but even surrender the islands after they shall have come into their possession; for they must necessarily fall even according to Mr d'Oubril's views, before any such plan of pacification as that which he contemplates could be carried into effect.

My object in seeking a conversation with the Russian Minister was rather to satisfy myself what his views now are in regard to this subject than to attempt to change them. Notwithstanding his positive and repeated assertion that he had suggested nothing to this Govt. except the expediency of taking the subject at once into serious consideration, I am induced to think with Mr. Lamb, from the whole tenor of his conversation that he encourages them in regard to the probability of recovering the Colonies or at least of retaining an influence over them in one way or another. In fact, it is next to impossible that with his opinions he can converse with the Duke at all upon the subject without producing upon him an effect of that kind. The next morning after this conversation I sent to Mr d'Oubril a copy of my note of the 20th.—A day or two after I called upon him upon other business, and he then told me that he had ordered an abstract of it to be made for his own use, as he does not read English, and a copy to be taken for the information of his Govt. He has since returned me the original with a billet mentioning that he had transmitted the copy to St. Petersburg.

Since I had the honor of writing you last, I have conversed anew with the

Duke del Infantado once or twice upon this subject but without any definite result, and I am inclined to think that the effect of the first shock produced by the fall of St. Juan de Ulúa and the consequent probable attack on Cuba has in part passed away: It may perhaps continue to grow weaker until some new success of the Americans shall revive the alarm. The arrival at the Havana of the expedition from Ferrol, of which intelligence has lately been received, contributed in a degree to quiet the apprehensions of the Govt., and there is now less prospect of an immediate decision in favor of peace than there was when I last wrote. It is much, however, that a strong favorable impression has been made; and it was hardly to be expected that so great a measure should be carried thro' by the first impulse. They will now wait, I think, at the risk of losing the islands, to see the further progress of events in America. If this should continue favorable to the Colonies through the Spring and Summer (as there is every prospect that it will) I am still disposed to believe that the present crisis will produce a recognition. Even now the Duke continues to talk very fairly; and it is only from his delay in acting at so critical a moment that I am inclined to consider him as wavering in his opinions. At the first conversation which I had with him after I wrote you last he said that it was his intention to collect all the means of information he could find and submit them to the deliberate review of the Council; that he had read my memoir of the 20th with great attention, but that, as it was in English, he could not make use of it either with the King or the Council, and that in order to have any effect with them, it must be translated into Spanish; that considering the delicacy and importance of the subject it would perhaps be more agreeable to me to have a translation made under my own direction than to have it done in his office, which was also much pressed with business; and that if this were the case, he would be obliged to me to furnish him with one as soon as might be convenient. This proposition, while it illustrates plainly enough the inefficiency of the Duke's personal character, seems also to shew that he is disposed to attach some importance to this communication, and was thus far satisfactory to me. I assented of course to his request; and the next day he sent me the original with a short note, accompanying it, repeating in substance, what he had said the day before of which I enclose a translation¹ and copy. I have ordered a translation of the Memoir to be made by a very good hand, and shall have it ready in the course of a day or two. I have already communicated this paper to Messrs. King and Brown and shall avail myself of the next Courier to transmit a copy to Mr. Middleton.

The Sicilian Ambassador, Prince Cassaro, who takes a good deal of interest on the subject of America and is in some degree acquainted with my proceedings, told me the other day as a great secret that his wife had been informed by the Infanta Dona Louisa Carlota (wife of the King's second brother D.

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1147, Duke del Infantado to Everett, February 14, 1826.

Francisco and a Sicilian princess) that the other brother and heir apparent Don Carlos, is the great obstacle in the way of a pacification, and that he had declared in the Council of State, where he presides in the King's absence, with great violence, against any such proceedings. This Prince has long been known and recognized as the ostensible leader of the violent and fanatical Royalists; and it would therefore appear from this fact that they, as a party, are still firm on the subject of America. On the other hand the reputation of the Duke del Infantado as a staunch Royalist and confidential organ of the clergy stands as clear as that of any man in the Kingdom; and it is quite certain that his views have, since he came into office, undergone a change. Time alone can shew, and the progress of events in America will doubtless determine, whether prejudice or prudence shall carry the day.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *March 13, 1826.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of a plan of an expedition against the Colonies which was proposed a few weeks ago to this Govt. The author of the scheme is a clergyman, confessor of the Infante Don Carlos, and the details were probably digested in concert with this Prince. You will judge from their extravagance of the moral and intellectual capacities of the persons who enjoy the confidence of the fanatical party. The project, before it was submitted to the King, was shown to some of the merchants and contractors of this place in order to ascertain whether they would undertake to furnish any part of the supplies necessary for the expedition. It was thought that if any of them consented to do this the scheme would come before the council in a more feasible shape than it wears at first view. I received the papers from one of the contractors who also informed me that he was sent for by Father Cyrillo, a prominent member of the Council, to converse upon the subject, but refused to go. The plan was afterwards put into the King's hands, who thrust it into his pocket and has perhaps never looked at it, as he has said nothing about it since. It does not appear that it has been submitted to the Council as a body, altho' it has engaged the attention of some of the most considerable members. I send it

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV. The enclosure has not been copied because of its great length and small importance, its character and reception being sufficiently described in the dispatch.

to you principally as a specimen of the character of the views and expectations of the most violent section of the ruling party.

I have learned since I had the honor of writing you last that a plan was in agitation about the commencement of the year to effect the great object of the acknowledgement of the Colonies by means of corruption. The British Minister was at bottom of this scheme. He has repeatedly expressed to me from time to time ever since I have been here the opinion that the point could never be carried in any other way; and the Dutch and Saxon Ministers, with whom he habitually associates on very familiar terms, have always said the same thing. He did not however tell me while the affair was going on that he was attempting this mode of operation, altho' we held at the same time very frequent communications on the general subject; and in this he was perhaps discreet, as the greatest possible secrecy was of course necessary to success. I have since been informed of all the particulars by the persons who were employed as instruments in making the attempt. The plan was laid by the British Minister in concert with the Saxon. The former has little or no intercourse with any body here, and is one of the least suitable persons I have ever known for managing an affair of this kind. The Saxon Minister on the contrary, tho' a gentleman of the most honorable and amicable character, is at the same time a man of the world; and as Minister from a Court allied to the Royal family enjoys uncommon advantages for communicating with the interior of the palace. Through him and another agent an understanding was effected with the King's private secretary and his principal *Valet de chambre* who agreed to use their influence with H. M. to procure his consent to a loan of twenty millions of dollars, one of the public conditions of which, was to be the recognition of the Colonies and one of the private, a bonus of half a million to these persons to be paid beforehand. The British minister undertook to furnish the money and wrote to his Govt. to request it. This was probably the demand for fresh instructions, which he informed me himself (as I mentioned in a former despatch) that Mr. Canning did not even notice. It is certain at any rate that the money was not furnished and thus the project failed.

While the British Minister has been endeavoring to carry the point by corruption, the French have been and still are employing menaces and intimidation for the same purpose; each working with the instruments corresponding to the general spirit and practice of their respective Govt. I have lately obtained pretty full accounts of the proceedings of the French embassy and am informed that they have for some time past been urgently pressing upon the Govt. the expediency of bringing the war to a close, and as a first step the nomination of one or more plenipotentiaries to treat with the Colonies. In order to make the proposition more palatable they represent that such a nomination will not necessarily lead to a recognition of the independence of America, but will merely bring them into communication

with the other part and still leave them free to adopt any course they may think proper as to the terms of the negotiation. They think however that if they can once induce the Govt. to appoint a Minister, and despatch him to Paris or London, for this also is a part of the plan, it will then be impossible for them to escape from taking the important step. I confess that I see no very good reason for proposing this business in this indirect shape; nor do I believe that this Govt. will appoint a Plenipotentiary until they have made up their minds to treat upon the basis of mutual independence. They are now pretty well aware that it would be wholly impracticable to negotiate upon any other terms.

The French Govt. have hitherto prescribed to their Ambassador here the observance of great moderation and *ménagement* in pressing this subject, and he has been, I understand, for some time past quite as urgent, if not a little more so, than the letter of his instructions required. He is himself however so fully convinced by his personal observations on the state of Spain, of the absolute necessity of bringing the war to a close that he has repeatedly written home of late for new instructions which should authorize him to threaten this Govt. peremptorily and explicitly with an immediate recall of the troops unless they consent to make peace. One of the principal Secretaries who is employed by the Ambassador to treat directly with the Duke upon this subject told me yesterday that they expected by every mail instructions to this effect. It is now however a considerable time since the Ambassador has communicated his views to his Govt. and from the delay that has occurred in sending him the new instructions he wishes, it may perhaps be doubted whether the French Ministry are prepared to act with the energy necessary for bringing the business at once to a point. It is difficult indeed to imagine why they should hesitate since an energetic course in the affairs of this country is imperiously enjoined upon them by every consideration of policy and duty, and involves no real inconvenience of any kind. It seems nevertheless that M. de Villele, for some unknown reason, has not yet thought proper to assume the tone of authority which he might and ought to do for the good both of France & Spain. He permitted Mr. de Zea to be removed in direct opposition to his advice and wishes. It remains therefore to be shewn by facts whether he is capable of exhibiting the firm spirit in regard to the American question which the crisis requires. I sincerely hope that he may, but am inclined to fear that he will not. The Baron de Belleval tells me that the Duke del Infantado promises very fairly in regard to the nomination of a Plenipotentiary and that he renewed his assurance as lately as yesterday. Unfortunately these promises have now been repeated so often without bringing performance after them that they have become rather cheap. The French plan contemplates like that of England an arrangement under the mediation of the three principal maritime powers; Great Britain, France and the United States. The French and

English Ministers are both strongly impressed with the expediency of conducting the negotiation, whenever it may be decided on, either at London, Paris or some place other than Madrid, conceiving that the immediate presence of the Court might perhaps have an unfavorable effect upon the proceedings. I am not myself much struck with the force of their remarks upon this point; but I think it not improbable that, if peace be decided on, the form recommended by them will be agreed to. The President I presume will consider it advantageous to the interests of the United States and of their American allies that they should take a part in the mediation, as they will undoubtedly be invited to do; and in that case, if he is satisfied with my proceedings and correspondence on this subject, I venture to hope that my services will be employed in the further prosecution of the affair, whether it may be concluded here or at any other place in Europe.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, April 5, 1826.

SIR: Since I had the honor of writing you last little if any progress has been made in the great affair of the recognition of the new American States, and most of the persons here who take an interest in favor of that measure, consider it as adjourned, and laid wholly aside at least for the present.

I was rather less sanguine than some of them in regard to success, when it appeared most probable: and am now rather less disposed than they are to think the case desperate, although the prospect is certainly not so flattering as it was. The strong impression that existed at one time during the winter in favor of a pacific course was mainly the effect of the political events that occurred just before, particularly the surrender of St. Juan de Ulloa. The immediate danger that appeared to threaten the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico in consequence roused this Government for the moment from their usual apathy. Since then two or three little things have happened from which they have allowed themselves to derive encouragement as drowning men are said to catch at straws. The arrival of their reinforcements at the Havana, the safe return from that port of one of their small convoys of merchant vessels to Cadiz, and the reported capture by a privateer in the Gulf of Mexico of a few prizes seem to have really revived their spirits. The Duke del Infantado has mentioned this last circumstance to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXV.

me with an air of great satisfaction not less than three or four times. The Russian Minister who is always on the watch makes the most of every trifle of this Kind, and as nothing of importance has occurred since the fall of St. Juan de Ulloa to discourage them, the result of the whole has been that they have in a great measure recovered from their first alarm. They also appear to derive considerable hope and comfort from the war between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, although all the success has hitherto been on the side of the former.

The Russian Minister likewise attaches great importance to this circumstance: and I should not be surprised to learn hereafter that this war has been the result of the instigation of the Holy Alliance and that it is intended as a first and introductory step towards a renewal of hostilities by Spain upon the American Continent. Should this prove to be the fact the affair would deserve the very serious consideration of England, the United States and all the American Governments, since a covert interference of this Kind is equivalent in principle to an open declaration against the New States and still more dangerous in effect, so that it must be considered as equally adverse to the policy which has been avowed by the above mentioned Governments in regard to this subject. But however this may be, and whether the war made upon the Buenos Ayrians by the Emperor of Brazil be the effect of his madness or of the craft of the Holy Alliance (which I consider more probable) it may be expected to end in bringing defeat and ruin upon Don Pedro and in giving an accession of strength to the cause of Independence in America. There is every reason therefore to suppose that important events, whenever they occur, will be favorable to the Americans; and that several will in fact occur in the course of the year, as the fall of Callao, and the conquest of Chiloe, a serious and probably successful attack upon Cuba and Puerto Rico, and very possibly the expulsion of the New Emperor of Brazil or his voluntary return to Portugal which would produce an equivalent effect. Either of these events would give another violent shock to this Cabinet; and it is by the repetition of such shocks if at all that the recognition will be brought about.

The crisis cannot therefore be considered as entirely over but merely as suspended. In the mean time that I may not appear to you from the expectations intimated in some of my former despatches to have been too sanguine upon the subject, or to have been misinformed, I will just mention here that the French and British Ministers not only detained their Couriers at one time under the expectation of receiving from day to day some proposition of a pacific character; but, as I have since been told by the Secretary of the French Embassy, were actually advised by the Duke del Infantado to detain them for this express purpose. I had also at the same time, as I informed you, almost daily conversations with him upon the subject, which left no doubt whatever upon my mind in regard to his sentiments: but which

also gave me such an opinion respecting his character and the general state of the affair, that although I certainly entertained great hopes of an immediate arrangement, they were, as I then stated to you, somewhat less confident than those of the other Ministers who were laboring in the same cause. The impression which was then made, although it did not produce any immediate result, I still regard as a thing of importance: and as likely to facilitate considerably any future negotiations in favor of the Americans which the course of events may render expedient.

The British Minister has relapsed into his former inactivity, and tells me now that he considers the affair for the present at least as entirely desperate. I was inclined when I wrote you last upon this subject to expect something from the influence of France, having been informed about that time that the Ambassador was in daily expectation of new instructions which should authorize him to recommend the recognition in the decisive and peremptory tone which would probably be effectual. He has received, in fact since then some communications upon the subject, but not, as it appears, of the kind that he expected and had requested. I conversed with him a few days ago respecting the whole business more fully than I had done before, and was satisfied from his remarks that neither he nor his Government have yet taken a correct view of the situation of America or of the prospects and policy of Spain. He admitted that the recovery of America by actual military invasion was out of the question, but affected to suppose that a proposition to place the Bourbon Princes at the Head of the governments of the New States would still be received with great favor, and was very much astonished that it had never been made. I reminded him in answer to this that it had in fact been made to Buenos Ayres under the mediation of France and with the assent of Puerrydon then Supreme Director of that Republic and had met with no success at all. He could find no answer to this objection; but remarked for the sake of saying something that the proposition had been made without the Knowledge of Spain, which is a fact worth notice. He appeared to consider the new Governments as entirely unsettled and said that Mexico, for example, which is a Republic today, was an Empire last year, and might be a Monarchy the next; he did not believe that I would undertake, speaking honestly, to say that I had any confidence in the permanence of any of these constitutions. I told him that these Governments appeared to me sufficiently well established, and that the recognition of them by the United States was the best proof of the opinions which we entertained upon the subject, that the question was not, however whether the existing forms of Government were likely to endure, but whether Spain was likely to recover her authority over these countries, which I certainly considered as a thing entirely hopeless even in the event of new troubles; that as to my own private sentiments I would as soon lay a wager upon the stability of the Government of Mexico as of that of France without meaning

however to question the latter in the slightest degree; that there were doubtless seeds of revolution and trouble in both, and in fact in all other countries, which unfavorable circumstances might at any time develope; and that the danger of any occurrence of this Kind appeared to me to be as great in France as in Mexico; that if the Mexicans who were now Republicans had recently been Imperialists for a year, the French who were now Monarchists had at no distant period been Republicans for ten years and then Imperialists for ten years more. The Ambassador replied to this by a number of remarks upon the resources and power of France, and then reverted to the unsettled state of Spanish America concerning which his notions are in every respect very loose and vague. He enlarged a good deal upon the superior talents and virtues which had been exhibited by the founders of the Independence of the United States, and thought that no conclusions ought to be drawn from the success of our attempt, in favor of the probability of the success of the Spanish Americans. These he described as so many *tas de gredins*—heaps of ragamuffins—and he said that if the King of Spain should decide at once to recognize their Independence he really did not know to whom he could make the proposition. I then told him that the United States had Ministers accredited at the residences of these Governments, and that if duly authorized by the King of Spain to make propositions they would be at no loss to whom to address them. These however were the considerations to which he constantly turned from every other view of the subject during a long conversation of two hours, and are evidently those which most naturally present themselves to his mind in connexion with it. He appeared to think that he was saying much when he intimated that he did not after all approve the proceedings of the Russian Minister—that he had not advised the King against recognizing the Colonies and that if their Commissioners should present themselves here immediately and solicit such recognition he should do nothing to prevent it. I concluded from the whole conversation that the Secretary from whom I had my information before was a great deal more earnest in the cause than the Ambassador or his government, and that the influence of France will not be exerted here in such a way as to produce any effect.

The Baron de Belleval mentioned to me in a late conversation that Mr. Canning addressed a representation to the French Cabinet just before the opening of Parliament upon the subject of the occupation of Spain by the French troops, stating that he considered it as unnecessary and disagreeable to the Court of Spain. The French Minister in reply denied both these assertions and undertook to exhibit a written document emanating from this Cabinet and proving their desire that the occupation should be continued. They accordingly wrote to the Ambassador here and desired him to procure such a document but without expressly demanding it in writing. Mr. de Moustiers upon receiving these instructions communicated them to the

Duke and agreed with him, that in answer to some representation made by the Ambassador in regard to the treatment of the French Troops, the Duke should seize the occasion to express, as if entirely of his own accord, the great satisfaction of the King with the good conduct of the army of occupation and his high sense of the important service they were rendering to H. M. by occupying his Kingdom. This was accordingly done. Baron de Bellevall read to me the note from the Duke containing these expressions. The object of the French Cabinet in wishing to obtain them in this indirect way was doubtless that they might look more like a spontaneous and sincere declaration of the sentiments of this government. A King must be reduced pretty low when he is compelled in this way to solicit and approve the intervention of a foreign army. It is however in fact true enough that the occupation of Spain is to all appearance indispensable to the continuance of the present political system, and that if the French army were to evacuate the Kingdom immediately their departure would probably be followed very shortly by a new revolution.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, May 20, 1826.

I received a few days ago the President's Message to the House of Representatives on the subject of the mission to Panama with the accompanying documents; and am happy to find that the measure is likely to meet the approbation of Congress. I have been for some time intending to renew my exertions here in favour of the recognition of the Colonies upon the first good occasion that should offer. On looking over the documents transmitted with the message, it struck me that the note addressed by you to Messrs. Salazar and Obregon² on the subject of the expedition to Cuba might be communicated with advantage (with one or two unimportant omissions) to this Government, and would furnish a suitable opportunity for requesting an answer to my overture of the 20th of January.³ I accordingly transmitted to the Duke this morning a copy of your note accompanied by one from myself to that effect, of which a copy is herewith enclosed.⁴

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 150, Clay to Salazar, December 20, 1825.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141.

⁴ See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1152, Everett to Duke del Infantado, May 20, 1826.

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to the Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

MADRID, May 20, 1826.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith to your Excellency a copy of a note addressed by the Secretary of State of the United States to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Colombia residing at Washington for the purpose of communicating through him to the government of that Republic the wishes of the Government of the United States respecting the projected expedition against the Island of Cuba. A similar note was addressed on the same day to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of Mexico.

Your Excellency will perceive that it is the object of this communication to advise the Governments of Colombia and Mexico not to put in execution at present their plans of attack upon the Spanish Islands, and to point out to them the inconveniences that might eventually result from an enterprise of this description. I am authorized to inform you that the answers of the aforesaid Ministers without being decisive are nevertheless satisfactory and exhibit a strong disposition on their part to consult the desire and to conform to the policy of the government which I have the honor to represent as far as other considerations of a still more imperious nature may permit. I have also to add that the Ministers of the United States at the Congress of Panama will be instructed to offer to the Powers that may assemble there, the same Counsels that have already been addressed to their Ministers at Washington.

These vigorous and I may add successful efforts to secure the tranquillity and present political situation of the valuable possessions that still remain to the King in America, will, I trust satisfy His Majesty's Government of the friendly dispositions of that of the United States and of their sincere wish to promote the real interest of Spain as far as their other obligations will allow.

Having thus employed not without effect their good offices with the American Governments in favor of the rights and interests of the King, they think themselves justified in expecting that His Majesty will be induced to listen with attention to the intercessions they have made with his government in favor of the rights and interests of his ancient Colonies.

It is now about four months since I had the honor of addressing to your Excellency a detailed note in which I stated the views of my Government upon this subject, their full conviction that the Colonies can never be recovered and their earnest desire that the war may be terminated as speedily as

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, May 20, 1826, which see above, pt. XIII, doc. 1151.

possible, by a recognition on the part of Spain of the independence of the new nations into which they have been formed.

I avail myself of the present occasion to inquire of Your Excellency what answer His Majesty's Government intend to return to this note and whether the King is disposed to accept the offer which I then made on the part of my government of their good offices in bringing about a reconciliation between the parties to the War on the only practicable basis.

I pray Your Excellency to accept [etc.].

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *June 2, 1826.*

It was also reported here last week with a good deal of confidence that the subject of the Colonies had been recently taken up anew in the Cabinet at the earnest instance of the French and English Ministers and that there was every prospect of a favorable result. I did not at the time consider this rumour as sufficiently probable to be worth mentioning in my despatch: and I found in fact upon making inquiry at Aranjuez that there was as little foundation for it as for the other. I conversed with Mr. Lamb upon the subject the day after my arrival, and he told me, with his usual frankness, that as far as he was concerned there was indeed some slight ground for the story, inasmuch as he had within a few days verbally communicated to the Duke the news of the fall of Callao, which he had received by express from England, and had upon that occasion conversed with him anew upon the general subject of America; but that he had no reason to think that there had been any recent proceedings in the Cabinet, or the Council in regard to it, still less any change in the views of the government, and that he did not believe that the French Ambassador had done any thing, as he should probably in that case have heard more or less of it. The rumour in question probably grew out of this communication of Mr. Lamb taken in connexion perhaps with my late note and its enclosures. Some indistinct notions may have transpired as usual respecting the proceedings that took place on these occasions, and in passing from one to another have been gradually moulded and magnified into the shape in which I received them.

You may recollect that I informed you in some of my preceding despatches of communications that had been made to me by Baron de Belleval, first

¹ MS. Despatches from Spain, XXVI.

Secretary of the French Embassy, respecting their proceedings in regard to this subject: and especially respecting his own repeated interviews with the Duke and urgent endeavours to persuade him to adopt a new Course. It is rather a singular fact that within a few days the Baron has been recalled by his Court with orders to depart at twenty four hours notice. This he told me himself but did not state the reason of his recall which may be politically a matter of indifference. It is conjectured however by some persons that his great activity in regard to the American question has given umbrage to his own Government. I noted and mentioned to you at the time a considerable divergence between the views of the Secretary and the Ambassador as exhibited in their respective conversations with me of about the same date: and I was particularly struck in the course of these conversations with the Secretary to hear him say at the moment when he represented himself as being so very active, that the Ambassador had never spoken to the King upon the subject, although he is in the habit of recurring directly to His Majesty on matters of business and has found his applications attended at times with effect.

If these conjectures respecting the recall of Baron de Belleval are correct the fact would lead to confirm the opinion I have heretofore expressed and still think on other accounts probable, that the French Cabinet, although they evidently feel a pretty strong desire that Spain should recognize the Colonies, are nevertheless not prepared to act upon this question with the vigour and decision which alone would make their intercession effectual. This is the more to be regretted as France is in fact the only foreign power that has any real influence over the present Ministry. The weight of Russia which at times has been predominant here is a good deal diminished for the present in consequence of the circumstances attending the Duke's appointment. England is looked upon with something worse than indifference on account of her recognition of the Colonies; and the United States, for various reasons which I need not here detail, can hardly be supposed to possess much positive influence, although the dispositions of the government are quite as friendly to us as could reasonably be expected under all the circumstances and although they are evidently more and more sensible from day to day of the expediency of treating us with at least as much cordiality as they really feel.

I availed myself of the opportunity of my visit to Aranjuez to converse with the Duke del Infantado upon the several subjects in negotiation between the two Governments and called upon him by appointment for this purpose at his office on the 29th ult. I began the conversation by reminding him of my late communication of your note addressed to the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico respecting the expedition against the Spanish Islands and told him that I took for granted that these proceedings would be agreeable to His Majesty's Government. He assented with much cordiality to this remark,

and assured me that they were fully satisfied with the conduct of the Government of the United States upon this occasion and duly grateful to them for their timely assistance. He also expressed the pleasure with which he had learned that our Ministers at the Congress of Panama would be instructed to dissuade the New States from attacking Cuba and Puerto Rico. I then remarked to him, as I had done in my note, that if these measures were approved by His Majesty and considered as advantageous to his rights and interests, they would, I hoped, give new weight to our intercession here in favor of the Colonies; and I then inquired of him whether the government were yet prepared to give an answer to the proposals for mediation made in my note of the 20th of January.¹ Mr. Lamb had told me that the Duke mentioned to him among other reasons why the necessity of coming to a decision at once was not urgent, that the situation of the Islands had materially changed since the winter, and that as they were now safe in consequence of the policy adopted by the United States one great motive for pressing the conclusion of peace was removed. With a view of meeting this objection in advance I added in making the above inquiry the observation that the policy we had adopted, although it had probably been the means of giving them a few months, perhaps a year or two, longer for deliberation, could only be regarded as affording a temporary relief; and that it could not be supposed that our influence with the new States, were it ever employed in this way, would be sufficiently powerful to prevent them, if Spain should voluntarily persevere in the war, from attacking her in her only vulnerable point. I also suggested to him the recent facts of the fall of Callao and of Chiloe as additional proofs of the utter hopelessness of the Royalist cause in every part of the Continent.

The Duke replied that the Government were not yet prepared to give a decisive answer to the proposal of mediation on the basis of independence, made by me in the name of my Government; that some of the other powers were also anxious on the subject, but that nothing was yet determined on or probably would be immediately; that the King would however be very desirous to avail himself of the good offices of the United States, if he ever came to negotiate upon the basis contemplated in my offer, and would even consider their aid in procuring advantageous terms as perhaps more important than that of any European Power on account of their positive influence in America, and of the greater disinterestedness which appeared in general to distinguish their policy. I expressed to the Duke the satisfaction I felt at the favorable opinion which he appeared to entertain of our principles of Administration. I told him that we did not mean to claim the merit of entire disinterestedness for the steps which we had taken in regard to the Islands; that the consequences of an attack upon them by the new Governments were wholly uncertain, but could not in any event be agreeable to my

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1141.

Government, and might in some contingencies make it necessary for us to adopt measures which would risk the continuance of our friendly relations with the great Powers of Europe; that these considerations had their weight in recommending to the President the policy which he was pursuing, and in which he was cordially sustained by all the branches of the government; but that it was also a matter of high satisfaction to him that the same course which was required by the interest of the United States, would also tend to promote the advantage of an ancient ally and a Power with which we were desirous to maintain the best possible understanding.

The Duke then said that it was the more difficult to come to an immediate decision as the question appeared to be taking the shape of an European affair and must of course be treated as such in consultation with all the great Powers. I enquired of him in what sense he meant to be understood when he said that the question was becoming European; but did not find that he intended anything more than that several of the Powers had offered their advice to the Spanish Government and had interested themselves in one way or other in the progress and issue of the war. The Duke had made the same remark to Mr. Lamb at their late conversation upon the subject. I told him that he was probably aware that the British Government were determined not to become a party in future to any general consultation of the great powers upon this or any other subject; that my government as far as I was informed of their intentions would have no objections to employ their good offices in conjunction with any other power or powers that might be willing to proceed upon the same principles, but that after all the affair was properly an American one, and that the United States would probably be able to do for Spain quite as much, if acting alone, as if embarrassed by the cooperation of other nations. I then suggested to him my apprehensions that the influence of Russia was not employed in the way which we had wished and hoped. He replied to this in rather an indefinite manner, saying that he doubted whether that government felt a very strong interest on the subject, and that at all events their opinion, whatever it might be, would not be considered here as of any great importance.

After this a good deal of conversation took place upon the general subject of the policy most suitable to the interest of Spain. I suggested anew to the Duke the evident impossibility of recovering the Colonies and the three great evils attending the war, to wit, the actual expence, the danger of losing the islands, and the interruption of Commerce with America. The Duke in his reply alluded more particularly to this last point; and said that such was the inferiority of Spain to the other countries of Europe in all the branches of industry that he doubted very much whether the return of peace would throw into her hands a great share of the trade with America. I endeavoured to satisfy him by a number of considerations (the same in substance as are detailed in my note of the 20th of January) that these apprehensions were

not well founded, and that the establishment of friendly relations with the Colonies would have a very powerful effect upon the Commercial situation of the country; but he did not appear to be persuaded of the correctness of my views upon this subject. He denied that the example of England and the United States was applicable to the present case, and believed that we had returned to the English market after the conclusion of the War of Independence merely because the manufactures of England were the best and cheapest, and not on account of the community of origin and the old habits of intercourse. In his remarks upon this head, although I think them incorrect, the Duke exhibited a more familiar acquaintance with the argument pro and con than I had known him to do before, and has probably directed his attention to it and conversed with others upon it since I talked with him last. It seemed to me rather a singular thing to hear the Prime Minister of a nation which is generally thought to have retained all its pride, however much it may have lost of its former power, founding the justification of his measures upon the supposition of the absolute and irremediable inferiority of his countrymen in all the fine and useful arts of life. Contrary to the usual and what might be considered the natural course of a discussion of this kind, or because my part—to dwell upon the great resources of the Spanish territory, the eminent qualities that had always distinguished the nation and the excellence at which they had formerly arrived in every branch of art and industry; while he on the contrary was insisting upon the defects in the character of the people, undervaluing their ancient attainments, and despairing of any improvement in future. It did not perhaps occur to him at the moment how absurd it would be to expect that several empires in a distant quarter of the globe should voluntarily come forward, renounce their independence, beg pardon for having assumed it, and acknowledge the lawful authority of a nation; condemned, as he affirmed Spain to be, by incurable natural defects to a state of irremediable and hopeless imbecility. Although the facts which I adduced in support of my remarks upon this head could not be contested, they appeared to make little or no impression upon him, and he observed repeatedly that the only way in which the trade with America could be made profitable to Spain would be for the Colonies to allow some important discriminations in her favour. The monopoly which she possessed before the Revolution, and not the Excellence of her products and fabrics or the community of origin and habits, was, in his opinion, the real cause why the trade then existed, and without a revival of this monopoly or something equivalent to it, a return of peace would never bring the trade back. To this I could only answer that I doubted whether the new States would grant any such privileges to the Spanish Flag since they had bound themselves to each other and to foreign nations by express treaties not to do so: that the United States were one of the nations with whom they had entered into engagements to this effect, and that it would of course not be our

policy to urge them to violate their treaties with us in points directly favorable to our own interest.

I avoided suggesting to the Duke on this occasion the probability that the new States might be induced to make some immediate pecuniary sacrifices as a compensation to Spain for the abandonment of her ancient territorial rights; because I had lately been informed by a private correspondent that the intimation to this effect contained in my note of the 20th of January did not accord precisely with the President's views. It struck me at the time of drawing up that note, which I did with much reflexion, that there was a substantial and very important difference between granting commercial preferences which would operate unfavorably upon other friendly nations; and paying down a sum of money which without injuring any other power would be an important thing to Spain. It appeared to me also that these young and flourishing States might reasonably be supposed willing to contribute out of their abundance to the relief of the distresses of their miserable old parent upon her making a concession, which though little more than formal on her part, would nevertheless be to them of real advantage. These considerations led me to introduce the idea in the guarded manner in which it appears in the note; and I still cannot but think that they have some weight; although the deference which I feel for the President's opinion diminishes the confidence which I had previously entertained in their correctness. I need not add that as far as I am made acquainted with the views of the government respecting the subjects upon which I am required to negotiate I shall always conform to them in my communications with the greatest possible exactness.

I finally remarked in order to bring the conversation to a close that in regard to this affair which was in its character peculiarly a Spanish one the United States could only propose their mediation and that it was for His Majesty to determine whether or not he would accept it. I added that I had lately been informed by our Minister at London that Mr. Hurtado, the Colombian Minister there, was authorised to accept an offer of peace though not to make one; and that if the King chose to avail himself of our proposal, I would with much pleasure convey the information to Mr. Hurtado who would doubtless consider the acceptance of the mediation of the United States as a sufficient basis for the commencement of a negotiation. The Duke appeared to take some exception to the idea that Mr. Hurtado should be authorised to accept peace but not to seek it. He thought it much more proper for the Colonies to make the first advances. I told him that if an understanding could be established there would probably be no difficulty in adjusting the points of form and precedence; but that the King was the party which declared and continued the war, that the Colonies were known to be always ready and willing to make peace; and that it seemed therefore natural enough for the King when it suited his purpose to come forward on his part and express his disposition to meet them. Such was the substance

of this conversation. Mr. Lamb informed me that he inquired of the Duke whether this Government would accept a proposition for an armistice should one be made to them by the Colonies, but could not get him to give a decisive answer.

The British Minister also told me that the impression remaining on his mind from the conversation he held with the Duke was, that this Government was now less disposed than ever to acknowledge the new States. The President will judge how far such a conclusion would be justified by the remarks which I have reported above as correctly as my memory would permit. On my mind they left the general idea that this government though wavering and irresolute is on the whole inclining towards a better policy than they have hitherto pursued, that they are beginning to be aware of the utter hopelessness of the struggle and of the ruinous consequences that may attend the continuance of it, but are nevertheless afraid to assume the immense responsibility of so portentous a change as they consider the sacrifice of the Colonies to be in the situation of the country; and that in a matter which they regard as so vastly important, they distrust alike their own opinions and the advice of other powers and shrink involuntarily from encountering the crisis. How long this state of irresolution will last is of course uncertain; but I am inclined to think that they would be glad of almost any occurrence that should relieve them from it; and that they would experience a real satisfaction, whatever they might say upon the subject, if any other power, as France for example, should come forward and require them peremptorily to make peace at once. I have already said however that there is no probability of the adoption of any such measure by France, the only power whose situation would authorise or permit it, and this Government will therefore be left in a great measure to act for itself. According to the best judgment that I am able to form the chance for an early recognition is on the whole greater than it has ever been excepting for a short period during the last winter, and may be considered as gradually increasing. Much will depend on the progress of events in America, and much on the fluctuations in the Ministry here; but I confess that I look forward with a good deal of confidence to a termination of the war in the course of the present year, or at farthest the next.

I had another long conversation on this subject two or three weeks ago with the Russian Minister which I need not trouble you by undertaking to report in detail as the argument in both its parts is perfectly familiar to you. Mr. d'Oubril has received no new instructions; and in fact the attention of his Government has been and still is too closely occupied by affairs at home of a pressing character to leave much time for looking abroad to another world. This gentleman continues to take great interest in the progress of events in America, and often converses with the Ministers about them. He probably does not advise this Government directly to persevere in the present system; but no doubt encourages them in regard to their prospects,

and by sharing in their delusion assists in some degree in keeping it up. There is little hope, I fear, at present, that the influence of Russia will be exercised here in favour of peace.

1154

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain*¹

MADRID, June 7, 1826.

SIR: I have lately been informed by the Minister of the United States at London that the Government of the Republic of Colombia has requested the Government of His Britannic Majesty to propose to that of Spain an armistice of twenty years; that a similar request has been made to the Government of His Most Christian Majesty and that the United States have been invited to cooperate with France and England in urging the Spanish Government to accept this proposal.

This information was officially communicated to the Minister of the United States at London by the Minister of the Republic of Colombia at that place for the purpose of being transmitted to me with a request from the latter that I should take such steps in the business as might appear to me proper [and] consistent with my instructions.

I have no orders yet from my government upon the subject but should feel myself authorised by the general instructions under which I act here to support any proposal of this kind which you or the French Ambassador may be instructed to offer and I shall be happy to receive from you any communications upon the subject which you may think proper to make to me.

1155

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain*²

MADRID, June 8, 1826.

SIR: In addition to the contents of my letter of yesterday I have the honor to inform you that I have this day received the orders of my Govern-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, June 25, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1162. An identical letter, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent on the same date to the Marquis de Moustiers, French Ambassador to Spain.

² MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, June 25, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1162. An identical letter was sent on the same date to the Marquis de Moustiers, French Ambassador to Spain.

ment to propose to that of Spain in the name of the Republic of Columbia and its Allies the conclusion of a long armistice. I am also directed to co-operate as far as may be practicable with the Representatives of the British and French Governments in urging the acceptance of this proposal.

Having some reason to suppose that you may have already made in the name of your Government an overture of this description, it would be agreeable to me, before I proceed to execute the orders I have just received, to learn from you as far as you may think proper to inform me what steps you have taken in the business and with what results.

I have the honor [etc.].

1156

*Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain*¹

ARANJUEZ, June 8, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR: In our last conversation I stated to you what had passed between the Duke of Infantado and myself on the subject of an armistice. The disposition he shewed was so unpromising that I do not intend to push the proposition further. I have had no conversation with the French Ambassador upon the subject. If any thing should have passed at Madrid between you and the Duke which may in any way affect this view of the question I shall be much obliged to you to acquaint me with it.

Believe me [etc.].

1157

*Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain*¹

ARANJUEZ, June 9, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date but can add nothing to my communication of yesterday; except that I shall be most happy to hear of the success of the proposition you are charged with, and to give it every support in my power.

Believe me [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, June 25, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1162.

1158

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *June 9, 1826.*

SIR: I received yesterday your despatch N^o 5² with its enclosures. I shall lose no time in proposing to this government in the name of the Republic of Colombia and her allies the conclusion of a long armistice agreeably to your instructions, and shall give you the earliest information of the manner in which the proposal is received.

I have reason to suppose that an overture of this kind has already been made by the Representatives of France and Great Britain, the latter having informed me, as I mentioned in my last despatch which accompanies this, that he had hypothetically suggested to the Duke del Infantado the idea of an armistice. From the manner in which, according to Mr. Lamb's account, the Duke received this suggestion, and from the observations made to me by the latter and reported in my last despatch,³ there is no great prospect of an immediate acceptance of the proposal. I am not however without some hopes of success, as the Duke intimated, I understand, to the British Minister, that whenever the King should make up his mind to treat, an armistice would naturally be the first step towards negotiation. As a permanent arrangement I am inclined to think that a formal treaty could be obtained with nearly as little difficulty as a long armistice. I recollect that soon after the Duke del Infantado came into office an article appeared in one of the French Ministerial papers recommending to Spain the adoption of such a policy, and that in the course of some conversation which I then had with the Duke on the subject, he expressed his disapprobation of the plan and thought that if the system now acted on were to be abandoned it would be better to make a full treaty at once. I think it not improbable that the idea of proposing a long armistice may have been suggested to the Colombian Government by that of France. I learned some time ago from Mr. Hurtado, the Colombian Envoy at London, through the medium of Mr. King, that it was intended to make such an overture, and have been ever since in daily expectation of your instructions.

I had anticipated, as you will have learned from my preceding despatches, your direction in regard to the use to be made here of your intercessions with the Mexican and Colombian Governments respecting the expedition against Cuba. The effect on this Cabinet has been very favorable, and will give to our negotiations for peace a weight which they would not have had under

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

² See above, pt. I, doc. 157, Clay to Everett, April 13, 1826.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1153, Everett to Clay, June 2, 1826.

any other circumstances. There is no alteration yet in the Russian policy on this subject, at least as manifested here. As the dispute with Turkey is likely to be adjusted without much trouble or delay, the Emperor may perhaps have leisure after a while to turn his attention more directly to the affairs of America than he has hitherto done.

1159

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to the Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

MADRID, June 10, 1826.

SIR: I have just received instructions from my Government to propose to that of His Majesty in the name of the Republic of Colombia and its allies in the War, the conclusion of an armistice. These instructions were transmitted to me by direction of the President of the United States, at the particular request of the Colombian Government communicated by their Minister Plenipotentiary accredited at Washington. Should the King think proper to take this proposal into consideration, I shall with much pleasure make known to Your Excellency the terms and conditions that would be agreeable to the Colombian Government.

An armistice would naturally be looked upon by both the belligerent parties as a preliminary step to the conclusion of a definitive treaty. I have already had occasion to inform Your Excellency in detail of the strong desire of the Government of the United States for the restoration of peace in America and of the reasons which induce them to believe that a farther continuance of the war, while it disturbs the quiet of all that part of the world, can be of no real advantage to Spain. This communication has no doubt received from His Majesty's Government the attention due to the importance of the subject and the amicable spirit in which it was made; so that I need not here repeat its contents. The Government which I have the honour to represent has given unequivocal and very recent proofs of their disposition to aid in securing the rights and promoting the interest of His Catholic Majesty as far as was compatible with their neutral position. They consider it as another mark of the same friendly sentiments which have hitherto directed their conduct to advise His Majesty respectfully but very strongly to accept the proposal now made. Should the King come to this decision, the Government of the United States will be happy to lend the aid of their good offices, either for the arrangement of the armistice or the con-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, June 25, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1162.

clusion of the definitive treaty, in any way in which His Majesty may think it proper to employ them.

I shall only add to the above remarks that the Colombian Government in proposing an armistice at the moment when the events of the war have placed at their disposal a considerable military force which might now be employed in new expeditions has given evidence of a spirit of moderation which will doubtless be duly appreciated by His Catholic Majesty.

I avail myself [etc.].

1160

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to the Marquis de Moustiers, French Ambassador to Spain*¹

MADRID, June 12, 1826.

SIR: Agreeably to the orders of my Government which require me to co-operate with your Excellency in urging the Spanish Cabinet to accept the armistice proposed by the allied American Powers, I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information a copy of a note which I have addressed to the Duke del Infantado upon that subject.²

I venture to hope that Your Excellency will receive from Paris such instructions as may authorise you to give a decided and vigorous support to this proposal as I am fully satisfied that no other consideration will induce the Spanish Government to agree to it. The influence of France if powerfully exerted would in all probability effect the object.

The principal condition desired by the Allies is that during the continuance of the armistice Spain should not augment her armed force in the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico; in consideration of which the Allies will engage on their part to make no attempt to excite internal dissensions in these islands. Nothing is said in my instructions on the subject of a guarantee but it would be natural that the armistice if proposed and accepted under the mediation of the three maritime Powers should be jointly guaranteed by them all.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, June 25, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1162.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1159, Everett to Duke del Infantado, June 10, 1826.

1161

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Frederick Lamb, British Minister to Spain*¹

MADRID, June 12, 1826.

SIR: Agreeably to the orders of my Government which require me to co-operate with you in urging the Spanish Cabinet to accept the armistice proposed by the Allied American Powers, I have the honor to transmit herewith for your information a copy of a note² which I have addressed to the Duke del Infantado upon that subject: and am [etc.].

1162

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*³

MADRID, June 25, 1826.

SIR: Having some reason to suppose, as I mentioned in my last despatch,⁴ that communications had taken place between this government and the British and French Ministers here upon the subject of an armistice before I received your instructions to propose one myself, I thought it proper before I took any step in the business, to ascertain precisely what they had done. I had in fact written to both these gentlemen, who were then at Aranjuez on the subject in consequence of what I had heard from Mr. King respecting it on the day before I received your letter. After the receipt of this I wrote to them again, & in the course of a day or two obtained their answers. I enclose copies of these papers⁵ which will of course be regarded as confidential. It appears from them that the French Ambassador has had no orders whatever from his Government on the subject, and from the letters of the British Minister as well as from my subsequent conversation with him and with the Duke I am satisfied that he made no direct proposition but merely a preliminary suggestion as reported in my despatch No. 36⁶ of which the duplicate is herewith transmitted.

Finding that the affair was thus entirely open I determined to address a note immediately to the Duke del Infantado and propose the armistice to

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, June 25, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1162.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1159, Everett to Duke del Infantado, June 10, 1826.

³ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

⁴ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1158, Everett to Clay, June 9, 1826.

⁵ See above, pt. XIII, docs. 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1160 and 1161, under the following dates: June 7, 8, 9, and 12.

⁶ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1153, Everett to Clay, June 2, 1826.

him in a formal way. Had I conceived that there would be any advantage in doing this verbally I should have taken another journey to Aranjuez expressly for this purpose; but it appeared to me that the proposition would produce a better effect in the first instance in a written form and, as there would be no prospect of an immediate & decisive answer, that nothing could be gained by the other course. I accordingly addressed to the Duke on the 10th a note of which copies are enclosed in French and English.¹ The latter may be considered as the original. With a view of obtaining the co-operation as far as possible of the French and British Ministers I sent them copies of the note with accompanying letters of which I enclose copies as also of the answers of Mr. Lamb. Mr. de Moustiers sent me no written answer but has since informed me that he transmitted immediately copies of the note and of my letter to his Government and should wait for their instructions.

I was a little in doubt what course to take with the Russian Minister. If there had been any prospect of obtaining a favourable answer immediately and before he was likely to be informed that the proposition had been made, I should have said nothing to him about it, from a fear that he would use his influence against it. But viewing an immediate favorable decision as entirely hopeless & knowing that he would of course become acquainted after a while with all the proceedings, I thought it more conciliatory and politic to begin by requesting his cooperation. I accordingly sent him a copy of the note at the same time as to the other Ministers and availed myself of the occasion to enquire of him whether since I last conversed with him he had received any new instructions. In his answer he engaged to explain himself upon this head at a future interview; and the day after his arrival in town he in fact called upon me, and we had much conversation on the whole subject which I shall report more fully in a subsequent letter. It appears that he has had some additional orders and that they are rather of a more favorable cast than the preceding. The Russian Government seem to have been well satisfied with the proceedings in regard to Cuba and Puerto Rico.

I have also had conversations with the British and French Ministers and with the Duke del Infantado since the return of the Court to town of all which I shall send you complete notes hereafter. The remarks of the Duke were conciliatory in form and manner, but evasive as to the substance; and promise little or nothing at least for the moment. Having but a short time to prepare this despatch for a private opportunity, I confine myself for the present to the above brief explanation of the nature of the papers enclosed and must refer you for more details to future communications.

I have the honor [etc.].

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1159, Everett to Duke del Infantado, June 10, 1826.

1163

*The Duke del Infantado, First Secretary of State of Spain, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain*¹

[TRANSLATION]

SACEDON, July 8, 1826.

SIR: I have laid before the King my August Master your note of the 10th ult² in which you propose by order of your Government and at the request of the Republic of Colombia, so called, and its allies an armistice between their troops, and those of His Majesty. I am ordered to inform you that the King has seen in this communication undoubted evidence of the strong interest taken by the Government of the United States in the restoration of peace in the countries bordering upon their territory and of their desire to promote the general good of mankind by putting a stop to the effusion of human blood.

His Majesty cannot but appreciate very highly these sentiments of a friendly power to which he is also under obligations for the opinion which it has lately expressed in favor of the preservation of the present state of things in the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The King has always taken pride in giving proofs of his affection for his subjects even when they have failed in their duty; and cherishing still towards them the affection of a father for his children, he ardently desires that the war may cease, and that the crisis of discord and agitation through which the Spanish Provinces in America are now passing may be followed as soon as possible by the period of peace and good understanding which is necessary to the happiness of both worlds and of the Sovereign who reigns in them.

I avail myself [etc.].

1164

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*³

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, July 13, 1826.

SIR: I received the day before yesterday the answer which the Duke del Infantado had promised me to my note on the armistice and have the honor

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI, enclosed in Everett to Clay, July 13, 1826, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1164.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1159.

³ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

to transmit herewith a copy and translation¹ of it. It corresponds very exactly with the general tenor of his conversation upon the subject of America, being civil and conciliatory in form but evasive in substance and looking rather to a continuance of the war than to an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies.

1165

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*²

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, September 1, 1826.

. . . The King of France is said to have stated that he would with pleasure so far comply with the desire of his relation and ally the King of Spain as to permit all the troops now here to remain for the present; but that it was impossible for him to think of making himself permanently responsible for the tranquillity of this country. He therefore earnestly advised the King of Spain to adopt immediately some measures that would place the government on a better footing and supersede the necessity of foreign assistance. He then particularized three which he thought of the greatest importance and most urgent character and which were.

1. To appoint and despatch to Paris a Commissioner authorised to treat for Peace with Commissioners from the Colonies. . . .

. . . The first recommendation is a mere repetition of the advice which has uniformly been offered here by the French Embassy on the subject of America. The substance is good but the form seems to be dictated by a wish (natural enough perhaps in the French Government) to exercise as much influence as possible in determining the conditions of a general pacification and to give them as favorable a character for the interest of France as the nature of the case will admit. . . .

I enclose a copy of a plan for opening the trade between this country and the Colonies which is under discussion before the board of Trade.³ If

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1163, Duke del Infantado to Everett, July 8, 1826.

² MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

³ A translation of the proposed plan follows:

Plan of the Committee for the regulation of duties to throw open trade between Spain and her ci-devant Colonies to foreign vessels; to be transmitted to the Commercial Tribunals for advice

1st. The produce and merchandise of the revolted colonies as respects the payment of duties, shall be subject to the same rates as are applied to a foreign flag.

2^d. Said produce and merchandise may be entered into our ports by Spaniards, direct from thence or from foreign ports as may be found most convenient.

3^d. When imported under a Spanish flag a deduction of a third of the duties will be allowed; which deduction shall be specified in the duties that may be assigned.

there were the least consistency or principle of any kind in the proceedings of this government the proposition of such a measure would indicate a settled intention of recognizing very soon the independence of the Colonies. But it is probably not connected with any such view.

4. Such produce and merchandise as may come direct from the Colonies under the Spanish flag, and without having touched at any port, whatever may have been the cause, shall be entitled to a reduction of half the duties.

5. Cocoa of all kinds and all other goods and merchandise, whatever may be the place whence they proceed, shall pay 18 p^r. 100 under the Spanish flag and $\frac{1}{3}$ more, that is 24 p^r. 100 under a foreign flag, according as they may be valued.

6. No other sugars shall be admitted than those coming from the Island of Cuba with a corresponding Register; and they are to pay 2 p^r. 100 upon the value assigned if imported direct from thence and under the national flag; if under a foreign flag, or if the ship shall have touched at any foreign port, whatever may have been the cause, the present existing duties of 4 reals per arroba shall be paid on the presentation of the original Register and proof being given of their shipment at said ports of Cuba.

7. All other goods and merchandise from the loyal Colonies shall be subject to payment of 2 p^r. 100 on their value, under the Spanish flag, as before stipulated, the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico excepted, which are to continue in the enjoyment of the privileges that have been granted them.

8. As the produce and merchandise of the revolted Colonies are to be brought to the same standard as foreign merchandise, the presentation of certificates of property and place of shipment is not to be required.

9. The importation of Colonial produce, whatever port it may proceed from, will be allowed in the exempted provinces and in Navarre for the consumption of the same, and may be entered through the ports of Bilboa and St. Sebastian free of all duties, agreeably to the privilege which they have always enjoyed as respects foreign importations; said produce may, also, be imported into the adjoining provinces through the Custom houses of Victoria, Orduña, Agreda, Logñoño, and Mallen on payment of the duties assigned to a foreign flag; but in this case it will be indispensable to send along with the goods a certificate of the Judge of Contraband of Bilboa and St. Sebastian; these being the only ports prescribed for importations, whatever may be their denomination, but in no wise are they to be conveyed over land. The prohibition against keeping magazines in the frontier towns of Castile and Aragon remains in full force; the importation of goods through Navarre shall be lawful only by way of Pamplona; in which case the Custom houses will deduct the necessary duties but not any others, in a manner that the payment of duties may be brought to a level with those exacted in Cantabria.

10. Foreign Colonial produce and that which may come from our Americas, (now put upon an equality,) which shall be carried to the ports of the exempted provinces from the prescribed ports, (where they will have paid the duties,) for the purpose of being imported into Castile or Aragon, shall not be obliged to pay said duties over again to the Custom houses of Cantabria, and others before mentioned, in conformity to the privilege granted them in the foregoing article.

11. All the regulations relating to the Commerce of America established by the ordinance of the 16th April 1816 are suppressed, except those that regard the coasting trade of the Island of Cuba, or any others that may hereafter be adopted as supplementary to the existing ones.

1st. The produce and merchandize of Spain may be exported to the revolted Americas upon the same terms as may be established for foreign countries; for said provinces being considered as such, it is immaterial whether the products of Spain be carried to them or to foreign ports; by which means, in case of a concession being granted to any goods going to America, it will be easy to prevent others from being considered as entitled to the same benefit.

2. Foreign vessels arriving at our ports, on transit to America, with goods or merchandise of lawful Commerce and of their own production, will be allowed to ship these of the Peninsula free of duties, provided the Cargo they may bring do not exceed the third part of the vessels tonnage and that they load the other $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{ds} with the produce or manufactures of Spain; but if it exceed the aforesaid $\frac{1}{3}$ ^d part the duties of entry on the Cargo brought shall be paid in full.

3^d. Foreign vessels arriving in ballast or laden with goods for sale, and that ship in return an entire cargo of the produce or manufactures of Spain, shall be allowed the

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, November 7, 1826.

The Russian Minister communicated to me two or three days ago the substance of some new instructions which he has received from his government on the subject of the relations between Spain and her Colonies. He had transmitted to his Court the answer² which was given to my proposition of an armistice; and the reception of this document was the immediate occasion for despatching these instructions. The Emperor expresses his surprise that His Catholic Majesty should return a merely formal and evasive answer to a proposal of this kind, and directs his Minister to ascertain whether this is the only reply which is to be given to the offers of amicable mediation by the United States and to the overtures made by the Emperor Alexander last year in consequence. Such is the account given by Mr. d'Oubril of the nature of his new instructions. Mr. Lamb received despatches from Mr. Canning while the latter was at Paris informing him that the Russian Government had sent orders to Mr. d'Oubril to use his influence with this Cabinet in favor of an immediate acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies.

Mr. d'Oubril told me at the same time that he had succinctly stated to Mr. Salmon the Emperor's wishes upon this subject: but that he had thought it his duty to inform his Government that in the present unsettled state of this Cabinet and especially while their attention is so exclusively occupied with the affairs of Portugal he did not think it probable that the question of the Colonies would be suddenly taken up still less speedily decided.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1163, Duke del Infantado to Everett, July 8, 1826.

benefit of $\frac{1}{3}^d$ of the tonnage duties, whether they be destined to America or to a foreign port.

4. Spanish vessels taking entire cargoes, as above stated, either for America or for foreign ports, shall be entitled to the $\frac{1}{2}$ of said duties.

5. It shall be permitted to trade to the Island of Cuba under Spanish and foreign flags, upon the same terms or difference of charges as may be observed in respect to foreign ports with an extra charge of 4 p^r. 100 on foreign flags, as a means of giving some advantage to our Commerce with that Island, for which purpose our vessels shall also enjoy a reduction of half the tonnage duties in those ports.

6. Both Spanish and foreign vessels shall load the $\frac{2}{3}^ds$ of their Cargoes with Spanish produce and merchandise; the remainder may be completed with foreign goods imported into the peninsula, or it may be received in foreign ports; but when the entire cargo shall consist of Spanish produce, foreign vessels in the Island of Cuba shall be entitled to a reduction of $\frac{1}{3}^d$ of the tonnage duties; but our vessels shall always enjoy the benefit pointed out in Article 6, although they should not have laden more than $\frac{2}{3}^ds$ of a Cargo, as before stated; and as respects the remaining 3^d part consisting of foreign goods, brought from the peninsula, they are to have the benefit of a 3^d part of the duties of importation into said Island.

Mr. Lamb communicated to me yesterday a despatch which he has just received from Mr. Canning also containing new instructions on the same subject. Mr. Canning begins by stating that it has been signified to him by the Colombian Minister at London as the wish of his Government that that of Great Britain would use its good offices with the Spanish Cabinet in favour of the conclusion of an Armistice; that the Government of Mexico unites in this wish; and that Mr. Dawkins the Commissioner at Panama appears to think that the Representatives of the several Powers there assembled have the same general disposition. Mr. Canning directs Mr. Lamb to mention these facts to the Secretary of State but not to accompany them by any offers of mediation or service. The time for these, he adds, is past, the former proposals of this kind having been met with total silence. He then enters for two or three pages into a sort of indirect statement of the advantages which Spain would derive from a pacification, constantly remarking however that it is a matter of entire indifference to the British Cabinet whether they make peace or not any farther than respects the interest which every civilised and Christian nation must of course feel in checking the effusion of blood. He alludes to the Autographic letter of the King of France (mentioned in my former despatches) and says that it would be superfluous to attempt to add anything to the arguments there urged on the interest of Spain in favor of peace. He concludes by directing Mr. Lamb to obtain from the Spanish Government a declaration of their intentions upon this subject (not for the satisfaction of the King who is wholly indifferent about it) but that he (Mr. Canning) may know what to say to the Colombian Minister.

Mr. Lamb delivered a copy of this despatch yesterday to Mr. Salmon.

The occasion of transmitting these new instructions was probably the same with that which led to those of Mr. d'Oubril, viz., the answer to my proposal of an armistice. This was the first written reply that had been given by this Cabinet to any proposition of amicable mediation; and being couched in civil and friendly terms though insignificant in substance induced the foreign Governments to suppose that there was now some prospect of effecting an arrangement. Hence the autograph letter of the King of France and these new Instructions to the Russian and British Ministers. The affected indifference of Mr. Canning is of course a mere cover; and one through which it is not difficult to discern the workings of some other feelings as well as that of resentment at the neglect shown by Spain of the former offers of service made by Great Britain.

I have always considered the answer to my proposal of an armistice as at least leaving open the door for farther negotiation if not absolutely holding out a prospect of a favorable result; and have intended to avail myself of the first proper occasion to renew my efforts upon this subject. The change of Ministry which took place immediately after, the unsettled state of the

Cabinet ever since, the King's absence from the Capital and the engrossing events that have intervened in Portugal, have rendered it impossible thus far to attempt any thing further. I have occasionally touched upon the question in conversation with Mr. Salmon in a general way; and, have little doubt as well from his remarks as from his known character, that his individual opinion respecting it is precisely the same with mine. But while he holds the Department merely *ad interim* and does not attend the King's person, his influence is not considerable; and it would be a waste of labour to attempt to produce an impression upon him. The difficulties with Portugal are now in some degree appeased, at least for the present: The King returns to Madrid on the 26th, and the moment will then be somewhat more opportune for reviving this subject. The determination of France to admit the Spanish American Flags (an effective though informal recognition of their Independence) and the change of policy in the Russian Cabinet upon this subject are circumstances which ought to have great weight here and will vary the state of the question very much from what it was last winter. I cannot say that I look forward with any great confidence to an immediate decision in favour of peace; but it seems nevertheless as if a Cabinet so completely passive as this appears to be at present in regard to its foreign relations must after a while be carried along by the combined efforts of all the Christian Powers acting upon it in unison for one common object.

I have the honour [etc.].

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *January 7, 1827.*

I have lately heard with surprise and regret the proceedings of Bolivar at Lima although I had been partly prepared for something of the kind by the tenor of the Constitution which he had previously dictated for his republic in the mountains. These events appear to me to change very considerably the situation of affairs in Spanish America and must produce I should suppose an effect upon our policy in regard to those countries. It can hardly be an object with the United States to encourage the establishment of a military despotism in Colombia and Peru the first operation of which would be to place an advanced post on the Island of Cuba. Should Bolivar realize his projects he must do it almost wholly by the aid of the coloured castes who will of course under these circumstances form the dominant portion of the

MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVI.

people. A military despot of talent and experience at the head of a black army is certainly not the sort of neighbour whom we should naturally wish, if we had the choice, to place upon our Southern frontier. On some future occasion and when the views of Bolivar (which are already however but too clear) shall be more fully developed, I may perhaps take the liberty of submitting some further reflections to you upon this subject. According to my view of it I confess that were the moment favorable for resuming the negotiation at this place upon American affairs (as it evidently is not) I should hesitate about the propriety of insisting any longer upon the recognition of the republic of Colombia as a thing agreeable to the United States. A considerable time will probably elapse before there will be opportunity for treating any subject of importance with this government excepting that of Portugal. In the mean time you would oblige me very particularly by furnishing me with new Instructions upon the subject of our relations with the Spanish American Governments and the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. I should also be indebted to you for a communication of the Instructions that have been given to our Ministers at Panama and in general for any information tending to illustrate the views of the President upon this branch of our foreign policy.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, March 31, 1827.

The Duke of San Carlos who has generally been looked to ever since the resignation of the Duke del Infantado as the permanent successor and who has been during the intervening period residing at Paris, is now on his way home; and it is supposed among the best informed persons that he will immediately, be appointed Secretary of State. He is (as I think I informed you in a preceding letter) an American and has very large landed estates in Peru. He is also represented as a person of moderation and correct judgment though of not very brilliant intellectual powers. His appointment would perhaps be likely to exercise a favorable influence on the question of the acknowledgment of the independence of the Colonies.

As regards this subject, I am happy to be able to inform you that arrangements are in a state of forwardness at Rome for the conclusion of Concordats with the new American Gov^{ts}. This fact was communicated to me yester-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVII.

day by the Bishop of Cervia, Secretary of the Embassy here. It is still kept as secret as possible in order that it may not come to the knowledge of the Spanish Cabinet until the details are all settled. It is thought that when the business is fairly terminated the Ministry will acquiesce though perhaps with a bad grace; but that if they were aware that the negotiation was proceeding they would be at some pains to obstruct it and might give the Pope a good deal of trouble. The Bishop expects to receive copies of the treaties in a short time and has promised to communicate them to me as soon as they arrive. The first effect of these arrangements in America will be to fill the vacant sees through the whole vast extent of the new States. The general influence of the event will be, I should think, highly favorable to the good order and tranquillity of those countries; but whether it will tend to confirm their present republican form of Gov^t. is perhaps more doubtful. I am inclined in fact to attribute the somewhat sudden termination of these negotiations to the influence of Bolivar, who probably conceived that an established church will serve to consolidate the new constitution, which it appears to be his intention to introduce in Colombia and Peru. These are also the Govts. with which, as I understand, the arrangements have approached most nearly to a conclusion. In my next letters I shall perhaps be able to give you some further particulars upon this subject.

I am [etc.].

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, April 7, 1827.

SIR: I have mentioned to you, I believe, in some of my preceding letters the cases of several citizens of the United States who have been taken by the Spaniards in the service of the new American Governments and have been detained in consequence as prisoners. According to the pretext of sovereignty over the American Continent which is still held up in form by this Government such persons are liable to be treated as rebels, and to suffer the punishment of death. John Lyon, formerly a Lieutenant in the Navy, is now in this situation at the Canary Islands, and several individuals named on the enclosed list are imprisoned at Ceuta for the same cause.

Although these persons by making war upon a power in amity with the United States have forfeited their right to be claimed and protected as citizens, they are nevertheless according to our view of the political situation

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVII.

of the American Continent not to be considered as accomplices in acts of high treason against the Spanish Government. The public acknowledgment by the United States of the Independence of the Spanish Colonies doubtless had some indirect influence in inducing them to seek their fortunes in the service of these Powers. For these reasons I have thought myself at liberty to take an interest in their favor and to employ any means for obtaining their release which might appear most likely to succeed. I have accordingly from time to time mentioned their case both verbally and in writing to the Minister and have urged their release or exchange chiefly on the score of common humanity. The affair has been for some months past under the consideration of the Minister of War and I have been promised from week to week a decision, which, I rather suppose when it comes will be favourable. Finding however that the matter was attended with much delay and fearing that some of the prisoners, especially Lyon, who is in bad health, might die in the interim, I determined to solicit their liberty of the King as a personal favor to myself. I accordingly requested of His Majesty through Mr. Salmon a private audience for this purpose which was very readily granted for the following day. At this interview with the King I stated to him briefly the motives of humanity that recommend the release of these men and added as a particular reason which had encouraged me to solicit their pardon, that a favour of this kind which His Majesty had granted to my predecessor Mr. Nelson in the case of one Pechut had been rendered ineffectual by the delay that had previously taken place, the prisoner having been executed before the pardon arrived. The King received the application very civilly and said that Mr. Salmon had also interested himself for these persons. He promised to take the matter into consideration and I am induced to hope that the request will be granted. I delivered to the King a written memorandum of the names of the persons in question of which I enclose a copy.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, *April 19, 1827.*

The report of the appointment of the Duke of San Carlos to the place of Secretary of State has in a great measure subsided and the existing arrangement, which is entirely provisional in substance as well as in form, seems likely to continue for the present. The King left town yesterday for Aran-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVII.

juez taking with him of the Ministers only Calomarde who has the department of Grace and Justice and is regarded as the organ of the Clergy in the Cabinet. This circumstance indicates distinctly enough the nature of the influence which is still really predominant notwithstanding the concessions which it has been found necessary to make to the Portuguese and English. It appears that Count Ofalia will stay a while at Paris on his way to London, and will endeavour to arrange the misunderstanding that has taken place between the two Courts, so as to replace the formal diplomatic relations on the usual footing. The French papers intimate that he is charged with instructions to communicate to the Cabinets of Paris and London the intention of this Government to fit out a new expedition against Mexico. Their articles on the subject are doubtless an echo of some vague rumours to this effect which circulated here about the time of the Court's departure, but which after making a pretty careful enquiry I have not been able to trace to any distinct foundation. Mr. Salmon assured me formally and explicitly that the Court had no instructions in regard to America; and Mr. Lamb who communicated with him before he set off respecting the objects of his mission confirms the assurance. It is well understood, however, that the dominant party are less inclined then ever to an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies. The late movements of Bolivar in Peru and Colombia and the disturbed state of some of the other Governments have revived their expectations which had been a good deal depressed by the constant ill success of the Royal arms on the Continent of America.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, June 9, 1827.

It has been vaguely rumoured here that Count Ofalia was authorised in the event of finding much difficulty in effecting the objects of his mission to offer as an additional consideration for the evacuation of Portugal the acknowledgment by Spain of one or more of the new American States and of a part of the Loan contracted by the Cortes. But these reports are evidently baseless. It was supposed with a greater appearance of probability, as I mentioned² to you at the time of the Count's departure, that he was empowered to negotiate upon the subject of the Colonies. I then made a

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVII.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1170, Everett to Clay, April, 19, 1827.

pretty careful inquiry upon this point and came to the conclusion that he had no positive instructions to treat for the acknowledgment of the new States or in any way to commit the Government; but was probably ordered to report any proposition that might be made to him from any quarter. Such was the account which Mr. Salmon gave me of the nature of the Count's powers at the time. The rumour alluded to has lately been renewed both here and abroad; but I have learned nothing yet that would lead me to give any credit to it. Mr. Salmon's assurances are the same as before and he repeated them to me at my last conversation with him on the 5th inst. He then said that orders had been given a long time ago for the preparation of a full report upon this interesting question which, when made, would become the basis of a new examination of it by the Council that might possibly end hereafter in the adoption of some specific measures, but that in the meantime the events in Portugal had occurred and that the Government for a year past had given no real attention to any thing else and least of all to the state of America; that as regards the mission of Count Ofalia in particular the only object of it was to attempt to obtain the evacuation of Portugal by the British army.

A little circumstance however occurred here lately which might be interpreted so as to prove that the Count either with or without authority, was taking some interest at present in the affairs of the Colonies. Among his personal acquaintances at this place was a certain Dr. Joseph de Presas, known as an individual of respectable talent and as being pretty well acquainted with America. He had been employed as private Secretary to the Queen of Portugal while she resided at Rio Janeiro and had returned with her to Europe. He then passed into the Spanish Service in which he held several respectable places and in the year 1823 went out to Mexico probably as a secret agent to collect information. Upon his return he made a report upon the situation of that Colony which was afterwards printed and of which I send you herewith a translation.¹ It is violently hostile to the Revolution and found a good deal of favour in the eyes of the Count and the diplomatic corps, more I suppose from its spirit than from its substantial value as it gives little or no real information respecting the Republic. Since his return from Mexico this person had remained here without any ostensible employment; but within a few weeks he left the City in a rather mysterious manner giving out to his most intimate friends that he was going to Catalonia upon some affairs of a private character which he stated in detail. The first letters received from him after his departure were dated at Paris and it appears from the last accounts that he was leaving that City for London at about the same time with Count Ofalia. This coincidence has induced some persons here to believe that he was invited by the Count to come on for the purpose of assisting him in his negotiations in regard to America; and the conclusion seems to be altogether probable whatever may be the nature of

¹Not printed.

the Count's instructions. The employment of Presas whose opinions and feelings are decidedly against the Independence of the Colonies is itself however a symptom that nothing of that kind was contemplated as the result of the mission of Ofalia. It must be allowed in fact even by those who are most strongly inclined to recommend to Spain the policy of Recognition that the present moment is not precisely the one which a prudent Government would select for adopting any new system of a decisive character in regard to America.

You will have learned directly from Paris that the visit of Mr. Camacho, Minister of foreign affairs in Mexico, to that City produced a favorable effect upon the relations between the new Republic and France. Letters addressed by him to one of his friends and countrymen at this place which passed through my hands mention that the French Ambassador at London, after specially consulting his Government on the subject acknowledged Mr. Camacho as Minister Plenipotentiary from Mexico in the passport which he gave him upon leaving England and that he had procured from the Ministry the recognition of the Mexican Consul accredited at Paris and the expedition of commissions made out in the same form for the French Commercial agents in his own country. These proceedings amount to a formal acknowledgment of the Independence which had before been substantially recognised by the admission of the flag. I have also learned from the Bishop of Cevica [Cervia?] Secretary to the Pope's Embassy here that the arrangements which I mentioned in a former despatch¹ as being in a fair train had in fact been completed. The Nuncio and his Secretary have recently quitted the country and the Embassy is for the moment entirely vacant. Copies of the concordats concluded with the new Governments had not been received here before the Nuncio's departure, but I shall probably be able to obtain them soon through the medium of the French Chargé d'Affaires who is instructed to sustain the interests of the Pope at this Court. These important proceedings in France and Italy may be viewed as completely confirming the Independence of such of the American States as are enabled by their internal situation to derive the natural advantage from them and particularly Mexico. It is much to be regretted that the recent turn of events in the Republic of Colombia should have been of such a kind as not only to destroy the prospect of immediate tranquillity but even to throw some uncertainty upon the mere fact of independence, the security for which, as far as there is any, now rests entirely, as respects that Government, on the imbecility of Spain.

Gen^l. Loriga an officer who has served with some distinction in America was lately appointed to command the second military division on the Island of Cuba, and it was rumoured here as the intention of the Government in sending him out that he should ultimately take the direction of a new

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc, 1168.

expedition against the Continent. He left Madrid about six weeks ago for Bordeaux where he was to embark for his destination, but had hardly had time to reach that City when a Courier was despatched in pursuit of him with an order countermanding his appointment and recalling him to this place. It was reported here that his recall was occasioned by a denunciation made by me of a plot for delivering the Island to the English in the event of actual hostilities in which Loriga was concerned. I have since seen a person not now employed in the Government but who occasionally visits the King in private and who told me that he had himself denounced Loriga directly to His Majesty as being every way a most corrupt and suspicious character and had furnished such documentary proofs of his charges as determined the step that was taken.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

MADRID, August 17, 1827.

SIR: The enclosed copy of a confidential despatch addressed to the Minister of State by the Conde de Alcudia, Spanish Minister at London,² was handed me today by a private friend and may be depended on as authentic. As this communication was made to me in the strictest confidence, and as the document is in itself unsuitable for the press, I take the liberty of transmitting it to you for the President's information in the form of a private letter, and request that it may not be placed on the public files of the Department of State.

In this letter the Spanish Minister informs his Gov^t. of a plan conceived by that of England, and already in a state of partial execution, for effecting a revolution in the Canary Islands & in Cuba. The sources from which the Count de Alcudia derived his knowledge upon the subject are, as you will perceive, of the most respectable character, and such as leave no doubt of the reality of the facts. The object seems to be to establish the British influence in those islands—in the end probably to obtain territorial possession of them; the cover of a spontaneous declaration of independence by the inhabitants is to be employed in order—as is expressly stated—to avoid awakening the jealousy of the Gov^t. of the U. S.

I have thought it of high importance to give you the earliest information of these proceedings: and wishing to send off the paper by the French Canice that leaves town tonight, I have no time at present to add any further re-

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVII.

² See above, pt. XIII, enclosure to doc. 1172, p. 2147, under date of June 1, 1827.

marks. The President will perceive at once the bearing of these projects upon the interest of the U. S. and will judge what measures it may be proper to adopt for the purpose of defeating them or counteracting their effects. If any should be resolved on in which my concurrence may be wanted, you will of course favour me with the necessary instructions. In the mean time I shall endeavour to collect all the information on the subject that is accessible here, and shall give you notice of any other circumstances that may come to my knowledge.

It is rather singular that the Duke of Wellington should have made known to the Spanish Minister a plan formed & acted on while he was himself a member of the cabinet. The fact was probably owing to the strong feelings of disgust & bitterness with which he has been inspired by the late change in the Administration. It is also rather singular that Mr. Salmon himself should have made no communication to me upon a project, which is certainly not indifferent to the U. S. and in regard to which he might naturally expect that their cooperation would be useful to Spain. Upon this point & others connected with the subject I shall hereafter submit to your consideration some additional remarks.¹

I am [etc.].

[ENCLOSURE]

PRIVATE DISPATCH ADDRESSED TO MANUEL GONZALEZ SALMON, FIRST
SECRETARY OF STATE OF SPAIN, BY COUNT DE ALCUDIA,
SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN

LONDON, *June 1, 1827.*

Confidential.

SIR: For the information of the King I deem it my duty to make known to Y. E. that this Gov^t. dispatched a Frigate some time ago to the Canary Islands with persons on board who were instructed to ascertain whether any preparations were making for sending out troops to America, as well as the state of defence of the islands & the sentiments of the inhabitants. All this was accordingly performed, and the islands were found to be destitute of defence, the Troops few in number, and those few disaffected & ready for any enterprise.

Having thence proceeded to the Havana, they found that there was a similar disposition among the inhabitants there; but that the strength of the place and the care with which every point is guarded, would make any attempt to take possession of it very difficult without the concurrence of the authorities and the garrison. Under these circumstances it has been concluded to prepare the public opinion in favour of England by means of emissaries, to the end that the inhabitants may declare themselves independent and call in the British to their assistance, who will be ready to give it, and who by this means will avoid any collision with the Gov^t. of the U. S. This plan has been connected between the revolutionists residing here (at London) and in

¹ See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1174.

the islands; and a Spanish General now at this place has been fixed upon for taking the command at the Havana.

The Duke of Wellington has given me advice of this plan, and it is confirmed by an intimation which he also gave to Brig^r. Don Francisco Armenteros, when the latter took leave of him upon going to the Havana. The Duke then requested him if he discovered any disposition in the authorities of that place to throw off the Gov^t. of H. C. M. to acquaint him (the Duke) with it as it would be a great pity that the King should lose that possession. God preserve [etc.]

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, November 8, 1827.

The late difficulty with the Pope in regard to the affairs of South America seems to be amicably settled. The new Nuncio, who takes the title of Archbishop of Athens, arrived here a week or two since, and although he could not be presented to the King was allowed by His Majesty to enter at once upon all the privileges of his office. It is even rumoured that the Court of Rome has consented to defer for a year the formal installation of the Bishops lately named for Colombia. But this report rests on doubtful authority, and is not very probable after the late proclamation by His Holiness of the names of these Bishops in open consistory and after the misunderstanding with this Government, which resulted from the proceeding, is nearly or quite arranged.

Various reports have been current of late both here and in other parts of Europe respecting negotiations for peace between Spain and her colonies, and a pretended treaty has, I believe, been published in some of the French papers. From the information which I possess upon the subject, in the accuracy and completeness of which I have the fullest reason to put confidence, I can assure you that there is not the least foundation for these reports, and that no step whatever of importance has been taken respecting the Colonies since my last communications on that subject, or is likely to be for an indefinite time to come.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVIII.

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*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

Confidential.

MADRID, *December 12, 1827.*

SIR: I have intended ever since I received the information respecting the British intrigue for revolutionising the island of Cuba and the Canaries,² to communicate with this Govt. upon the subject at the earliest favorable opportunity. The unsettled state of the Administration for some time after, and then the departure of the King and the only effective Minister for Catalonia, together with the urgent character of their occupations in that quarter, rendered it of course inexpedient for the time to direct their attention to any other affairs, however in themselves important. I should probably have adjourned the matter untill after the King's return, which is expected about the middle of January, had not the Gov^t. recently shewn a disposition to terminate at once the negotiation respecting Indemnities. It struck me that a free communication with the Minister upon the subject alluded to would naturally produce a more friendly & confidential feeling towards the U. S. which might possibly have a favorable effect upon the decision of this question. In the conversations which I have recently had with Mr. Salmon I have accordingly taken occasion to suggest, without of course mentioning from what quarter the information had been received, that the Gov^t. of the U. S. had reason to suppose that the British Gov^t. had organised a plan for revolutionising the islands; and I enquired of him whether this Gov^t. had any knowledge of the proceedings. Mr. Salmon seemed a little surprised at the tenor of my remarks; but replied that this Gov^t. had in fact received information some months ago that the British Gov^t. had sent out a frigate to the Canaries & to Cuba for the purpose of reconnoitering the state of the preparations for defence at those islands, and of establishing relations with such discontented persons as might be found there. He had heard nothing respecting the results of this expedition, & believed that thus far everything was tranquil & secure. The Gov^t., he said, placed great dependence on the fidelity & efficiency of the troops at Cuba, which they believed were quite competent to secure the island against any hostile enterprise foreign or domestic.

I then mentioned to Mr. Salmon that according to the information which the Gov^t. of the U. S. had received, the object of the plan was to place the island under the protection of G. Britain, but that the form of a declaration of Independence was to be adopted in order to avoid awakening the jealousy of the U. S.; that the U. S. would not of course be deceived by this artifice;

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVIII.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1172, Everett to Secretary of State, August 17, 1827.

that they could not view with indifference these movements of the British Gov^t. considering it, as they did, as a settled principle that the island must in no event pass into the possession or under the protection of any European power other than Spain—that it was not their desire to derive any accession of territory or other direct advantage from the part which they might be compelled to take in the affairs of Cuba by the results of this intrigue; but on the contrary to employ their influence, should it be necessary, in the manner most agreeable to the wishes and the interest of H. M. and I intimated to him that the moment seemed to be favorable for a more full & free communication of intentions & opinions respecting the state of this island and of the American Colonies in general than had yet taken place between the two powers. I suggested to him, at the same time, that it would in my opinion contribute materially to the establishment of a good understanding between them (so desirable on every account at the present moment) if H. M's. Gov^t. would consent to arrange immediately to the satisfaction of the U. S. the several questions now under negotiation.

Mr. Salmon appeared to be a good deal interested in what I said upon the subject, and requested me to give him a note of the principal particulars that he might be able to make them known with precision to the other Ministers. I have accordingly prepared a short confidential memorandum upon the subject, which I shall hand him the next time I see him. No results can be expected from these communications in reference to the more general subject of the Colonies, or even of the island of Cuba, untill after the return of the King & Mr. Calomarde. . . .

Soon after writing my last confidential letter I received a visit from Colonel Cloiet [?], one of the two persons who had given me the information which I transmitted to you upon the abovementioned subject; the other, Marco del Pont, having been as you are aware, arrested. The Colonel attempted to put a good face upon the conduct of his associate, and affirmed that he was perfectly innocent of any share in the troubles of Catalonia; that the letters which had been found and produced against him related merely to business transactions; and that he would shortly be set at liberty. Several weeks have since passed away, and Marco still remains in close confinement. Although the Colonel disavowed for himself & his friend any share in the conspiracy, it was evident from his conversation that he heartily wishes that it might succeed and also fully believed that it would. At this interview he mentioned that he thought of going shortly to Valencia for a change of air, and it is probable that he soon after left town, as I have not seen him since.

At this, as at our preceding conversations, the Colonel professed the highest respect for the Gov^t. & people of the U. S. & the strongest wish that the island of Cuba might form a part of our Confederacy. Such, he said, was the wish of a great part of the inhabitants; and he did not doubt that it would sooner or later be realised. He had been, he added, an ardent Royalist,

and had given proofs of the most devoted attachment to the King under all changes of fortune; but he had now become satisfied that the system of administration adopted in this Kingdom was so thoroughly corrupt—beyond all hope or possibility of improvement—that the island could never really prosper under it or enjoy any actual security against the occurrence of troubles. For these reasons he was ready to cooperate at any time to the extent of his influence in any measures that might be expedient for delivering it up to the U. S. and would put into their hands with pleasure the port & colony of Fernandina of which he is Governor. The bay of Jagua on which it is situated would, as he said, afford an excellent landing place for a body of troops—it being capacious & secure—not very remote from the Havana, with a good road leading from it to that place across the country.

These proposals were made without any solicitation on my part, not did I give the Colonel any encouragement to suppose that they would be acted on. I told him, on the contrary, that the U. S. were on good terms with Spain, and would on no account take any measures inconsistent with this relation—that if it should become necessary, in consequence of the present British intrigues or of any future occurrence, for them to interfere in the concerns of the island, even to the extent of landing troops there, they would still act in the name & on the behalf of the King, and with the intention of maintaining his authority. I added that with this understanding of the policy of the U. S. it would be highly interesting to them to know that in the contingency alluded to (which was certainly far from being an impossible one) they could depend upon his cooperation and that I would certainly communicate the overtures which he had made upon the subject to my Gov^t. You will perceive at once by inspecting a map how important the possession of the point in question would be in the event of any active operations on the island. The Col^l. who is very much advanced in years, possesses the Gov^t. of the colony for life with reversion to his son, whose dispositions are probably the same with his own; so that the state of feeling indicated by his proposals will doubtless exist at this point for a long time to come.

I think it proper to inform you that I have been for some months past in communication with a private agent of the Colombian Gov^t. at this place named D^a. Thomas Quintero. He is a native of Caracas, where after having been educated for the bar he was employed by the Bishop of the diocese as his private secretary. Soon after the opening of the revolution the latter returned to Madrid and Quintero accompanied him. The Bishop soon after died, leaving his secretary executor of his will, in which capacity he has been acting ever since. He is considered as a person of superior talent and is the author of some literary works of merit. He was introduced to me in the first instance by a third person as a private gentleman, and some time after read to me letters from Mr. Ravenga, authorising him to act for the Gov^t. of Colombia, and specially requesting him to communicate with me. He has

also read to me letters from the Colombian Minister at London. I do not find that he has any powers to treat with this Gov^t. directly or indirectly, so that his chief or only business here is to furnish information. I have thought it my duty, upon being assured of the reality of his public character, to communicate freely with him upon matters in which the interest of his Gov^t. is concerned, and have in turn derived considerable assistance from him in collecting information respecting the state of passing events in this Kingdom.

A few weeks since he put into my hands a list of Colombian citizens who had been taken prisoners by the Spaniards and are now kept in close confinement in the Peninsula, together with another of Spaniards who have in like manner been taken by the Colombians and are now detained in their hands, with a request that I would use my influence with this Gov^t. for effecting an exchange. The two lists had been transmitted to him by the Colombian Minister at London. I felt of course no difficulty in acceding to his desire; and after first conversing with Mr. Salmon on the subject, I addressed a note to him respecting it.

1175

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

Confidential.

MADRID, April 4, 1828.

SIR: Since I had the honour of writing to you last on the subject of the memoir on the American question transmitted by Count Ofalia from London & now under consideration in the Council of State, I have taken occasion from time to time to converse with Mr. Salmon about it, and to obtain such information as I could from other quarters. Mr. Salmon tells me that the memoir is circulating from hand to hand among the members, agreeably to the mode of transacting business in that body, in order that every one may form and put in writing his private opinion upon it, after which it will be taken up in Council. He rather holds out the idea that the deliberations will terminate in the adoption of some decided measures; but this is probably the effect of his general habit of accomodating the manner, and in some degree the substance, of his remarks to what he supposes to be the disposition of the person with whom he is talking. The information which I receive from other quarters inclines me to think that there is no prospect of any important result from these proceedings, and this is the more probable as the larger & only effective part of the members of the Council are known to be more decidedly opposed to concession than perhaps any other equal number of persons in the Kingdom.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVIII.

I have been positively promised a copy of this memoir as soon as it shall come into the hands of a certain member of the Council, and if I obtain it shall of course send it to you without delay. From the farther notions which I have been able to obtain respecting its contents, I am inclined to doubt whether it is precisely such a paper as I had been led to suppose in the first instance, & whether it was a spontaneous & decided effort by its author to aid in bringing about an acknowledgment of the independence of the new States. Notwithstanding the positive & repeated assurances which I received from the Gov^t. about the time when Count Ofalia set off upon his mission that he was not authorised to treat upon American affairs, I have now very little doubt that he was instructed to communicate either directly or indirectly with the agents of the American powers, and to hear their proposals, particularly with the view of ascertaining whether any of them would be satisfied with any thing short of complete independence. The memoir which he has now transmitted contains, as I have reason to suppose, the result of these communications accompanied by observations from the Count himself on the merits of the question, but not conveying any express recommendation of an acknowledgment of the independence of the new States.

It is perhaps more probable that the Count in transmitting the memoir at this moment and the Gov^t. in taking it into consideration have rather acted on the opinion that, in consequence of the continued troubles in various parts of Spanish America and the apparent tendency of the general condition of all the new states to proceed from bad to worse, the period was favorable for attempting an arrangement upon a different basis from that of separation. The same idea has also been suggested to me by the Russian Minister. His instructions since the accession of the Emperor Nicholas have been more precise than they were before on the subject of advising a pacification even on the basis of independence, if no other could be obtained; but in consequence of the troubled state of the Peninsula, and the absence of the King he has had no opportunity of acting upon them. Upon his return from Barcelona I communicated to him the information I had received on the subject of the memoir of Count Ofalia of which he had before heard nothing; and he has since occasionally conversed with Mr. Salmon about it. The impressions he has received from these conversations and from such other intelligence as he has been able to obtain in regard to the contents of the memoir & the views of this Gov^t. in taking it into consideration, agree with mine as expressed above.—He also appears to think—as I just remarked—that the internal troubles throughout Spanish America indicate a decided incapacity in the population of those regions to organise regular governments, and that the better course would be for the principal European powers in concert with the U. S. to endeavour to mediate between the two parties to the war on a different principle from that of independence. This opinion is

however, as I understand it, entirely a private one, & probably rather at variance with the spirit of his last instructions on the subject. Although the events of the last two years are certainly of the most discouraging character, I cannot for myself renounce the belief that the new States will assume after a while a more settled aspect, and can hardly suppose that either the United States or G. Britain will be induced to adopt a new system of policy in regard to them in consequence of appearances which, however unpleasant, are doubtless incident to a greater or less extent to all violent Revolutions of this description and may be expected to subside of themselves in the course of time. While countenanced as they are now by these two powers it is not likely that any of the Spanish American States will think of voluntarily relinquishing their independence; and considering the natural pertinacity of the Spanish character, it may well be doubted whether after all that has passed a general intervention of all the Powers—including G. Britain & the United States, would succeed (without employing actual coercion which would of course never be resorted to) in inducing them to consent to such a thing. The plan of the Russian Minister appears to be therefore on all accounts impracticable, but considering the suggestion as in itself entitled to some attention and as being perhaps the precursor of some more formal proposal of a similar kind from the same quarter, I have thought it worth mentioning to you confidentially for the information of the President.

The American question being again under the consideration of this Gov^t. and of course to a certain extent under that of the other principal powers, it seems desirable that the latter should be as well informed as possible of all the past occurrences connected with this business. Under this impression I thought it expedient to communicate to the Russian Minister the despatch from the Spanish Minister at London transmitted with my confidential letter No. 1.¹ He had no previous information of the proceedings mentioned in this document, and appeared to be a good deal surprised—not in the most agreeable manner—at this exhibition of the policy of the British Gov^t. He agreed with me in thinking that the system then adopted will probably not be pursued by the new Administration. Although the Duke of Wellington was a member of the Cabinet at the time, it is quite apparent from his giving information of the proceedings to the Count de la Alcedia, that they did not meet his personal approbation; and it is already sufficiently evident from his public declarations & acts as Prime Minister that he will take much less interest in the cause of Spanish America as well as of Portugal & Greece than his predecessor. The project may therefore be viewed as in a great measure personal to Mr. Canning, and as an effect of his—in this instance—perhaps extravagant & ill judged zeal for liberal principles aided possibly in part by jealousy of the United States.

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1172, Everett to Clay, August 17, 1827.

In the last conversation which I had with Mr. Salmon on this subject he mentioned to me that the memorandum I had delivered to him respecting it had been, with several other papers relating to the American question, annexed to the memoir of Count Ofalia that they might be taken into consideration by the Council in connexion with it. In allusion to the intimation given in this memorandum and on various other occasions that it was the policy of the United States to maintain the existing state of things in the island of Cuba, as far as they could do it with propriety & consistently with the observation of a fair neutrality between the belligerent parties, he desired me to state more particularly—if I had no objection—in what manner the Gov^t. of the United States would lend their aid for this purpose if the occasion should require it. I replied, substantially in the same way as I did soon after my arrival here and have done in several subsequent instances to inquiries of a similar kind, that the United States could not undertake to guarantee positively & formally the possession of the island of Cuba to the King, because they did not wish to enter into engagements which might involve them in war—but that they considered their well known policy on this subject taken in connexion with that of G. Britain & France, which were equally notorious to the world, as furnishing a security hardly less formal & probably much more effectual than any written obligation considered merely as such. He remarked in reply that he was aware that it was our policy to prevent the island from passing into the hands of any European power other than Spain; and alluding to the project of the British Gov^t. disclosed in the communication of the Count de la Alcudia, according to which they were to take it under their protection employing the form of a declaration of independence in order not to awaken the jealousy of the United States, he inquired what course we should adopt supposing (what is not at present very probable) that a serious attempt should be made to realise this plan. I replied that my Gov^t. had received information of the project in question, but had not given me any new instructions in consequence of it; and that I could only answer by reference to the tenor of my preceding instructions, which were of a general kind, but nevertheless sufficiently explicit—that in them I was expressly authorised to assure the Spanish Gov^t. that the United States could not in any event permit the island of Cuba to pass into the hands of any European power other than Spain, and to inform them that a similar communication had been made to the principal cabinets of Europe particularly France, G. Britain & Russia. If notwithstanding these declarations any one of these powers should undertake to disturb the existing state of things, it followed in my opinion as a necessary consequence that the United States would be prepared to cooperate actively with H. C. M. in maintaining it. He then inquired what sort of cooperation they would under these circumstances probably agree to. I replied that having, as I had already informed him, no precise intimation in regard to the contingency in question

I could only give him my private opinion, but that on my view of the subject the case supposed seemed hardly to admit of any doubt, and that [the] United States would cooperate in the first instance by good offices, and if these failed, in any other form that might be agreeable to H. M.'s Gov^t. He then said that these assurances were satisfactory but that he should be glad to have them if possible in a more completely official shape. I told him in answer that I would with pleasure inform you of the substance of our conversation & lose no time in making to him any farther communications which might be given me in charge. His precise object seemed to be to ascertain whether in the case supposed the United States would go the length—should other methods fail—of employing their naval & military force in aid of the King. I made no scruple of assuring him that I had no doubt they would—considering this as a necessary result of their declared & well known policy. Should the President's opinion be different he will of course instruct me¹ to qualify what I have individually said upon the subject by any official communication which may appear to him expedient. It may be proper to add that in seeking to obtain some farther & more precise assurances from the United States, this Gov^t. does not probably act under an apprehension of the immediate occurrence of the danger alluded to, but merely for the general purpose of satisfying themselves in regard to our policy. The project entertained last year by the British Gov^t. has been the immediate occasion of taking the matter into view at present: but Mr. Salmon assured me very explicitly, and I have no doubt sincerely that they did not believe that the plan would be pursued or that the island was now exposed to any danger.

I have received no official answer to the note transmitted with my last confidential letter containing a proposal for a reciprocal exchange of Colombian & Spanish prisoners.

I received a few days ago from the Colombian Minister at London a letter in which he informs me that armed vessels of his country cruising on the Mediterranean station are exposed to embarrassment for want of some port where they may occasionally take refuge. Gibraltar is, it seems, made an exception from the general liberty given them by their treaty with England of establishing Consuls in all British harbours, and using them freely for all purposes of war & peace consistent with the usual principles of national law. They are therefore obliged to resort occasionally to the ports of the Barbary powers; but even here they are unable at present to establish Consuls and of course to prove their national character in a satisfactory manner. In consequence of these circumstances Mr. Madrid desires me—should I feel myself authorised to do so—to instruct the Consuls of the United States in these ports to lend such facilities as may be in their power to the Colombian vessels that may enter them, as well for the purpose of authenticating their national character as of protecting them if necessary against any arbitrary

¹ See above, pt. I, doc. 185, Van Buren to Van Ness, October 2, 1829.

proceedings on the part of the Regencies of Barbary. As good offices of this description appear to me to come within the range of those which are usually reciprocated between the agents & citizens of friendly Gov^{ts}. when occasion requires, I propose to comply provisionally with his request: but have thought it proper at the same time to give you notice of the circumstance that the President, should he think it necessary, may have an opportunity of countermanding my instructions by a direct injunction to the Consuls at Gibraltar and on the Barbary Coast, to whom I shall address it.

I have the honour [etc.].

1176

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, April 29, 1828.

SIR: The enclosed paper² was lately communicated to me by a friend who received it from an authentic source at Lisbon with an assurance, that it contains the substance of a proposition lately made to the Regent by the British Ambassador at that place as a basis for a negotiation respecting the settlement of the succession to the two Crowns of Portugal and Brazil. It is rather more favorable to the Regent than the system at present established by the Charter, which excludes him entirely from any pretensions to either Crown, at least until the complete failure of the line of the Emperor of Brazil in all its branches. No answer has yet been returned to this proposal.

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVIII.

² The paper follows:

Substance of an arrangement of the right of succession to the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil proposed to the Government of the former by that of Great Britain.

1

The Emperor of Brazil cedes his right to the Crown of Portugal to his daughter D^a Maria de Gloria and acknowledges the Infant D^a Miguel as Regent according to the Charter.

2

The succession of Brazil is secured to the lineal descendants of the Emperor with the exclusion of D^a Maria de Gloria.

3

The succession of Portugal is secured to the lineal descendants of D^a Maria de Gloria and on their failure to those of the late King with the exclusion of the Emperor of Brazil.

4

If either of the two lines become extinct the succession passes to the other; the heir for the time being will then make his election between the Crowns, and the one which he renounces passes to the next heir in succession.

5

The mode of succession to the Crown in the two countries shall be determined by the laws of each.

You are probably aware that during the course of last winter the Emperor of Brazil was advised by the principal powers of Europe acting in concert for this purpose to derogate from the settlement of the succession to the Crown of Portugal, established by the charter, and to recognize his brother Miguel as King. It is understood that in making this suggestion they proceeded on the supposition that upon the Emperor's establishing himself abroad the right of succession rested *ipso facto* in Miguel by the ancient Constitutional laws of the Kingdom, and that they had inadvertently overlooked this circumstance when they previously assented to the settlement made by the Emperor in favor of his daughter. This suggestion was sent out about the first of last December and it is now about time for the answer of the Emperor to arrive. It is not improbable therefore that the arrangement contemplated in the enclosed paper, which is a sort of middle term between the settlement as now established and the one suggested, by the Powers may have been proposed by the Emperor to them and to his brother as a compromise.

But under whatever auspices it may have been proposed it will not be readily assented to by the Regent whose partizans are fanatically bent upon overthrowing the Constitution and declaring him absolute King. Nothing short of the most positive and determined opposition from the great powers will prevent this result whether the Emperor of Brazil consent to it or not.

I have the honor [etc.].

1177

*Manuel Gonzalez Salmon, First Secretary of State of Spain, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain*¹

[TRANSLATION]

AT THE PALACE, *April, 1828.*

SIR: The King my August Master has been informed that a Proclamation signed by David Porter styling himself Commander of the Squadron belonging to the pretended Republic of Mexico has been published in Vera Cruz under date of the 16th of November last, offering to grant letters of Marque and ordering the Inspection and detention of all vessels having Spanish property on board or articles contraband of war destined for His Majesty's service. The above proclamation is conceived in the following terms.

By a resolution of the Supreme Govt. dated 23d of last July and in conformity with the tenour of the existing laws and ordinances all vessels that shall be found to have enemies' property on board are to be brought into this port for their acquittal or condemnation. This

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVIII, enclosed in Everett to Clay, May 1, 1828, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1179.

measure is to extend to all vessels carrying contraband articles to an enemy's port; which articles are understood to be mortars, cannon, muskets, pistols, and other fire arms, as also swords, sabres, bayonets, and other offensive weapons; powder, balls, grenades, and every kind of warlike stores; timber for shipping, rigging, sail cloth, and all other articles made use of in the construction and equipment of vessels; military troops, sailors, horses, clothing for soldiers and generally all effects employed in the military or naval service:—Of all which notice is hereby given to the public for their information and to the end that it may produce the proper effects without any one being able to alledge ignorance. I also make it known for the government of those who may be disposed to solicit letters of Marque and for that of vessels employed in cruising against the enemy.

It seems unnecessary to observe to Y. E. that this singular measure is not calculated to injure the interests of Spanish commerce alone; that of the United States will perhaps be the first to feel the effects of the wrong thus done to their flag. Such no doubt is the opinion entertained by the Insurers of Philadelphia, New York and Boston, who, as His Majesty has been informed, have represented to Your Excellency's Government against Porter's Proclamation. His Majesty therefore cannot permit himself to doubt that the President will resist all pretentions on the part of those rebels to search the vessels of the United States, and that he will cause their flag to be respected. But should it happen otherwise, which His Majesty is unwilling to believe, the Spanish Government will then be under the painful necessity of adopting suitable measures of reciprocity, and of ordering the interception by their ships of all articles contraband of war, that may be found proceeding to the ports of the insurgents.

His Majesty's Minister in Philadelphia has been directed to represent this circumstance to Your Excellency's Government and I hope that Y. E. on your part will also communicate it for their knowledge.

I avail myself of this opportunity [etc.].

1178

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Manuel Gonzalez Salmon, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

MADRID, April 30, 1828.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive Your Excellency's late note² informing me of a proclamation issued by Commodore Porter under the authority of the Government of Mexico in which he announces his intention to capture

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXVIII, enclosed in Everett to Clay, May 1, 1828, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1179.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1177, under date, April [?] 1828.

and bring into port for adjudication neutral vessels having enemies' property or articles contraband of war on board, specifying those which he considers as being of this character; and instructs the national and private armed ships under his command to do the same.

Agreeably to Your Excellency's request I shall immediately transmit a copy of your note to the Government which I have the honor to represent. Having no other information of the facts to which Your Excellency alludes, and of course no instructions on the subject from my Government, it is not in my power to furnish at present any particular explanation of the light in which the President views this proceeding of Commodore Porter, or of the policy which he may think proper to adopt in consequence, I can venture however to assure Your Excellency in advance that it will be the earnest wish of the Government of the United States on this, as it has been on all former occasions, to establish the most liberal construction of the acknowledged rules of public law; and that they will continue to observe as they have heretofore done a fair neutrality between the parties to the present war in America.

The list of contraband articles given by Commodore Porter includes several which have been on former occasions declared by the Government of the United States not to be properly included in it, particularly timber and other naval stores. The President will doubtless remonstrate with effect against their being now treated as such by the Government of Mexico.

I avail myself of this opportunity [etc.].

1179

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACT]

MADRID, May 1, 1828.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of a note² which I lately received from the Secretary of State respecting a proclamation issued by Commodore Porter in the name of the Mexican Government, and of my reply.³

I also enclose a translation of a late circular instruction jointly addressed by the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Navy to the inferior agents in their respective departments, and prescribing certain measures to be adopted by

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain XXVIII.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1177, Salmon to Everett, April [?], 1828.

³ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1178, Everett to Salmon, April 30, 1828.

the latter for the more effectual prevention of contraband trade. It was transmitted to me by Mr. Salmon with a request that I would make known the contents to my Government, and to the Consuls of the United States in this Kingdom. As the regulations established in this instruction are of some interest to the merchants engaged in the Spanish trade, it may perhaps be expedient to publish it in the newspapers.

I am [etc.].

1180

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

[EXTRACTS]

MADRID, June 23, 1828.

I have reason to suppose that nothing farther has been done in the Council of State on the subject of the report of Count Ofalia upon the relations with America; and that nothing important will probably result from it. This event corresponds, as you will recollect, with my anticipations. The dominant party in the Council of State is in fact more decidedly adverse to the acknowledgement of the Independence of the Colonies than perhaps any equal number of persons in the Kingdom; and in sending the memoir to this body for consideration it must have been the intention of the Ministry to shut out the idea of any such concession, were it even recommended, as is very doubtful, in Ofalia's memoir. I have not yet obtained the copy of this paper, which I have been promised, but shall probably receive it sooner or later.

The same person, from whom I received information of the transmission of this memoir, and by whom I have occasionally been favoured with other communications of value, mentioned to me within a few days a fact, which I cannot believe to be possible, but of which I think it my duty to give you notice for the information of the President. He states that another memoir, also transmitted by Count Ofalia, is now under the consideration of the Council of State, in which the Count advises an attempt to reconquer Mexico, and place one of the Infantes there as Viceroy; adding that the British Government will not only not oppose the expedition, but will on the contrary assist Spain with money and an auxiliary army of eight thousand men. The person who gave me the account stated that he received it from one of the agents of Government, who is himself employed by the Council of State to make a report to them upon the subject, agreeably to the mode of proceeding usual with that body in treating all important affairs. It was

¹ MS.¹ Dispatches from Spain, XXIX.

added that the only objection made in the Council to the immediate acceptance of the offer arose from a doubt whether they could with propriety trust the good faith of the British so far as to allow their armies to enter the Colonies even as auxiliaries. Such is the statement which is made to me, certainly on authority which I should consider in general as pretty good.—The known disposition of the Duke of Wellington, who is politically and personally friendly to the King of Spain, and has kept up a confidential correspondence with him ever since the war, together with the nature of the late internal movements in Mexico, which were not probably very satisfactory in their issue to the British Government, render a report of this kind somewhat less improbable than it would have been a year or two ago. Still however, as I remarked above, I cannot but view it as a thing impossible that such a proposition should really have been made. The report may perhaps be an incorrect account of some actual proceeding in the Council, of which, should that be the case, I shall probably hereafter be able to give you the details. . . .

The *Consulado* of Cadiz drew up a short time ago a strong representation to the King in favor of the acknowledgment of the Independence of the American Colonies and sent it on here informally to the Ministers in order to ascertain whether it would be well received by His Majesty. It was returned with a negative answer, and has consequently not been presented. A copy has been sent me from Cadiz, of which I shall transmit a translation with my next despatches. It is somewhat curious as an expression of the opinion of an important portion of the mercantile community upon this interesting question, and it also includes a good deal of positive information on the present state of Commerce in this Kingdom.

I am [etc.].

1181

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Manuel Gonzalez Salmon, First Secretary of State of Spain*¹

Confidential.

MADRID, December 15, 1828.

SIR: Y. E. is aware that the agents in Europe of the new States, which have been formed out of the Spanish Colonies in America, are authorised to treat for peace whenever it may be agreeable to H. M's. Gov^t. to open a negotiation with them for this purpose. I have lately been requested by the Colombian Minister at London to intimate to Y. E. in a confidential way that there is at present a disposition on the part of those states to make some pecuniary sacrifices for the attainment of an object so desirable on every

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIX, enclosed in Everett to Clay, January 10, 1829, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1183.

account to both the belligerent parties. These sacrifices would not be offered as indemnities for a sovereignty of which the American States consider themselves as in possession, and which H. M.'s. Gov^t. would on their part doubtless not regard as a fit subject for bargain and sale: but as payments in the nature of those that are often made by one independent nation to another at the conclusion of a treaty of peace, for the purpose of covering the expenses of the war and otherwise facilitating the arrangement of terms. Should H. M. Gov^t. deem this suggestion of a nature to be taken unto serious consideration I shall be able after communication with the Colombian Minister at London to enter into some further details on the subject.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

1182

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to F. M. de Madrid, Colombian Minister to Great Britain*¹

MADRID, *December 30, 1828.*

DEAR SIR: Your letter, dated Buxton, October 8th² and enclosing copies of the correspondence between Admiral Laborde and the authorities at La Guayra on the subject of the exchange of prisoners, was duly received. I am happy to inform you—as you have doubtless learned already through D. Tomas Quintero, that the prisoners who were detained at the Four Towers, have lately been released by the effect, as the Gazette states, of the King's clemency, and with an understanding that if they are taken under the same circumstances they shall receive no quarter. William Natta, who appears to have been the Commander of the privateer *Gen^l. Armario*, is alone excepted from this indulgence. I was informed by the Consul of the U. S. at Cadiz that the exception was made at the demand of the French Consul at that place, but have since learned from the same authority that the French Consul denies having interfered in the affair. The Consul of the U. S. is making further inquiries into the cause of his detention, and will communicate to me the result of them. I shall with pleasure take any further steps that may appear likely to be of service in effecting his release. I think it proper to mention to you in this connexion, that the Consul of the U. S. at Cadiz, Mr. Alexander Burton, has been indefatigable in his attentions to these prisoners, as well as to the crews of one or two other Colombian ships which have been placed before in similar circumstances; and has on all these

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIX, enclosed in Everett to Clay, January 10, 1829, which see below, pt. XIII, doc. 1183.

² See above, pt. XIII, enclosure to doc. 1183, p. 2170.

occasions made every sacrifice of labour, time, and money, that could possibly contribute either to their liberation, or to their comfort, while they remained in confinement. The letters, which several of them have addressed to him before and since their release, and of which he has shewn me the originals, are filled with the strongest expressions of gratitude and obligation for his kindness. It occurred to me that your Gov^t. would probably be desirous of reimbursing to Mr. Burton his actual pecuniary advances to prisoners in their service, and I accordingly requested him to send me an account of his expenses of this kind with the intention of transmitting it to you for your information and Gov^t. Mr. Burton however very disinterestedly declines to avail himself of my proposal, and requests me to suggest to you that if at a future period your Gov^t. should have occasion to establish a consulate at Cadiz, and should not think it expedient to employ a native Colombian, he would be happy to render them in that capacity all the services that might be in his power. I feel much pleasure in making you acquainted with these particulars, which are honourable, I think, to the character of Mr. Burton, and which I doubt not you will learn with satisfaction, and perhaps deem it proper to make known to your Gov^t.

I shall avail myself of the earliest good opportunity to inform the Consul at Algiers of the favourable sense entertained by your Gov^t. of his proceedings respecting their relations with the Barbary powers. I have heard no further from him or the other consuls on that coast upon the subject since I wrote you last. Before proceeding to acquaint you with the steps I have taken in consequence of the intimations contained in your letter on the subject of a negotiation for peace it may be proper to premise that you appear to have been, at the time of writing, under some little misapprehension—arising probably from not having your papers immediately about you—in regard to certain communications which as you suppose, were made to you by me upon this subject. You allude to a letter of mine, of which you do not quote the date on account of your absence from London, but which you describe as having given you information of some proceedings of a private character, which were commenced at this place by Mr. Lamb two or three years since, and as you say continued by me. You will find upon recurring to the file of my letters, if you have preserved them, that no mention is made in any of them of the proceedings in question; nor had I, as you suppose, any share in commencing, or continuing them. They were entered upon by Mr. Lamb,—in connexion with another foreign minister from one of the German Courts, and, I believe, without any authority from either of their Gov^{ts}. An opinion was entertained by these Ministers, that much might be effected by a distribution of money among the persons immediately around the King. Some overtures were made for the purpose, and the negotiation proceeded so far, and, as Mr. Lamb thought—with so much probability of success, that he communicated what he had done to his Gov^t. and requested that if they approved

of his proceedings they would remit the funds necessary for accomplishing the object. To this communication the British Gov^t. made no reply whatever; and here the negotiation rested, nor has it since, to my knowledge at least, been resumed. I was not at the time or since informed by Mr. Lamb of any of these particulars, but was confidentially made acquainted with them after the affair had entirely terminated by the other foreign Minister to whom I have alluded above. I have since had some reason to suppose that this intrigue had injured rather than improved the prospect of a pacification and that the Royal Family were unpleasantly impressed by the indirect suggestions that were made upon this occasion by the British Minister. However this may be, I was not, as I have just mentioned—informed at the time of the transaction, nor should I have felt myself at liberty without the express orders of my Gov^t. to take a part in a negotiation of a description rather out of the ordinary line of our policy. In the course of conversation with D. T. Quintero upon the subject of a pacification, I informed him confidentially of the circumstances which I have just stated, and enquired of him at the same time whether the Spanish American States would probably be disposed at present to make any pecuniary sacrifices for the purpose of obtaining peace. From his communications to you made in consequence of this conversation you doubtless received your information on the subject, and as my name was mixed up with them you naturally enough supposed—writing from memory—that it was conveyed in a letter from me.

Without meaning to intimate that there was any thing improper or impolitic in these proceedings of the British Minister, I have thought it expedient to give you this explanation, in order to avoid any mistake on your part or that of your Gov^t. as to the nature of my negotiation on the subject of peace. The intimations contained in your letter of the 8th of October of the disposition of your Gov^t. to make pecuniary sacrifices for the attainment of this object were of such a nature that I felt myself at liberty to act upon them under my general instructions. I understand it to be their intention to offer a payment in the nature of those which are frequently made by independent nations at the conclusion of treaties of peace in order to cover the expenses of the war, and facilitate in other ways the arrangement of terms. There is nothing in a proposal of this kind out of the ordinary course of negotiation, or which seemed to render necessary a special reference to my Gov^t. The present moment is not perhaps—as you suggest in your letter—particularly opportune for overtures towards pacification on account of the internal dissensions that unhappily continue to exist in different parts of the Spanish American States, and particularly in Colombia. But this consideration is rendered of less importance by the great delay which attends the transaction of all political business at this Court. Under the most favourable circumstances a proposal of this kind would certainly not be acted upon, perhaps not taken into serious consideration, until a long time after it had been made.

It appeared to me therefore expedient that it should be brought under the notice of the Gov^t. immediately. Months may perhaps elapse before it will become the object of any very serious deliberation. In the mean time the state of affairs in America may become more favourable, and when a suitable time for pressing the negotiation shall arrive, the suggestion will have become familiar to the Ministry and may have its weight in determining their opinions. This at least is certain, that when the recognition of the independence of the Colonies was most urgently recommended to the King by several of the foreign Gov^{ts}. about three years ago, one of the arguments employed for the purpose of parrying the proposition was, that the Colonies exhibited no disposition to make such a measure in any way profitable to Spain, and that they demanded large concessions without offering any thing in the way of equivalent. The present suggestion will serve, at least in part, to remove this difficulty. It is not improbable, as you suggest, that the Ministry, combining the time when it is made with some late occurrences in America, may imagine for the moment that it is the result of conscious weakness: but on this head there can after all be—I should think—no very strong delusion in the minds of this cabinet. They are pretty well aware that however the internal situation of the new States may from time to time vary there is little or no prospect of such changes as would at all facilitate the conquest of any part of the continent by their arms, and that it would rather be their policy to apply in the present case the ordinary rule for international negotiation, and endeavour to make use of a moment when the enemy was somewhat less favourably situated than usual for the purpose of obtaining better terms than he might otherwise be inclined to grant. In short all proposals for negotiations made by one belligerent party to another, as they imply of course a desire for peace in the party that makes them, may be construed into a confession of weakness: but this consideration does not prevent such proposals from being habitually tendered or from being uniformly viewed more favourably and agreed to more readily in proportion as they hold out greater advantages to the adverse party. It appeared to me therefore on the whole that there was very little danger of any unpropitious result from such an overture and that as far as it produced any effect, it could not fail to do good.

For these reasons, and after taking a suitable time for deliberation upon the manner in which it would be most expedient to sound the Ministry upon the subject I concluded that the most direct and regular mode would on all accounts be the best. I accordingly took an opportunity of mentioning to D. Manuel Gonzalez Salmon that I had received from you a communication of an interesting character in regard to the relations with America, and begged him to appoint a time for a private interview at which I might give him the particulars. I then stated to him the nature of the proposal, without however specifying any particular extent to which the American States might be

disposed to go in the way of pecuniary sacrifices, a point which would more naturally come under consideration at a future period, should the principle be acceded to—and taking care to let the Minister understand distinctly that in making this offer it was not the intention of the States to purchase a sovereignty, of which they considered themselves already in possession, but to propose a payment in the nature of those that are occasionally made by independent nations at the conclusion of peace, to cover the expenses of the war and facilitate in other ways the arrangement of terms. I availed myself of the occasion to repeat some of the suggestions which I have frequently made before on the general expediency of a pacification—and added others resulting from occurrences of a recent date. I remarked particularly to the Minister that it was doubtless not singular that Spain should be among the last of the European powers to acknowledge the independence of her ancient colonies, but that in fact nearly or quite all the others, who had any motive for opening new relations with distant parts of the world, had already taken this step, and that within the last year the two Courts which were most intimately allied with Spain, and of whose friendly sentiments and dispositions to promote her interests in every practicable way she had the least reason to doubt—France and Rome—had adopted such measures in regard to the Colonies, as evidently shewed that they considered the contest as at an end, and the question of independence substantially settled. Mr. Salmon listened to these remarks with attention, making of course such objections and qualifications, as might have been expected from a person speaking in the interest of Spain: and suggesting particularly that the late and present internal troubles in almost all parts of Spanish America demonstrated very plainly that the Am. Gov^{ts}. had not yet attained such a state of consolidation and stability as would give them a claim to expect to be recognized by other powers, especially by the mother country. In reply to this remark I reminded him that internal dissensions of greater or less extent were unfortunately inseparable from all Revolutions: but their occurrence in the present case under all the circumstances by which they were attended appeared to me to furnish arguments rather in favour of than against a pacification: Internal dissensions in these States afforded an opportunity for the manifestation of sentiments favourable to a return to the Government of Spain if any such existed, and as no Spanish party had in fact appeared at the time when if ever such a party would naturally shew itself the conclusion appeared irresistible that the country was unanimous in favour of independence, whatever differences of opinion there might be upon other questions—that Spain could of course derive no advantage from the results of these differences, should they even, as they have done in several instances, take the form of civil war, and that an attempt to subjugate the continent by force—were it convenient for Spain to make one—would probably have no other effect than that of appeasing for the time the domestic divisions, and

uniting all parties against a common enemy. On the other hand the existence of these internal dissensions, while it in no way increases the chance of the recovery of the Colonies by Spain, might perhaps be reasonably expected to render them more anxious for peace. Hence by negotiating at such a moment the Spanish Cabinet might perhaps obtain more favourable terms than would be assented to at a period of entire tranquillity.

At the close of the conference Mr. Salmon assured me that the overture should be taken into consideration, and that he would immediately communicate it to the Council of Ministers, where it must regularly be discussed before it could be submitted to the King. That there might be no misunderstanding in regard to the nature of the proposal he desired me to give him a written memorandum of the substance of it. I waited a few days before doing this in order to ascertain by a further conversation with him what impression the former one had made upon his mind. In the course of the following week I had another interview with him for a different object, at which he turned the conversation himself to this subject, and desired me particularly to send him the memorandum. He said that he had mentioned the proposal to the other ministers, but that no consultation would be held upon it until the note was received. Within a few days after I addressed to him the short confidential note of which a copy is annexed,¹ and which merely contains a naked statement of the proposal with the restrictions and qualifications with which you requested me to guard it. No answer has yet been returned to the note, nor have I, since writing it, had any conversation of consequence with the minister upon the subject.

The close communication, which has existed between the Gov^t. of the U.S. and that of Russia in regard to the efforts that have been made here by both in favour of a recognition of the independence of the Colonies, rendered it proper that I should acquaint the Russian Minister with the steps which I had taken. I have accordingly communicated to him your letter authorising the overture, and the substance of the conversations I have had with D. M. Gozalez Salmon on the subject. Without entertaining any very sanguine expectation of the immediate success of this proposal, he expressed his satisfaction that it had been made, conceiving that an offer of a considerable pecuniary payment by the American states would remove one of the difficulties that had hitherto obstructed the negotiation. He was gratified with the confidence I reposed in him by informing him of the overture, and promised to use his influence, which is not inconsiderable, with the Gov^t. in support of it. The influence of France is however greater than that of Russia; and as the French Ministry is now decidedly favourable to the independence of America, and is represented here by a very liberal and able Ambassador I intend to inform him also of the proceeding, and to request him, should it be agreeable to his instructions and views of propriety, to

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1181, Everett to Salmon, December 15, 1828.

concur in it. Mr. Salmon and the Russian Minister are thus far the only persons, out of the Legation, with whom I have communicated upon the subject, excepting D. Tomas Quintero; and it was therefore with some surprise that I saw the steps I had taken alluded to in a letter from Madrid, published in the French Newspapers, and which must have been written almost immediately after my first conversation with Mr. Salmon.

I pray you to make known the contents of this letter to Mr. Barbour for his information in regard to these negotiations, and beg to assure you [etc.].

1183

*Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MADRID, January 10, 1829.

SIR: I received a few weeks since a letter from the Colombian Minister at London, in which he requested me to make some further suggestions to this Gov^t. on the subject of a negotiation for peace. The enclosed translation will inform you of the nature of the contemplated overture. It appears that the Republic is disposed to agree to considerable pecuniary sacrifices for the purpose of facilitating the arrangement of terms. The Minister seemed to think that the other American States, although they have not yet been consulted about it, would concur with her in making an offer in the name of the whole of twenty million dollars. Should Spain shew a disposition to treat on this basis Colombia would consult the other States, and should they refuse to concur, would agree to a separate peace, she paying her part of the above-mentioned sum, and Spain engaging to treat with the other States, whenever they might deem it proper to come in upon the same conditions.

This proposition appears to have been the result of a report made by the Colombian agent here to his Minister at London of certain conversations which he held with me some months ago. I informed him confidentially of the steps that were taken by the British and Saxon Ministers here in regard to the subject in the winter of 1826-7, of which I also gave you notice at the time. Their object was, as you will recollect, to operate on the minds of the King and Royal family, by a pretty liberal distribution of money among the persons in immediate attendance at the Palace, and who were supposed to have much influence upon their opinions and feelings. In these proceedings I had—as I informed you at the time—no share, not having indeed been consulted about them by Mr. Lamb, and having only learned them from Baron de

¹ MS. Dispatches from Spain, XXIX.

Kormeritz after the project had been abandoned. In communicating to the Colombian agent what took place on this occasion I however enquired of him whether his Gov^t. or those of the other American States, would probably be willing to make pecuniary sacrifices for the purpose of obtaining peace. In giving his Minister at London an account of this conversation he appears to have represented me as having taken part in the intrigue instituted by Mr. Lamb, and as having continued it since his departure. The Minister on the other hand—in writing the letter of which a translation is enclosed at a distance from his papers refers erroneously to a letter from me as the source of the information on this subject which he received from D. Thomas Quintero. These errors are perhaps of no great importance, but I thought it due to the honour of the Gov^t. and my own that there should be no misund[erstand]ing anywhere in regard to the nature of our negociations on this subject. I have accordingly taken care to rectify the impression which Mr. Madrid had received from the agent here in my answer to his letter of which a copy is enclosed.¹

Although I should not have felt myself at liberty to take part in proceedings of the nature of those above alluded to without being authorized by the express instructions of the President I saw no difficulty in making the suggestion contemplated in the letter of Mr. Madrid, which, although it indicates a change in the policy of the Colombian Gov^t. agrees nevertheless with the usual course of negotiation between independent powers. I accordingly took an early opportunity of conversing with Mr. Salmon on the subject, and afterwards at his request transmitted to him a concise statement of the proposal in question in a confidential note.² The particulars of my conversation with him and also with the Russian Minister on the same subject are given at length in the enclosed letter to Mr. Madrid: and a copy of the note is hereunto annexed.

I am [etc.].

[ENCLOSURE]

T. F. MADRID, COLOMBIAN MINISTER TO SPAIN, TO ALEXANDER H. EVERETT, UNITED STATES MINISTER TO SPAIN

[TRANSLATION]

BUXTON, *October 8, 1828.*

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st of Aug^t. last, containing a confirmation of the assurance given to you by the American Consuls at Algiers and Tangiers of affording Colombian vessels all the assistance and protection in their power. I offer you anew my sincere thanks and those of my Gov^t. for your very opportune and effectual good offices, and request you to communicate them to the Consul at Algiers. As respects the observations made by the letter,

¹ See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1182, Everett to Madrid, December 30, 1828.

² See above, pt. XIII, doc. 1181, Everett to Salmon, December 15, 1828.

I have communicated them to my Govt. and requested their decision upon the points to which they refer. Although I am authorised to treat with the Barbary powers, I am not instructed to agree to the pecuniary sacrifices of which you make mention. I must therefore wait for further instructions.

Those which I demanded in consequence of a letter from you, the date of which I cannot state as I am at present out of town, for the purpose of negotiating and obtaining a recognition of our independence, and of concluding a treaty of peace with Spain, have been received by me. The Liberator President is desirous that the negotiation commenced by Mr. Lamb, and continued and promoted by you, should be renewed and carried forward with the greatest activity. He is willing that the sum of 20 millions of dollars mentioned in your aforesaid letter be offered for the privy purse of H. C. M. in the name of all the American States, and is ready in order to the conclusion of a peace to make payment of the part of said sum corresponding to the State of Colombia. This proposition however, ought in the first instance to be made in the name of all the States. I therefore request that you will sound the disposition of the Cabinet of Madrid, and should it be found favourable, that you will give me the necessary information, that I may then, agreeably to the instructions of my Gov^t. endeavour to procure the acquiescence of the other new Republics, with a view to which I shall communicate with their respective Ministers residing at this Court. In the case of a refusal on their part to enter into such an arrangement, Colombia will treat for herself, provided H. C. M. manifest a disposition to conclude a treaty of peace and amity with her, and declare his readiness to make similar agreements with the other states upon the same conditions whenever the latter may make known their wishes to this effect. It is not the intention of my Gov^t. that the above-mentioned sum should be offered to H. C. M. as an indemnity for a sovereignty which he has lost forever, and which the states of America, and especially Colombia, have achieved by their own efforts. Wherefore, it is indispensable that this proposition, when made, be not presented in the light of an indemnity.— I leave it to your discretion to conduct this business in the manner that may seem to you most decorous, as also to determine, according to your opinion of the present disposition of the Spanish Cabinet, whether this be or not a favourable moment for opening such a negotiation. In the present state of our affairs the Spanish Government may perhaps look upon these overtures as a proof of weakness or apprehension on our part, while they are in fact only the effect of a spirit of conciliation in my Gov^t. and of the wishes entertained by them for the general welfare. Colombia headed by the Liberator is very far from having any thing to fear from Spain: and I doubt not that you will impress this upon the minds of the ministers with whom you may have to treat in relation to this subject.

Although I am furnished with the necessary powers for treating with H. C. M., I shall take no direct steps towards doing so until you shall have had the goodness to give me your opinion as to the propriety of it, as well as my demanding the necessary safe conduct to enable me to repair to that Court.

I transmit to you herewith by order of my Gov^t. a copy of the convention concluded between Adm^l. Laborde and the authorities of Colom-

bia for the exchange and release of their respective prisoners of war. As it is to be presumed that Laborde acted in this instance according to the instructions of his Gov^t., so also it may be believed that the latter will not make any difficulty about setting our prisoners at liberty: but should it happen otherwise, my Gov^t. and myself flatter ourselves that you will be able to remove every obstacle, and that these unfortunate persons who have so long languished in the prisons of the Peninsula, will be indebted to your humane exertions for their release from captivity. I therefore offer you in advance the grateful acknowledgements of Colombia for the signal service you are about to render her citizens.

By the public papers you will have learned the fatal results of the Convention of Ocana, and the resolution of the inhabitants of Colombia to confide their Gov^t. exclusively to Gen^l. Bolivar, and to invest him with extraordinary powers for the purpose of enabling him to restore order, and correct the abuses that have crept into the various departments of the administration, as also that he may, when it shall appear to him a proper season, assemble the representatives of the people, who, in the midst of peace and when the ferment of the passions shall have subsided, are to dictate the fundamental laws, best adapted to the necessities and circumstances of the Country.

By the same papers you will have perceived with regret that Colombia was on the eve of a war with Peru. Unfortunately it is but too true that the conduct of the latter Republic towards Colombia has been hostile, rash and impolitic in the extreme. — — — I refrain from making any remarks upon this disagreeable subject, and will only observe that I am still in hopes that a reconciliation will be effected, whereby will be avoided the evils and the scandal attending a war between two sister nations who are both so much in need of peace, and whose chief object should be to live in the strictest union, in order to their being respected abroad and to the securing of tranquillity and happiness at home. In one of my former letters, I made some remarks on the subject of the policy of this Government with regard to the new American States. I have found no reason for giving credit to the report which attributes to the Duke of Wellington the design of establishing the Infante D^a Francisco de Paula at the head of the Gov^t. of Mexico with the title of Viceroy or King. No one knows better than yourself that it is not the interest, and consequently cannot be the policy, of G Britain, that any member of the family of Bourbons should reign in America.

I am [etc.].

PART XIV
COMMUNICATIONS FROM URUGUAY

COMMUNICATIONS FROM URUGUAY

1184

*General José Artigas, revolutionary leader of Uruguay, to James Monroe, President of the United States*¹

[TRANSLATION]

PURIFICATION, *September 1, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: I had the honor to communicate, in the first instance, with Mr. Thomas Lloyd Halsey, consul of the United States in these provinces, and I have to congratulate myself on so fortunate an incident. I have tendered to him my respects and all my services; and I will avail myself of this favorable occasion of presenting to your excellency my most cordial respect.

The various events of the revolution have hitherto deprived me of the opportunity of according this duty with my wishes. I pray your excellency to be pleased to accept them, now that I have the honor to offer them to you with the same sincerity that I strive to promote the public weal and the glory of the republic. To their support are all my efforts directed, aided by the sacrifices of thousands of my fellow-citizens. Heaven grant our wishes!

In that event I shall renew to your excellency, still more warmly, the assurance of my cordial regard, and of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be [etc.].

1185

*W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Montevideo, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*²

MONTVIDEO, *April 17, 1821.*

SIR: The preceding is copy of my letter under 29 March, forwarded via R°. J°. in confirmation of the opinion then advanced, a. representation has been made by the *Cabildo & Consulado*, Directed to the King, requesting His M. *not to abandon* the Province: that they were fully satisfied with the Gov. of His M's. actual Repres^t. and felt confident no difficulty could now occur to render such a step necessary.

There is not a doubt but that should it be the determination of the Portuguese Gov. to keep possession of this Territory, the face of it would be so

¹ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 179. The original in Spanish is in MS. Papers Relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces.

² MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I.

changed in twelve months, and would evince a depth of Policy, highly creditable to the General, in as much as it would enable him by fomenting the *Estancias* or large cattle estates to enrich the country and restore it to its former wealth, with tranquillity, thus establish the benefit of remaining under the protection of the Portuguese:

The deputy to the Cortez has sailed: a Grand Ball was given to the General on the 12 instant by the Portuguese resident merchants in this place: the billet of invitation I deem it of note to forward, as it will tend to demonstrate the public feelings of Portuguese subjects in this quarter: the wife of Alvear the disting^d. female Guest: there were upwards of 500 persons present; yet the same observation may be made resp^a. the Creoles of which there were not ten in the room, and only those families imm'y connected with the Gov. or its officers.

I am [etc.].

1186

*W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Montevideo, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MONTVIDEO, April 18, 1821.

SIR: A few days since an order was passed to the Superior officers of the emigrants of B^a. Ayres, directing their detention in this City, in as much as the General was sorry to observe that notwithstanding the declared neutrality he had endeavored to observe his intentions had been misinterpreted and the factions on the B^a. Ay^a. side had supposed him active in assisting Ramirez: that he had consequently determined as a measure of precaution useful to both Countries to require their arrest: and to continue to consider themselves so until further orders: at this moment the Party of Puereydon had entirely obtained the ascendancy in B^a Ay^a. and he had actually taken his passage in a Brig to proceed there: this measure was considered as calculated to blind the generality and make it appear he was considered as inimical as any one of the Federal Gov. has been: this day however an officer has arrived from B^a. Ay^a. with a passport for P. & he leaves this tomorrow: all other officers particularly Sales, Dorrego, Vedia, Quintana, & other federal Chiefs that have been are detained: it was hinted that a war was probable: It is justly conceived that this was, merely as a veil to smoothe the entrance & return of Puereydon:

The letters from Chili state that the *Macedonia* will proceed direct to Rio from Valp^o. from whence she sailed on the 19 ultimo, with a valuable shipment [*sic*] Dollars:

A vessel arrived a few days since from the newly discovered lands off Cape

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I.

Horn & states there were upwards 100 sail vessels this year: of which 45 were under the Amⁿ. flag: 50 British 1 Russⁿ. 50 Gun Ship & a tender: immense quantities [of] skins had been taken.

I am [etc.].

1187

*W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Montevideo, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MONTEVIDEO, July 13, 1821.

SIR: I had the honor to address the departm^t. on the June, via Boston: subsequent to that date, several interesting occurrences have transpired, of a nature highly important to this Province; and tending to elucidate clearly the ulterior policy of the Portuguese Gov. respecting its future fate.

The representations made by the *Cabildo* and *Consulado*, immediately subsequent to the events of the March and remitted thro' the General Le Cor to the King, praying that H. M. would not withdraw the Portuguese force actually stationed in this province, &c. have met the serious attention of H. M's. Gov^t. and previous to the departure of the King for Portugal he issued a decree the spirit of which no doubt emanated from the shrewd intelligence of the General and his Council: This decree embraced various objects.

1. That a Provincial Congress should be immediately convoked, of deputies from this City, & the different villages and districts of the interior, with faculties to determine the fate of the country, and that to effect this the deputies were to be permitted to deliberate freely and without fear, whether this Province sh^d. be annexed to the Portuguese empire, or

2. Whether it would [be] for the interests of the Country that H. M. troops should be withdrawn, the country abandoned to its fate and the people permitted to form their own Government,

3. That in the event of the determination of the inhabitants to become a Province annexed to the Portuguese Empire, the Gov. and people of the Province of B^s. Ay^s. and those more imm^r. in connection with that Province, were to be invited to accede to the said annexation & by a recognition of their independence as a preliminary, compensated for this acquiescence in the tranquil cession of their right to the Portuguese: And for this purpose Dⁿ. Juan Figueredo a Portuguese by birth married in B^s. Ayres, has come from Rio, a passenger in the frigates with the appointment of Consulator & special Agent for the purpose.

The document marked A will explain satisfactorily the nature of the orders respecting this Province, liberal as possible in their tenor but how widely

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I.

different has been their execution. To assist in the furtherance of the object proposed, two frigates were dispatched from Rio for the ostensible purpose of conveying back to that Port, a part of the Troops, should the propositions of the King not be admitted: On these were embarked upwards of 40 of Artigas' officers, and principal satellites including his brother Manuel Artigas Ballejas, and the blood thirsty cutthroat Ortoguez, formerly Governor of this City, notorious in the annals of the Province since the capture of M. Vº. by the Patriot army in 1815, for his unequalled acts of barbarity and rapacity; these men part of a greater number of prisoners made by the Portuguese during the continuance of hostilities, among whom were many respectable young men of family and connections of credit, and whose release had been earnestly entreated by the *Cabildo* at the instance of their families: of these many were embarked perforce as sailors and sent to Europe in the very vessels which convey^d. the King and suite home: and in their lieu those whose vices, whose depravity, and whose thirst of blood when in command made them dreaded nay even abhorred were released at this critical moment and permitted to return, either gained by bribery to take an active part in favor of the Portuguese, either directly or indirectly, or to intimidate the more peaceable part of the community by a pretended hostility towards all those who had taken an active part with or in favor of the Portuguese or who had been any way instrumental in furthering the Portuguese interests. These characters were hardly landed ere they openly, seriously or in jest threatened to revenge them and menaced a confiscation of property if they could once more obtain power or a command by the Portuguese withdrawing their troops in consequence of the inhabitants not acceding to the purposed annexation of the Province to the Brazils.—

On the 26th June the decree No 3 was issued by the General with a view to prepare the minds of the people, to soothe the irritated feelings of the peasantry and cattle breeders, and to evince tho' tardy a disposition to advance, promote and foment the interests of the inhabitants generally but more especially the owners of estates in the country: and to remedy the injuries the hitherto unpunished licentious conduct of the soldiery, under the immediate sanction of their officers, had caused by driving off the cattle from the frontiers into the Portuguese settlement^s, and thus reducing this once fertile and abundant province, particularly in animals, nearly to a desert: and further to serve as a salve to reiterated complaints of the landholders, & wealthier peasants, against the continued abuse practised on them by irregular settlers, who had taken possession of various parts of their estates & in a most unwarrantable manner having no regular place of livelihood sheltered by a wretched hovel, maintained themselves by the plunder and slaughter of every stray animal and at times actively employing themselves in carrying off whole droves, to sell them to the first military despot they could encounter at any price.

Recurring to the immediate theme; the dread of a reiteration of the excesses to which they had been subjected during the Gov. of Artigas & Ortoguez; the total annihilation of all order: and an end of all tranquillity, which notwithstanding the absolute nonfulfillment on the part of the Portuguese of almost every article of the treaty made with the Cabildo when the town was delivered up to them in 1817, had been preserved, and in this item only had been fulfilled, permitting the peacefully disposed to look round and agⁿ. build up the ruined wall: and in some measure place their habitations in order 1. [*sic*] the fear of the threatened persecution of those who had been instrumental in calling in the aid of the Portuguese and surrendering up the country to their plunder under the disguise of protection & a pact of peace, and fair promises! All have tended to cause in those who have aught to lose and whose connections and influence enables them to have weight, an unmanly dread of future evils without suggesting a single expedient of remedy and will eventually influence them to the determination to submit to the Portuguese rather than incur the hazards a contrary resolution will subject them to.

To enable you, Sir, to form a still more correct idea of the system of intrigue by which the inhabitants are reduced to this alternative, I pray your reference to document B containing the order of the King as communicated by the General to y^e Political Gov^r. & Intendant of the Province, Dⁿ. Juan Duran, directing him to form note of instructions for the election of the deputies for the Congress: It was not forwarded as its tenor would lead one to suppose to the Alcaldes, or district magistrates, but delivered to them at the moment they presented themselves in their respective places of meeting with an insinuation to proceed in the act to the election of a deputy without any consultation with the people. Some days, previous however, with a view to ascertain the sentiments of the leading creoles, and other inhabitants, several young and influential creoles, more immediately in the confidence of the government, were requested to attend the General who with apparent frankness told them to sound their countrymen and to endeavor to persuade them to think seriously of recommending the immediate withdrawing of the P. troops and to endeavor to persuade them to adopt the second proposition and once more become independent, presenting them with plausible reasons for such a measure: fully persuaded that these insinuations were sincerely and well meant and proceeded from some real intention to protect them in the effort, &c., the partizans of the liberty of the Province met, and freely discussed the propriety of acceding to so liberal a proposition & began to speak openly of their intention: among others Dⁿ. Carlos Alvear, formerly Director of the United Provinces, who had since his last ineffectual essay against B. A^s. remained a quiet spectator of passing events, commenced an active canvass, and persuaded by many of his partizans conceived his elevation to the Supreme Magistracy feasible.

Not a step passed unnoticed by the Government; the partizans of the liberty of the Province became known: their consequent supposed enmity to the Government manifested: they were caught in the toil: were summoned by the General to an audience and severely reprimanded individually & generally. Amongst the others Alvear did not escape, or any of his friends; all were threatened with a serious and marked proof of displeasure: to Alvear in particular the General observed his surprize that he should pretend to enter the lists in opposition to the Gov. after having received so many instances of attention and friendship. Conceive Sir, the astonishment of the parties who had thus been led to discover their real sentiments and were in a measure completely outwitted by the consummate shrewdness of the Pronuncial [*sic*] Gov. and

During these pretended demonstrations of an intention to leave the Country and still further set aside all doubt, three companies of Reg. no 2 were embarked on the King's vessels in the harbor to be transferred to the frigates in the roadstead: in place of being sent immed^y. on board the frigates they have been detained on board the craft; and there no doubt await the result of the determination of the Congress, to meet on Sunday the 15.

The partizans of the liberty of the Country now ascertained, the real friends of the Portuguese disclosed themselves and were summoned to assemble in the town hall on the 12 inst^t. when the instructions issued by the Intendant were delivered the members individually: the Cabildo as directed assumed to itself the right of representing the people and proceeded without comment to elect the deputies without any consultation or intervention of the people: this proceeding so contrary to the express order of the King: vitiating in its commencement the election was thus determined by political Gov. as a necessary measure to avoid in conformity to the order of the General the collision of parties.

The actual Cabildo consists of Dⁿ. Juan Jose Duran poli. Gov. & Intendant of the Province: & Commander of the Port order San Benito; Biangui actually Collector of the Custom house; Juan Mendez a merchant, order of chas^t., *idem*; Jose Alvares, *idem*.

[?] members of the Audience & others of inferior note. Of the whole body, twelve in number, four were members of the Cabildo which called in the aid of the Portuguese and four are decorated with orders received from the King.

From the election of this Body resulted, a majority in favor of the above-mentioned Dⁿ. J. J. Duran, a decided partizan of the Portuguese.

D^r. Laranaga, a priest and Curate of the Principal or Matrix Church, with superintendant power over all the Curacies of the Province, a man of science, a great naturalist liberal in his sentiments, a friend to his country, shrewd and intelligent yet addicted to the Portuguese and has accepted an order of nobility. Dⁿ. Thomas Garcia one of the greatest land and house holders in the Country having a territory of full 30 leagues in a strait line and upwards

of 150 slaves, a friend of all parties: he has maintained his influence since the revolution with whatever party reigned has the most influential and powerful & wealthy friends in the Country, is considered a man of strong mind, bigoted, well read, and since the expulsion of the Spaniards by the Patriots in the year 1814/15 has been placed at the head of the Patriot party, altho' it is query to which he inclines most: in his house, *Ortoquez*, dreaded & shunned by all, actually resides.

D^a. Pio Ger^o. Biangui, brother of the collector Notary of the City, Solicitor to the Cabildo, a determ^d. friend of the Portuguese.

These are the deputies for the City; the Cabildo were proceeding to the election of the deputies for the Congress when it was suggested by a member, a friend of the liberty of the Country, that Frutose Rivero (formerly second in command to Artigas and from whom the Portuguese experienced a more decided and effectual opposition than from any other chief under Artigas) would be a suitable person to name to represent that part of the Country over which the Cabildo had an immediate controul and had assumed the right to elect its deputy. Since the surrender of the country to the Portuguese he has remained on his estates, dedicated to the breeding of cattle, that by electing him, formerly well known to detest all persons wearing a long coat, as he considered them as natural enemies of the *gauchas* or peasantry, among whom he was a leading character whom they conceive will now vote with the majority from a wish to preserve his actual estates and tranquillity, the Cabildo would in a measure by thus compromising him be shielded from his resentment and that of the peasantry whose confidence he enjoys.

From the preceding it may naturally be inferred that the sentiments of the deputies chosen were well known long previous to their election: with little variation from the causes already stated, I trust sufficiently, they being more or less compromis^d. the result of the debates is already as well ascertained as if made and the annexation of this Province to the Portuguese Gov. I may venture say fully determined.

In the morning the members will meet and present their respective powers: a mere form and on Monday the Congress will be open.

The reflecting part of the community however deeply resent this stretch of power and altho' absolutely frightened in[to] silence by impending & a conscious weakness and want of means to resist, still there are [those who] dare to say, the time will come, when the Portuguese may regret, this forced proceeding violating every principle of liberty and every article of the pact with them: and contest openly the right of the Cabildo to deliver up this country to the Portuguese or to assume to itself the rights and privileges of the people in this most unauthorised manner when their very existence as members of the Cabildo originates in force and is dependent [on] their immediate and blind submission to the Portuguese mandates. How far the Portuguese may be acting in this in a blind obedience to higher determina-

tions is as yet a query. I have been favored with the perusal of a letter in Spanish of a very Singular tenor written from Rio Janeiro Subsequent to the departure of the frigates dated the 18 June; it contains the assurance of a great change ere long; that the Individual has been appointed a resident diplomatic agent by the Court of Spain at this place; in which he would, time fitting, present himself; the ostensible object of this agency [is] to protect the European Spaniards, residents, in this [*sic*] who had been most cruelly outraged and many banished hence by the General or Sent under arrest to Rio: that the party to whom the letter is written may rest certain that the Portuguese are now *merely blind instruments*, towards the *Great ends* proposed by this Writer and his partizans, and are only furthering the *views of Spain*; that every confidence may now be placed in Ortoguez and all his coadjutors, who are absolutely Secured, and in their interest, say of the Writer of the letter and will in due time Shew their power: that party now must maintain a most watchful Silence & strict Secresy and not despair at Seeing things apparently go *Almost the reverse* of what *might appear likely to tend to the end*; that all would go right; that General had been deeply censured for his conduct towards the European Spaniards and as a proof would in future be more kind & humane; that he *had many* and most inveterate enemies at court; that the veil would Soon be removed; that he deferred his departure under the pretext of not being sufficiently provided with the articles Requisite to appear in a manner becoming his Station that he had taken due precaution & only waited a letter from hence advises the state of his friends.

I state the contents of this letter as my memory Serves; not having been permitted to take a copy; the individual is a man of property and was named by the King of Spain Some four years since President of the audience in Chili; he is well known and his letter merits every attention and evidently designates some under plot which has not met the public eye, or will it, if I am to judge from the precautions taken until its operation will be effectual Sunday evening.

A head mind has detained the Ship; until tomorrow morning. I hasten to State that the members met this morning and presented their respective powers and examd. the notes:

As I had foreseen the troops are absolutely relanding this afternoon: and this occurrence more strongly than ever convinces the unbiassed mind that whole proceeding has been a *coup de théâtre* which has had its effect.

I have not omitted under all circumstances making every possible use of the Situation in which I am placed, to insinuate to various persons connected with the Cabildo and deputies that in the event of decreeing the annexation of this Province to the Portuguese empire it should be under Special agreements and Solemn engagements on their part that this Should be considered a free Port, and exempt from any immediate controul of the British or any

unjust or discriminating duties in favor of any nation: That the vessels of all nations Should be admitted to trade on an equal footing and, pay the same duties on their imports and Exports; this will favor the trade of our Citizens, particularly if the clause that all India & China Goods can be freely imported many vessels which are excluded at Rio.

Several American vessels have lately arrived with Cargoes of some value consisting of domestic articles principally. Some few wines & Silks:

I have the honor to transmit the latest note of intelligence from Chili by which it appears that Lord Cochrane continued to detain British Vessels. It may be justly observed that the crooked policy of England in respect to Blockades, has eventually recoiled on herself from a quarter little expected; and in Serious manner on Several of Her Subjects, and has at last called forth a train of modifications rather mortifying.

I have the pleasure to State that my relations continue on the most friendly footing with the General and Government: a few days Since on representing that an American vessel was Supposed to be in distress off the Coast every possible aid was immediately furnished me of anchors, a pilot man from the admiral's vessels, with his barge, & a Government Schooner if required; to convey any extra existence [assistance?].

There are no letters from the department by any of the vessels.

I am [etc.].

1188

W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Montevideo, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States¹

MONTEVIDEO, *July 20, 1821.*

SIR: I had the honor to address the department on the 15² Instant for the Ship *Henry* of Philada.: advising the meeting of a Congress in this City composed of 18 members from the different districts of the Province in consequence of an order from the King of Portugal communicated thro' the General Le Cor to the Intendant & Political Governor of the Province, according to the tenor of which the inhabitants were to elect members for a Congress to meet & determine whether this Province Should become annexed to the Brazils or the Portuguese troops withdrawn & the Province once more left to its own Guidance.

Nothing definitive has yet been determined on: the General opinion however, is, that the Congress from the means resorted to, & in consequence of which the members are either actually in the Employ of the Portuguese

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I.

² Apparently an error for 13, which see above, pt. XIV, doc. 1187

Government. or connected in a manner, with its ruin will decide for the annexation of the Province. This measure will not be in accord in any wise with the will of the people! is forced! and the effect of intrigue! and measures highly offensive to the real Patriots! yet under circum. calculated to Secure tranquillity, a Settled Govt., and the future prosperity of the Province.

I am under impression this will not be duly forwarded yet venture this much for the immediate information of the Government referring to the despatch per the *Henry*, with Every respect and consideration.

I remain [etc.].

1189

*W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Montevideo, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MONTEVIDEO, *September 14, 1821.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of a letter written to me by Mr. Daniel Brent of the Department of State under date 27 April, forwarding duplicate of the Patent Granted me by the President Madison, appointing me Consul of the United States for Montevideo and its dependencies, accompanied by the certificate of the Honble. head of the Department declaring that there had been no revocation of the original:

I immediately addressed the note, translation of which marked No 1 is herewith, to the Secretary of State, Acting Colonel Miguel Antonio Flangini, who three days Since returned me the answer No 2 which I have the honor to hand enclosed. I presented the note & the Patent personally, and was immediately invited to meet the Authorities of the Province, at a dinner given by the General the Ensuing day, in celebration of the 24 August. A *written* invitation the Ensuing day, addressed to me as *Consul of the United States* for Montevideo and its dependencies was sent at the same hour that the other Invitations were distributed: I then only Conceived it becoming to appear in the Uniform appropriate and received every attention and mark of respect being placed as a distinguished Guest in Front of the General between the Admiral and Brigadier General of Cavalry. Pardon this minuteness: it is with a view to enable the head of the department to Judge of the *Policy* which actuates this Government!! I could not however but observe that there appeared some disappointment on the part of the General, and the tenor of the letter received from the Secretary is a proof! with due diffidence I presume to call the particular attention, of the head of the department, to its tenor, as well as to that of the documents herewith, by which the Important changes, in the political relations of this country, are declared; and fur-

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I.

ther with equal diffidence to Suggest, whether under such a change, and the Province having become a *State*, and annexed to the Portuguese Empire, (if it should not be in contradiction to the views of the Government,) that the Patent of this Consulate could be so altered as to do away the Impressions caused on the mind of the General and the local authorities, by the objectionable clause directed to the Government of Buenos Ayres, which from the natural anterior (?) Jealousy of this City and the people of this Province to those of Buenos Ayres is now augmented to a degree of rivalry which will not be easily extinguished especially if the Portuguese authorities fulfil the arrangement entered into; and the Country as it is generally expected made to prosper from the liberality of its commercial regulations.

I feel persuaded it has been a rather mortifying circumstance to the Baron De Laguna, to have found this clause and the tenor of the letter admitting me to exercise the functions *de facto* of Consul, sufficiently explains as I have already Stated his feelings as well as those of the Colonel Flangini. I am not Sufficiently *au fait* in Diplomacy to know whether ye nomination of a Consul is made to pass thro' the Channel of the Minister resident of the Jurisdiction to which he is appointed.

In conversation with the Baron de Laguna, (conceiving it to be politic to avoid putting to paper any discussion on the Subject), I observed "that at the time the Patent was issued Buenos Ayres presumed, nay had assumed a territorial Jurisdiction and influence, and indeed had maintained an army and Governors in various dependencies of the Consulate, to wit, Maldonado, & Colonia and even in points Still nearer Montevideo, and that the army of Bs. Ays. had complete possession of the Province as his Excellency knew for some Mos. in 1815 and that it consequently behoved the President to Secure Protection to the Consul equally from Buenos Ayres as from the other local authorities that might have existed at the time, and I presumed the Actual Honl. Secretary of State acting under A knowledge of the declared motives of the occupation of this Province by the troops of H. M. F. Majesty of Portugal and probably not officially advised of any change in the political relations of the Country of the Portuguese Government in its intents, had conceived (on application made to the department for a duplicate of the Patent of the tenor of which I was then ignorant,) that, accompanied by the certificate annexed to it, it would be equally available as a New Patent."

It did not appear to Satisfy the General.

The Portuguese to all intents & purposes are the actual & Real Sovereigns of the Country their troops occupy every military point: their coin, Gold, Silver & Copper until their arrival unknown, circulates and is Current in Every place. The King's Portrait receives every mark of obeisance whether in the theatre or the Cabildo and the Cries of Long live the King of Portugal & now Cisplatina alone resounds.

The General doubtless casts a longing eye to Something like a recognition of the legitimacy of the Intrusion of the Portuguese into this Territory.

Under every point of view however with becoming diffidence I again presume to Suggest, that there should be some change in the Patent: as by the objectionable clause it appears directed to the Authorities of Buenos Ayres: and untill the Capture of this place by the troops of Buenos Ayres in 1815, under Carlos Alvear, B.Ays. never could in justice pretend to a sovereignty maintained by a Captain General of the King of Spain and Supported by Spanish troops.

I have Studiously avoided any compromise, that would hereafter render me as Consul of the U. States unpopular with the Patriot party and altho' I conceive there is no reason to fear a change, under present circumstances yet it appeared the wisest part for me to take: But under any change, I Cannot but consider my having no other document to present as likely to Subject me to difficulty.

With due Submission to the Superior judgement, and Known wisdom Of the head of the Departm. of State I have done what appeared to be a duty in placing these circumstances under his consideration.

A Still more pleasing duty remains for me to fulfill; to offer my most Sincere and most grateful thanks for this distinguished favor & continuance of confidence on the part of the Government of my Country, and to Solicit, the Honble. head of the department to be pleased to make Known to the President, how deeply Sensible I feel for so flattering a distinction when there are so many worthier Citizens to fill this Consulate.

Moreover I cannot withhold my acknowledgements to you personally Sir, for the very prompt attention you were pleased to Grant to the request of my honored father, to have the duplicate of the original Patent forwarded; and pray you will permit me to assure You, Sir, that I shall Ever be ready to attend to whatever you may deem me worthy to be thought useful in effecting, towards advancing the Interests of my Country in this or Elsewhere.

I have the honor [etc.].

1190

*Joshua Bond, United States Consul at Montevideo, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MONTEVIDEO, February 20, 1829.

SIR: I have the honour to announce to you my return to this city on the 25th of January last from New York in conformity with the permission of the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I. In this volume no communications subsequent to Miller's dispatch of September 14, 1821 (see above, pt. XIV, doc. 1189), occur until about the middle of 1825, between which time and the date of this dispatch of February 20, 1829, are a few dispatches signed by Joshua Bond occupied with a discussion of matters of transitory interest only, most of them relating to difficulties of United States vessels due to the blockade consequent upon the war between Brazil and Argentina over the possession of Uruguay, which, as shown in this of February 20, 1829, resulted in the Independence of Uruguay.

Department of State limiting my leave of absence till the autumn of the past year.

You have doubtless been informed of the Convention concluded at Rio de Janeiro on the 28th of August last between the Brazilian & Buenos Ayrean governments, by which this province was erected into an Independent State. On my arrival, I found that, in conformity with the Treaty, representatives had been duly chosen throughout the province who had assembled at the village of Canelones, where, after being organized, they proceeded to the formation of a provisional government for the new state, which they named the *State of Montevideo*, and elected General Don José Rondeau, (who bore a distinguished part in the early revolution of this country) to fill the Executive Department under the title of Governour and Captain General. The functions of the Brazilian authorities ceased in this city on the ninth of December, of which official notice was given, and the new governour soon after formed a cabinet of three ministers, viz: of Interiour & Foreign Relations, of War & Marine, and of Finance. The Representative assembly has been and is yet employed in arranging the affairs of the State and will shortly proceed to the discussion of a Constitution, the form of which is soon to be reported by the Committee named for that purpose & which will be republican & liberal, upon the adoption of which a re-election will take place, when it is most probable the same persons will be chosen.

The Treaty has been, so far, most scrupulously performed by the Brazilian government, all their troops having been withdrawn from the province except 1500 men who remain in this city, but who are to be embarked by the 4th of April next, agreeably to an article of the Treaty. The Buenos Ayrean contingent of 1500 men, which was to remain in the province by the same article for 4 months after the organization of the government, was, in consequence of the recent events in Buenos Ayres, withdrawn to assist in the support of the revolutionary party.

Soon after my arrival I waited on the Minister of Foreign Relations and requested permission to exercise my official functions until I could procure new credentials corresponding to the recent political changes, my present commission being addressed to the Emperour of Brazil, which was cheerfully complied with. I therefore respectfully solicit the Government to furnish me with other credentials addressed to the existing government of the State of Montevideo.

Under the late government the cargoes of American vessels, in common with those of other nations not having commercial treaties with Brazil, paid a duty of 24 per cent, more favoured nations only paying 15 per cent; but as these distinctions ceased with the change of affairs, the productions of all countries are now, by an order of the new government, only subject to a duty of 15 per centum.

In consequence of its having become necessary for me to make occasional

visits to an estate in the country, I have not yet thought proper to resume the exercise of the notarial and commercial duties of the station, but have continued, with permission of this government, my brother, Dr. James Bond, in the exercise of these functions as Acting Consul, in which capacity he has uniformly conducted himself to my satisfaction, and to which act I respectfully request the assent of the Government of the United States, it being understood that I am to be considered always responsible for his conduct.

I have the honour [etc.].

1191

*Joshua Bond, United States Consul at Montevideo, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States*¹

MONTEVIDEO, *November 20, 1830.*

SIR: I have the honor of informing you that a Constitution for this State has been finally adopted and a "permanent" Government established according to the provisions of that Instrument.

The constituent Assembly which was elected in conformity with the Preliminary Convention of Peace, concluded at Rio de Janeiro in August, 1828, between Brazil and Buenos Aires, after organizing a Provisional Government, occupied itself in framing a Constitution and agreed on one in the Month of September, 1829, which was submitted to the two contracting powers for their approbation, as prescribed by the Convention, but in consequence of the unsettled state of Buenos Aires, it was not approved until May last, when it was examined and formally sanctioned at Rio de Janeiro, by Commissioners appointed by the respective Governments. The ceremony of Swearing to the Constitution took place throughout the State on the 18th of July, and an election for a new Legislature was immediately ordered.

The title adopted for the State is "The Oriental State of the Uruguay", (*Estado Oriental del Uruguay*); the Government is Republican and elective, and is vested in a Legislature composed of two branches and a President elected every four years, on joint ballot of the two chambers, with nearly the same powers and restrictions as are contained in the Constitutions of the various States of the United States. The most remarkable difference is, that a joint "permanent" Committee is to be appointed, whose duty it is, during the recess of the General Assembly, to watch over the observance of the Constitution and the laws, and the Constitution also provides for the election of a "Junta Economico-Administrativa" in each department, the object of which is to promote agriculture and other branches of industry; to watch over the

¹ MS. Consular Letters, Montevideo, I.

education of the department, and preserve individual rights and propose to the Legislature any improvements it may deem useful.

The first Assembly elected under the Constitution was organized in October, and on the 25th of that month, General Fructuoso Rivera was elected President of the State, by a considerable majority, and on the 13th of this month, was Sworn into office.

Previous to the revolution, the population of the province was estimated at 100,000; it is believed that at this time, it does not exceed 50,000 inhabitants, scattered over a territory much greater in extent than the State of Virginia. The revenue of the State is derived almost wholly, from the duties on foreign importations, collected at this port; the expenditures of the Government considerably exceed the receipts. The State deems it expedient to maintain a large military force, in proportion to the population, the expenses of which consume about three fourths of the revenue. The people throughout the state show a disposition to return to the peaceful occupations of civil life, but it is impossible to foresee how long the tranquillity of the Country will be preserved.

I have the honor [etc.].

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
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